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ABSTRACT
Medicine plays an important role in human life. It may 
serve to enhance or re-establish the health of an 
individual, and may shape the extent to which he or she 
can participate in the essentials of life. Thus, it may 
predict or assist in the level of self-determination 
which a person may exercise. It is argued here, 
however, that self-determination is also an important 
value within the medical act, and that - albeit 
unwittingly - medicine and its practitioners may also 
effectively reduce the individual's capacity for autonomy 
by withholding information which is important for the 
patient's capacity to make knowing and free decisions.
Thus, an attempt is made to establish that there 
is, or should be recognised, a right to information - a 
right which belongs to the patient and which is a 
precursor of the doctor's corresponding duty to 
disclose. Indeed, it is argued that such a right is 
currently recognised as having importance. However, 
from the perspective of the individual, if this right is 
to have concrete meaning, it must be capable of effective 
vindication.
Having sought to establish the value of the right, 
and its pervasiveness, certain special categories of 
patient are considered in more depth - namely, the 
mentally ill, the mentally handicapped and children - 
since it is conceded that, if the right described does
not apply to these groups then its very universality is 
threatened and its standing in the hierarchy of important 
interests may be minimised. It is concluded, however, 
that the law at present does not deny the value of 
autonomy in medicine even in respect of these groups who 
might otherwise be thought to be vulnerable to denial of 
autonomy. A comparison of different legal systems shows 
fluctuations in the extent to which protection is 
offered, but it is not doubted that value is placed on 
extending this right to these groups. It is asserted, 
therefore, that the law does not and need not approach 
even these most complex situations without bearing in 
mind the crucial significance of the right and demanding 
considerable justification for its denial.
Whilst acknowledging that many disputes are 
settled outside of courts of law, it is argued that the 
role of the law cannot be underestimated, since even out 
of court settlements are generally made only after known 
legal criteria are met. Thus, it is claimed, if the 
patient's right is to be acknowledged then it should be 
given a legally recognised status. Moreover, it is 
crucial that an appropriate form of action is made 
available for vindication of any right.
Thus, the thesis goes on to examine the major 
legal actions available - assault, negligence and no 
fault liability. Comparisons are made with the systems 
and decision-making approaches of courts in Scotland, 
England and the United States, with some reference also
to Canadian judgements. Particular account is also
taken of the Accident Compensation Scheme in New
Zealand. It is concluded that current legal approaches
are relatively unsatisfactory in terms of their capacity 
to give precedence to the rights of patients. 
Dissatisfaction with these systems stems from two sources 
in some cases (e.g. negligence) the pattern of 
decision-making described is essentially inimical to the 
demand for information disclosure. In others (e.g. 
assault and the no fault system in New Zealand) there are 
structural difficulties which ensure that rights 
vindication cannot uniformly be achieved.
The thesis concludes by tentatively hypothesising 
alternative strategies for the law, which would permit
the serious attention, which it is argued is merited by
\
this right, to be extended to it. It is suggested that 
there are a number of possibilities available if the law 
is prepared to acknowledge the value of the right
described. In Scots law, the actio injuriarum may
provide a possible source of redress, whilst in English 
law the uncertainties surrounding the manner in which 
tort law has developed make it more difficult to envisage 
radical reform. However, the negligence action remains 
a possible source of redress for grievances a) if the
purely professional aspects of the physician's role are 
separated from the moral obligations imposed on any
professional to respect the integrity of his or her
client, thus permitting decision-making which reflects
v
the source of the harm rather than concentrating on the 
technical conduct of therapy, and b) if the law concedes 
the value of self-determination in medicine
PREFACE
The hypothesis that there is a fundamental right to 
information disclosure in medicine, as an aspect of the 
more general right of self-determination, is tested 
primarily by reference to the sane, adult human being. 
Thus, except where otherwise stated, he or she will be 
taken to be the paradigmatic patient. It is
acknowledged, however, that other groups have importance 
for the claim that such a right should be vindicated. 
Thus, consideration is made of some of the special 
situations in which the right may be challenged. The 
groups selected comprise children, the mentally ill and 
the mentally handicapped.
The writer has deliberately excluded consideration 
of the unconscious patient, since, it is submitted, the 
characteristics and difficulties which apply in this 
situation can be distinguished from those which apply in 
the cases considered. This is not to imply that the 
unconscious patient does not equally have access to the 
right, but merely to indicate that in this situation the 
immediate considerations which apply relate rather to 
necessity than directly to the right here described. In 
any event, the legal position of the unconscious patient 
seems relatively uncomplicated, particularly where 
therapy is life-preserving. Accordingly, it was not
felt to be essential to include specific consideration of
\ •
the position of the unconscious patient, partly on
grounds of space, but particularly because the aim of the 
thesis is to define the right and to consider the
efficacy or sensitivity of legal systems in respect of 
its vindication. In seeking to present an analysis of 
the extent to which the law is capable of protecting this 
fundamental right, the assertion that the law both should 
and can do so is taken to apply to all groups of
patients. The groups selected for special consideration 
were chosen because of the peculiar complexities of their 
situation within the context of an autonomy based
analysis.
The discussion begins with a consideration of the 
role of medicine. Chapter 1, therefore, considers the
potential of medicine both to enhance and to delimit the 
autonomy of the individual, and introduces the question
of patients' rights. Chapter 2 goes on to consider the 
question of information disclosure and consent to
treatment in more depth, and seeks to establish and
describe a right to information disclosure which, it is^ 
argued, should be given legal recognition. However, the
chapter concludes that, even if the right described djs
taken as having value, its vindication depends on the 
capacity or willingness of legal process to recognise
infringement as a legally protected interest.
Moreoever, whilst it is clear that the right is currently 
accepted by law as having significance, legal process
must also make available an effective mechanism for its 
vindication, otherwise the right has merely symbolic or
limited value.
The mechanisms available to the aggrieved patient 
have changed over the years, and the next section of the 
discussion goes on to consider a range of available legal 
responses, and tests their efficacy as systems of redress 
against the underlying assumption of the importance of 
the right. Chapter 3, therefore, considers the now 
largely obsolete option of raising an action based in 
assault, and concludes that, whilst showing overt promise 
as a means of concentrating primarily on the rights of 
patients, it is inherently flawed, since it's capacity to 
recognise non-physical invasions of integrity is 
apparently limited. Chapter 4 considers the negligence 
action in general, since this is now the most common, and 
in some cases, the only avenue of redress available to 
the patient.
The negligence action, it is concluded , is, by 
its very nature, not ideally suited to the vindication of 
individual rights, since it depends on descriptions of 
duties, and rationalises behaviour in a theoretically 
objective manner which does not lend itself to the 
outright vindication of rights. In Chapter 5, emphasis 
is placed on the application of the negligence action in 
respect of information disclosure. In particular, 
consideration is made of the development of consent 
doctrines in the United States. It is argued that, even 
in those States which adopt the 'prudent patient' 
approach, use of negligence rather than an alternative
analysis distances the matter of concern from the 
individual patient and his or her rights in a way which 
is unsatisfactory for those who would argue for the 
direct application of rights to information disclosure as 
a prerequisite of real consent. In Chapter 6, the 
situation in the United Kingdom is reviewed, and it is 
concluded that British Courts have traditionally shown
considerable deference to the professional test when
\
considering medical behaviour. Moroever, it is argued 
that the flaws in negligence analysis are compounded by 
the importation of extra-legal factors into 
decision-making. Without alteration in judicial
attitudes, and unless the right at issue is given 
priority, it is. therefore, concluded that the
application of the negligence action in British Courts is 
inimical to recognition of the right described.
Although assault and negligence remain the two 
most obvious legal processes available to the patient, at 
least one jurisdicition - New Zealand - has instituted a 
radical and novel system of liability which is
effectively designed both to recognise the involvement of 
the community with all of those who are disabled, and to 
provide some form of redress and rehabilitation in the 
event of damage. The system is therefore reviewed in 
some detail in order to assess whether or not it provides 
a framework which would be more appropriate in medical 
cases in general and information disclosure cases in 
particular. It is concluded that, although there seems
x
to be a reluctance to equate medical accident or 
negligence with 'medical misadventure' (the qualifying 
criterion), nonetheless this depends on the attitudes of 
decision-makers. and can therefore be modified. 
However, in respect of failure to disclose sufficient 
information, the system offers no incentive to make 
disclosure, and indeed cannot accommodate the provision 
of redress where the damage caused amounts to an insult 
to integrity rather than physical damage. The scheme 
is, therefore, unsuited to the vindication of the right 
here described.
In Chapter 8, the discussion moves on to consider 
the extent to which the right may be said to be generally 
applicable, since the fact that legal process to date 
seems to deal with it relatively unsatisfactorily, may be 
less significant if the right in fact is only of limited 
application. Thus, special groups - children, the 
mentally ill and the mentally handicapped - are 
considered in some depth, in order to assess whether the 
right either could or should be extended to them. If it 
is conceded that the right is of major significance, then 
their exclusion would both deny them autonomy enhancing 
information and would seriously affect the extent to 
which the right can be taken seriously. It is concluded 
that the law already is prepared to extend the right to 
cover at least some members of these groups, and that 
accepting its importance would further extend its 
application.
In Chapter 9 a brief assessment is made of the 
capacity of the law to develop sufficiently to take 
account of the primacy of self-determination in the 
medical enterprise. It is concluded that overt and 
unequivocal protection of the right is necessary in order 
that legal process can incorporate its vindication. 
This can be achieved either by the use, for example in 
Scots Law of the actio injuriarum, or - perhaps more 
simply - by adopting a distinction between the technical 
aspects of the physician's role and the moral aspects. 
Whilst good medical practice would ideally draw no such 
distinction, the law may be required to do so when 
assessing matters of information disclosure, which 
supersede the technical and guarantee the morality of the 
medical act.
INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER 1
Over the last few decades, the practices, claims and 
aspirations of orthodox medicine have come under scrutiny 
as never before.[1] The individual doctor is seen less
as a favoured friend and a devoted healer, and more as a
specialist participant in a system whose impressive
battery of weapons will serve the health of the
world.[2] Orthodox medicine has a wide variety of
sophisticated tools - routinely paraded before an
awestruck public - with which to decide who is ill, to 
provide diagnosis and prognosis and to cure (or at least 
alleviate) many of these conditions. Of course, nothing 
is perfect and perhaps not every illness can be cured,
but medicine can at least make the symptoms less 
difficult to cope with.
Moreover, the rapid growth of associated 
industries - notably the pharmaceutical industry - has 
also changed the face of medicine.[3] Physician-like 
uncertainty and combined consideration of a given
problem, have shifted to the apparent clinical certainty 
of drugs, tubes and sophisticated equipment. As medicine 
and its related industries became more and more subtle in 
their capacity to assess the mechanics of ill health, so 
the cures and the palliatives became more specifically 
targeted, more chemically refined. Medicine became more
1
than an 'art' (or perhaps less than one) - it became a 
science, technically based, technologically equipped and 
distanced in terms of knowledge, understanding and 
comprehension from the public who became increasingly 
baffled, but nonetheless impressed by its 
sophistication.
Moreover, orthodox medicine in its struggle for 
professionalism, notably throughout the nineteenth 
century, significantly affected many aspects of the life 
of every citizen. It is widely believed, for example, 
that the rise of professionalism in medicine, made a
significant, if not determinative, impact on laws 
relating to abortion.[4] Orthodox medicine played a 
major role in the downgrading of what is now known as 
'alternative' medicine,[5] with the implication that it 
is fringe medicine - not the real thing at all. But, 
perhaps even more significantly, orthodox medicine seemed 
to have adopted a particular posture - namely 
interventionist rather than preventive. This trend has 
not been substantially reversed, ensuring (or at least 
contributing to the fact) that the vast majority of 
people in countries with orthodox medicine turn to it to 
cure or alleviate illness rather than to prevent it. In
this way, and perhaps partially for this reason, the
panoply of medical skills is significantly weighted 
towards sophisticated diagnostic techniques, and 
expensive high technology equipment, and medicine has
looked to the pharmaceutical industry to provide many of
2
its cures and palliatives.[6]
These points are significant within the context of 
this discussion, since it will be necessary to conclude 
that without challenging the absolute 'good' of orthodox 
medicine, without challenging the concepts of health and 
illness, and without a healthy scepticism of orthodox 
medicine's health care monopoly, then autonomy reducing 
practices may more readily be justified. Moreover, the 
influence of the technical nature of much of modern 
medicine should not be underestimated as a factor in at 
least some of the problems currently confronting the 
doctor/patient relationship in many countries. In 
particular, the increasing sophistication of medicine may 
cause communication problems between doctors and patients.
In those so-called developed countries in which 
orthodox medicine has a virtual monopoly of health care, 
the phenomenon of challenge through complaint or 
litigation is playing an increasing role.[7] The doctor 
in some jurisdictions may find him or herself constantly 
afraid of legal challenge whilst the patient may find 
that his or her status as patient can minimise personal 
autonomy. If, as is routinely said, trust is essential 
to a 'good' relationship between doctor and patient then 
a 'good' medical act can only follow Where such trust 
genuinely exists.[8] Indeed, one of the major reasons to 
fear the ‘American disease' of litigation explosion is 
precisely that its impact on the beneficent relationship 
between doctor and patient is so dramatic as effectively
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to reduce the potential for trust, and therefore for a 
'good1 medical act, which should be the aim of both 
parties to the interaction. Kennedy,[9] amongst others, 
has criticised what he calls the engineer/scientist model 
of medicine, seeing it as both personally unsatisfactory 
for the patient (perhaps also for the doctor) and 
therapeutically of limited value. What is claimed here 
is that the nature of the medical enterprise is greater 
than merely its technological capacity, and extends into 
more personal and less easily measured realms of morality 
- in particular respect for persons.[10] Achieving a 
level of trust in any relationship depends on respect 
between the parties, and whereas the patient routinely 
respects at least the technical skills of the physician 
(otherwise why seek him or her out), respect must also be 
shown by the doctor to the patient.
Viewed in this way, medicine is not simply an 
exercise of purely clinical skills. It transcends the 
technical to reach the level of morality by the sharing 
of respect. Indeed, medicine has long been concerned 
with questions of ethics, and has long shown a commitment 
to morality in dealing with the patient - however 
incomplete it might be seen by some as being. Moreover, 
much of this commitment relates to recognition of the 
need to view the patient as an autonomous human being, 
with rights and interests which are identifiable 
independently of medicine. Recent codes of practice, for 
example those promulgated by the World Medical
4
Association.[11] have explicitly dealt with the human 
subject in terms which leave no doubt as to the status to 
be accorded to the patient. Although this commitment is 
traditionally more clear in cases where the likely nature 
of the interaction is experimental.[12] it remains sound 
and appropriate in whatever situation the doctor 
exercises his or her professional skills.
Medicine's response to its patients is not merely 
an academic question, since at one time or another (and 
in some cases frequently) each of us will have some 
contact with orthodox medicine. Indeed the increased 
longevity to which many people in the developed world can 
aspire, will likely have a significant effect on our 
experience of medicine. This is primarily because 
whatever our lif e-expectancy - age brings with it 
apparently inevitable problems. High technology may be
able to provide pain relief for the chronic conditions
associated with the elderly, such as arthritis, but it
seems neither able to prevent nor cure it. Given the 
monopoly which orthodox medicine has in health care, even 
pain relief for the chronically ill will generally be
sought through contact with orthodox medicine. The 
increasing number of elderly in the community is likely 
therefore to mean that - as a community of nations - the 
per capita contact with medicine will increase.
A substantial number of prescriptions are issed in 
the United Kingdom each year.(13] There is no obvious 
reason to think that this number is decreasing, and
5
indeed measures have recently been taken to attempt to 
limit the drug bill in the National Health Service. [ 14] 
This means that, despite the claim that a substantial 
proportion of illness is self-limiting,[15] many more 
consultations result in the issuing of a 
prescription.[16]
Moreover, increased media attention, increased 
publicity by doctors themselves and the political capital 
which can be made by being ahead in the race for better 
cures, more exciting surgical techniques, control over 
life and death and so on, meant that medicine was 
constantly paraded before the public in dress uniform. 
Its successes were trumpeted - its failures often 
ignored. This apparent imbalance may have represented no 
more than a desire to view only the positive, perhaps for 
a variety of reasons, but it also resulted, whatever its 
motivation, in an exaggerated and potentially problematic 
perception of medicine as something which is not only 
always good and well-motivated, but also always 
successful, or at least always showing enterprise, 
awe-inspiring skills and an understanding which goes 
beyond that which could be expected of ordinary 
mortals. The current trend of parading medicine's 
failures has further dramatised the practice and 
capabilities of medicine in a manner which is scarcely 
helpful.[17]
This proliferation of claims about orthodox 
medicine, and therefore by implication about the doctor.
6
may result in a number of phenomena, many of which are 
inimical to the morally good practice of medicine. The 
patient may become humble, undemanding and uninvolved 
with his or her treatment. Indeed it has been said that:
Although scholars have proposed various 
models to describe or prescribe the 
distribution of power within the doctor 
patient relationship, for a number of years 
one view dominated professional ideology and 
customary practice. Under that view, the 
patient was seen as making only one key 
decision, to place herself in a given 
doctor's care. thereby delegating all 
subsequent authority to the doctor. Such a 
model assumed that the patient lacked the 
technical ability to make medical decisions 
and their expertise justified the doctors 
making decisions on the patients' behalf.[18]
Since much treatment is enhanced by the active mental 
co-operation of the patient (indeed it is now becoming 
part of accepted therapy that the positive involvement of 
the patient can be beneficial),[19] patient participation 
is seen as very significant, but is unlikely to be 
achieved in a relationship between a masterful doctor and 
a cowed patient. Further, the doctor may increasingly 
come to regard his or her skills as so far removed from 
the ordinary patient's understanding and experience as to 
forget that the use of these skills results in human and 
not solely technical consequences. The former of these 
the patient not only can understand but also must live 
with.
\
The technical revolution has also had further 
significant implications for doctors and patients. As
7
the gap in technical skills widens, so the difficulties 
of communication inevitably increase.[20] Equally, 
however, the expectations of the patient are increased, 
resulting in disaffection with the medical act which does 
not succeed - a disaffection which is likely to be all 
the greater if not canvassed in advance as a 
possibility. In other words, communication may seem 
paradoxically to have become more difficult and yet more 
significant. This significance is, however, not just 
moral. Patients may be more impressed by the panoply of 
medical technology, but citizens in general are equally 
more aware of their civil rights. Challenge can lead to 
hostility, and yet is more likely in a rights conscious 
community. Moreover, it is more likely where 
explanations, communication and discussion are sparse or 
absent.
This is not, however, to suggest that the exercise 
of purely technical skills is not highly important. 
Indeed, perceived failure to exercise professional skills 
properly remains the major source of challenge in 
medicine, as in other disciplines. However, the 
expectations generated by the claims of orthodox medicine 
are merely one set of expectations which the patient may 
have. Rights consciousness also raises expectations of 
involvement and of dialogue, and the fact that it is the 
patient and not the physician whose health is in issue, 
raises the expectation that the patient will or should be 
intimately involved in his or her therapy.
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Moreover, medicine as currently practised, is a 
high risk enterprise. No drug, for example, is entirely 
safe, and risks attach to diagnostic and therapeutic 
techniques. Even the most technically proficient medical 
act cannot guarantee complete success, nor can it be 
assured that unsought side effects will not occur. 
Communication, therefore, becomes important at a further 
level. Not merely does it permit of the establishing of 
a therapeutic bond between doctor and patient, but it 
permits the patient to have a reasonable awareness of the 
possible outcome of therapy or of diagnosis. Thus, not 
only does it allow for free decision making on the part 
of the patient as to whether or not to become involved in 
the medical enterprise, but it can also serve to minimise 
the disappointment and ill-feeling which can result from 
a short-fall between expectations and results.
Recognising the significance of communication 
between doctor and patient is a fundamental step in 
generating a therapeutic atmosphere capable of respecting 
the rights of the individual patient. The doctor who
ignores or minimises the importance of patient
\
involvement places his or her position at risk. The 
number of actions raised against the medical profession 
continues to rise, [21] and the impact of this on medical 
care cannot be underestimated. It has been said the the 
raising of an action against a doctor is the archetypal 
expression of patient dissatisfaction.[22] However, 
dissatisfaction may be with the outcome of the medical
9
act rather than with the technical skill demonstrated by 
the particular doctor. Thus, many challenges may stem as 
much from a failure to explain known risks as from the 
doctor's operational mistakes or negligence. Moreover, 
failure of communication denigrates the patient's status 
as an autonomous individual and represents an insult at 
the abstract, but highly significant, level of morality. 
A 'good' medical act - the desired outcome of all 
consultation and treatment - is inconceivable if it is 
not consensual. It is here that the consent of the 
patient becomes most significant. Medicine must be 
encouraged both to practice its skills to a high standard 
and to deal with patients at a morally acceptable level.
Medicine and Technical Skills
As with most groups in the community, challenges against 
the medical profession have traditionally arisen through 
a perceived failure on the part of individual 
professionals to exercise their skill at the expected 
standard. This standard is higher where, as with 
doctors, the individual holds him or herself out has 
having special skills and a high level of expertise.[23] 
Each group in the community professing a trade or 
profession is expected to demonstrate a reasonable level 
of care and attention when practising its art or
science. When the enterprise is particularly risky, then
\
a higher standard of care is expected by law and by the
10
consumer.[24] As a high risk enterprise, expectations 
(both legal and personal) of medicine are particularly 
high - at least in theory. This results not merely from 
the fact of the risk element but also from the value 
placed on health - the guardians of which, in the
developed world at least, are routinely perceived to be 
orthodox medicine and its practitioners.
The status of the individual as healthy or ill is 
not value free - indeed it can be highly
significant.[25] Thus, the diagnosis of ill-health 
(which again is generally the monopoly of orthodox
medicine) may have a profound effect on the individual at
a number of levels. At one level, the individual’s
self-perception is altered by the fact of illness, his or 
her personal and social capacities can be severely
limited by the knowledge of the illness and its nature. 
At another, certain forms of illness can have even more 
significant results. The diagnosis of mental illness, 
for example, which has been described by some as highly 
speculative, [26] may result in loss of freedom, loss of
opportunity to form relationships (particularly sexual 
relationships), loss of capacity to enter into legally 
binding agreements and perhaps more significantly, in 
extreme circumstances may result in the person so 
diagnosed being precluded from participation in the
democratic process. Medicine, therefore, plays a 
political as well as a personal role and its importance 
is thereby enhanced. The person who seeks medical
11
advice, therefore, may also place himself or herself in a 
situation of vulnerability beyond that which is generated 
by the mere fact of illness. Whilst this does not mean 
that contact with medicine is dangerous in se, it does
suggest that the morality of the medical act and the
adequate use of skills within it, have significance 
beyond the narrowly technical.
Issues concerning the application and definition 
of medical skill will be considered later,[27] but it is 
worth noting at this stage that the law has recognised 
the significance of professionalism in ethical terms and 
respect for individuals at the moral level, by having 
developed rules which relate to the negligent performance 
of duties[28] and - in the medical context - rules about 
the provision of consent to treatment.[29] Some 
jurisdictions have also become relatively sophisticated 
in their handling of the other side of the consent coin, 
that is, its withholding.[30] The medical profession 
itself has recognised its vulnerability, and its 
responsibility, by the establishment of defence
organisations, which - although not technically classed 
as insurance companies - provide a sort of insurance 
service, for doctors.[31] However, in addition, they 
offer a service to the patient (funded by doctors
themselves) in that indefensible cases, and cases thought 
likely to succeed, can be settled without the need for 
the patient to become involved in potentially protracted 
litigation where there is evidence of a legitimate
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grievance. Just as in courts of law, the decision as to 
the capacity to defend a given case is generally made by 
reference to legal rules, although in same cases, it has 
been suggested that other factors also play a role in the 
decision to settle.[32]
In its traditional role as balancer of interests 
in disputes, the civil law plays a fundamental part in 
setting the standards to which practitioners of medicine 
(and of course all citizens) are expected to aspire. 
Failure to achieve the level set by law, coupled with
damage resulting from this failure, will result in an
\
award of damages designed to place the injured party in 
the position he or she would have been in but for the 
negligence involved.[33] There are a number of possible 
methods for obtaining redress which will be dealt with in 
more detail in later chapters.[34]
As noted above, the majority of challenges to 
doctors arise from a perceived failure in that aspect of 
their practice which relates to the nature and quality of 
technical skills. Judgements are concerned with the 
doctor's professional competence - routinely narrowly 
conceived as relating to the manner in which technical 
matters are effected. This is of course no less true of 
other professions or groups in the community. The 
fundamental duty of the doctor can, then, be described as 
being to exercise the technical expertise possessed 
reasonably, in line with what can be expected of other 
doctors of similar standing. However, despite assertions
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that doctors are judged by the law as we all are, there 
are additional difficulties in reaching judgement in 
these cases. The increasingly specialised nature of 
medicine makes it more difficult for courts to assess 
what the reasonable doctor knows or should have been able 
to achieve. Thus, a number of eminent lawyers have 
remarked on the difficulties of assessing technical 
skills, and even of understanding technical (and 
apparently inevitably jargonised) evidence.[3S]
The assessment of clinical behaviour will be 
discussed in depth later,[36j but is is worth pointing 
out at this stage that the perceived difficulties of 
assessing most professional behaviour without possession 
of the skills oneself renders accountability of 
professional groups problematic. Accountability to the 
community is obtained substantially by the Use of the law 
through the mechanism of the courts. The law sets 
appropriate standards, however vague, and it is against 
these which behaviour will be measured. For the 
•ordinary' citizen, the test will be that of the 
•reasonable* man[37] and for the professional, the test 
will generally equate to the reasonable professional at 
that level of skill.[38] However, whilst courts are 
deemed to understand in what way a reasonable man would 
or should behave, and also how to assess the behaviour of 
lawyers.[39] doctors amongst others pose more 
difficulties. A court inevitably has more problems in 
assessing the technical aspects of their behaviour, and
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must therefore depend heavily on the evidence of fellow 
professionals. Whereas no individual is permitted to 
testify as to what a reasonable man (or woman) would or 
would not have done in a given set of circumstances,[40] 
the sophistication of the medical act is such that others 
skilled in the same profession are necessary to assist in 
making an assessment of what level of skill it is 
reasonable to expect, and whether or not the person whose 
behaviour is currently under scrutiny can be deemed to 
have deviated from that level, or to have fallen below 
the standard which is reasonably expected of him or her. 
This problem is, of course, not confined to medical 
practice, but for the purposes of this discussion, it
remains the most central area.
Nor is this the only factor which is used in cases
and which has an impact on the law’s capacity to perform
its traditional role of interest balancing. Although it 
has been suggested that the role of the doctor in the 
community may have altered with the changing face of 
medicine itself, nonetheless the credibility of medicine 
and its practitioners remains at a high level. The image 
of medicine as a specially protected social good is, if 
anything, enhanced by its high technology image. The
capacity of medicine to achieve what - in the public eye 
- amount to nothing short of miracles, for example in 
heart transplantation, ensures that it is held in the 
highest esteem, and that medical practitioners are viewed 
with the mixture of awe and deference due to the
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contemporary witch doctor. Nor are courts immune from 
this apparently unquestioning belief in the value of 
medicine. In many court decisions, society is reminded 
of the value of medicine, of its contribution to the 
world and of its responsibility for the common good in 
the shape of health.[41]
This is not an insignificant point, nor is it 
unrelated to the context of this discussion. 
Decision-making in the courts has a profound effect both 
on the standard set by medicine and, of course, on the 
rights of patients. The attitude of the law to doctors 
and their discipline may profoundly affect the capacity 
of the patient to succeed in obtaining redress for a 
grievance, and the tone adopted by these same courts in 
decision-making provides some guidelines for the 
professionals themselves as to the behaviour which is 
acceptable to society. What is clear from an analysis of 
judicial statements is that often, in the United Kingdom 
at least, a number of extra-legal criteria are used in 
decision making in this particular area.[42]
The use of these factors may relate to the 
perceived social good of medicine - by and large 
unreservedly accepted, although some commentators, 
notably McKeown,[43] Illich[44] and Szasz[45] would 
dispute this. However, other factors have also 
influenced decisions in respect of patients1 claims - for 
example the status of the doctor,[46] the possibility of 
defensive medicine,[47] and so on. The burden of proof.
it has been said, is higher when a challenge is made to 
the doctor than it is in other allegations of 
negligence.[48] The rationale for the significance of 
these factors is linked, therefore, to the status 
accorded to orthodox medicine and its practitioners, and 
thus merits some consideration. r
Moreover, yet another rule of law may be 
affected. The normal rule is that the greater the risk 
of the enterprise, the higher the standard of care 
against which the individual will be judged.[49j 
However, in medical cases, the existence of this high 
risk is sometimes used to restrict rather than to expand 
liability.[50] Of course, where some of the unavoidable 
risks of therapy occur, there must be no necessary 
implication that negligence was involved. If courts 
confined themselves to this view few would quibble with 
it. However, the use of the risk factor often surpasses 
this relatively unexceptionable one, and results in 
acceptance of behaviour which might seem to be 
questionable. That 'we cannot accept the benefits of 
medical treatment without also accepting its risks’[51] 
need not expose the public to a high risk unless the 
assumptions of beneficence, benign motivation and high 
profile credibility are taken too far. Certainly, risks 
are inherent in medicine, and - if agreed to - can be 
accepted. However, the individual patient is neither 
obliged to accept them merely because medicine is thought 
to help many people, nor obliged to run unspecific risks
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in the interests of medical practice or advancement.
At the simple level, the doctor who experiments in 
the hope of improving standards might well elicit
approval, and sympathy, even if something goes wrong, but 
to relieve him or her of liability because he or she did 
not know there could be a risk is to omit to consider one 
other crucial factor, namely the harm done to the patient 
as a result of non-standard treatment, administered 
without approval and without the benefit of safety
requirements. Although some patient must be the first,
simply to deny responsibility because medicine is a risky
business, even although the particular risk was 
self-generated, seems legally unusual to say the least, 
and yet this is precisely what happened in the case of 
Roe v. Ministry of Health.T521 Indeed, it is plausible 
to argue that the risk factor in medicine is precisely 
why accountability is so important, and accountability is 
ultimately achieved through the civil courts.
So, in conclusion, it can be seen that there are a 
number of factors which influence legal decisions on the 
technical practice of medicine. Whatever their 
credibility, they have informed the approach of the 
courts to challenges to medicine, and to the assessment 
of the behaviour of physicians in carrying out the 
operational aspects of their profession. In brief, these 
factors seem to be the status of orthodox medicine and 
its contribution to the general social good, the 
temptation to rely heavily, if not definitively, on the
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evidence of fellow practitioners - a reliance which stems 
from the increasing complexity of the practice of 
medicine. The reluctance of any professional group to 
criticise its members in any but the most overtly 
negligent situation is a further contribution to the 
difficulties facing the pursuer who seeks to show that a 
doctor has been negligent. Yet, as has been said in one 
leading American case, fairness to the patient demands a 
standard set by law and not by doctors themselves.[53]
Of course, where operational matters are 
concerned, the law cannot set rigid standards. 
Professional competence will vary on a personal basis, 
but a general standard will nonetheless be required as a 
yardstick. Just as people are all tested against the 
mythical reasonable man, whatever the characteristics of 
the individual, so too the doctor is judged on a common 
denominator approach. Information as to what the average 
or standard or reasonable doctor is, or what he or she 
would do in a given situation, will primarily come from 
those who share the expertise - that is those in equal 
possession of the knowledge and skills of the person 
whose behaviour is challenged. Little wonder that courts 
are loath to interfere in the assessment of medical 
behaviour when it is made by an eminent representative of 
the profession itself. In view of this, that the law 
sets the standards is in some situations not obvious, and 
it seems to many to be objectionable that medicine is 
often apparently self-regulating even in the courts.
19
However, to take this view is, whilst understandable, 
overly simplistic.
It may, however, seem to be misleading to talk of 
dependence on professional evidence as a problem. 
Indeed, could it not be argued that only through this 
kind of informed decision making can the courts 
reasonably be expected to reach an accurate and 
appropriate conclusion? In any event, the courts reserve 
to themselves the right to make the ultimate decision, 
disregarding if they so choose the evidence of 
professionals. How often in fact this is done will be 
considered later.[54] In this context, however, it may 
seem that this caveat takes on considerable significance 
as a way of controlling what otherwise may be seen as 
merely a\system in which professionals themselves assess 
the legal standing of their colleagues' behaviour. 
Indeed, were the courts not to make a stand of this sort, 
then their role would be reduced to that solely of 
calculating damages, and not of actual decision making on 
liability. If the evidence of fellow professionals were 
to be all important, then there would be little 
justification for expensive, protracted hearings of the 
sort that often arise in difficult cases such as in 
allegations of medical negligence, and the opportunity 
for public accountability of professional groups would be 
significantly reduced.
However, the paradox also is that where courts 
decide about medical behaviour relating to the exercise
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of technical skills, they do perceive a genuine 
difficulty - a short-fall of expertise which, when 
combined with other factors, can result in a heavy 
dependence on medical evidence, and render the role of 
the law symbolic rather than truly decisive.
The rule of law is that the value of competing 
evidence is a matter for the courts.[55] Whereas it has 
been suggested in at least one case that uncontested 
psychiatric evidence must be accepted by the court,[56] 
at least in the criminal law it is clear from the recent 
trial of Peter Sutcliffe that even eminent and 
uncontested medical (in this case, psychiatric) evidence 
need not be taken as definitive of legal matters.[57] 
However, it is also worth noting that in other 
situations, also involving the criminal law, for example 
the trial of Dr. Arthur,[58] medical evidence as to 
standard practice was deemed to be decisive even although 
it was of no technical relevance to the charge of murder 
(subsequently reduced to attempted murder). Courts, 
therefore, may be said to have shown a certain confusion, 
in the criminal law at least, as to the emphasis to be 
placed on medical evidence - an ambivalence that seems to 
relate to the nature of the desired outcome as much as it 
does to the value of evidence in any abstract sense.
Thus, one cannot underestimate the importance of 
expert testimony on the determination of whether or not 
the behaviour in question falls below the level of skill 
which'can be reasonably expected of the person in
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question. Whilst there are practical reasons or 
explanations for this, it may also seem that some highly 
technical or sophisticated professions, such as medicine, 
may find themselves, however unwittingly, in the position 
of effectively usurping the role of the court. Moreover, 
these are the very groups whose professional etiquette 
most strongly demands that a colleague should not be 
publicly criticised. Thus, for one doctor to speak
against another requires the most serious consideration. 
Professional and defence organisations alike will caution 
silence and the group - not unusually - prefers to keep 
its problems internal. In fact, at least one eminent 
commentator has indicated that the ultimate condemnation 
for a doctor is the criticism of his fellow
professionals, and not censure by a court.[59] Indeed, 
this attitude has been accepted by some members of the 
judiciary, notably Lord Denning, who has been highly 
influential in forming the body of knowledge which makes 
for legal precedent and for decision making in this 
area. [60] In a number of cases. Lord Denning made it 
clear that the court should hesitate to condemn medical 
behaviour if other doctors would not condemn it.[61] In 
other words, the doctor's behaviour is most accurately 
and appropriately assessed by his or her own colleagues 
and not by the courts or by a standard generated by law. 
That is, the standard may be set by the law - in the
technical sense that the law may insist that the standard
to be achieved is not necessarily that thought suitable
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or sufficient by doctors - but the nature, extent and 
shape of medical responsibility may actually be formed by 
the profession itself.
Doctors, as expert witnesses, are, however, no 
more competent to speak to the ultimate issue than are 
other experts. Their business is to inform the court as 
to their opinion of the behaviour under challenge, that 
is, their opinion as to whether the behaviour meets the 
standard of the reasonably competent practitioner. This 
capacity to give opinions is what distinguishes the 
expert witness from the ordinary one.[62] However, the 
opinion which the expert is entitled to give is not in 
fact, or as a matter of law, an opinion as to whether or 
not the legal test is met. In other words, negligence is 
a legal and not a professional matter - in this case not 
a medical matter. If courts rely too heavily on expert 
evidence then the legal rule is in danger. Blanket 
acceptance of professional assessment does no good for 
the theory of law nor for its practice.
However, there is a certain logic - indeed it 
might be argued a necessity - in the significance of 
medical evidence in cases of medical negligence. The 
fact that other doctors would not criticise their 
colleague is informative, as will be descriptions of what 
the profession regards as good or competent medical 
practice. Inevitably, although reluctant to criticise 
their colleagues, doctors will also not wish to present a 
description of competent medicine which seems to set so
23
low a standard as to render it not worthy of esteem. For 
this reason, it is likely that a balance of interests can 
be achieved. However, it remains the case that the law 
must decide not merely whether doctors think the 
behaviour in question was acceptable, but rather whether 
or not it was negligent.
Negligence is described and delineated by rules of 
law and is not commensurate with accepted professional 
conduct. Whilst the latter will be informative, there 
are issues involved in the decision-making of the courts 
which are wider in their implications than the 
preservation of narrowly professional standards.[63] The 
courts, in considering whether or not to redress 
grievances, are also capable of taking into account 
issues of justice, need and so on. Moreover, and perhaps 
more fundamentally, the courts must satisfy themselves 
that the legal requirements of a successful action are 
met. This is true whatever the basis on which the action 
comes to court.
Thus, judicial decision-making is of major
importance in the ultimate assessment of the validity of
a claim. Importance is therefore placed in this
discussion both on the nature of the available action and 
on the scope which each form of action provides for the 
exercise of judicial discretion. Of particular
significance will be the extent to which the 
decision-makers themselves emphasise the rule of law, and 
the rights of patients, or the interests and evidence of
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the group under challenge. At a later stage this will be 
considered in some depth.[64] For the moment, however, 
it is sufficient to consider what are the implications of 
the foregoing section.
Summary
Even ignoring the extra legal factors which can - and it 
has been claimed, do - affect decision-making in medical 
cases, there remains a plausible distinction between 
medical and legal interpretation of a given piece of 
behaviour. At least, there remains this potential 
difference, since in theory each of the parties involved 
is seeking to make different assessments and to answer 
different questions - however subtle that difference may 
be. The medical expert seeks to assess his or her 
colleague's behaviour in terms of its clinical validity, 
within certain boundaries, and in the light of certain 
allowances. The expert will, of course, inevitably also 
have an eye on the impact which his or her description 
may have on the ultimate assessment of the court.
However, it has been claimed that expert assessment need
\
not point to the ultimate decision of the court.
In matters of technical or operational competence, 
it may - as has been seen - at first sight seem most 
plausible to argue that the best people to assess whether 
or not the doctor is negligent would in fact be his or 
her fellow professionals. After all, they are the
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experts in a highly specialised and technical 
discipline. Who better than a fellow specialist to judge 
such behaviour? However, it has also been indicated that 
the description of the doctor's behaviour as negligent or 
not i^s for the courts and not for other professionals. 
Nor is this a narrow academic point, since the 
significance of a finding that the legal test has been 
met goes beyond professional censure or approval. Thus, 
even in those aspects of the doctor's business which are 
intimately linked to his or her technical skills - that 
is, in matters often referred to as operational - the 
legal assessment of his or her behaviour, for the 
purposes of the legal system at least, cannot 
appropriately or competently be made merely by reference 
to what others in the profession might think of as good, 
or alternatively substandard, behaviour - however 
valuable this information may be.
An Introduction to Patients' Rights in Medicine
There is a further level to the medical act which goes 
beyond the purely technical. Indeed, the moral aspect of 
medicine - as with all human interactions - cannot 
properly be described solely in terms of the narrow 
discipline. The responsibilities of the lawyer to his or 
her client, the psychologist, the architect, as well as 
the doctor, share characteristics which make it 
impossible to describe the factors under consideration as
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only 'medical* or 'legal', and so on. The level at which 
professional groups deal with their clients as 
self-determining human beings is not specific to any one 
discipline, but relates to the characteristics of the 
client as much as it does to the profession or the 
professional involved. Thus, whilst the nature of the 
technical skill which clients seek may differ, the 
essential characteristic of a good transaction need not 
change. A good act remains one which respects the 
client's moral autonomy (as well as being one which 
demonstrates the level of technical competence which can 
reasonably be anticipated) and facilitates his or her 
capacity (and right) to make free and uncoerced decisions 
based on the honest provision of information.
Thus, although the courts have placed heavy 
emphasis on medical evidence in describing the doctor's 
technical duty to his or her patient, does this equally
apply to the moral aspect? If it is questionable when
\
technical professional skills are under scrutiny, is it 
not even more questionable when the question at issue is 
not technical at all, but rather relates to reinforcement 
of a view of the individual which is treasured by 
national and international law and morality?[65] This is 
not to say that the acknowledgement of the status of the 
patient is not intimately tied into the provision of the 
technical skill being sought, but it is an aspect of the 
professional relationship which also transcends it. It 
is the right of the individual which generates the duty
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of the professional not to overstep authority in the name
\
\
or the interests of professional skill or technical
superiority. Thus, although the technical gap can seldom 
if ever be bridged, respect for the individual demands
that relevant information is disclosed and an opportunity 
presented for either individual or consensual 
decision-making.
In the case of medicine, this provision of 
information permits the patient to make choices about
whether to run certain risks, and what risks to run.
Whilst information disclosure can easily been seen as an 
aspect of the doctor's professionalism, it is scarcely 
only an aspect of the exercise of these technical
skills. Assessment of the doctor's behaviour in this
aspect of medical intervention is less obviously
susceptible of clinical assessment or judgement. If the 
aim of disclosure is the protection of individual
autonomy, then it represents a wider issue than the 
clinical, and is not a matter defined by standard medical 
practice but rather one which is to be determined by 
reference to considerations which go far beyond the gap 
in technical skills and expertise between doctor and 
patient. Respect for persons demands that the 
opportunity for free decision-making is made available, 
and that the choice - albeit coupled with professional 
recommendation - is that of the individual who holds the 
right. The request for technical skills to be exercised, 
for example in a request for diagnosis, cannot and does
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not impose on the person making the request a duty to 
accept even clinically optimal recommendations.
Thus, if medicine is. to be a good, it must do more 
than merely demonstrate through its practitioners a high 
level of technical skills. It must also contain and 
foster the moral element which protects the integrity of 
the individual. But this moral element goes beyond 
professional definition, and demands external 
considerations of a type which doctors, in common with 
other professionals, are not inevitably the best or most 
appropriate persons to judge. Moreover, it is here also 
that the significance of the medical enterprise can be 
seen to impose even greater responsibility. When 
communities delegate important decisions about health and 
illness to orthodox medicine, with the potential 
implications of diagnosis and treatment, then it is even 
more important that participation in the enterprise is 
both free and knowing. In this way, autonomy is 
respected.
Viewing medical intervention in this way makes 
analysis of the relationship between doctor and patient 
in the terms of human rights, intelligible. Admittedly 
some claims which patients may have in health care may 
not be capable of practical resolution, even if they can 
be couched in the language of rights. For example, 
difficulties may arise from the fact that the medical 
enterprise is itself circumscribed by resource 
problems. The fact that health care resources are
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unlikely ever to meet potential or actual demand may
result in the denial of appropriate care in some cases. 
The shortage, for example, of dialysis equipment - a 
situation which evidently could be remedied - means that 
decisions must be made as to how resources are 
allocated.[66] However these decisions are made, they
represent a lack of universality in health care, which 
renders the use of the language of rights rhetorical 
rather than likely to achieve practical results.
Equally, whilst the patient may reasonably feel 
him or herself to be entitled to the best possible care, 
or even to cure, it would be an. unreasonable and 
intolerable burden to place on any discipline a demand 
that this was universally the actual result. However, 
the patient can legitimately demand a reasonable standard 
of care, and a perceived failure to supply care at this 
reasonable standard can, and sometimes does, form the
basis of a grievance redressable at law.
Thus, although the language of rights may not 
always point a clear way for resolution of perceived 
problems, it nonetheless plays a significant part in the 
determination of the relevant interests at stake. In
any event, the sane adult who enters into a relationship 
with medical practice will have two distinct sets of 
conscious or unconscious expectations. On the one hand, 
he or she may reasonably demand a level of care which is 
acceptable - not primarily as an aspect of human rights 
but rather as an aspect of what can be expected from a
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group setting itself up as having special skills, which 
skills are the basis of the patient’s decision to seek 
out a doctor. On the other hand, however, the patient 
can expect that mere admission of illness does not affect 
his or her standing as a moral agent. In other words, 
just as involvement with a lawyer does not diminish the 
moral standing of the client neither does involvement 
with a doctor inevitably imply or justify any reduced 
standing in a human being.
At a national level, protection of autonomy is 
generally offered by means of the law recognising its 
significance and vindicating its existence as a legal and 
a moral right. Whether by formal or informal rules about 
due process, or the careful determination of rights and 
duties, it is the law which can deter the unwarranted 
assumption of authority, and provide the capacity to 
redress grievances. Indeed, the reponsibility for such 
protection is one which is, in theory at least, of major 
importance to the law. As Shultz [67Jnotes:
Judges and legal scholars have long asserted 
the importance of patient autonomy in medical 
decision-making. Yet autonomy has never been 
reognized as a legally protectable interest. 
It has been vindicated only as a by-product 
of protection for two other interests 
bodily security as protected by rules against 
unconsented contact, and bodily well-being as 
protected by rules governing professional 
competence. Neither bodily security nor 
bodily well-being, however, is an adequate 
surrogate; they do not coincide with 
autonomy. Nor is autonomy merely a formal 
issue. Decisionmaking by competent
professionals does not provide an adequate
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substitute for patient choice. Injuries that 
arise from invasion of patients' interest in 
medical choice are both substantial and 
distinct.[68]
Moral autonomy is, albeit often without direct reference, 
protected by most advanced legal systems. In situations 
where individuals are denied autonomy through, for 
example, the removal or refusal of valued political 
rights, or unwarranted denial of liberty, it is not 
merely the instant symptoms which are the source of 
outrage. Rather the fundamental concern is the denial 
of autonomous and self-determining status to the 
individual, of which the action under consideration is 
symptomatic, striking as it does at common morality and 
the consensus of what it is to be accorded the respect 
which the status of being human demands. Although seldom 
put into words in courts of law. at least in . the United 
Kingdom, the concept of respect for autonomy is as much a 
matter of concern as the concept, for example, of due 
process - again not technically a concept of Scots or 
English Law, but nonetheless one to which significance is 
attached.
However, law is not merely concerned with narrow 
technicalities. Not only do laws develop to protect the 
individual, but the determination of breach of these laws 
is more wide-ranging than the mere assessment of 
technicalities. Whether it is the rights and duties of a 
civil servant or the rights of the newborn, law and its 
decision-makers are creative. Constant concern is
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demonstrated for the rights of individuals both as an 
aspect of what a developed legal system regards as good, 
fair and proper, and in due deference to international 
commitments to respect for the individual. Thus, it 
makes real sense to emphasise basic human rights in all 
aspects of daily life. Indeed, as has been suggested 
above,- in some aspects of that life consideration of the
i
rights involved is more than just desirable - it can 
become absolutely essentially to the matter in hand. The 
significance of the political enterprise for example 
makes the use of rights terminology routine. 'The right 
to work', 'the right to take industrial action' are now 
common-place terminology, as are demands for industrial 
and political autonomy and equality of bargaining 
power.[69] Whether or not these 'rights' show all of the 
characteristics of what are called fundamental human 
rights, there is a perceived value in the symbolism of 
rights discourse, which serves to emphasise not merely 
the power of language, but also the conceptual importance 
of the individual.
The potential invasiveness of medicine, and its 
social and political potential, make it an area ripe for 
rights discourse. More importantly, the inevitable 
personal - in physical and mental terms - impact of any 
therapy or diagnosis places medical care in the forefront 
of concern for the individual. But rights are not merely 
protected by payment of lip service to the conceptual 
framework within which they play a part. Translation of
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rights into reality is also vital to their national, 
international and personal significance. For this 
translation, we generally turn to the law to provide both 
a statement of what rights are, and the machinery whereby 
infringement of rights can be remedied.
Thus, it does not suffice merely to say that, for 
example, patients have rights in their interaction with 
medicine, nor that doctors' duties flow from these 
rights. The willingness of the law to redress legitimate 
grievances, and the mechanisms available for such 
redress, are of equal, if not even greater, ultimate 
significance to the description and realisation of these 
rights. It would be insufficient, not to say 
disingenuous, for example, to say as a matter of policy 
that patients have a right to choose whether or not to 
undergo therapy, whilst at the same time demanding that 
the patient who feels him or herself to have been denied 
this choice proves this to an unacceptably high level. 
Equally it would be unacceptable were the burden of proof 
to be raised to the level of near or actual
impossibility. Moreover, the action available to the
\
disaffected patient may have a profound effect on his or 
her capacity to prove invasion of physical or mental 
integrity.
Conclusions
It is evident, therefore, that the practice of medicine
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and the application of its techniques - preventive, 
diagnostic and therapeutic - is not a value-free 
enterprise. At one level, the content of the interaction 
between medicine and the individual is a technical one. 
But the application of clinical skills, whilst central to 
the interaction, is but one aspect of what is actually 
going on. Beyond this, and subsuming it, is the moral 
quality of the act which tranforms a mere clinical act
into a 'good' medical act. Even ignoring the doubts
which some commentators have expressed about the real 
benefits of orthodox medicine, and in particular the 
doubts about its actual impact on health,[70] the nature 
of the medical act has a significance of its own. This 
significant value is more than cure or alleviation of 
suffering - it is also a recognition of the fact that the 
individual must not be subordinated to the acquired 
skills of any single group in the community. Just as
consensual politics is deemed to represent the best form 
of government, so consensual medicine is the best form of 
that discipline. Indeed, most doctors (and patients) 
would find little to argue with in such a statement. 
However, breaches of faith do occur, and it is here that 
the law has a major role to play. Whatever the 
motivation, however benign the exercise of professional 
paternalism, the important issue remains the right of the 
patient not to be the subject of involuntary or
unauthorised intervention in his or her life.
\ This discussion therefore will concern itself with
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consideration of the value and meaning of consent to 
medical treatment, as being the clearest example of the 
need for information disclosure and sharing. The 
provision of a real consent - real, that is morally and 
legally - is the act of an informed and autonomous 
individual as, indeed, is the refusal of consent. The 
debate currently raging in the United States concerning 
the choice of patients to demand the discontinuation of 
treatment, is another clear example of the concern felt 
by many as to the extent to which the patient actually is 
in control of his or her health. As reported in the 
Bouvia case in the ‘Los Angeles Times' of March 14th 
1986, the rights of patients in making decisions about 
therapy are increasingly under legal scrutiny. 'People', 
it was said, 'have the right to refuse medical care.' 
This right, the converse of the right to consent to it, 
will depend on a variety of factors which transcend the 
illness and its clinical classification, and which relate 
to individual choices about the best personal course. In 
the case of consent, therefore, only full knowledge of 
the implications of accepting or rejecting therapy will 
place the patient in a position to make the (personally) 
appropriate choice about his or her future. This 
contention becomes less challengable when it is accepted 
that information sharing is not solely a clinical matter, 
but a matter which offers, or has the capacity to offer, 
free choice and respect for autonomy. Autonomy is 
defined as ‘the power or right of self-government'.[71]
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A patient has no less right to this than does the person 
who is not sick. Equally as medicine changes and becomes 
inherently more risky, as well as potentially more 
therapeutically valid, the patient's voluntary 
involvement in it plays an even more significant role in 
his or her capacity for autonomy.
It will be argued here, therefore, that 
information disclosure plays a central and fundamental 
role, both in the autonomy of the individual and in the 
morality of the medical enterprise. Moreover, it will be 
shown that only legal decision-making which distinguishes 
between the technical and the moral aspects of the 
medical act can adequately safeguard either of these 
important considerations, even although ideally the two 
should be inseparable in the practice of the physician. 
Particular attention will be paid to the . mechanisms 
currently available for redressing grievances, since it 
is here that the actual commitment of the law to 
safeguarding patient autonomy can most clearly be seen. 
In this way, a theory of the role of consent at the 
abstract moral level will be tested against the actual 
performance of the law and legal systems. The legal 
systems under consideration will predominantly be those 
of the United Kingdom and New Zealand, with some 
reference to the United States, since they provide a 
variety of legal models for redress. These systems will 
be tested in respect of their desire or capacity to place 
primary emphasis on the rights of patients to make
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uncoerced and knowing choices about the value of therapy 
to themselves as individuals. Analysis will also be 
made of the nature of the decision-making involved and 
the implications of the decisions taken.
It will be argued that the provision or 
withholding of consent is the right of the patient, and 
on this depends the morality of the medical act. Since 
consent plays a role in the civil law in general, it will 
also be shown that the adequacy of information to which 
the patient is given access necessarily affects the legal 
status of any intervention. Neither medicine nor the law 
are totally value-free enterprises, and it will be
submitted further that there is, in the jurisdictions
\
under consideration, and whatever the mechanism used, an 
apparent alliance between the law and the perceived good 
of medicine, which takes an overall rather than an 
individualised view of what medicine is about. 
Acceptance of the 'good1 of medicine, may obfuscate the 
need for a 'good' medical act. Orthodox medicine it will 
be contended, is, however, the sum of its individual 
acts, rather than being some abstract, generalised good.
It will be accepted, however, that there are some 
situations where the apparently clear-cut demands for 
respect as an autonomous self-determining subject become 
more problematic. Children, the mentally handicapped and 
the mentally ill are the most obvious examples of this 
potential exception.[72] However, it will be maintained 
that a theory of consent which relates to individual
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human rights need not inevitably be inapplicable in these 
situations. In other words, the theory identified will 
be seen as the yardstick against which all medical acts 
should be judged. Thus, deviation from the level of
disclosure and choice necessarily involved in this view 
of consent - whilst it may be possible - requires
considerable justification.
In sum, it will be argued that the significance of 
consent provisions lies in their capacity to reflect and 
enhance the moral standing of the individual, and
therefore that they have a collective impact on 
communities. The law has a major role to play in guiding 
professionals (including doctors) as to what is
acceptable behaviour and what is not, whatever other
professionals may believe, a necessary commitment to 
disinterested decision-making, and an interest in the 
provision of a viable method of redressing grievances.
It will be assumed, therefore, that the law should
reflect the rights of patients to give or withhold
consent to medical treatment based on information
disclosure, both through the form of action which it 
makes available and through judicial or quasi-judicial 
decision-making.
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THE RIOH' TO CONSENT TO MEDICAL TREATMENT
Chapter 2
Whilst many human rights have been created as a result of 
the abuse of individuals by states and their agencies and 
through forces Which seem inherently wrong or dangerous 
in themselves, the use of the language of rights in 
respect of medical treatment is in a somewhat different 
tradition. It is used in this aLea rather to assess the 
result of the interaction of two forces both of which are 
deemed to be good in themselves - namely medicine and the 
law, as primarily represented by the judiciary. 
Moreover, the terminology of human rights is used both to 
protect the freedom of individual choice and to impose a 
corresponding duty on ethers to facilitate that knowing 
or meaningful choice through disclosure of information.
Whilst there is little doubt that choice-making 
about therapy is an aspect of the right to personal 
autonomy or self-determination, it merits specific 
consideration on a number of counts. first, it provides 
a classic example of the lav/'s balancing of competing 
' goods1 and may therefore be instructive of the extent to 
which human rights nay be limited or expanded by the 
law. Second, and to some extent derivatively from the 
first, health and health care are sc fundamentally
51
important to the human condition that the language of 
rightd may be used to ensure that technical interests are 
not given priority over the freedom of the individual 
patient to make choices based on disclosure - choices 
Which could be technically (that is medically) 
irrational. A complication of this, however, is that 
the provision of health care through therapy may be seen 
as autonomy enhancing, rather than as a challenge to 
human rights. In some cases, for example the mentally 
ill and children, the decision to minimise certain 
aspects of autonomy by restricting information 
disclosure, nay be seen as being protective of human
rights, because, for example, of the existence of a right
to treatment.[1] And, of couise, the cor;munity attitude 
to health care may reflect anbivalence about the 
competition between the therapeutic imperative and the 
rights of the individual. Whilst not all communities
have primary health care services Which utilise orthodox 
medicine, every community has its medicine men. Hie
rights Which it is claimed patients have in the orthodox 
transaction are no less important in alternative forms of 
health care provision.
'The practice of medicine has an ethical as well as 
a technical content.[2j The predominance in many 
cultures of high technology orthodox medicine in no way 
reduces the moral content and implications of the 
interaction between the doctor (healer) and the patient, 
although it nay sometimes disguise it. That is, tire
growth of technology does not per se affect the essential 
nature of the medical transaction although it nay change 
its form.
Cne feature of all medical transactions is the 
vulnerability of the patient, vho lacks the tecfmical 
skills on which reliance must be placed if he or she is 
to regain, or perhaps retain, the state of health which 
is so precious. Because of this reliance, the 
individual is highly dependent on obtaining the 
assistance of the skilled healer. One reason why health 
is so important to the individual is that on it rests not 
only freedom from physical and mental illness, but also 
the capacity to determine his or her current and future 
affairs. lor these reasons, health lias been equated 
with 'the degree of lived freedom',L3] Further, health, 
and therefore treatment for ill-health, is more than a 
prerequisite of freedom or self-determination in life as 
a whole. It is also an area within' which 
self-determination may be exercised. Indeed, given the 
importance of health to the individual, it is vital that 
he or she has Hie capacity and opportunity for 
decision-making in respect of medical intervention. 
This ability to nake choices means that if tire sick 
person is to retain autonomy, he or she must be free to 
seek treatment, to choose between therapies with 
different prognoses and even to choose illness over 
therapy. For where therapies carry risks which may be 
judged by the patient to be worse than the illness
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itself, or may produce aide-effects of potential 
significance to the patient, there is no easily defined 
assessment of what, in these circumstances, actually 
amounts to 'health'. Health choices are part of life 
choices and cannot therefore be readily removed from the 
would-be autonomous individual. However, such choices 
may have to be made in situations where clear, long-term 
thought is difficult and the immediate pressures of 
illness coupled with the presence of skilled persons with 
superior medical knowledge may not be conducive to 
independent patient . decision-making. Autonomy,
therefore, is a crucial element of the medical 
transaction, but is not one which is always observed:
Although the principle of individual autonomy 
is widely endorsed in theory, its practical 
implications for the doctor-patient 
relationship are controversial. Individuals 
exercise their autonomy in medical 
decisionmaking by arranging for needed 
professional services. Presumably these 
individuals remain the source of authority 
and can choose to delegate all or only part 
of their control to professionals. Yet, 
ironically, the most significant tlireat to 
patient autonomy comes from the very doctors 
whom patients hire. Because of their 
knowledge and traditional role, doctors often 
preempt patient authority.L4j
Nonetheless, the right to self-determination is 
one which communities and individuals treasure. As has 
been said:
...the assertion of civil rights in 
democratic countries has encouraged
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increasing interest in the rights of 
self-determination for every citizen and 
public participation in decisions which 
affect the general welfare. The democratic 
ideal lias also challenged tire claims of any 
group, professional or ctherv;ise, to special 
privileges.L5]
Nowhere in the interaction between doctor and patient is 
tire patient's fundamental right to self-determination 
more clearly expressed, or more contentious, than in the 
right to provide or withheld consent to therapy or other 
medical intervention, based on information disclosure.
lire implications of this right are fundamental to 
an understanding of the human state, and form a vital 
part of the moral and legal status of medical practice.
It is not merely that the choice between accepting and 
rejecting therapy, or particular forms of therapy, 
reflects the essentially voluntary nature of the medical 
enterprise, but also that the provision of adequate 
consent by the patient can render lawful actions which 
would otherwise amount to an assault.[6J lire skills 
\ possessed by tire doctor do not in themselves give him or 
her the right to make alterations to''the physical or 
mental condition of another, and the. need for real 
consent to be obtained provides a valuable protection for 
tire autonomy of the patient.
If the Tinajor impact of the provision of consent by 
a patient is to render the actions of the doctor both 
moral and legal, and to protect individual rights, then 
at first sight it is difficult to see why any problems
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about this aspect of medical practice should arise. It 
would, in these terms, seem to be in the interests of 
both patient and doctor that real or true consent should 
be obtained. In the case of the patient, the right to 
retain physical and mental integrity is protected where 
he or she is genuinely in a position to make free and 
knowing choices about health care. The doctor protects 
him or herself legally in obtaining real consent, and 
should also find the professional relationship with the 
patient enhanced.
Nonetheless, problems do arise in this area, and 
challenges are made. For the doctor, such challenges, 
especially where litigation ensues, can be both 
personally painful and professionally damaging. For the 
patient, the desire or need to act in this way against a 
doctor nay be both anxiety-provoking and expensive. At 
least in theory then, it is in the interests of both 
parties to any medical transaction that respect and trust 
are shewn by each participant to the other. However, 
the way in which issues of consent are dealt with by 
courts and other relevant tribunals can, if viewed from 
the autonomy model, seem less than protective of 
individual rights.
Ihe doc tor/patient relationship is based, in its 
best manifestations, on trust. Often, however, this 
trust is perceived as a one-way transaction. That is, 
claims that trust is essential to a good and efficient 
doctor-patient relationship often seem to centre on the
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element of trust which the patient places in the 
doctor. If the patient demonstrates this trust/ in 
addition to his or her essential dependence on the skills 
and expertise of medicine as a discipline/ then it is 
assumed that the medical transaction has been 
successfully commenced, and may be satisfactorily 
concluded. However, trust may also - and more 
appropriately - be perceived as a two-way transaction. 
[7] That is, the doctor luight equally be expected to 
trust the patient to cope with potentially distressing 
information and to take decisions about him or herself 
and his or her integrity, bodily or mental. It is in 
recognition of this latter element of a trust-based 
relationship that the provision of real consent becomes 
so vital, and yet it is precisely this element which may 
lead to many of the disagreements and disputes which make 
the actions of a given doctor the subject of challenge or 
litigation, since seme medical practitioners are opposed 
to providing a full discussion of therapies and their 
alternatives in every case.
Consent is, in fact, both fundamental to, and 
highly problematic for, the doctor/patient 
relationship. The implications of insufficiently or 
improperly obtained consent are often vital to the 
general well-being of the patient and thus to the 
clinical, moral and legal aspects of medical practice. 
Consent is nmch more than a legal device or invention- 
designed to intimidate medical practitioners. It is, of
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course, a concept adopted by national legal systems and 
by international agreements,[8j and is primarily 
derivative from a more general philosophical commitment 
to the essential right of the individual to make choices 
about what can and cannot be done with his or her body 
and mind. In ether words, the legal system's insistence 
on the provision of consent in medical treatment is both 
a reflection and an acceptance of an agreed moral 
principle that the individual has a right to 
self-determination, which necessarily includes a right to 
physical and mental integrity.
Fundamental principles of this type nay often be 
inplicitly accepted rather than overtly stated. 
Nonetheless, their breach may result in general 
condemnation. Fcr example, it is precisely the lack of 
respect for such principles which causes many people, 
including doctors, to condemn abuses of psychiatry 
> wherever these occur, and the atrocities conducted in the 
name of medical science under the Nazi regime in Germany 
during the Second World War. Thus, where blatant abuses 
of the patient/victim occur, on grounds which are seen as 
malicious, political or spurious, condemnation of the 
perpetrators can be guaranteed. This condemnation is 
much more than just a reflection of the distaste which is 
invariably felt when medicine, as an essentially 
benevolent discipline, is used in such a way as to 
tarnish its commitment to caring and concern. It also 
reflects a generalised acceptance that nothing should be
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done to a person without that person's actual or real 
consent. That is, he or she should Lave the political 
or human right to participate or not, and the freedom to 
withhold cooperation - a freedom which is central to the 
right to self-determination and which is sadly lacking in 
the examples used above.
However, these examples are extreme, and as such 
tend to polarise opinion. Few have any real doubts 
about their reaction to the involuntary incarceration of 
those whose only apparent deviation from the norm is 
their expressed opposition to a political regime. Nor 
would many support the use of ethnic or religious 
minorities as guinea-pigs to be sacrificed on the altar 
of political dogma or scientific interest. The 
position, then, seems relatively clear. In these 
selected situations, people revolt against the 
exploitation of fellow human beings and, in so doing, 
recognise man's right to self-determination within 
medicine. This, then, seems to reflect a level of
commitment to fellow citizens which renders disputes 
about the manifestation of their integrity through the 
provision of consent to medical teatment, obsolete.
The truth is, however, far from this. When 
situations are as clear as the alleged Soviet abuse of 
psychiatry, or the Nazi doctors' well-documented abuse of 
the Jews or the handicapped, then a powerful, vocal and 
\ fairly consistent response car; safely be predicted. Eut 
the standard therapeutic medical interaction seems so far
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removed from these excesses that it appears at first 
sight to have no relationship Whatever with them. 
Surely, there is no coercion, no political overtone in 
the ordinary practice of medicine?
Whilst this is an understandable question, there 
are those who for some time have identified just sucli 
characteristics even in the most elementary or apparently 
unproblematic medical action. Szasz, [_S] for example, 
would argue that psychiatry always demonstrates just such 
features. Psychiatric diagnoses and treatments are, in 
his terms, political tools used to safeguard the 
community and its interests from those whose views or 
behaviour are unacceptable, strange or frightening. 
Illich,LlO] further, argues that the role of medicine in 
the community is always, at least incidentally if not 
primarily, political, and he identifies several levels of 
political and functional deprivation[llj which can result 
from iatrogenesis (medicine induced illness) or from the 
aspirations and practices of medicine.
Hie picture, then, my be less clear than at first 
appears. Whilst the problems arising from the aims and 
functions of orthodox medicine nay be overstated by Szasz 
and Illich, nonetheless, if health - physical and mental 
- really is vital to the human and political status of 
the individual, and through tire individual to the 
community, then it is important that the moral principles 
on which the orthodox practice of medicine is based be 
carefully examined from the point of view of the human
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rights involved. In fact, the more subtle shades of the 
standard medical transaction do present examples of abuse 
which may be less clear-cut but Which are nonetheless 
important, even although they may seem to have less overt 
political and moral inport.
Of course, the subtle nature of the standard 
medical relationship makes Hie identification of abuse 
more difficult, and the fact that its motivation will 
generally be benevolent makes its exposure more 
painful. Nonetheless, such abuses as do occur may be 
every bit as detrimental to the good practice of 
medicine, in both its tedlmical and moral sense. 
Requirements about consent are such that they are central 
to the moral nature of medical practice, as well as 
bearing on its technical and healing capabilities. The 
inevitable inequality of information and technical skills 
between doctor and patient, plus the essential 
vulnerability of the patient, make this requirement at 
once both highly sensitive and vitally important.
How is Consent Evidenced?
\
For the patient to make a free and knowing decision 
either to consent to or refuse therapy, certain moral and 
legal requirements must be met. In theory at least 
these requirements seem to coincide. The patient should 
be a sane, adult person, free irom duress, and the 
decision about therapy should be based on the provision
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of sufficient/ intelligible information for him or her to 
make what is often referred to as an 'informed' choice. 
[12] As has been said, 'Li]t is the prerogative of the 
patient, not the physician, to determine for himself the 
direction in which his interests seem to lie.'[13]
Before considering what is actually meant by the 
real consent, it is appropriate first to consider hew the 
patient may indicate consent to medical intervention, and 
as a corollary, how refusal of consent may be 
evidenced. It is sometimes thought that a patient 
evidences consent to medical treatment merely by 
consulting the doctor.L14] this inference is drawn from 
the mere fact of voluntary consultation, but a further 
step must be made before this consultation bears on the 
question of consent. Certainly, the patient will, in 
the run-of-the-mill medical transaction, freely and 
voluntarily consult the doctor, impliedly or explicitly 
inviting the making of a diagnosis, and perhaps even 
anticipating the prescription of therapy. yet, can this 
really be equivalent to an acceptance of the subsequently 
recommended therapy without further information being 
given?
Quite apart from the obvious ethical 
considerations which would be involved were such an 
assertion to be routinely accepted, common sense would 
dictate that the invitation to exercise the professional 
expertise held by the doctor and to reach a diagnosis 
cannot be equivalent to providing consent to whatever
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treatment- the doctor may then regard as being appropriate 
to the condition. Nor does it equate to consent to the 
use of potentially invasive diagnostic techniques unless 
these are explained and accepted. It may be that it is 
easier to equate the two when one considers the routine 
prescription of a drug whose side effects are likely to 
be known and minimal. However/ if consultation equals 
consent to therapy then the same implications v;ould also 
necessarily have to apply where the therapy was more 
radically intrusive, for example involving chemotherapy 
or amputation of limbs. Clearly, if consent is to mean 
anything, it must involve more than the mere fact of 
consultation. It must, in fact, be based on 
information, and since the' patient knows little or 
nothing in advance about the likely diagnosis and the 
range of available therapies, he or she surely cannot 
have the decision to accept or reject that therapy 
pre-empted merely by taking the step of consulting a 
doctor. Consent,, in order to be meaningful, cannot be 
backdated to the stage at which the individual recognises 
illness and seeks investigation of its cause and 
nature. Further, in view of the rights which it lias 
been claimed the patient has to make choices about 
whether or not to undergo treatment, it would be 
illogical to impute consent to therapy at a stage when 
the choice as to whether or not to accept it lies in the 
future.
Of course, the patient may come to the doctor
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specifically seeking a particular torm of therapy/ for 
example/ anti-depressants or antibiotics. Indeed/ such 
drugs may have been prescribed in the past. This 
situation differs from that descibed above in that there 
may already be an element of knowledge. The extent to 
which the situations differ will, however/ depend on the 
extent of any prior knowledge which the patient had. 
Where the patient seeks a drug about whose risks and 
benefits he or she has not previously been informed, but, 
for example, requests it by specific name, it may be 
argued that this is an expressed or implied consent to 
accepting the drug, and therefore is real consent. 
However, if the nature of real consent is that it is 
based on information disclosure, then clearly mere 
knowledge of a brand name cannot constitute sufficient 
information to provide the patient with a knowledgeable 
choice of therapy. further, were such a definition of 
consent acceptable, it would necessarily assume that 
consent is demonstrated simply by the patient saying 
'yes' or taking the prescription, and would beg the 
fundamental question as to whether or not he or she can 
provide legally or morally acceptable consent in 
ignorance of risks and benefits.
This specific question will be considered later in 
more detail, [15] but it is worth bearing in mind at this 
stage that the doctor is consulted precisely because lie 
or she has certain skills. The average patient lacks 
this expertise. The doctor who equates consent to
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treatment with the request for diagnosis or for the 
provision of certain drugs, is placing him or herself in 
a morally and professionally dubious position. 
Therefore, acceptance of therapy, whilst it may 
pragmatically seem to be the equivalent of actual consent 
to therapy, cannot necessarily be equated with a morally 
or legally acceptable or valid consent. This is an 
important consideration for doctors to bear in mind 
' since, if therapy provided on this basis causes 
unpleasant side-effects, they may find themselves 
successfully challenged on the basis that, even although 
diagnosis and therapy were both accurate and appropriate, 
the patient was not aware of, and did not accept, the 
risks which in fact occurred. In other words, the 
consent which is given must be much more than the mere 
acceptance of the doctor's treatment plan, it should also 
be knowing, that is, based on information.
The second situation, involving, the patient 
seeking the provision of a drug which has been prescribed 
before, differs fundamentally from this example. Where 
the doctor has previously explained the potential risks 
and benefits of the drug or therapy, then recent legal 
opinion would suggest that no explicit subsequent 
reference to them is necessary.[16] However, when 
consent is viewed as involving discussion and disclosure 
of information, even previous prescription of the drug or 
practice of the therapy would not satisfy these 
requirements where no explanation was made at that
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time. The requirement about disclosure of information 
remains, even Where the drug or therapy has been used 
before.
This is not to say, however, that non-verbally 
indicated consent cannot be valid. Where sufficient 
information has been disclosed and the patient accepts 
the therapy, for example the provision of a prescription, 
his or her consent may be demonstrated by the taking of 
the prescription to the chemist, acceptance of the drugs 
and commencing the treatment programme. Indeed, it is 
probably the case that the -method of indicating consent 
to therapy is legally and morally irrelevant. What is 
vital is the basis on which that acceptance of therapy is 
made, that is, the extent, nature and sufficiency of the 
information on which the patient formulated his or her 
decision.
What is fundamental to the provision of consent, 
then, is the protection of the freedom of the individual 
to make choices, and therefore, what functionally makes 
consent valid is that aspect of it which is sometimes 
'referred to as being knowledgeable. For obvious 
reasons, the doctor may be better protected by having the 
patient consent in writing, since this leaves evidence of 
an agreement having been readied.[17] However, this nay 
still be diallenged if the patient claims that something 
other than what was consented to was actually done, or 
challenges the quality of information disclosed. Thus, 
in Devi v. West Midlands Regional Health Authority [IS]
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although a woman had signed a consent term authorising 
abdominal surgery/ she was awarded damages since she had 
' not consented to the doctor carrying out a sterilisation 
while she was under the anaesthetic. Further, in Wells 
v. Surrey Area Health Authority, L19] even the fact that a 
consent form (to a sterilisation) had been signed, was 
not taken as establishing in se that the information on 
which the signing was based was adequate. In fact, the 
court judged that the patient had been inadequately 
informed, and damages were awarded accordingly. 
Obviously, however, the more specific the consent form, 
the more likely the doctor is to be protected.
Consent, therefore, may be demonstrated in a
number of ways, ranging from simple acceptance of the 
therapy, to the specific signing of a consent form. 
However, expression of a legally and norally valid
consent, whichever of these devices is used, still 
depends on the informea[2Gj nature of that consent. It 
is particularly important to remember. this, since it is 
the right of the patient to choose therapy or not - it is
not the right of the doctor to treat merely because he or
she can. Whilst it is easy to conceive of the doctor as 
having duties in respect of the patient, he or she has no 
rights in this respect, other than the right to practice 
his or her profession when authorised to do so by those 
seeking his or her help. Ihis is a practical rather 
than a moral right, dependent on the professional 
requirements for entitlement to give treatment, rather
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than on any essential moral right to exercise his or'her 
skills come what may.
What is Consent?
Real consent is, in theory at least, a prerequisite of
morally or legally valid medical practice, although 
English Courts have recently indicated that 'informed 
consent' is not a part of English law.[21] Indeed, it 
will be argued infra [22] that there is much to be gained 
from using a terminology which differs from that of 
'informed consent'. This is not, however, to imply that 
British courts will ignore consent as an issue, ncr to 
imply that current legal doctrine has no implications 
about disclosure. As was said in Hills v. Potter[23]:
... it is quite clear from the English
cases...that on any view English law does 
require the surgeon to supply to the patient 
information to enable the plaintiff to decide 
whether or not to undergo the operation.[24]
There is no doubt that Scottish courts would also give 
considerable weight to information disclosure, although 
the point has not been directly tested. As lias been 
seen, the provision of consent is vital since it is not
only a protection of the moral status of the individual
patient but it also has the effect of rendering medical 
intervention lawful. For the patient, the former may be 
the more important aspect, but for the doctor perhaps the
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latter consideration is the more vital.
The valid provision of consent can turn What could 
otherwise be deemed an assault into legally protected 
behaviour. For, whilst consent is only rarely a defence 
in the criminal law, it may be a defence - as in this
\
1 case - in allegations of a civil (that is non-criminal) 
nature. Hie reasons for this difference are 
illuminating. In the criminal law, it is not possible 
to change the nature of a charge, say, of murder because 
the victim consents to it .Lit] Thus even voluntary 
euthanasia or assault remain criminal offences.[26] 
This is a reflection of the fact that the behaviour 
involved in the act is struck at by the law on the 
grounds that it is in itself morally reprehensible. Cf 
course, this effectively limits some aspects of vhat 
might be called the autonomy of the individual who is not 
permitted to absolve the attacker of blame - even where 
he or she voluntarily submits to the assault - but this 
limitation can be justified because it represents only a 
small intrusion into autonomy and the overwhelming value 
of preventing sudi behaviour overrides the minimal value 
of this aspect of autonomy. The only situation in which 
consent will be a defence in the criminal law is where 
the lack of consent is central to the nature and quality 
of the act. Thus, for example, a reasonable belief that 
a woman consents to intercourse (net in itself a morally 
reprehensible act) will provide a defence against a 
charge of rape.L27]
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Medical practice, however, is traditionally dealt 
with by the civil law, in terms of which acceptance of 
risk and agreement to take the consequences of the risk, 
should it occur, is a valid defence expressed in the 
maxim volenti non fit injuria.L28] In other words, the 
person who freely and knowingly agrees to a course of 
action which involves known risks is not injured legally 
if one of these risks actually occurs, and therefore 
cannot sue the other party to the enterprise if lie or she 
is damaged as a result of the occurrence of the risk. 
So, although medical practice may involve the doctor in 
undertaking a course of behaviour which, in other 
circumstances, would be an assault - for example surgery 
- the knowing and free consent of the patient will render 
this lawful. Voluntary acceptance by the patient, based 
on adequate information disclosure, will also ensure that 
he or she cannot successfully sue the doctor should one 
of the risks to which attention was drawn, and which he 
or she indicated agreement to assume, actually occur.
It is therefore in the interests of both doctor and 
patient that valid consent (involving disclosure of risks 
and benefits) is provided in all forms of therapy.
It has already been pointed out that mere apparent 
acceptance of therapy, whether verbally or in writing, is
\
not necessarily a sufficient demonstration that consent 
has been validly given. Thus, even where the patient 
agrees to undertake the therapy, it cannot necessarily be 
assumed that this 'choice1 has been based on sufficient
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information to render it meaningful or sufficient to 
satisfy moral or legal criteria. Hie provision of valid 
consent is much more than a mechanical procedure 
culminating in the patient accepting therapy. I-iore is 
required, implying the disclosure of information, and 
perhaps even patient understanding of that information.
[29] However, even this is rather vague and 
unhelpful. Disclosure of what? Does the doctor have a 
duty to ensure patient understanding? Deed the doctor 
disclose rare and unlikely possible risks?
Clearly, if morally arid legally valid consent is 
dependent on the patient being in a position to make a 
real choice, then there must be information made 
available to him or her on which this choice can be 
based. Of course, even without disclosure, it could be 
argued that the patient has available a sufficient range 
of choices. Ihe patient may choose not to consult a 
doctor, or nay accept or reject therapy without any 
information at all. Thus, if the right to self - 
determination is protected merely by the availability of 
choices, then does not the patient already have choices 
in these terms, and is self-determination not 
sufficiently protected by these freedoms alone?
Ihe answer to these questions will obviously 
depend on what is meant by 'choice'. In the medical 
transaction, the freedom to consult a doctor or not does, 
of course, bear some relation to the freedom of the 
individual. Equally, the patient may choose not to seek 
\
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any information about diagnosis or therapy, and it would 
be his or her right to do so. However, the patient who 
chooses the latter course of action will be increasingly 
rare in a rights conscious society, and the doctor should 
not assume that this will be the case. Equally, the 
fact that a patient has the freedom to consult a doctor 
or not, whilst it may be important, does not affect the 
freedoms and rights to which he or she may be entitled 
once the choice has been made to enter into a 
relationship with a doctor. In recognition of this, it 
is seldom argued that no information should be disclosed 
to patients about their proposed therapy, although it may 
be the case that, for example, in the routine 
prescription of common drugs, such as antibiotics, little 
if any information actually is disclosed by the doctor 
about possible side-effects. This is a reflection of a
number of factors, such as assumptions about patient 
understanding of the likely side-effects of such common 
drugs, rather than a moral supposition by the doctor that 
there is no general obligation to make disclosure.
Hie major dilemma in questions of disclosure, 
however, relates more often to its nature and extent than 
it does to the actual need to make it. Thus, doctors 
may be uncertain about whether or not they are legally or 
morally obliged to make disclosure of risks even if a 
patient does not ask for information, and also about what 
sort of disclosure satisfies the concept of real consent.
Clearly, the doctor is the possessor of both
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skills and information in the medical transaction. Vvere 
it otherwise, then he or she would net he consulted. 
Ihe patient, then, is vulnerable not only because he or 
she suspects illness and may therefore be in need of 
help, but also because of the inequality of information 
possessed by the parties in the doctor /patient
relationship. If this information is essential to the 
ability to make informed choices in the vitally important 
matter of health, then the doctor has at least a moral 
duty to disclose such medical information as he or she 
has, even where this information is unsolicited. 
Indeed, to make the extent of disclosure dependent on the 
questions asked by the patient would obviously be 
inappropriate, since by definition, the patient is 
unlikely to possess the information which would be 
necessary to ensure that the right questions are asked.
[3 0 ]
However, the doctor - whilst doubtless likely to 
accept the logic of this - is nonetheless still faced 
with the dilemma of what infornation must or should be 
disclosed in order to ensure that the patient is 
'genuinely consenting. Eoes the patient have to knew the 
technicalities of drug action or of the relevant surgical 
procedure? Should the doctor disclose all known risks, 
or merely some of them? How much account should the 
doctor take in deciding about the level of disclosure, of 
the chances of the therapy succeeding, even if its 
potential side-effects are particularly unpleasant?
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One possible view, of course, is that only by 
making full and complete disclosure of all known risks 
and potential benefits can the patient's autonomy be 
protected. By selecting the information which is to be 
disclosed, the doctor is already limiting the patient's 
right to determine his or her own future, because certain 
assumptions are being nade about which information the 
patient needs or should know. Ihe desire of the doctor 
to be selective is easily understood, not only on the 
pragmatic basis that full disclosure could be 
unreasonably time-consuming, but also on the more general 
basis that the aim is to cure, or at least to alleviate, 
suffering, and that this could be said to be the most 
important aspect of the interaction of the doctor with 
his or her patient. further, since disclosure of 
certain information might serve to dissuade the patient 
from undergoing the therapy which the doctor knows, or 
has reasonable grounds to believe, might ensure the 
improvement which the patient presumably sought when 
consulting the doctor, then surely the doctor has a 
professional duty not to disclose that information? In 
other words, if the patient voluntarily makes contact 
with the doctor, is it not reasonable that, where 
medicine can help, it should do so? Is the restoration 
of health not also vital to the patient's autonomy, 
perhaps as important as his right to make choices? 
Indeed, it nay be that the restoration of individual 
health could also be seen as an important benefit to the
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community as a whole, either because of risks to the 
health of others, or on economic or other grounds.
Whilst this approach has certain attractions, it 
is based on challengeable assumptions. host notable of 
these is the belief that voluntary consultation 
necessarily implies a comndtment to cure or to undergo 
therapy. EUrther, and even more fundamentally, it seems 
to imply that the decision about whether or not to accept 
therapy is one which can or should be taken on the basis 
of purely medical considerations. It has already been 
claimed that mere consultation cannot amount to an 
indication of consent to therapy. For example, the
\
patient may in fact only want diagnosis, and may net 
actually seek or accept therapy. EUrther, the patient 
may choose whether or not to undergo a given therapy on 
the basis of values and criteria which are not medical - 
they may be emotional, financial and so on. Only full 
disclosure of known risks and likely benefits will 
actually allow these other considerations and factors - 
which are relevant to the patient - to be taken into 
account. The role of the doctor is to facilitate 
health, not to inflict it on the public. Medicine lias 
no general right to enforce its diagnostic techniques, 
therapies or palliatives on an unconsenting or unwilling 
patient. In some situations, of course, ^the health of 
the community may be deemed more important than the 
individual freedom to choose therapy or not. This is 
often the case in preventive measures, such as mass
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vaccination programmes. But it is worth noting that it 
was precisely because the patient in these situations is 
encouraged or required to undergo the vaccination that 
the Bqyal Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation 
for Personal Injury[31] (Pearson Commission) made damage 
resulting from vaccine a special case. Unusually in 
non-contract situations, compensation nay be sought for 
vaccine damage under a strict liability scheme.[32]
In other situations, however, there is a close 
link between the unknowing and the unwilling patient. 
Few doctors, if any, would seriously countenance 
deliberately inflicting therapy on a patient who has
refused to participate in it, even where the therapy is 
likely to succeed. Such behaviour could easily be seen 
as immoral and unprofessional, whatever its legal
implications. However, medicine does seem to 
countenance undertaking therapy in respect of those who 
are not overtly unwilling - they may even have apparently 
consented - but who in fact liave teen denied the
opportunity to be unwilling by the conscious withholding 
of information. This non-disclosure may be explained on 
the grounds that the therapy will be likely to be
successful, but this may also be the case with the 
unwilling patient whose forcible treatment the doctor 
would be unlikely to seek to justify. Hie distinction 
'between non-voluntary and involuntary medical treatment 
is a fine one. Thus, even where medicine knows it can 
cure, an elementary commitment to the patient's right to
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self-determination must allow for choice, and real choice 
is only available where disclosure is made.
Evidently, however, although full disclosure may 
be a morally attractive gcal, it may be difficult to 
achieve for practical reasons. Hie extent to which 
these practical considerations are taken as significant 
will be evident from analysis of legal rules and 
'attitudes, since they nay have the effect either cf 
reinforcing or reducing expectations, and will shape the 
practical definition of the rights of the patient.[33] 
Hie attitude adopted by the legal system will therefore 
play a fundamental part in the explanation of what is 
valid consent. In the meantime, however, there are 
further arguments beyond the puiely practical one of time 
shortage which could be used in an attempt to justify 
limitation of information or even total non-disclosure.
For example, it may be argued that full disclosure 
of technical or specialised information is irrelevant and 
unnecessary because the patient cannot fully understand 
the information. However, the doctor may rationally be 
perceived as having a duty to make disclosure which - 
although it may ideally lead to or facilitate patient 
understanding - can also be seen as independent of it. 
That is, if the patient has a right to receive, and the 
doctor has a correlative duty to disclose, there is no 
inherent implication that the received information is 
also understood. Vhilst some writers have argued that 
disclosure without understanding is useless,[34] it may
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be that the mere act of disclosing information and 
inviting discussion nonetheless serves a purpose Which is 
important.[35] Thus, although disclosure of information 
which is highly technical in nature and which may be 
unintelligible to the patient may serve little, if any, 
practical purpose, it may nonetheless have an important 
symbolic one which may prove to be vital to the creation 
or maintenance of trust and respect between doctor and 
patient, ana to the enhancing of the patient's
autonomy.[36] In any event, whilst it seems reasonable
to impose a duty to disclose, derivative from the
patient's right to information, it is scarcely reasonable
to impose a duty on the doctor to ensure understanding.
Further, whilst the patient cannot reasonably be 
expected to understand the technicalities of precisely 
how an incision is made or why a particular drug may 
cause nausea, hair loss and so on, it is disingenuous to 
pretend that he or she cannot understand the fundamental 
point that the result will be an abdominal scar, sickness
or baldness. If information is presented in everyday
\
language, then the salient points about side-effects can 
be grasped by most patients.[37J
It may also be argued that disclosure of risks 
will cause patient distress, and that therefore only 
selected (presumably non-distiessing) side-effects should 
be disclosed. Indeed, it has been argued that 
disclosure of too many risks may amount to negligence if 
the patient is indeed distressed.[38] Buchanan, [39]
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amongst others, convincingly challenges this so-called 
'prevention of harm' argument by pointing out its
essential fallacies. First, a doctor will seldom be in
\
a position to know precisely what will distress the 
patient, since that distress will inevitably be bound up 
with personal factors which may be totally non-medical. 
Secondly, for the doctor to act on the basis that 
withholding information will avoid patient distress, 
account must also be taken of the possibility that the 
withholding of information may in itself turn cut to be 
even more distressing.[40]
This 'prevention of harm' argument further makes 
the (challengeable) assumption that the patient's 
distress about certain types of side-effect is irrelevant 
to the calculation as to whether or net to undergo 
therapy, whereas it may - on personal rather than purely 
medical grounds - be vital to that decision, and autonomy 
enhancing. It is also interesting to note the 
underlying paternalism of this view which, whilst it may 
in certain rare instances have some merit, is nonetheless 
a debateable basis for medical practice in general. 
Interestingly, the available evidence would suggest that 
many patients who are given full disclosure are not 
apparently harmed by it.L41] Ihe implications of the 
approach which justifies non-disclosure seem to militate 
strongly in favour of the kind of one-way trust which 
reflects the dominance of the medical profession, and 
detracts from the benefits of a partnership between
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doctor and patient.
Vvhilst it is understandable that the doctor may 
have a bias in favour of therapy, or a particular 
therapeutic option, the mere fact that a potentially 
successful therapy is available should not blind him or 
her to patients' rights. Thus, it is unconvincing to 
argue against disclosure on the basis that it might 
prevent the patient from undergoing therapy. Hie 
patient may, as has been seen, on balance prefer the 
disease to the cure, or even the diagnostic procedures, 
for reasons which may be personally convincing but 
medically irrational. This apparent irrationality 
provides yet another argument against making full 
disclosure since, if the patient receives and understands 
the information what, it could be argued, is the point of
\
taking the trouble to make disclosure if he or she can 
then ignore the import of it and act on a whim? It may 
seem particularly desirable to avoid irrational (in 
medical terms) behaviour in areas as fundamental as 
health and illness. However, it must be a part of the 
patient's autonomy that he or she can act on the basis of 
the information provided, or on the basis of different 
information. In other words, the patient nay act on a 
mere whim or because other factors are mere persuasive.
It is, perhaps, only where the behaviour of the patient 
threatens others, that a justification for intervention 
is perceived, at least on classical utilitarian lines. 
The freedom to ignore professional or other advice is, of
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course, also a feature of other less sensitive areas of 
human conduct. Whilst A may freely and voluntarily 
consult a solicitor, who may advise him or her to the 
best of his or her ability to pursue course X, A nay 
nonetheless choose to do Y instead. As in the medical 
situation, A will bear the consequences of his or her 
behaviour which ray seem to be professionally irrational, 
but may in fact be personally sensible.
So, what, then, must or should a doctor disclose 
to his or her patient in order to ensure that real 
consent has actually been obtained? In this section, 
the emphasis has been on the moral and professional 
arguments about what constitutes reasonable or ethical 
consent. Ihe final arbiter will, of course, be the 
legal system, since challenges which may reflect moral or 
professional convictions will - if redress is sought - be 
judged on the basis of tests set by the law, even if they 
are decided outside of a court of law. Hie extent of 
the disclosure required by the law will therefore be an 
important (although not necessarily satisfactory) guide 
to the doctor.
Ihe Legal Position
Ihe civil law has the function of considering and 
balancing competing claims and interests. In this way 
it distributes loss by assessing the relative merits of 
\ behaviour. Overtly, therefore, the law could reasonably
SI
be expected to adopt a disinterested view of any 
professional behaviour, and to offer protection of 
fundamental rights such as the right to autonomy or 
self-determination. Eut is the situation this 
straightforward where the aims of medicine conpete with 
the interests of the individual?
The interests of the community (as represented in 
this case by Hie law) may be reflected both by the 
protection of the individual's freedom of choice and by 
\ the protection of medicine and the availability ofl
therapy. Balance, therefore, may be particularly 
difficult to achieve in this area. / Courts have, indeed, 
perceived this situation as one requiring special 
precautions in order to ensure that an appropiate 
compromise may be attained.[42]
A number of theoretical positions have already 
been identified which could be used to justify anything 
from full to very limited disclosure of information. 
Since disclosure is fundamental to the extent to which 
consent can be said to be real, and therefore, protective 
of individual rights, the amount of disclosure required 
by the law will be vital to the protection of such rights 
and the resolution of disputes.
Ihe legal and the moral positions may not of 
course equate, even where they appear to be the same. 
Ihe basic theoretical position is that consent is an 
essential prerequisite of lawful and morally justifiable 
medical intervention. Emphasis is therefore apparently
placed on the rights of patients. As Pellegrino and 
Thomasma[43j point out:
Ihe , traditional stance of benevolent 
authoritarianism in the pa ti ent-phy s ician
encounter is increasingly under scrutiny and 
challenge. tore patients want full 
disclosure of the therapeutic alternatives.
Legal opinion is unanimous in requiring 
informed consent not only in experimental 
procedures but in the ordinary therapeutic 
encounter.L44]
Whilst British courts have claimed to be prepared 
to reinforce the right of the individual to make choices 
about therapy, the extent to which they will actually do 
so seems to depend on considerations which relate to the 
type of intervention as much as to the rights of the 
patient.
 ^ In some cases courts have been prepared to uphold
the patient's claim that real consent was not given and 
to award damages correspondingly. However, cases such 
as Devi v. West Midland Regional Health Authority[45] and 
Wells v. Surrey Area Health Authority, [46] where such 
decisions were taken, share a common characteristic which 
may help to explain the apparent willingness of the 
courts to provide redresaTY Each of these cases related 
to situations where the result of the intervention to 
which real consent had not been given was the 
sterilisation of the parties concerned. In one case, 
sterilisation was carried out during the course of 
another operation, as a means of avoiding the potential
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dangers of a subsequent pregnancy, and no mention had 
been made in advance that sterilisation might be carried 
out. In the other, although sterilisation had been 
discussed with, and agreed to by, the patient, it was 
decided that insufficient infornation had been given on 
\ which the patient could base her decision.
Hie common theme of these two cases may well be 
the fact that the implications of the surgery were so 
dramatic. It is claimed by seme that there is a 
fundamental human right to reproduce, L47] and the courts 
may well have been heavily influenced by recognition of 
the existence of this right in reaching their 
decisions. They would, however, seem to be considerably 
less impressed by the claim that, no matter the nature of 
the proposed intervention, there is a fundamental human 
right to self-determination in medicine which is also 
worthy of legal protection, and which is best protected 
by requiring full disclosure of all available risks ana 
benefits.L48]
The law does, of course, have a role to play in 
the rationalisation of competing interests. In cases 
where what is in dispute is whether or not consent has 
been validly given, the formal position of the lav/ is 
that:
It is clear law that in any context in which 
consent of the injured party is a defence to 
what would otherwise be a crime or a civil 
wrong, that consent must be real.[48J
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Ihis assertion would appear to reinforce the need for 
disclosure. However, although it seems to reflect an 
emphasis upon the rights of the patient to give real 
consent, this theoretical position seems to be at 
variance with at least some of tie cases outlined 
above. Ihe perceived necessity to rationalise the 
interests of the patient in making choices, and of 
medicine in curing or alleviating symptoms, seems in some 
cases at least to have induced the law to adopt views 
which can be described as paternalistic and which can 
also be effectively and convincingly challenged. The 
sane, adult human being may, then, be vulnerable to an 
apparent priority awarded to clinical decisions over the 
r^ights of the patient to make free decisions about what 
is to be done with or to his or her body or mind. Hie 
right to choose (however 'irrationally') seems to have 
been subordinated to the 'light' of the doctor to make 
disclosure or not, and to select what information will be 
passed on to the patient. fioreover, the selection of 
information on the' basis of what are only arguably 
medical grounds, allows little or no scope for the kind 
of personalised choice which it has been claimed makes 
consent real, knowing and valid.
British, and other, courts have traditionally 
protected the clinical freedom of the doctor on those 
(relatively) rare occasions when a challenge to its 
exercise has been made.[50] Ihe pattern of litigation 
in medical cases seeius to have changed in recent years,
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however, and courts and defence organisations have been 
confronted with more regular challenges of this type. 
Whilst clinical freedom has been protected in most 
countries, it lias been claimed that the British courts 
have been more protective than those in other countries, 
perhaps as a reflection of the general, prevailing 
attitude to medicine and its practitioners.[51] In 
other countries, a lesser commitment to the interests of 
medicine has resulted in a perhaps more genuine, but not 
necessarily more satisfactory, effort being made to 
reconcile the conflict between medicine and its 
patients. American courts, for example, have clearly 
stated that:
A physician violates his duty to his patient 
and subjects himself to liability if he 
witholds any facts which are necessary to 
form the basis of an intelligent consent by 
the patient to the proposed treatment. 
Likewise the physician may not minimise the 
known dangers of a procedural operation in 
order to induce his patient's consent.[52]
This statement seems to identify no conflict of interest 
between the doctor's professionalism and the patient's 
rights. Further, whilst not excluding an element of 
discretion for the doctor, it nonetheless firmly restates 
the basic principle that the doctor's duty to disclose is 
based on the patient's right to receive information, 
although it still falls far short of a standard for full 
disclosure. In Canterbury v. Spence, [53] it was made 
quite clear that there were 'formidable obstacles to
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acceptance of the notion that the physician1s obligation 
to disclose is either generated or limited by medical 
practice.'L54] Ihe law, therefore, as representing the
community, must, by inplication, set standards for 
professionals and others which reflect the status 
a^ccorded to the human being, and provide redress for 
infringement of his or her basic rights. However, in 
most jurisdictions full disclosure is not required - only 
that which is reasonable. The reasonableness question 
may hinge on what the reasonable doctor would disclose or 
what the reasonable patient could expect, but, whichever 
test is used, there remains an apparent assumption that 
not all information need be disclosed.[55]
It is argued that everyone, including doctors, is 
ultimately judged by the law. Legal standards are 
therefore necessarily vague, since lawyers can claim no 
specific expertise in many of the areas on which 
decisions must be made. Architects and engineers as 
well as doctors, will ultimately, in the event of 
challenge, find their behaviour judged by legal concepts 
and principles rather than by their fellow 
professionals. In this way, public accountability is 
said to be achieved, and the community has the benefit of 
continuity and consistency in decision-making. However, 
the law also serves a protective purpose both for the 
individual and for groups or professions. Thus, the 
abstract principle applied is of major importance, as is 
the way in which that principle is interpreted by the
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courts. Whilst both British and American courts, for 
example, would claim to espouse the same commitment to 
the individual's freedom, and the same appreciation of 
the difficulties of medical practice, nonetheless it will 
be seen that their practical approach has varied 
considerably, presumably because of the relative weight 
given to each of these factors when conflict occurs. 
[56] However, neither these nor other jurisdictions 
make a clear-cut commitment to the right of the patient 
to full disclosure leading to a meaningful, and morally
,reinforced, decision. bather, there remains a bias in
\I
favour of clinical juagement. This so-called 
disinterested decision-making, then, may ultimately lead 
not to an acceptable standard, protecting the right of 
the patient to offer a meaningful consent (or to withhold 
consent), but rattier to a reflection of the personal 
perceptions of judges or the interests of a particular 
grcnp.
How is Lack of Information Challenged?
The apparent legal commitment, in most jurisdictions, to 
seeing medical intervention as a profound good, coupled 
with an apparent distaste for legitimising challenges 
against medical decisions, is reflected in the cases 
referred to.L57] However, there has also been a further 
legal move which serves to nake it more difficult 
successfully to raise an action against a doctor where
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the allegation concerns apparent or real failure to 
obtain genuine consent. Ibis move is concerned with the 
methods available to the disaffected patient in seeking 
redress by way of compensation, and profoundly affects 
the capacity successfully to challenge breach of the 
right to consent.L58J
As a corollary, protection of valued rights and 
interests is offered through the existence of a system 
which can ensure redress in respect of those who are 
thought to have a genuine grievance. In recognition of 
the importance of autonomy in medicine, the right of the 
patient to make choices about the nature and extent of 
medical intervention is, therefore, in theory at least, 
legally protected, and compensation can be sought for the 
unauthorised invasion of what might broadly be called the 
privacy of the individual.
Traditionally, this right of action has been based 
on the concept that an unauthorised intervention is a 
form of (non-criminal) assault cn the individual, an 
approach which has some apparent benefits for the 
patient, since it involves a straightforward commitment 
to the protection of his or her rights, and suggests that 
the right of action stems from a primary interest in 
protecting them. Simply, it depends on the patient's 
choices and freedoms. He or she need not have suffered 
measureable medical harm from tire intervention but must 
simply have had his or her right to choose ignored, or 
his or her ability to make a choice seriously restricted
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by lack of information. The crucial element is that of 
non-disclosure, and the selection of information by the 
doctor could provide a sufficient basis for a successful 
action.[59]
However, recent trends have illustrated a tendency 
for this type of action not to be used.[60] Kather the 
courts are demanding that - except in the most extreme 
cases - the appropriate form of action would be in
negligence and not on the basis of assault.[61] At 
first sight, this shift in the basis of the action may 
seem logical enough and relatively non-intrusive of the 
right to consent. After all, it may be said, what is 
essentially being considered is the behaviour of a given
\
'doctor, and such behaviour will normally be judged on the 
basis of what is good or normal medical practice, a type 
of assessment which is well suited to negligence 
analysis. Indeed, in one leading decision in New 
Zealand, it was expressly declared that, when dealing
with matters of this sort, what is being considered is
not the patient1 s rights but the doctor1 s duty. In
Smith v. Auckland Hospital Board,[62] it was said that:
If the issue in the case was the maintenance 
of the individual's right of 
self-determination, the matter would quickly 
resolve itself. But it is not. This is a 
question within the duty of care concept of 
negligence... Hie welfare of patients would 
not be secured if a doctor's duty to warn 
about proposed treatment was to be considered 
in abstraction from the condition to which 
they were to be applied. [63]
The emphasis on doctor's duties Which is inherent 
in the negligence action could, of course, still protect 
individual rights if the doctor's duty is defined by lav/ 
in appropriate terms.L64] however, courts have, rather, 
tended to emphasise the standard of care set by other 
medical practitioners as being descriptive of the 
doctor's duty.L65] therefore the shift to the 
negligence action has, in most jurisdictions, provided 
limited opportunity for the individual to obtain redress 
for grievances of this sort and has served to redefine 
the right in issue. The alteration in the form of 
action Which is deemed appropriate is more than merely 
symbolic, then. As has been noted:
How the case is pleaded in many cases is more 
than a matter of mere academic interest. It 
will have important bearing on such natters 
as the incidence of the onus of proof, 
causation, the importance of expert medical 
evidence, the significance of medical 
judgement, proof of damage and, mcst 
important, of course, the substantive basis 
upon which liability may be found.[66]
Indeed, if the purpose of providing an action in such 
cases is the protection of individual rights, then, 
whereas the interpretation of others will be interesting 
and may be informative, to describe the right purely or 
even primarily in terms of the duty owed to the person 
who has the right seems to be to place the emphasis on an 
inappropriate aspect of the event. The description of 
'the right seems to have a logical precedence over the
91
description of the corresponding (and derivative) duty.
It is clear that the assessments made under negligence 
analysis are appropriate when the crux of the issue is 
the professional behaviour of the doctor in terms of the 
exercise of his or her technical skills as diagnostician 
and healer. However, if requirements about consent are 
primarily designed to protect the patient's right of 
access to information and freedom to make decisions, then 
this technical behaviour is relevant here at a secondary, 
rattier than a primary, level.[67]
Conclusions
It has been argued in this chapter that there is a
special reason for considering the rights of patients in
medical treatment. Whilst such rights are clearly
aspects of self-determination and personal autonomy,
discussion of them demonstrates clearly how - even where
/
there is a public commitment to protecting 
self-deteriuination - competing ' goods' may be used 
insidiously to infringe on the core of the right itself.
lb some extent, this hypothesis can be further 
tested by considering contemporary commitments - under 
international lav/ - to the notion of 
self-determination.L68] This concept is not neutral in
respect of medical practice, and indeed the language of 
rights has been used to delimit medical practice in seme 
cases.L69] The international community has witnessed
medical abuse in the past, resulting in mass outcry and 
the promulgation of cedes rendering the unwarranted 
assumption of authority over the individual by doctors 
morally outlawed. Ihe therapeutic imperative has, in
international agreements at least, considerably less 
importance than the rights of the individual, although 
the translation of this moral position into the reality 
of individual protection is left to states whose 
processes and policies may not completely satisfy it.
Rights in medicine, therefore, play an important 
role in the general protection of the individual and the 
extent to which patients' rights are protected reflects 
the commitment of individual states to the autonomy of 
individual citizens. Whilst the ascription of a special 
status to orthodox (or alternative) medicine is net in
itself unreasonable or threatening, if national legal 
systems ignore or obfuscate the narrow line between
unwilling arid non-consensual medicine, then the rights of 
the individual will receive scant attention in the face 
of the sometimes competing interests of medicine.
Having established that it is legitimate to talk 
in terms of a right to consent to medical treatment based 
pn information disclosure, and briefly commented on some 
of the associated difficulties generated by the method by 
which such rights are protected, it is now pertinent to 
consider the role of the law in more detail. In
particular, this demands concentration on the- forms of 
action available to the patient, an analysis of the
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requirements Which satisfy them, and the extent to which 
the available forms of redress are fundamentally 
committed to, cr capable of, offering protection to the 
rights of the patient.
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ASSAULT TO NEGLIGENCE
CHAPTER 3
It has been claimed that the purpose of rules about 
consent is to protect the inviolability of the
individual. By having the capacity to make free and 
knowing choices about whether or not to undertake a given 
therapy, or participate in a particular diagnostic
technique, the individual's right to self-determination 
is protected and vindicated. Moreover, it has been noted 
that the form of action which is made available through 
the legal system is also a highly significant factor in 
the equation which leads to facilitation of the liberty 
of the individual. Indeed, the form of action available 
has significance on a number of counts. On the one hand, 
it dictates the nature and extent of the evidence
necessary to sustain a claim successfully, and on the 
other - and perhaps more subtly - it reflects the hidden 
values ascribed to the interests which it is sought to 
protect.
It is axiomatic that, if the reason for 
maintaining the significance of the right to consent to 
medical treatment relates to patient autonomy and freedom 
from involuntary or nonvoluntary intervention, then the 
patient who is not provided with the opportunity to make 
free and knowing choices has been the victim of an
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invasion of his or her physical or mental integrity. In 
other words, whatever the motivation, the patient has 
been the subject of what could be termed an assault on 
his or her body or mind.
Although the terminology of assault, battery or 
trespass might at first sight seem more obviously linked 
to the criminal law, each of these concepts (which are 
used interchangeably here, although they are not, 
strictly speaking, synonymous[1]) has a relevant place in 
the civil law also. [2] Indeed, even in the medical act 
itself, not routinely an object of concern for the 
criminal law, as Skegg notes '[mjedical procedures which 
involve bodily touching come within the potential scope 
of the crime of battery (known more popularly as 
assault).'[3] Nonetheless, the use of assault-based 
terminology seems to some to be out of place in the 
medical situation which is essentially beneficent in 
motivation. Thus, it is clear that, for example, surgery 
would amount to a criminal (or tortious/delictual) 
assault were it undertaken in other circumstances, by 
different personnel and for different reasons. However, 
the act loses the taint of criminality (or tort/delict) 
when it is carried out for good reasons, with consent, by 
appropriately qualified professionals and in a proper 
setting.[4]
However, as far as the civil law is concerned, the 
act of surgical intervention need not be entirely 
value-free when it is conducted without the consent of
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the patient. This is the case because of the value which 
has long been attributed to self-determination as an 
aspect of what it is to be human. As John Stuart Mill 
put it:
The sole end for which mankind are warranted 
in interfering with the liberty of action of 
any of their number, is self-protection
  The only part of the conduct of anyone
for which he is amenable to society, is that 
which concerns others. In the part which 
merely concerns himself, his independence is, 
of right, absolute. Over himself, over his 
own body and mind, the individual is 
sovereign.[5]
Medicine - however well-intentioned - clearly has the 
potential to affect the sovereignty of the individual 
over his or her own body or mind when free consent is not 
obtained. As Shultz[6] said, in a more modern context:
Ultimately.... the stake of both experts and 
loved ones is less intense than that of the 
patient whose well-being is directly 
affected. Patients' preferences, therefore, 
ought generally to be controlling.*[7]
In other words, since the patient is the person most 
directly (albeit perhaps not exclusively) concerned by 
the illness, it is the patient who has the ultimate right 
to decide on the conduct of therapy - if any. Neither 
professional nor societal interest should, therefore, 
interfere with the right of the patient to determine his 
or her future in health care. Failure to respect these 
rights in the individual results in an action unsupported
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by the law. Notably, in medical matters the law involved 
will be that of the non-criminal system.[8]
Traditionally, and in particular before the
synthesis of the negligence action in its present form, 
the action typically used to register complaint where 
such rights were not respected was based on assault. The 
trend in recent years however has been to move away from 
the assault-based action and into the negligence
format.[9] There are a number of reasons for this shift 
in emphasis, and it is almost certainly not unconnected 
with the growth and development of the negligence action 
itself. However, there would also seem to be
plausibility in the claim that it is regarded as many as 
inappropriate - perhaps even distasteful - to deal with 
medical matters in the terminology of assault, which 
conjures up deliberate or wilful threatening behaviour, 
or actual physical touching without consent. This shift 
has led to a move away from the perception of unconsented 
to therapy as an assault and may disguise the intention 
or recklessness lying behind the withholding of 
information. Indeed, it has in many jurisdictions, 
significantly affected the nature of decision-making and 
the underlying assumptions made by courts. As Shultz 
[10] notes:
Discomfort with treating doctors under a 
doctrine aimed at antisocial conduct has 
prompted most jurisdictions to limit the 
battery action to those relatively unusual 
situations where a medical procedure has been
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carried out without any consent, rather than 
where the consent has been insufficiently 
informed. The modern allegation of battery 
typically arises when consent to a particular 
procedure is given and a different or 
additional procedure is carried out.[11]
Thus, as was indicated in the English case of Chatterton 
v * Cerson.f121 only a gross failure to inform and secure 
consent will result in a successful action in battery. 
Although this has never been tested in Scots law, it is 
likely, following the obiter dicta in Sidaway v. Board of 
Governors. Bethlem Hospital.f131 that Scottish courts 
would adopt a similar view.
However, this is not to say that the reasons for, 
or importance of, maintaining respect for the individual 
are different merely because the available action has 
changed. Although the nature of the legal action affects 
the quality of evidence necessary, the factors to be 
proved, and perhaps even the likelihood of success, the 
rationale for consent rules should not be forgotten. 
Thus, it has been said that:
The relative infrequency with which battery 
claims arise today should not .... obscure 
the fact that battery doctrine retains a 
critical philosophical and practical function 
in protecting patient self-determination.'
[14]
Whether or not the form of action is called battery, what 
is being protected - the interest under consideration - 
is the fundamental one of patient self-determination or 
autonomy. For this reason, the assault-based action was
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initially seen as appropriate since it not only offered 
obvious protection, but also symbolically was seen as an 
accurate description of what had in fact occurred when 
patient consent was deemed to be inadequate or absent. 
In fact, both its terminology and its form may seem to 
make it well suited to situations where it is alleged 
that therapy has been imposed without adequate consent - 
whatever its motivation. It establishes ' . . . . an 
uncompromising base-line of protection for patients' 
self-determination.' [15]
This is achieved in a number of ways. On the one 
hand, it establishes the precedence to be given to 
patient choice without obfuscating the issue. Whatever 
the outcome, the patient is unequivocally given the right 
to make decisions about his or her own therapy and, where 
such rights are breached, the law provides a mechanism 
for redressing a legitimate grievance. Moreover, as the 
professionalisation of medicine developed, so too did the 
assumption of authority vested in the medical 
practitioner. Decision-making under the assault-based 
action reflected the rights of the individual rather than 
reinforcing the assumption of authority by the 
professional. The individual, in juxtaposition to 
respected professional decision-making, remained in a 
superior position. Thus, '[u]nder battery analysis, the 
patient's wishes take priority over even the fully 
competent recommendation of the doctor ....'.[16]
However, as has been noted, the current trend is
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away from overt protection of patient autonomy in even
this symbolic way, and towards the casuistry of
distinguishing between types of failure to inform. 
Although it is said that '[a] doctor who operates without 
the consent of his patient is, save in cases of emergency 
or mental disability, guilty of the civil wrong of
trespass to the person ..... '[17], it was made clear in
Chatterton v. Gersonf18] and Hills v. Potter.f191 amongst 
other cases, that this refers only to cases where no 
consent has been given. The law, therefore, makes a 
distinction between a complete failure to inform and a 
mere withholding of information, however relevant or 
potentially of significance to the patient. Indeed, Lord 
Scarman in S_idaway[20] agreed that it would be 
'deplorable'[21] to use the assault-based action in the 
vast majority of medical cases.
Equally, the development towards negligence and
away from assault-based actions has also been evidenced 
in the United States.[22] Although trespass was accepted 
as the appropriate form of action in Salgo v. Leland 
Stanford Jr University Board of Trustees in 1957,[23] its 
routine use had been rejected even before the landmark 
decision in Canterbury v. Spencer241 by decisions such as 
Natanson v. Kline in 1960.[25] The benefits to the 
patient of the capacity to use the assault-based action 
were clearly perceived as being outweighed by the 
problems associated with it, and it is worth reviewing 
these benefits and drawbacks here, with particular
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reference to what has been claimed to be the fundamental 
interest underlying consent requirements.
Benefits
The most obvious benefit of the use of assault rather 
than negligence has already been discussed - namely that 
the assault-based action gives priority both symbolically 
and in fact to the rights of patients to make free 
choices about therapy. In so doing, it underplays, and 
even undermines, the therapeutic imperative which is so 
often claimed to be a characteristic of medicine.[26] 
The mere fact that the relevant therapy is medically 
appropriate, is medically recommended and might result in 
cure, has less significance in this type of analysis than 
the fact that the patient must be free to choose whether 
or not any of these considerations is important or 
crucial. In this way, the patient's sovereignty over his 
or her body is protected and enhanced. At a moral level 
then, the use of the assault-based action seems appealing 
in offering sanctity to a fundamental good. The reasons 
for proceeding without appropriate consent do not enter 
into or confuse the equation, and the focus of attention 
remains the rights of the individual patient. Nor is 
this the sole benefit of the assault-based action from 
the patient's perspective.
Legal differences also exist between the assault
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and the negligence actions which provide an insight into 
further possible reasons for the shift in emphasis 
witnessed in most contemporary jurisdictions. If the 
rationale for consent rules is the protection of 
individual autonomy, then the mere fact that relevant 
information was not disclosed is sufficient to establish 
a cause of action. This is indeed the case under the 
assault action. However, and this will be discussed in 
more detail later,[27] there is a further requirement 
inherent in the negligence action which renders the right 
to self-determination of lesser significance. Using the 
framework of negligence requires evidence of one further 
and often problematic - factor, namely that of 
causation.[28] In these situations, causation refers to 
the ultimate outcome of therapy. Thus, the patient must 
demonstrate that, had the information been disclosed, 
then the therapy would have been rejected. As Robertson 
says:
The relevance of causation in informed 
consent cases is linked to the difference 
between trespass and negligence. If one 
adopts the view as the early American cases 
did, that failure by the doctor to disclose 
necessary information about the proposed 
treatment vitiates the apparent consent which 
the patient has given and thus gives rise to 
the tort of battery, the patient is not 
required to show that, had this information 
been given to him, he would have chosen not 
to undergo the treatment.[29]
Clearly, this difference may have a significant impact on 
the patient's capacity to have a grievance both
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recognised and redressed by the law.
It is human nature to assume that where something 
beneficial has occurred then the individual in question 
would have wished for it. Thus, where therapy has been 
successful, or at least has not caused significant 
deterioration, then it will - particularly given the 
value attached to medicine - be legally difficult for a 
patient to claim that he or she would not have undergone 
the therapy had the risk been disclosed. It is 
apparently as difficult for courts to conceptualise the 
patient who would have preferred to maintain his or her 
capacity for self-determination even in the face of 
potentially beneficial treatment, as it is for them to 
conceptualise the preference for death over life[30] - 
indeed, in some cases, the nature of the choice may be 
similar. Yet, as a self-determining human being, the
patient is theoretically given the moral standing to make
\ '
just such a decision. However, this moral standing, if 
unprotected by the law, retains an ever diminishing 
significance both legally and morally, whatever its 
importance may be in the abstract.
Analysis based on patient's rights, and not on the 
benefits - real or imagined - of therapy, not only 
permits the protection of patient choice, but also serves 
to place the court in a position to make factual rather 
than speculative decisions. In the assault-based action 
what is significant is the fact of whether or not 
information was disclosed, not its likely or possible
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impact on the person in question. Under negligence-based 
assessment, however, the court will weigh other factors 
also - such as, what would have been the rationality of 
having rejected therapy had the risks been known and what 
in fact was the outcome of the therapy. Whilst these 
factors would be irrelevant in the assault action, they 
can be, and often are, vital to the making of decisions 
under the negligence framework because of the form of the 
action itself.[31] They allow for the importation of 
value-laden criteria into what could otherwise be a 
merely factual conflict, and permit the admission by 
doctors that they have indeed failed to disclose certain 
information to go unchallenged and the patient 
unrecompensed. In other words, the patient's rights are 
submerged by the value placed on clinical judgements. As 
one writer puts it:
.... if the claim is framed in trespass and 
the court concludes that the failure to 
disclose information was such as to vitiate 
the apparent consent given by the plaintiff, 
the legal wrong of which the patient 
complains is not the failure itself but 
rather the performance of medical treatment 
without consent .... Consequently, if the 
claim is framed in trespass, the patient is 
not required to show that he would not have 
consented to the treatment had the 
information been disclosed to him.[32]
From the moral perspective therefore, there are distinct 
practical, as well as abstract, advantages in the use of 
assault analysis. Given that the rules about consent were 
designed to protect precisely these interests, then it
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may seem surprising that the action does not continue to 
be legally sanctioned in routine cases. There are, 
however, a number of drawbacks to the use of the 
assault-based action which have served to support the 
shift towards negligence.
Drawbacks
Perhaps the most significantly utilised objection to the 
sole use of the assault action, is that legally it might 
appear to require some form of touching,[33] which is, of 
course, not always the case in medical intervention. 
Without redefining touching to include, for example, the 
provision of drugs, it is difficult to see some forms of 
therapy as assault, since, in common-sense terms at 
least, they do not amount to touching. A reluctance so 
to redefine touching may have formed the basis of at 
least one aspect of the distaste for the use of the 
assault-based action in medical cases. Yet it need not 
have done so since other situations (equally requiring no 
touching) are legally recognised as redressible under 
assault analysis.[34J Thus, the law would not have been 
creating a special or unusual situation for the medical 
profession had it accepted that physical touching was not 
essential to the tort of battery or assault. If the 
interest to be protected is autonomy, then autonomy 
itself represents considerably more than mere bodily 
safety. In any event, even if this were the sole or the
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major prerequisite of autonomy, even then there need be 
no insurmountable obstacle to finding that an assault or 
a battery has taken place. Yet:
Defining the scope of an autonomy interest in 
terms of physical contact with the body has 
intuitive appeal and offers a certain 
simplicity of administration. But
ultimately, physical contact is too literal a 
demarcation for what is a much broader, 
non-tangible interest in patient choice.
Health care choices of vast consequence can 
be made and implemented without such bodily 
contact as predictably triggers battery
analysis.[35]
However, the question of 'touching* has been considered a 
significant drawback to the use of the assault-based 
action, and may have served to diminish its importance. 
Certainly, were the patient to be required to show that a 
'touching' had taken place before an action in assault or 
battery could successfully be raised, then inevitably 
many patients would face grave, if not insurmountable, 
obstacles. However, the need to establish a 'touching' 
is not, on analysis, of paramount importance unless the 
concepts underlying assault are very narrowly defined or 
interpreted. Not only do other non-physical forms of 
assault have legal credibility, but if the interest which 
has been 'assaulted' is given priority, then it can 
scarcely be important how the invasion of integrity took
place.
\
Indeed, physical touching, which is generally 
required in examination and so on, is not routinely
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regarded as an exceptionable aspect of medical 
treatment. It is. therefore, equally possible to argue 
that 'touching' in some cases may be the least offensive 
or invasive aspect of the medical act. If a doctrine is 
to be developed which covers both those situations 
involving touching and those which do not, then it must 
be - and generally is - developed from the interest which 
is considered worthy of protection. Thus, the actual 
mechanism whereby an interest has been invaded has less 
importance than the fact of its invasion. It has been 
said that:
If the key issue is knowledge and choice 
regarding the fate of one's body, there is no 
meaningful difference between a decision that 
will be implemented by touching the body and 
one that will be implemented without doing 
so. Physical invasions have symbolic 
importance and they constitute one important 
class of situations in which autonomy 
interests are involved. To treat that 
sub-category as co-extensive with the 
autonomy interest as a whole, however, 
creates grave deficiencies in the protection 
of the broader interest.[36]
Thus, although the problems about the question of 
touching may seem substantial, the extent to which they 
have a real impact is dependent on whether or not the 
original function of rules about consent is regarded as 
being of prime importance. The problem, therefore, may 
be said to be pragmatic rather than fundamental. Indeed, 
were this to be portrayed as the fundamental reason for 
discarding assault, then the law could legitimately be
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accused of being disingenuous at best, and as having 
ignored the prime purpose of the law at worst.
An equally significant characteristic, however, 
of the move from assault to negligence - in fact, perhaps 
an even more important consideration - relates to the 
terminology of assault itself. This terminology is 
routinely reserved for deliberate or wilful anti-social 
behaviour - far removed, apparently, from the practice of 
medicine. Moreover the patient will normally have 
voluntarily placed him or herself in a position where the 
physician may reasonably expect to be invited to exercise 
his or her professional skills.[37] Apart from rather 
extreme examples, this will not normally be the case in 
what might be described as the 'standard' form of 
assault. Thus, the patient may be thought by some to 
have impliedly offered consent to whatever the doctor 
chooses.[38] Certainly, there is no doubt that - unlike 
other kinds of assault - even highly invasive surgery can 
be consented to. As Skegg says[39]:
.... conduct which benefits bodily health 
should not be regarded as causing bodily 
< harm. But even if it were regarded as
causing bodily harm, there could be
absolutely no doubt that it was possible to
give a legally effective consent to such
procedures.[40]
There is one further factor which distinguishes the 
doctor's behaviour from that which generally 
characterises assault. It is, of course, not necessary
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to have the actual intention to cause harm, nor even to 
act without the consent of a person, to sustain a 
criminal charge of assault or murder.[41] However, the 
benign motivation of medicine is perceived as 
distinguishing it from other categories of 'assault', 
whatever the impact on the patient. As has been said:
Despite the capacity of the battery doctrine 
to protect the degree of physical autonomy in 
patients' relations with doctors, many 
aspects of the medical care relationship do 
not fit comfortably with the battery model. 
Doctors lack the anti-social motivation 
usually associated with intentional torts 
such as battery.[42]
This is doubtless true, but bearing in mind the fact that 
the distinction between unwillingness and lack of 
knowledge may be defined in a rather narrower way than is 
traditional,[43] there is at least little doubt that the 
withholding of information is both deliberate and 
conscious. The fact that it is designed to benefit and 
not to harm may have less significance than it is 
currently given.
Nonetheless, the factors outlined above have had 
considerable influence on the willingness of courts to 
countenance the use of assault-based actions in medical 
cases. But just how significant are they as reasons for 
the shift to negligence? It has been suggested that the 
problems identified with the question of touching are by 
no means insurmountable when it is borne in mind that it 
is the invasion itself, and not its method, which
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constitutes the assault, and threatens patients' rights. 
Moreover, whilst distaste for the terminology of assault 
in relation to medical practice is understandable, it is 
scarcely sufficiently weighty to merit the impact which, 
as will be seen later, [44] the shift from assault to 
negligence has had on protection of patient autonomy. In 
any event, mere terminological fastidiousness is seldom 
an acceptable or appropriate rationale for the rendering 
more difficult of the protection of a fundamental human 
interest. Yet, both of these considerations have been 
regarded as significant in the United Kingdom, as in the 
United States, in the move away from battery and towards 
negligence.
The United Kingdom
There is no longer any doubt as to the appropriate action
\
to be raised where the basis of the claim is an alleged 
failure to disclose risks of therapy. As Robertson says, 
'[t]he recent English cases have firmly rejected the view 
that failure to inform of inherent risks can vitiate 
consent and give rise to a successful action for 
battery.'[45] Scottish courts have had little
opportunity to undertake consideration of these matters, 
but their practice seems likely to equate to that in 
England, since negligence is the predominant action for 
compensation in both jurisdictions and some of the 
leading cases decided by the House of Lords have
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Ioriginated in Scotland.[46]
The position was apparently finally settled by the 
House of Lords in the case of Sidaway, [471 although 
Brazier[48] claims that the debate about consent 
requirements in general is by no means over.[49] 
Whatever the interpretation of its impact on consent 
requirements, however, it does seem to settle the law in 
respect of the nature of the appropriate action. Even 
if Scottish courts had contemplated the retention of 
assault analysis, this decision would most likely 
effectively close this avenue in Scots, as in English, 
law.
This move in fact resulted from a acceptance of a 
combination of a number of the factors outlined above, 
even although they can be said to be of insufficient 
weight to merit a minimisation of the importance of 
individual autonomy. But it is also likely that the 
general growth of the importance of the negligence action 
in the redressing of grievances also played a part. 
Moreover, the courts' choice to concentrate on the duty 
to inform of risks, as if it had some kind of precedence 
over the right of the patient to receive information, has 
led to the claim that it 'would be very much against the 
interests of justice if actions that are really based on 
a failure by the doctor to perform his duty to inform 
were pleaded in trespass.'[50] It would, however, 
equally not be against the interests of justice were 
priority given to the interest of the patient in
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maintaining his or her autonomy - a priority which is
more evident in assault-based than negligence-based 
analysis.
In other words, the court in this case made a
series of presuppositions and presented them as being 
important in serving the interests of justice. But no 
analysis was made of whether or not these presuppositions 
were 'right'. In particular, the assumption that the 
issue for concern is the doctor's duty fails to take 
sufficient account of the right from which that duty is 
derivative, and whose boundaries must shape the nature
and extent of the duty itself. This last point will be 
considered in more depth later, [51] but for the moment it 
is worth noting the importance of the concept of duty in 
shaping judicial policy in these situations.
The decision in Chatterton v. Gerson[52] reflects 
the use of considerations of the type outlined above to 
reinforce the court's view that the assault-based action 
was inappropriate, even although - in terms of the 
rationale for the action - the problems of assault 
analysis may be semantic rather than fundamental. 
Nonetheless, they are given considerable weight. One 
commentator has suggested that these considerations
however open to challenge - were central to the almost 
universal drift to the negligence action, saying:
It is submitted that there are two principal 
reasons for the judicial policy .... against 
trespass claims in informed consent
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litigation. First, ....  judicial policy
seems to be in favour of restricting claims 
in battery to situations involving 
deliberate, hostile acts, a situation which 
most judges would regard as foreign to the 
doctor-patient relationship. Coupled with 
this is the stigma and damage to professional 
reputation which courts repeatedly emphasise 
are an inevitable by-product of a successful 
claim against the doctor. These consequences 
are probably seen as even more serious in an 
action for battery than in an action for 
negligence.[53]
Thus, the potential impact on the person whose behaviour 
is challenged of having his or her behaviour categorised 
as assault, here, as in other situations involving 
medicine, is given some consideration at the stage at 
which the decision is being made as to the very existence 
(or not) of the tort/delict, and the form of the 
tort/delict which has been committed. In other words, it 
could be said that the possible outcome of an action is 
taken as influencing the very basis of the claim itself.
However, if the above arguments are accepted, then 
these considerations might be thought to carry less 
weight than that which should be given to the potential 
impact of the action on the patient's right to 
self-determination. Yet the congruence of judicial 
policy making in this country is also reflected in other 
jurisdictions which have witnessed the same moves and 
justified them on the same basis. If for no other reason
than this, they cannot be lightly dismissed. However,
\
the aggrieved patient may find him or herself in direct 
conflict with such reasoning, however apparently
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widespread.
The United States
Patients in the United States have routinely faced the 
same type of judicial reasoning as have their 
counterparts in the United Kingdom. As has been noted
above, the assault-based action was decried for the same
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reasons in the United States as it was in the United 
Kingdom, and the shift to negligence is therefore 
vulnerable to the same criticisms. There has, however, 
been an occasional aberration from judicial solidarity in 
the U.S.A. which has most notably resulted from an 
apparent desire to provide some form of redress, even 
where the difficulties of using battery analysis are at 
their most acute. For example, in Mink v. University of 
Chicago, f 541 whilst it was held not to have been 
negligent to have given pregnant women DES,[55] the court 
was clearly concerned to offer some avenue for redress, 
and therefore categorised non-disclosure as a form of 
battery, despite the absence of physical touching. The 
court claimed that 1[tJhe gravamen of the battery action 
is the plaintiff's lack of consent, not the form of 
touching.'[56] This case, whilst by no means the norm, 
nonetheless demonstrates that it is possible, even 
plausible, to ignore or avoid the problems associated 
with the use of the assault-based action in cases 
relating to the question of consent, where there is a
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will to safeguard patient choice and to provide 
compensation for a potentially far-reaching legal wrong.
•There was,' as Weir comments, 'bound to be a 
categorical conflict between negligence, with its 
insistence on unreasonable conduct and foreseeability of 
harm, and trespass, with its emphasis on positive action 
and directness of invasion.'[57] Seldom is this 
conflict more problematic than when the challenge is to a 
medical act - a situation where sympathy is often 
generated by both parties to the dispute.[58] In facing 
this dilemma, courts have apparently opted for what may 
be seen as a balance between conflicting evils. Indeed, 
it has been said that:
The shift to negligence analysis made 
apparent analytic and practical sense. 
Although some critics decried losses to 
patient autonomy that would result from 
emerging negligence rules, current legal 
protection of patient autonomy has generally 
been deemed adequate.[59]
However, the same author continues, '[t]hat' judgement 
.... rests upon assumptions that are insufficiently 
examined and ultimately erroneous.'[60] Indeed, it 
should be clear that the swamping of the tort/delict 
system by the rapid growth of the negligence action 
might, in some cases, have an adverse effect on precisely 
those characteristics of the system which other torts or 
delicts sought to protect. Assessment of the adequacy 
with which patient autonomy is protected cannot readily
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be made unless autonomy is the central characteristic 
against which success or failure is measured, yet this is 
not the basis of decision-making indulged in, or
encouraged by, the current use of negligence in this area.
\
Is Assault Analysis Enough?
The primary advantage, therefore, of the assault-based 
action would seem to be its direct responsiveness to, and 
concern for, patient autonomy. However, there are 
significant drawbacks to the action which are 
distingishable from the policy considerations outlined 
above. Whilst the assault-based action may have 
relevance, even in cases which do not overtly seem to 
concern 'touching', it cannot be a complete answer to 
some of the problems of real consent.
In some situations, for example, the patient's 
allegations regarding lack of consent may relate to the 
failure of the doctor to act rather than to an act 
itself. This is particularly likely where there is no 
disclosure of therapeutic alternatives. In this
situation what is complained of - as in Hatcher v. 
BlackT 611 - is a lack of the kind of choice which is
central to the provision of real or meaningful consent, 
rather than simply being a claim that information about 
risks and benefits was not given. Equally, analysis 
based on assault can be inappropriate where the event 
complained of is a failure to undertake certain
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diagnostic or therapeutic acts, as in Whiteford v. Hunter 
and__Gleed. [62] This is not to say that battery analysis 
could not be used - rather that it could be said to have 
only a tenuous link with the common sense view of what 
happens in these situations.
Litigants in the United States have, however, 
occasionally been prepared to use battery analysis. In 
Gates v. Jensen,[63] for example, a doctor made a 
clinical decision that the patient's eye problems were 
associated with irritation from the use of contact
lenses, rather than from a possible glaucoma. In the 
event, this was the wrong diagnosis, but the doctor did 
not choose to undertake the further tests which would
have shown the glaucoma, and perhaps have prevented the
subsequent blindness of the patient. The possibility of 
further tests was not mentioned to the patient since the
doctor was apparently certain of his own diagnosis.
\
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Clearly, even although the patient's autonomy was
threatened by non-disclosure of alternatives, this 
particular case could not suffice to satisfy even a
modified version of assault analysis, because what the 
assault-based action protects in practice, although not 
necessarily in theory, is a form of physical safety
rather than an interest in choice. As Shultz says:
The choice of which Ms Gates was deprived -
whether to undergo further testing for 
glaucoma - was certainly as important as the 
one she was given - whether to undergo
treatment for the contact lens problem.
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Analyzed in terms of her interest in autonomy 
rather than her literal physical security, 
this patient's opportunity to adopt, reject 
or modify the doctor's unvocalized 
"recommendation" of inaction should have 
received as much protection as the choice 
about the contact lens treatment.[64]
However the use of the assault-based action in this case 
would, as presently interpreted, be entirely unsuited to 
vindicating the patient's rights. Again, in Karlsons v. 
Guerinotf 65] a woman sued her doctor on the grounds, 
amongst others, that the doctor failed to perform 
amniocentesis. The plaintiff claimed that she had been 
denied the opportunity to provide informed consent 
because the doctor had not told her of its 
availability. The court held that the doctrine of 
informed consent was restricted to:
...those situations where the harm suffered 
arose from some affirmative violation of the 
patient's physical integrity such as surgical 
procedures, injections or invasive diagnostic 
test...[66]
and was, therefore, not appropriate in this case.
Thus, only certain interests will in practice be 
adequately protected by the assault-based action. Its 
extension beyond these areas would apparently stretch 
judicial credibility, in particular when emphasis is 
firmly placed on the question of physical integrity or 
security. Autonomy interests are, however, wider than 
the purely physical, and involve the capacity and freedom 
to make relevant and appropriate personal decisions.
\
i
126
It should be made clear that it is not intended to 
suggest that the freedom to make choices implies anything 
about patient knowledge or medical expertise. These 
choices depend on personal matters and not on technical 
information. Thus, it is not necessary that the patient 
should share the technical expertise of the physician. 
Those opposing patient choice, particularly in cases 
where therapeutic alternatives are not disclosed or 
diagnostic procedures are not undertaken, may seek to 
point to the technical gap between doctor and patient as 
a vindication of non-disclosure, given that the patient 
may make the 'wrong' choice. However, it can equally be 
claimed that the introduction of questions of technical 
competence, often undertaken by those who value clinical 
over personal decision-making, is a red herring which has 
been given too much credibility.[67]
To demand protection of patient autonomy through 
patient choice, is not to depend on the patient's 
technical knowledge (or, more likely, lack of it) but is 
rather to emphasise that it is the personal, even more 
than the technical, which makes for a good, meaningful 
choice, and that the patient is the sole person with the 
knowledge and skills to make such a choice. Whilst this 
may seem to be a face-on threat to medicine, it can also 
be seen as beneficial. The fact that diagnostic and 
therapeutic techniques are available need not blind 
physicians to their potential invasiveness. For this 
reason, as was indicated above,[68] the value of dialogue
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is substantial. Moreoever this assumes additional 
significance when it is borne in mind that a patient's 
interest in autonomy may equally be damaged by diagnostic 
failure or lack of information about therapeutic 
alternatives.
However, the position in both the United States 
and the United Kingdom remains somewhat removed from the 
goal of dialogue. As Shultz says:
Protection of patient autonomy remains 
derivative rather than direct, episodic 
rather than systematic. As , a result, 
significant harms to patient interests in 
choice go unredressed.'[69]
Conclusions
This lack of protection stems from the powerful 
combination of medical prestige and legal reluctance to 
interpret available actions in such a way as to indicate 
or imply that there has been a deliberate invasion of the 
interests of the patient by the doctor. Moreover, even 
the assault-based action, which seems to offer some 
direct protection, has its limitations and pitfalls. 
Further, its use is also restricted since its success 
could result in the payment of damages where the therapy 
carried out was otherwise faultless. To the judiciary, 
and particularly in view of their fear of defensive
medicine,[70] such a result would be both unfair and
\
dangerous. From this perspective, the protection of
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patient autonomy could be seen as a threat to the 
practice of medicine, or at least as an interest whose 
value is subordinate to the overall value of the practice 
of medicine. Alternatively, the view might be taken 
that the values inherent in the medical act can be 
defined solely or substantially by reference to medical 
criteria. The apparent unfairness generated by the 
raising of a successful action where therapy is
beneficial may be given more significance by courts of 
law than the fact that the performance of therapy without 
the patient's consent is objectionable in itself.
Moreoever, whilst the assault-based action may 
efficiently protect patient choice where there is a clear 
touching, it seems not to be able to achieve this either
where there is no touching or where the invasion of
patient autonomy results from a failure to disclose 
alternatives. These reasons, plus the policy ones 
mentioned earlier, have contributed to the shift to the 
negligence action. But has this shift resulted in more 
or less protection of autonomy interests? In considering 
this question, it is necessary to discuss the form and 
implications of the negligence action in general, before
considering its specific application to medicine. In 
this way it can be ascertained whether it is true that:
Existing legal protection for medical 
patients' autonomy is more limited than has 
been recognized and more deficient than 
should be tolerated. Present doctrines 
falsely equate protection of autonomy with
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control over bodily contact. These doctrines 
also submerge analysis of the interests of 
autonomy with the related but divergent 
framework of redress for professional
incompetence.[71]
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NEGLIGENCE THE LAW AND THE DOCTOR
CHAPTER 4
The negligence action in its current form is a relative 
newcomer to the range of legal resources. Negligence is 
a complex subject, and a full discussion is beyond the 
scope of this discussion. However, what follows seeks 
to identify its major characteristics with particular 
reference to those aspects which are relevant to the 
argument presented.[1] However. it has had a major 
impact in its short history. As Weir,[2] for example, 
says:
It was barely fifty years ago that the tort 
of negligence was born, or synthesised, but 
it has thrived so mightily and grown so lusty 
that one could be forgiven for wondering 
whether there was room left for any other 
tort at all.[3J
For the purposes of this discussion, tort and delict (the 
Scottish equivalent) can be used relatively 
interchangably, although it must be borne in mind that 
there are both current and historical distinctions 
between them. Only where clear differences occur will 
the terminology be made specific.
The aim of the law of tort or delict is to redress 
legally recognised harms or losses,[4] and of particular 
significance in the case of negligence is the attribution
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of liability for fault. [5] It is on the basis of the 
assessment that someone was at fault that damages are 
awarded, not merely so that compensation can be provided 
to the victim of that fault, but also to ensure that it 
is paid by the person whose fault caused the harm. Thus, 
whether or not the negligence action is overtly penal in 
its nature, there is an element which does relate to 
punishing the wrongdoer, or at least to making him or her 
pay. The parties to the action are defined by the nature 
of their relationship to each other, the behaviour under 
question and the responsibility of one party for causing 
the loss or harm complained of. There may be many 
victims of one fault, and there may equally be a number 
of people whose fault renders them liable to be sued. A 
succinct description of the law of delict is given by 
Walker, who describes the social function of the law of 
delict as being:
...to give legal recognition and protection 
to certain valuable interests of the 
individual and of groups of individuals and 
corporate persons. Interests are those 
claims or demands or desires which human 
beings seek to satisfy, which the legal 
ordering of human relationships must take 
account of, and which are deemed by the law 
to be valuable, deserving of protection, and 
justifying retribution or compensation if 
interfered with.[6]
The aim of compensation, is of course, also to 
offer something to the victim - generally this is 
expressed as an attempt to place the victim in the
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position he or she would have been in but for the fault 
of the defender, [7j and as the Royal Commission on Civil 
Liability and Compensation for Personal Injury (Pearson 
Commission)[8J noted:
There is an elementary justice in the
principle of the tort action that he who has 
by his fault injured his neighbour should
make reparation. The concept of individual 
responsibility still has value.[9]
Of course, since the court is by and large limited to
offering financial compensation, it can scarcely hope to 
achieve the desired result in cases other than those 
where the loss is solely pecuniary.[ 10 ] Nor is 
establishing the negligence of the defender merely a 
matter of overt common sense. The fact that someone has 
been damaged does not per se establish negligence,
although it might raise preliminary presumptions about 
it.[11]
Because negligence is a legal concept, it is 
defined in legal terms. Thus, the basis on which damages 
can be awarded is tightly confined to certain types of 
action (or inaction) and to infringements of certain 
types of interests. In the United Kingdom jurisdictions, 
all torts and delicts have their own definition and 
structure, but basically they serve the same purpose - 
that of redressing wrongs and attributing responsibility 
for them. The balancing of competing interests and the 
distribution of loss in a just way are the raisons d'etre
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of these branches of law. The law, therefore, seeks to 
protect certain interests, and where these are invaded, 
to compensate the victim.
But the law is not entirely value blind in making 
decisions on these matters since additional concerns may 
influence decision-making in regard to the nature of the 
interests which are seen to be under threat. There is, 
and perhaps must be, a hierarchy of interests deemed 
worthy of protection.[12J This has particular 
significance for the practice of medicine, and will be 
discussed in more detail below.[13]
Moreover, the rules of tort and delict also have a 
symbolic purpose. Although comment on these areas of law 
is not routinely couched in terms of human rights, 
essentially it is rights which are being protected when 
losses are distributed and claims are recognised as 
meritricious. The symbolic significance of this should 
not be underestimated, particularly in countries without 
written constitutions where the language of rights is 
less commonly used than in those countries which do couch 
civil obligations in terms of the rights to which they 
relate. From the right to liberty, for example, in the 
United States in particular, stem not only other rights 
(such as a woman's so-called privacy right to terminate a 
pregnancy in the first trimester [14J) but also the duty 
of others to respect that right and not to intrude, for 
example, by photographing private property or interfering 
in legitimate behaviour.[15] Equally, in the United
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Kingdom jurisdictions, ' [i]n addition to its more obvious 
function of redressing harms the law of tort also 
indicates rights: it has a constitutional as well as a
compensatory function.'[16]
In some sense, therefore, the decision-makers - 
that is the- judiciary - are also representing more than 
just disinterested law. As Walker says:
It does not necessarily follow from the 
assertion of some right as a natural right or 
a human right, or as an individual or social 
interest, that the law will protect it and 
enforce legal rights and duties arising 
therefrom. Whether or not to recognise some 
interest is a policy decision for the law.[17]
The judiciary, therefore, also represent the state and 
give credence (or not) to the claims of citizens that 
they have a particular right or interest which is worthy 
of protection, as well as to the assessment of whether or 
not the right has been invaded. A creative judiciary, 
therefore, can have significant impact on the social 
order. Equally a judiciary loath to commit itself may
seriously restrict the rights of citizens. This is true 
whether or not the remedy being sought is financial
compensation or a declaration in the form of declarator
or injunction. Personal liberty can be defined,
delimited or destroyed by conservative decision-making or 
reinforced, expanded and vindicated by radical thinking.
The law of delict or tort is, therefore, 
wide-ranging and has broad concerns. Equally, the
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options available to decision-makers are not merely the 
provision of financial recompense.[18J However, in the 
case of the action in negligence, this is the sole option 
available,[19] beyond expression of judicial disfavour. 
The victim who raises an action in negligence may obtain 
personal satisfaction if the action is successful, but 
the court's role is restricted to making the legal 
assessment of whether or not the case is established, 
and, where the answer is in the affirmative, to awarding 
and calculating damages.
The Negligence Action
Each member of the community is liable for his or her 
negligent or wilful invasion of the interests or rights 
of another, provided that the other was within the ambit 
of the duty not to invade that interest.[20J This is so 
whether there is a contractual relationship with the 
other party or not.[21] Social life demands obligations, 
breach of which renders us liable to moral and/or legal 
censure. Moral censure is perhaps the more wide-jranging 
of the two, since its attribution depends on a consensus 
as to the rightness or wrongness of behaviour. It is not 
hidebound by the rules of evidence, nor by the need to 
establish to a legal standard the harm caused, nor the 
legal quality of behaviour. The public, therefore, were 
in no doubt as to the moral culpability of the Distillers 
Company in the Thalidomide tragedy, although the law was
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evidently in a state of uncertainty as to whether the 
company was legally liable, and even as to whether or not 
the damage to the children concerned was a redressible 
wrong at law. [22] As has been noted, the mere fact of 
the harm is not a sufficient - although it is a necessary 
element in establishing negligence. Thus, whilst
public pressure resulted in ex gratia payments to the
damaged children (or at least to some of them) there
remained legal uncertainty as to whether or not the case 
would have been successful in a court of law.[23]
Indeed, the existence of a legal, as opposed to a 
factual, wrong is perhaps the most significant
preliminary to the capacity of the individual to obtain 
compensation. The existence of that wrong depends on two
main factors. First, that there is a party legally
recognised to have been wronged and second, that the 
party causing the harm owed a duty to that person.[24]
This may seem at first sight to be relatively
uncomplicated, but to continue with the example of 
Thalidomide, it may not be so simple as it first
appears. Many of the fundamental problems associated 
with the action contemplated on behalf of the Thalidomide 
children were concerned with precisely this point. Did 
the children have legal standing to sue, since they were 
not born at the time of the damage occurring? Few cases 
had considered this question - in fact, only one in 
Canada[25] and one in Australia.[26] Although this 
question is now resolved, its resolution depended in
143
Scotland on the use of Roman law principles, essentially 
based on a legal fiction, [27] and in England on 
legislation.[28]
Eventually, the question having been answered in 
the affirmative, the problem nonetheless remained as to 
whether or not there was a duty to take care in respect 
of this particular group. The law requires that care 
should be shown to those who might reasonably be foreseen 
as coming within the ambit of any such duty[29] but 
interpretations of this may vary. As the Pearson 
Commission said:
In all cases, the law pays regard both to the 
degree of the risk and to the nature and
extent of the damage or injury which might
arise if the risk were to materialise. Both 
considerations are relevant to the question 
whether a duty of care arises, and to the
extent of that duty.[30]
In the Thalidomide case, although the company 
specifically marketed the drug for pregnant women and 
therefore must have known that developing embryos would 
be involved, it equally, on the basis of state of the art 
experiments, did not perceive the drug as harmful.[31]
On what 'reasonable' basis therefore could they be held 
to have knowingly generated the risk of the harm which 
subsequently eventuated?
Equally, it is necessary that the party who is 
alleged to have caused the harm can be sued for the 
occurrence of that harm.[32] The categories of
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negligence may never be closed,[33] but until recently 
there were some groups at least who were sheltered from 
its shadow. Most notably this arose in respect of 
lawyers themselves. In Swinfen v Lord Chelmsford.[34] 
liability for errors of fact or law was expressly 
precluded. However, this case arose before the modern 
development of the negligence action, and before 
expansion both of the heads of damage and of those who 
could be held liable.[35] Contemporary inclusion of 
lawyers demonstrates clearly the widening of the scope of 
the action itself, and reinforces the view that the 
judiciary can. and will, do more than merely operate 
within a rigid set of rules.
By expanding liability the judiciary also shape 
social rights. The development of the negligence action 
modified social policy and judicial decision-making 
reflected this. Moreover the role of the judiciary is 
significant in contemporary law also. The problems which 
arose in the Thalidomide case, however, are relatively 
rare and the person claiming to have been harmed as the 
result of another's actions will not necessarily have to 
face them. Given sufficient proximity,[36] the questions 
which will concern most plaintiffs or pursuers will be 
more intimately tied to the terminology of negligence 
itself. For negligence in general, these tests can be 
expressed thus: first, that there was a duty of care
owed by the defender to the pursuer; second, that this 
duty was breached; and third, that the breach caused the
145
harm complained of. which harm was reasonably foreseeable.
Duty of Care
Perhaps the most significant (if now somewhat elderly) 
case on this point remains Donoqhue v. Stevenson.[37 3 
The facts of the case are well known and the radical 
nature of the court's decision-making well accepted. For 
the purposes of this discussion, the crucial aspects of 
the decision in this case were, first that the duty of 
care which the court held to be owed was one to take 
reasonable care to avoid foreseeable injury, and second 
that the judgement represented an expansion of the group 
who might be deemed to be foreseeable as likely to be 
injured by one's negligence.[38J Subsequent cases have 
used these principles to decide on the liability of, for 
example, subcontractors.[39] In combination with the 
later decisions in Hedley Byrne v. Heller [40] and Home 
Office v. Dorset Yacht Co. [41] a principle has been 
established which was described thus by Lord Wilberforce 
in Anns v. Merton London Borough.f42 1
The position has now been reached that in 
order to establish that a duty of care arises 
in a particular situation, it is not 
necessary to bring the facts of that 
situation within those of previous situations 
in which a duty of care has been held to 
exist. Rather the question has to be 
approached in two stages. First, one has to 
ask whether, as between the alleged wrongdoer 
and the person who has suffered damage, there 
is a sufficient relationship of proximity or
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neighbourhood such that, in the reasonable 
contemplation of the former, carelessness on 
his part may be likely to cause damage to the 
latter, in which case a prima facie duty of 
care arises. Secondly, if the first question 
is answered affirmatively, it is necessary to 
consider whether there are any considerations 
which ought to negative, or to reduce or 
limit the scope of the duty or the class of 
person to whom it is owed or the damages to 
which a breach of it may give rise.[43]
As Lord Bridge pointed out, moreover, in McLouqhlin v. 
O' Brian:[44]
A policy which is to be relied on to narrow 
the scope of the tortfeasor's duty must be 
justified by cogent and readily intelligible 
considerations, and must be capable of 
defining the appropriate limits of liability 
by reference to factors which are not purely 
arbitrary.[45]
Indeed, Lord Bridge considered not merely the legal, 
culpability of the defendant in this case but also made 
the point that the attribution of legal responsibility 
for the psychiatric illness of the claimant would not be 
to impose a burden 'out of proportion to his moral 
responsibility.'[46] The remoteness of the damage might 
therefore be affected by considerations, not merely of a 
factual nature, but also of a moral nature. For example, 
despite a legal prohibition on trespassing, damages have 
been awarded to the trespasser on a railway line whose 
capacity to trespass was assisted by the failure of the 
Railways Board to maintain its fencing, and who therefore 
carried some moral blame for the incident.[47]
The assertion of the existence of a duty of care
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does not, of course, 
been said:
fully explain its content. As has
Given that a duty exists, it must be a duty 
with a content. The duty fixes not only the 
relationship between the parties but also 
the standard of behaviour to be required by 
the defendant.'[48]
The fact is, however, that it is in describing the duty 
of care that the parties to the action may come up 
against real difficulties and potentially irreconcileable 
positions. The fact that A might expect X does not 
necessarily mean that X is part of the duty owed to A - 
that will be decided by the law on the basis of what is 
'reasonable', and what is 'reasonable' may vary. As Lord 
MacMillan said in Muir v. Glasgow Corporation:\491
The degree of care for the safety of others 
which the law requires human beings to 
observe in the conduct of their affairs 
varies according to the circumstances. There 
is no absolute standard, but it may be said 
generally that the degree of care required 
varies directly with the risk involved. 
Those who engage in operations inherently 
dangerous must take precautions which are not 
required of persons engaged in the ordinary 
routine of daily life.[50]
The nature of the duty may, therefore, vary with the 
inherent risks of the enterprise being undertaken. 
However, the ultimate test of behaviour, even in high 
risk situations, remains that of reasonableness in the 
given situation. Thus, as Lord MacMillan also said in 
the earlier case of Bourhill v. Young:[511
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The duty to take care is the duty to avoid 
doing or omitting to do anything the doing or 
omitting to do which may have as its 
reasonable and probable consequence injury to 
others and the duty is owed to those to whom 
injury may reasonably and probably be 
anticipated if the duty is not observed.[52]
The duty of care, therefore, is not easily 
distintinguishable from its reasonably foreseeable 
consequences. Reasonablness is designed as an objective 
test. As has been said. *[i]t eliminates the personal 
equation and is independent of the idiosyncracies of the 
particular person whose conduct is in question.'[53]
Nor do the complexities of describing the duty of 
care owed stop there. The ordinary citizen is tested at 
the level of care which is deemed by the court to be that 
which ought to be shown by the 'reasonable man'.[54] 
However, the duty of care expected of others would 
normally be tested against what it would be reasonable to 
expect people in their situation to do, or conversely not 
to omit to do. Thus, those having or professing a level 
of skill beyond the norm must act in a manner which is 
reasonable, given that they are exercising that
skill. [55 J
This is not to say that the standard is
necessarily higher, merely that it is different. One 
crucial difference is that, whereas the behaviour of the 
reasonable man is deemed to be within judicial knowledge, 
and ' experts may not be called to describe what is
reasonable here,[56] the judgement of reasonable
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professional practice, is, as has been seen,[57] often 
substantially outside the scope of judicial knowledge and 
this routinely requires expert evidence as to the quality 
of the act or omission. Whereas it is not technically 
necessary,[58J expert testimony is generally used in such 
cases, as. for example, in the case of the doctor. Its 
formal status is no more than persuasive, although as 
will be argued below, in some cases at least, it appears 
to be taken as definitive of the case.
Breach of Duty
Logically, breach of a duty of care can only be 
established where it is known or agreed that the 
behaviour in question is relevant to the particular duty 
of care. Thus, a surgeon who negligently runs over a 
patient with his or her car is liable to the patient in 
damages, but not qua surgeon. The specialised duty of 
care relates only to those aspects of life in which he or 
she is carrying out the professional role. Outside of 
that role he or she becomes the 'reasonable driver' and 
not the 'reasonable surgeon'. However, the question of. 
breach of duty is, given that the duty has been defined, 
perhaps the least problematic aspect of the equation of 
negligence. It is a question of fact and will depend on 
the circumstances. However, the third aspect of the test 
for negligence, which is substantially connected to the 
question of breach of duty and the definition of the
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duty. is as problematic on occasion as is the first 
aspect.
Damage Resulting from Breach
In some situations the logical link between damage and 
breach is so clear as to invoke the use of the doctrine 
of res ipsa loquitur.f59] Thus, in cases where the facts 
speak for themselves, there is no dispute about the 
liability of the defender to compensate his or her 
victim. In some medical cases, it is worth noting, 
however. that even where common sense might have 
suggested that the facts did indeed speak for themselves, 
the courts - for example in the case of Mahon v. Osborne 
[60] - were reluctant to apply the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur. In any event, it is relatively seldom that 
such clarity will be available to a court in reaching its 
decision. In McWilliams v. Sir William Arrol & Co. [61] 
it was said by Lord Reid that, '[a] pursuer must prove 
his case. He must prove that the fault of the defender 
caused, or contributed to, the danger which he has 
suffered.'[62] This is otherwise known as the question 
of proving causation. As Warrington, L.J. put it in Re 
Polemis:[63]
The presence or absence of reasonable 
anticipation of damage determines the legal 
quality of the act as negligent or innocent.
If it be thus determined to be negligent, 
then the question whether particular damages
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are recoverable depends only on the answer to 
the question whether they are the direct 
consequence of the act.[64]
Or, to put it another way, as Viscount Simonds did in the 
Wagon Mound:f65 1
It is a principle of civil liability ......
that a man must be considered to be
responsible for the probable consequences of 
his act. To demand more of him is too harsh
a rule, to demand less is to ignore that
civilised order requires the observance of a 
minimum standard of behaviour.[66]
However, to couch this aspect of the test for negligence 
in these terms is to minimise the fact that causation may 
be more complex in certain areas of life. To return to 
the Thalidomide example, it is thought more than likely 
that, even if the law had been prepared to entertain the 
actions of the children, and even if. for example. 
Distillers could have been shown to have been negligent 
in some aspect of the production or marketing of their 
product, the link between the drug in question and the 
ultimate damage to children - that is the question of 
causation - might not have been capable of proof.[67] 
Cases of this sort require factual, often statistical, 
evidence of risk. Without this, then the link is tenuous
(at least legally) if not, in fact, legally absent. It 
will not, therefore, suffice to show that, for example, 
the other children of the family are healthy, that there 
is no history of these specific defects in the family and 
so on, unless it can also be shown that sufficient
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examples of particular damage occurred amongst the 
children of the women taking the drug.
In this case, despite the 400 or so cases in the 
United Kingdom alone,[68] the element of causation 
between taking the drug and the ultimate harm to the 
children might have been difficult, if not impossible, to 
establish. Thalidomide was available in some 37 
compounds in the United Kingdom, some available over the 
counter and some only on prescription. [ 69 ] A not 
unreasonable question in defence of Distillers might, 
therefore, have been why, if it was so widely available
and so widely used, did not more cases of damage occur? 
Was the drug (legally) sufficiently linked to the damage 
to satisfy this last test? Some commentators feel 
certain that this last element of causation would not in 
all probability have been capable of proof to the level 
necessary in a court of law and the children would 
therefore have remained uncompensated.[70J
In particular, difficulties arise from the fact 
that causation may be problematic where it is (as may
I
often be the case) not clear whether the harm (which can 
be factually demonstrated) is the result of the behaviour
of a given doctor^or merely a symptom of the pre-existing
illness. A refinement of this problem exists when the 
therapy involves the prescription, and sometimes multiple 
use of, pharmaceutical products. As the Pearson 
Commission [71] were told by expert witnesses, the more
that is discovered about the action of drugs, the less is
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actually known about their potential for harm, and the
relatively common use of drugs in combination makes 
predictions as to likely effects increasingly difficult.
It can be seen, therefore, that there are numerous 
problems facing the pursuer in an allegation of 
negligence. The definition of negligence is tailored to 
what it hopes to achieve - that is the distribution of 
loss based on the fault of the defender. The imputation 
of fault must be carefully undertaken, since to hold
people responsible lightly would itself amount to a 
social injustice as great as that which is said to arise 
when claims are rejected. The necessity of establishing 
the three-fold test for negligence is highlighted when 
one considers the possibility of the imposition of
potentially unlimited liability on individuals, which 
would result were there no such rules.
Equally, the tests are demanding of the 
pursuer/plaintiff and in many cases the question as to 
whether or not there is a duty of care will not be 
capable of determination in advance of judicial 
pronouncement on the given facts.[72] Moreover, the
extent and nature of the duty of care owed can in 
themselves be problematic, since they need not depend on 
a common sense view of appropriate duties. Essentially, 
in the routine case, the existence or not of a duty is a 
matter for legal determination, a determination which 
can, and sometimes does, depend on factors which lie 
beyond the purely legal.
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In cases where the professional is challenged, 
policy considerations may be even more important and 
weighty. Liability can therefore be expanded or 
contracted by the importance given to factors which are 
not strictly relevant in the instant case. It has been 
suggested by some commentators that, whereas policy has 
recently served to expand the liability of many groups, 
the opposite is true in cases of alleged medical 
negligence.[73] Moreover, the causation element, which 
is difficult to establish in many situations, can be 
pragmatically more difficult in cases involving therapy.
Here too, there is also room for the use of policy 
considerations and extra-legal factors. As has been 
noted 'underneath the apparent factuality of causal 
vocabulary lurk value judgements.'[74] However, the law 
is designed to protect citizens and their basic rights, 
and seldom are these basic rights more vulnerable than in 
the maintenance or re-establishment of health.[75J If it 
is the case that the law protects important interests, 
and that health is among these, then one might anticipate 
that the highest possible standards would be demanded of 
those to whom such matters are entrusted - that is the 
medical profession. One method of offering this 
protection is, of course, by defining widely, rather than 
narrowly, the duty of care owed by the doctor to his or 
her patient. A duty designed to provide optimal care 
would offer redress in many cases, and the law - as the 
mechanism responsible for defining this duty of care - is
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competent to do just that. The next section will 
concentrate on describing the attitude which judges have 
taken to the duty of care owed by the doctor, and on 
translating the general tests for negligence into a 
medical context.
Medical Negligence
The raising of an action in negligence by a patient 
against a doctor is the archetypal example of the 
frustration and hostility which can be generated by the 
failure of medicine to live up to the expectations of the 
patient. In other words, not all cases actually raised 
against doctors really are cases of negligence. They may 
rather be a reflection of the breakdown of relationships 
between doctors and patients.[76] Indeed, it is worth 
remembering that the impact of media coverage of medicine 
may also have a role to play in the generation of 
complaints. To some extent, both the medical profession 
and the media have conspired to generate an increased 
expectation of medical success, and perhaps even an 
exaggerated assessment of the competence of the average 
doctor. Thus, medical failure - whether or not legally 
actionable - may lead the patient into raising an action 
for damages.[77]
It is of course the case in medicine particularly 
that failure - whether from inherent risks or from 
careless or negligent therapy - may be particularly
156
devastating for the individual patient. It is partly due 
to the esteem in which medicine has been traditionally
held, and partly to the benign view which has been taken 
in general of the medical practitioner, that even the 
frustrated or non-cured patient has in the past been
relatively unlikely to sue. However, it is also true
that the low rate of action in such a risky enterprise as 
medicine has also - as with other professions - been 
related to the difficulties of obtaining the information 
necessary to raise an action,[78] or in finding a
qualified expert witness prepared to state that a
professional colleague was negligent.[79]
Some would suggest, however, that this situation 
has now changed. Reference has been made to the so 
called 'negligence explosion',[80] indicating that 
patients are now more than ever prepared to sue their
doctors. Certainly, there is evidence world-wide that 
doctors are more likely to be sued than before where
their diagnosis or treatment has been faulty or has 
failed.[81] In this, of course, doctors are not
particularly unusual, since the twentieth century has 
witnessed a massive increase in talk of. and awareness 
of, individual rights. It has also been suggested, 
however, that the 'explosion' - such as it is - may 
relate to the breakdown of the traditional doctor-patient 
relationship, [82] in part due to the preponderance of 
group practices, clinics and so on. The family doctor, 
it is claimed, is now a more rare animal. Illich[83]
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amongst others would also suggest that medical training 
is such nowadays that doctors are reinforced in what 
Kennedy[84] calls the engineer/scientist model of 
medicine, rather than being the healers and friends they 
once were. In other words, as medicine becomes more 
technological, much of the doctor's training and 
expertise becomes focussed on high-technology apparatus, 
and is, resultingly, considerably less personal. This, 
according to some, has generated an ambience in which the 
(non-technical) malpractice of 'professional callousness' 
has become endemic.[85]
Of course, increased legal action against doctors 
has a number of possible implications and consequences. 
It may, for example, merely mean that the general 
increase in awareness of civil rights has produced a rise 
which equates to the number of cases Which should have 
been raised in the past, but which were not raised. In 
other words, there may be no negligence explosion 
merely, people's increased confidence in their rights as 
citizens may lead to perseverance and insistence on these 
rights in medicine, as in other areas. It may also be 
said that the increased number of actions against doctors 
reflects what has been suggested already - namely that 
the claims of medicine have placed patients in a 
situation of expecting miracles, and have correspondingly 
increased the legal vulnerability of the physician. 
Further, even despite current criticism,[86] the 
availability of legal aid may have played a part in
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facilitating litigation. Failure to achieve miracles 
may lead to frustration and hostility. Further, the 
increase in legal action - whether dealt with by defence 
organisations or courts - may have had an impact on the 
practice of medicine itself.
For example, it is often said - and there is good 
evidence to support this claim - that increasingly in the 
United States doctors are practising what is called 
'defensive medicine'.[87] Indeed, in the United
Kingdom, many judges - perhaps most notably Lord Denning 
- have used the fear of defensive medicine as a reason, 
or at least part of a reason, for not allowing claims in 
medical negligence.[88J The theory is that if claims 
against doctors routinely succeed, then the practice of 
medicine will become defensive, with the implication that 
the patient will suffer. Now this is open to question on 
two grounds.
First, it seems a rather cynical view of medical 
practitioners. If negligent practitioners are found to 
be negligent, then it is difficult to see the logic in 
the assumption that other (non-negligent) doctors will 
automatically shun treatments which involve any 
substantial risk, or play safe, or never attempt anything 
new. Second, it would seem to take the simplistic view 
that what is called defensive medicine is necessarily 
bad. Of course it is clear that defensive medicine - 
which is generally taken to mean excessive diagnostic 
zeal - may indeed be bad for patients. It is not only
1S9
actual therapy which may place the patient in danger, but 
also some diagnostic techniques in themselves are 
dangerous. However, to assume that it is always bad to 
exhaust the possibilities before reaching a diagnosis and 
instituting therapy seems a somewhat overstated 
position. In The Influence of Litigation on Medical 
Practice f 89 ] this view that defensive medicine need not 
be bad medicine is presented quite strongly by some of 
the legal contributors, and it is fair to say that it 
cannot be entirely discounted.
Defence organisations handle the bulk of the 
allegations made against doctors,[90] but the actual 
rules about negligence are contained in the decisions of 
the courts. Negligence is a legal, and not a medical, 
concept and is therefore subject to legal definition and 
explanation. However, it has sometimes been suggested 
that the settlements made by defence organisations will 
not always coincide with what amounts to legal negligence 
because they may be under other pressures to settle.[91] 
Equally, their role in filtering out cases is sometimes 
put forward as a reason for what some commentators claim 
is an overly cautious approach by the courts to those 
medical cases which eventually do come before them. 
Whilst it is not intended to consider the role of these 
organisations in any depth here, there are two points 
which require to be made on this subject.
First, on the question of perceived pressure on 
the defence organisations to settle, it should be noted
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that in this respect they do not differ significantly 
from Insurance Companies, who are also constantly in this 
kind of situation. In other words, to suggest that this 
has a major impact on the nature of cases which come to 
court may be to overestimate the importance of this 
pressure and to fail to place it in its proper context. 
On the second aspect of this point, it is certainly the 
case that, in real terms, the defence organisations <|o 
filter out a substantial number of cases, and will 
therefore have some impact on the success rate of cases 
which do go to court. For example, if they settle all 
cases of clear negligence, then the likelihood is that 
only those cases which they do not regard as negligent, 
that is which they feel capable of defending, will 
ultimately reach the courts. In this respect, the 
finding of the Pearson Commission that personal injury 
cases against doctors were considerably less successful 
than other personal injury cases,[92J may be partly, 
explained. However, it is also worth noting that the 
defence organisations - whilst taking legal advice - will 
not unerringly be right in their assessment of what is 
negligent and therefore may choose to defend cases which 
do amount, in law, to negligence. In any event, in this 
situation also, there is very little difference between 
their role and that of Insurance Companies who routinely 
filter out clear-cut cases in other personal injury 
claims.
In considering questions of medical negligence, it
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is worth bearing in mind, as was pointed out by Lord 
Denning in the case of Hatcher v. Black, T93 ] that 
medicine does represent a significantly different type of 
enterprise from many others. As he said, in a factory if 
everything is done properly then everyone will be safe. 
However, he continued, in medical practice even if 
everything is done properly there remains an element of 
risk.[94J The doctor, by definition engaged in a high 
risk enterprise, would, one would expect, be subject to a 
higher standard of care because of this. Moreover, the 
potential impact on the patient of failed or negligently 
administered therapy is such that there is clearly a very 
significant interest to be protected by the law. One 
might expect, therefore, that the tests for negligence
would be rigorously employed by the courts in medical 
cases and would be both clearly and unequivocally 
defined. In applying the tests of negligence
specifically to the medical profession, it is intended to 
consider how each of the three necessary tests for 
establishing negligence can be, and are, applied in 
practice by courts of law. The information held on the 
files of medical defence organisations is maintained in 
secrecy, and is not therefore available for scrutiny, 
but, although their importance is not disputed,
ultimately the test of a legal rather than a medical
concept can appropriately be described by the attitudes 
adopted by courts.
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Negligence and Medical Practice
It will be remembered that the first aspect of the 
negligence action is the establishing of a duty of care 
between the doctor and the patient. This is a relatively 
simple aspect of the equation. The doctor's offer to 
treat is sufficient to establish a duty of care, whether 
or not the doctor is acting in a paid or unpaid 
capacity.[95] Indeed, even the provision of treatment in 
an emergency situation creates a duty of care, although 
the extent of the duty may be reduced or redefined 
according to the circumstances.[96J Thus, for example, 
the doctor who treats major injuries at the roadside 
cannot be expected to achieve the level of success, nor
even perhaps the level of confidence, which he or she, 
could do in a hospital with the appropriate environment 
and equipment. Nonetheless, negligence in the 
performance of what can reasonably be expected may still 
result in successful action. Indeed, it has been 
necessary in some American states, to pass what is called
•Good Samaritan' legislation in order to reduce the
potential liability of doctors in these circumstances, 
since litigation had become so frequent and so successful 
that ultimately doctors refused to treat victims at the 
roadside.[97]
Whilst the duty of care owed by the doctor may 
arise either from contract or from delict/tort and
indeed, may arise from both, the existence of the duty is
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seldom disput.ed. [ 98 ] However, this is not to say that 
problems have not arisen in the past, and in the United 
Kingdom they arose in particular before the establishment 
of the National Health Service, as to the nature of the 
duty owed by the doctor and, in particular, to whom this 
duty was owed. The issue of contractual liability was 
considered in the case of Edgar v. Lamont.[99]
In this case, Mrs. Edgar cut her finger and her 
husband called the doctor on her behalf the following 
day. Mrs. Edgar was under the doctor's care for a 
further two weeks, and ultimately claimed that due to his 
improper treatment she suffered great pain. Finally, 
her finger had to be amputated. Damages were claimed for
pain, suffering and loss, as a result of the doctor's
alleged failure to provide proper and professional 
treatment and attention. Dr.Lamont pleaded that Mrs. 
Edgar had no right to sue because, since the agreement 
was a contractual one, and it was her husband and not she 
who had entered into the contract, she had no standing in 
law. Lord Salvesen, however, said:
It seems to me that the clear ground of 
action is that the doctor owes a duty to the
patient whoever has called him in and whoever
is liable for his bill, and it is for breach 
of that duty that he is liable,, in other 
words that it is for negligence arising in 
the course of the employment, and not in 
respect of breach of contract with the 
employer.[100]
Thus, even in a situation when a contractual agreement
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arises - now less frequent [101] - it is clearly
established that the doctor's duty arises in general from 
delictual/tortious, rather than contractual, duties even 
though the latter may be of fundamental importance in 
private medicine.
In the past, however, there have been further 
difficulties involved in the assessment of who is the 
appropriate person to sue. It is an important feature of 
negligence actions that the harm is redressible by the 
other. This involves establishing (a) who is entitled to 
sue, and (b) who is the appropriate person to sue. The 
first of these is relatively easily answered. In cases 
where the patient survives, then clearly if all the 
criteria are established he or she will have the right to 
sue personally. Negligence resulting in death can form 
the basis of a claim by surviving relatives on similar 
grounds to those which would have been available had the 
patient lived - in England in terms of the Law Reform 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934 and the Fatal 
Accidents Act 1976, and in Scotland by the Damages 
(Scotland) Act 1976.
However, problems have arisen in the past over who 
is the appropriate person or body against whom the claim 
should be raised. In Hillyer v. St. Bartholomew's 
Hospitalf 1021 in 1909 it was decided that a hospital was 
not responsible for the negligence of its employees. The 
reason for this hinged on complicated arguments about the 
nature of the contractual relationship between the doctor
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or nurse and the hospital. However, in 1951, the leading 
case of Cassidy v. The Ministry of Health, f 103 1 made it 
clear that where a hospital is properly the employer, 
then it is responsible for the negligence of its staff. 
If, however, the patient employs the doctor privately, 
even if using the hospital's resources, the hospital is 
not responsible and the doctor is personally liable for 
his or her own negligence. The general practitioner is 
in a different position and must be sued personally if he 
or she is negligent,[104] whereas the hospital doctor 
will be pursued in conjunction with his or her 
employer.[105] Having thus established that the doctor 
owes a duty of care to his patient, whether or not there 
is an existing contractual agreement, and the question of 
who is the appropriate person to sue. it is necessary to 
consider the question of the extent of the duty of care 
and the problems of assessing whether or not the harm 
actually results from medical intervention.
Allegations of negligence in respect of the 
medical profession are intimately linked, if they are to 
be successful, to the nature of the doctor/patient 
relationship. As has been seen, this relationship is the 
trigger for a variety of duties on the part of the 
doctor. The doctor's duties, for example, may include a 
duty to maintain such information as the patient 
discloses in a confidential manner.[106] However, the 
commonest cause of legal conflict between doctor and 
patient relates to a perceived failure to exercise
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adequate professional care and skill, and it is this 
which most routinely forms the basis of actions in
medical negligence. The risks of medical intervention
are legion, some of them foreseeable and some of them 
less obviously so. Where the risks are unforeseeable, it 
is unlikely that their occurrence will give rise to a 
successful legal action. That this is the case was made 
very clear in the case of Roe v. Ministry of Health and 
Anor.: Woolley v. Same.f107]
In this case, two patients were operated on on the 
same day, both patients requiring minor spinal surgery. 
A spinal anaesthetic was administered in each case,
given, in line with normal procedure, by lumbar
puncture. A specialist anaesthetist. assisted by 
hospital staff, administered the lumbar puncture. The 
anaesthetic used was nupercaine, which was stored in 
sealed glass tubes kept in a solution of phenol to 
prevent the outside of the tube from becoming infected. 
This was a relatively new procedure instituted by the 
specialist in question, as a result of a number of cases 
in which the outside of the ampoule had become infected 
and caused damage to the patient when the hypodermic
syringe came into contact with the tube. After the
operations, both patients showed signs of spastic 
paraplegia caused by the phenol solution which had
percolated into the anaesthetic through invisible 
hairline cracks in the sealed tubes. The outcome was
that both patients were paralysed from the waist down.
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and both raised actions for damages. In finding for the 
defendant the court rejected the application of res ipsa 
loquitur, and further held that the hospital was not 
responsible in any case for the acts of the anaesthetist 
who had a private practice although he was also on
contract to provide regular services for the hospital.
On appeal it was held that the anaesthetist was a 
servant or agent of the hospital, and that therefore the 
hospital was liable for his acts on the principle of
respondeat superior. However, on the basis of the 
current established medical practice (that is current in 
1947, when the accidents occurred) neither the
anaesthetist nor any member of the hospital staff was in 
fact legally responsible for the damage. It was noted
that, the court case being finally heard in 1954, 
information had subsequently come to light which 
suggested that the use of phenol to store anaesthetic 
ampoules was bad practice, but that, as this was not 
known at the time, the doctor's action in storing the
anaesthetic in this solution of carbolic acid was 
undertaken in good faith. It was further suggested that 
the tube may have developed the crucial fault as a result 
of being carelessly handled by another member of the 
hospital staff, but Denning L.J. said. '[tjhere is no
duty of care owed to a person when you could not
reasonably foresee that he might be injured by your
conduct.' [108] In this case. Lord Denning also made one 
of his most often quoted and important statements. In
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discussing the question of liability in medicine he said:
We should be doing a disservice to the
community at large if we were to impose 
liability on hospitals and doctors for
everything that happens to go wrong .......
We must insist on due care for the patient at 
every point but we must not condemn as 
negligent that which is only a 
misadventure.[109]
It is not. therefore, a sufficient basis for a successful 
legal action that the patient - rather than being cured -
was actually harmed by his or her contact with medicine.
Lord Denning, moreover. continued to use this 
particular perception of the medical enterprise in a 
number of other cases. In the case of Hatcher v. 
Blackf1101 he further suggested that it would be wrong to 
suggest that, simply because a mishap occurred, doctors 
or hospitals should automatically be held to be guilty of 
negligence. No doctor, he said, should be found guilty 
because one of the risks attendant on an operation or 
other therapy actually did occur, or because in a matter 
of opinion he made an error of judgement. He further 
restated this attitude towards errors of judgement in the 
case of Whitehouse v. Jordan.r1111 although his statement 
that an error of judgement is never negligence was 
ultimately specifically overruled by the House of 
Lords.[112J
According to Lord Denning, a doctor should only be 
found guilty if he has fallen short of the standard of 
reasonable medical care - an unexceptionable assertion.
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However, he has also introduced other criteria to his 
decision-making in medical cases which go beyond the 
standard rule of law relating to reasonableness, and 
which seem to include extra-legal factors which may have 
considerable significance for the patient attempting
successfully to sue. [113 J For example, in the case of 
Hucks v. Cole.[114] he indicated that the burden of proof 
on the pursuer in a medical case was higher than it was 
in other allegations of negligence, substantially on the 
basis that the doctor's status in the community should be 
protected. Moreoever, he also used the - as yet untested 
- fear of defensive medicine to impose an additional 
burden on the pursuer/plaintiff.[115]
It is clear, in summary, that a duty of care 
arises on the doctor's offer to treat. However, the 
boundaries of that duty may be less than clear. It is
necessary therefore to consider what are, or might be,
the constituent elements of the doctor's duty to his or
her patient. In so doing, a number of potential, and 
apparently common sense, duties will be considered, in 
conjunction with decisions taken by courts. It is not 
suggested that the examples used need be taken as 
definitive of what might optimally be expected of 
medicine. Merely, they offer some examples of situations 
in which patients might reasonably feel that they have 
rights in the medical enterprise.
170
The Duty to Treat
When the doctor accepts a patient. then he or she 
undertakes duties of care in that respect, some of which 
derive initially from acceptance of the professional 
duties outlined in the Hippocratic Oath.[116] The 
fundamental duty towards the patient, as defined in the 
Oath, is to do his or her best for that individual 
patient. Of course, the definition of what is best may 
vary with the circumstances of each situation. Thus, 
whilst a doctor, surrounded by the best of medical 
facilities in a hospital, may be expected to perform 
complicated surgery as part of the general duty of care 
towards the patient, the actual degree and type of 
medical treatment which is deemed to be acceptable may 
alter with the situation. What is demanded of the doctor 
may then change, not only in the emergency situation 
discussed above, but also when his or her intervention is 
merely for the examination of a person for employment or 
insurance purposes. The doctor's duty very broadly in 
this sense is to treat to the same standard of care as he 
or she initially claimed to have possessed.[117]
The Duty to Attend
A private patient can, of course, summon the doctor to 
attend at any time, and the doctor may successfully be 
sued in negligence or in contract (or both) for failure
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to answer this summons.[118J The National Health Service 
patient also has the right to summon the doctor on whose 
list he or she is, and the nature of the doctor's 
contract requires him to provide all proper and necessary 
treatment.[119] Of course, decisions about the nature 
of a failure in the duty to attend, if there is one. may 
also be dependent on assessing whether or not the person 
who summoned the doctor provided adequate and pertinent 
information in order that the doctor could assess the 
need for attendance. Of necessity, the doctor on duty 
will establish priorities, but it is not beyond the 
bounds of possibility that a doctor could be negligent in 
not attending quickly enough at a case even where, on 
information received, there was no apparent cause to 
assume that the patient was in grave danger. However, 
this is unlikely - the normal expectation being that when 
the doctor is summoned he or she will attend as quickly 
thereafter as possible. However, in some situations the 
requirement that the doctor attends, and follows up any 
given therapy, may be much more clear.
This was clearly demonstrated in the case of 
Corder v. Banks T1201 in 1960. In this case a plastic 
surgeon operated to remove excess fat from below the 
patient's eyes. The operation was carried out on an 
out-patient basis, and the patient was told that, were 
bleeding to occur within forty-eight hours, prompt 
treatment would be necessary to prevent permanent 
disfigurement. In the event, bleeding did occur and the
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patient's call to the doctor went unheeded. The court 
held that there was a duty on the surgeon to provide 
post-operative care, and that since the doctor had made 
it clear that he would be available to be summoned by 
telephone, then it was also his responsibility - which he 
had failed to fulfill - to ensure that the telephone was 
properly manned. His failure in that respect was held to 
be negligent, and damages were awarded in respect of the 
patient's disfigurement.
The Duty to Treat in Accordance with Established Medical 
Practice
The question of experiments in medicine will be 
considered in more detail later,[121] but departure from 
accepted practice merits some consideration at this point 
as a possible aspect of the doctor's general duty towards 
his patient in the routine medical enterprise. However 
unreasonably, where there is an accepted school of 
thought in respect of treatment, the patient might expect 
that the doctor will carry out this particular therapy. 
However, there are inevitable variations in medical 
practice which can render it extremely difficult to 
establish that a particular school of thought was in fact 
predominant. Indeed even where this is shown, it may be 
extremely difficult to establish that another school of 
thought (that selected by the instant doctor) is either 
wrong or inappropriate. It is obvious that doctors.
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confronted with the same condition, may opt for different 
therapies. Thus, the law has concentrated on the 
reasonableness of the choice of therapy rather than on 
its nature. Nowhere is this more clearly evidenced than 
in the court's statement in the case of Hunter v. 
HanleyT1221 a case which provides the authority for 
most commonwealth jurisdictions in this matter.
This case involved an action of damages against a 
doctor, resulting from a situation in which the patient 
was given an injection during the course of which the 
needle broke. It was alleged that the doctor had used a 
different gauge of needle from that which would normally 
be used and had therefore failed to exercise due skill 
and care. In a much cited dictum it was said that:
To establish liability by a doctor where 
deviation from normal practice is alleged, 
three facts require to be established. First 
of all. it must be proved that there is a 
usual and normal practice; secondly, it must 
be proved that the defender has not adopted 
that practice; and thirdly (and this is of 
crucial importance) it must be established 
that the course the doctor adopted is one 
which no professional man of ordinary skill 
would have taken if he had been acting with 
ordinary care.[123]
As Lord Clyde further said:
In the realm of diagnosis and treatment, 
there is ample scope for genuine difference 
of opinion and one man is clearly not 
negligent because his conclusion differs from 
that of other professional men, nor because 
he has displayed less skill or knowledge than 
others would have shown. The true test for
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establishing negligence in diagnosis or
treatment on the part of a doctor is whether 
he has been proved to be guilty of such
failure as no doctor of ordinary skill would
be guilty of if acting with ordinary
care.[124]
At first sight, this case seems to suggest that, 
where a doctor has abided by a usual or normal practice, 
he or she will not be guilty of negligence in the absence 
of other evidence of it. Yet it has been held in other 
disciplines that, even although a practice is widely 
used, it may yet be negligent if it is shown to be 
sufficiently risky or unprofessional,[125] and presumably 
the same would apply in medical cases. Indeed, the test 
in Hunter v. Hanley was followed, although partially 
restated. in the case of Clark v. Maclellan & 
Another.f 1261 In this case, Peter Pain, J. described 
the difference between situations where there is a choice 
of therapy and those where there is not. As he said:
...where there are two schools of thought as 
to the right course to be followed, he [the 
doctor] may not be charged with negligence 
simply because he chooses one course rather 
than the other. Where however there is but 
one orthodox course of treatment and he 
chooses to depart from that, his position is 
different. It is not enough for him to say 
as to his decision simply that it was based 
on his clinical judgement. One has to 
inquire whether he took all proper factors 
into account which he knew or should have 
known, and whether his departure from the 
orthodox course can be justified on the basis 
of these factors.[127]
The judgement in Hunter v. Hanley shows the
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significance attached by courts to . the concept of 
ordinary medical practice, or demonstration of reasonable 
levels of skill and care. The crucial question, 
therefore, relates to the standard of practice which 
courts feel to be reasonable. Clearly, a high standard 
of care might be expected of the medical profession, not 
only because of the inherent risks of medical practice, 
but also because of the professional expertise which 
doctors claim to have and which forms the basis of
consultation decision. The standard will of course vary 
according to the status of the doctor. Thus the
consultant practising in a particular area of medicine, 
may be expected to demonstrate a very high standard of 
care.[128] The specialist who holds him or herself out 
as possessing special qualifications and skills will 
equally be expected to demonstrate those skills at that 
high level.
The concept of failing in professional skill, so 
central to the decision in Hunter v. Hanley, is not 
therefore an absolute one. Practice may vary from area 
to area, and the doctor's professional qualifications may 
help to define the standard of skill and care which he or
she can be expected to demonstrate. The doctor who holds
him or herself out to be a specialist will be expected to 
provide a different standard of care from that to be 
expected of more junior colleagues, or of a general 
practititioner. In passing, it is worth noting that the 
application of this rule has resulted, in some parts of
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the United States, in a move away from specialisation - a 
move away from higher expectations. Indeed, in that same 
country, in recent times there seems even to be a move 
within those left in specialisations, away from certain 
of them which are regarded as particularly high 
risk.[129] Interestingly, the recommendation of the 
(Merrison) Committee on the Regulation of the Medical 
Profession[130] that specialist training should be given 
to all general practitioners has not been implemented, 
but could have had implications for the standards to 
which they were expected to aspire in the United Kingdom..
The standard generally set by law is, then, that 
of the ordinary practitioner acting with ordinary 
competence. The doctor is therefore not required to 
demonstrate outstanding skill, and the modern statement 
of this is contained in the 1959 case of Patch v. Board 
of Governors, United Bristol Hospitals.T1311 In this 
case, it was said:
The liability of doctors is not unlimited: 
the standard of care required of them is not 
that standard shown by exceptional 
practitioners. Surgeons, doctors and nurses 
are not insurers. They are not guarantors of 
absolute safety. They are not liable in Law
merely because a thing goes, wrong .... .
The law requires them to exercise 
professionally that skill and knowledge that 
belongs to the ordinary practitioner.[132]
Importance, therefore, is placed on the assessment
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of what is the 'ordinary' practitioner - evidence which 
is likely to be provided by doctors themselves. Thus, 
doctors' expectations of the professional expertise of 
themselves and their colleagues will affect the standard 
which is expected by the law. Whilst this cannot serve 
to lower the standard below that of the reasonable 
practitioner, it could serve to raise the standard if the 
medical profession so wished. Moreover, it is clear that 
in assessing the doctor's behaviour, not only the degree 
of specialisation which he or she holds him or herself 
out as having will be important, but equally the relative 
experience of the doctor may play a significant part in 
assessing whether or not he or she was negligent.[ 133 ] 
However, it is also clear that the law expects, and good 
medical practice also expects, both the exercise of due 
care and skill and a recognition by the individual of his 
or her own limitations. As was said in the case of R v. 
Bateman[134], '[i ]t is no doubt conceivable that a
qualified man may be held liable for recklessly 
undertaking a case which he knew or should have known to 
be beyond his powers.'[135J '
The Duty to Make an Accurate Diagnosis
No doctor directly or indirectly implies that he or she 
will make an accurate diagnosis, and so an inaccurate 
diagnosis would not necessarily found a successful action 
for negligence unless the reasonable practitioner, acting
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with ordinary skill and care, could be expected to have 
diagnosed correctly, or there was some basic fault in the 
technique adopted. Whatever patients may expect of 
medicine, and this may well include an accurate diagnosis 
of their condition, the law does not require this. This 
is amply demonstrated by the case of Whiteford v. Hunter 
and Gleed.[136]
In 1942 Mr Whiteford consulted Dr Gleed in 
relation to retention of urine. In the belief that
surgical treatment might be required, the doctor quite
properly referred his patient to a specialist. As the 
result of the examination the specialist concluded that
Mr Whiteford was suffering from an inoperable carcinoma 
although no biopsy was performed, nor was the normal
cystoscopic examination made prior to opening the
bladder. After the operation, the family were informed 
of the diagnosis of cancer and told that the life 
expectancy of the patient was a matter of months. Mr
Whiteford gave up his job, sold his house and he and his
wife moved to America where his wife's family lived. 
After some time had elapsed, Mr Whiteford was encouraged 
to consult another doctor in the United States who, on
operation, was able to identify the problem, but found no 
trace of cancer. After the operation Mr Whiteford and 
his wife returned home, and an action for damages was 
raised against Dr Gleed and the specialist. At the 
hearing it was held that Dr Gleed could not be expected 
to possess the necessary skill to refute the diagnosis of
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the specialist and therefore he could not be held
responsible. Indeed, Dr Gleed had acted with due 
professional skill and care in referring his patient to 
the specialist.
On the first hearing of the case, the specialist
was held to have been negligent in failing to make an 
accurate diagnosis, but on appeal he was held not to have 
been negligent because he could not be expected to 
diagnose everything correctly and - significantly - the 
evidence of eminent specialists was that he had not 
deviated from acceptable practice even in not carrying
out cystoscopic examination or a biopsy. However, in the 
case of Elder v. Greenwich and Deptford Hospital 
Management Committee,f1371 a Casualty Officer was held 
negligent in failing to diagnosis appendicitis in an 
eleven year old child who complained of acute abdominal
pain and vomiting. She was sent home and instructed to 
return if the pain continued, but later died at home.
The position, therefore, seems to be that the doctor,
whilst not guaranteeing to diagnose an illness correctly, 
may be found negligent in some situations where the
obvious diagnosis should have been made.[138]
The Duty to be Well-Informed
Again, to some extent, whether or not this duty exists
may depend on the status of the individual doctor and the 
reasonableness of expecting him or her to keep abreast of
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developments. There is, of course, no obligation on any 
doctor to subscribe to any particular school of medical 
thought nor to subscribe to any particular form of 
treatment or diagnosis. Being well-informed might, 
however, arguably be a sine qua non of practising as a 
reasonable practitioner, since this last assumes a degree 
of knowledge. Indeed, failure to keep abreast of current 
literature in the doctor's own field may result in 
situations where the doctor is unaware that a practice 
that he or she has used satisfactorily over a long period
of time has effectively been discredited. Thus, whilst
on the one hand there may be credibility attached to 
using standard practice, on the other to do so 
unquestioningly can result in risk to the patient and 
perhaps also to the doctor.[139]
This very issue arose in the case of Crawford v. 
Board of Governors, Charing Cross Hospital.T1401 The 
incident arose out of an accident in the course of a 
blood transfusion, and the action rested on the 
allegation that the doctor had been negligent in failing 
to keep abreast of modern techniques. The patient
underwent an operation on his bladder, during which he 
received a blood transfusion. He had lost the use of one 
arm previously as the result of polio, and when he 
recovered from the anaesthetic it was discovered that he 
had lost the use of his other arm also. It was clear
that this had resulted from treatment of the arm during 
transfusion. The case was heard in 1953, and an article
181
published in 1950 was shown to have discredited the 
particular form of treatment used during this 
transfusion, outlining the possible dangers, including 
the one which occurred in this case. The doctor had not 
read this article, and was therefore unaware of the
dangers in what had been a fairly common practice. The
Court of Appeal finally held that mere failure to keep 
abreast of the medical press was not sufficient evidence 
of negligence, although the original judge had felt that 
there was a duty to follow up writings which were of 
particular relevance to the given doctor. In fact, it 
was admitted by the doctor that he knew of the existence
of the article, but had failed to read it. As an aside
to this case, it is interesting to ponder on what would 
have been the conclusion had the doctor read the article, 
but exercised his clinical judgement in not following the 
new procedure.
Although it would seem, then, that the doctor is 
not legally bound to keep up to date, there are some 
situations where he or she has a ready source of 
information available, to which attention should be 
directed, and which might result in the raising of ah 
action in negligence, even if unsuccessful, which 
suggests that every effort should be made to maintain 
knowledge at current levels. For example, it is a 
statutory requirement on pharmaceutical companies that 
they prepare and send to doctors a data sheet on all 
their products.[141J The information contained in the
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data sheet includes comments on special precautions, 
contra-indications and highlights those situations where 
it is felt that particular patients might be at special 
risk. It is not inconceivable that a doctor who fails to 
note the contra-indications may find him or herself 
guilty of negligence when known dangers subsequently 
occur.
The position of the doctor who fails to keep 
abreast was further stated in Barnett v. Chelsea and 
Kensington Hospital Management Committee[1421 which 
followed the statement in Hunter v. Hanley[143 1 that a 
doctor cannot simply use the same techniques where they 
have been shown not to equate to what is regarded by the 
majority of medical opinion as good and proper 
practice.[144 j
Duty to Communicate with Other Doctors
This particular duty would apply to general practitioners 
notifying specialists, specialists notifying general 
practitioners, casualty officers communicating with the 
doctor of the patient admitted as an emergency case, and 
so on. Although the duty to communicate with others 
doctors may not be a legal one it is nonetheless one 
which is of prime importance, particularly as the result 
of the decision in Chapman v. Rix.[145 ]
Mr. Chapman was a butcher who injured himself with 
a knife when boning some meat. Doctor Rix who was on the
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staff of the local hospital was summoned. He advised 
that the patient be transferred to hospital so that a 
more extensive examination could be carried out. Doctor 
Rix, himself a general practitioner, then re-examined the 
patient at the hospital, as there were no resident 
surgical staff. In his opinion, the wound extended to 
the deeper layers of the abdominal wall but there had 
been no penetration of the peritoneum. The wound was 
stitched, and the patient was sent home with explicit 
instructions to contact his own doctor and inform him of 
what had occurred. Doctor Rix, however, did not 
communicate with the patient's own doctor in any way. 
The patient summoned his own doctor that evening, by 
which time he was suffering from abdominal pain and 
nausea, and told his doctor that he had received 
treatment for an abdominal wound which had been said to 
be superficial. His doctor enquired no further, and was 
under the impression that Mr Chapman had been seen by a 
Casualty Officer, not realising that the hospital in 
which he was examined was a Cottage Hospital without 
surgical staff and that the examination had been, in 
fact, by another general practitioner. He therefore 
dismissed the abdominal injury as a factor in his 
patient's condition and diagnosed a digestive upset. 
Peritonitis set in and the patient died five days later. 
Post-mortem examination showed that there had been 
penetration of the peritoneum, and that the small 
intestine had been perforated by the knife at the time of
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the accident. The widow sued Doctor Rix on several 
grounds, but he was found at first instance to have been 
negligent only on the basis of his failure to communicate 
with Mr Chapman's own doctor. Doctor Rix appealed 
successfully, and Mr. Chapman's widow appealed to the 
House of Lords, where the decision of the Court of Appeal 
was upheld by 3:2. Lords Keith and Denning dissented, 
feeling that the patient's own doctor should have been 
told by Dr. Rix of the circumstances.
The Duty to Treat Adequately
One important recent case in this area is the case of 
Whitehouse v. Jordan.[146] In this case, it was alleged 
that during a difficult labour and birth, the doctor had 
pulled too hard and too long on the forceps, resulting in 
the child being born brain damaged. In the Court of 
Appeal, Lord Denning indicated that whilst there may have 
been an error of judgement on the doctor's part, an error 
of judgement could never amount to negligence.[147] The 
allegation that the doctor had failed to treat his 
patient adequately was dismissed by the court. The House 
of Lords upheld the ultimate decision of the Court of 
Appeal, but in so doing overturned Lord Denning's view 
that an error of judgement would never be 
negligent.[148J
The question of what amounts to adequate treatment 
is, of course, one which offers major scope for
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interpretation. If ‘adequate* means always being 
successful, or never causing damage, then this would 
clearly be an unreasonable burden to place on the 
doctor. [149] Equally, however, if it does not at least 
imply an expectation of these then it cannot be of 
sufficient stringency to meet the needs, and the 
expectations, of the patient. 'Adequate* has tended, 
therefore, to be interpreted as being a balance between 
the interests of the patient in not being harmed 
(although the alleged rise in iatrogenic disease must be 
considered here,[150]) and the right of the doctor to 
claim clinical judgement and freedom in the operation of 
his or her skills. Since there is no standard medical 
situation, and given that the technique chosen cannot 
therefore be standardised, the doctor must have 
reasonable scope in which to make choices about the type 
of therapy which is appropriate and the way in which he 
or she will carry it out. Always, of course, this is 
subject to the rule in Hunter v. Hanleyf151 ] as to 
reasonableness.
Summary
It can be seen, therefore, that the doctor is, on a 
practical basis, in a vulnerable position in relation to 
the risks inherent in his or her profession. Even a 
minimal degree of error, carelessness or recklessness 
short of actual negligence, may result in serious, and 
sometimes fatal, damage to the patient concerned. It is.
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therefore, deemed to be essential - if the benefits of 
medical practice are to be protected - that a balance is 
struck in terms of liability. However, it is also clear 
from the foregoing examples of potential duties, that it 
is particularly difficult to pin down, beyond the very 
vaguest terms, what duties a doctor does in fact have, or 
rather the level at which failure in these duties will be 
held to be legally culpable.
In some situations it might seem that the doctrine 
of res ipsa loquitur would apply - for example, in cases 
where there has been a failure to remove swabs from a 
patient undergoing surgery, or where the wrong leg has 
been amputated. Whilst the latter situation is clearly 
culpable, the former seems less inevitably so, and, as 
was already mentioned. in the case of Mahon v. 
Osborne. T1521 it was held that failing to remove swabs 
did not amount to negligence.
Moroever, the difficulties of assessing the level 
at which complex professional duties should be measured 
cannot be underestimated. This is a problem which, of 
course, applies equally to specialisms and professions 
other than medicine. Finally, there is the question of 
the general • standards which are imposed on doctors by 
organisations extraneous to medicine, such as society and 
the judiciary. As a legal concept, it has been claimed 
that there are basic rules of negligence which courts 
will apply without favour, demanding higher standards 
from those taking bigger risks, and (although there may
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be problems in the communication and understanding of 
technical information) applying the same fundamental 
rules to all groups. The question remains whether or not 
this is true in allegations of medical negligence.
It may seem, and indeed it has been claimed by 
some, that the doctor is, on the contrary, placed in a 
special category by the law.[153] There is a certain 
amount of evidence, certainly, which would suggest that 
considerations other than the purely technical or legal, 
do seem to carry weight, at least in some decisions about 
the quality of medical care. Primarily, as has been 
seen, the belief in medicine (and by implication its 
practitioners) as being a social good may lead to a 
certain reluctance on the part of the public, the 
legislators and the courts to criticise or challenge the 
doctor who is a representative of a caring and vital 
profession. However, even if it can be accepted that it 
is necessary to take the rough with the smooth in order 
to benefit the general welfare, judges (and particularly 
Lord Denning,[154]) have sometimes articulated other, and 
perhaps less acceptable, reasons for placing the doctor 
in a special category. Judicial reluctance to find a 
doctor negligent is, however, not immutable. In
specific respect of the suggestion that the burden of 
proof is higher in such cases, it was recently said in 
Ashcroft v. Mersey Regional Health Authorityf1551 that:
The question for consideration is whether on
a balance of probabilities it has been 
established that a professional man has 
failed to exercise the care required of a man 
possessing and professing special skill. If 
there is an added burden, such burden does 
not rest on the person alleging negligence; 
on the contrary, it could be said that the 
more skilled a person is the more the care 
that is expected of him.f1561(emphasis added)
It was mentioned in passing earlier in this 
discussion that both doctors and patients in the United
States are said to be suffering as a result of the growth
of defensive medicine. It is a commonly expressed fear
in the British courts that if doctors are found to be 
negligent too often, and perhaps even if there is
facilitation of the raising of actions against doctors, 
this will inevitably lead to the practice in the United 
Kingdom of this same defensive irtedicine. This 
extra-legal consideration not only goes beyond the 
definition of negligence per se. it also but rests on 
several challengeable assumptions which are worth a brief 
mention. It does not necessarily follow that
facilitation of genuine complaints would result in 
litigation spiralling out of control. Whilst the
experience in the United States might suggest that this 
could indeed be the result, blandly to accept its 
immediate translation into the United Kingdom, is to
ignore considerable differences between the structures of 
the societies and their legal systems.
Doctors in the United States occupy a different,' 
and often considerably wealthier, social position from
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that of their counterparts in the United Kingdom. It may 
be, for example, that patients in the United States are 
less reluctant to sue a doctor, given that they perceive 
him or her as wealthy rather than caring. Equally, the 
contingency-fee system operated by lawyers in the United 
States means that the patient takes no real risk in suing 
what, in the long run, will in most cases be an insurance 
company rather than the individual doctor or a service to 
which everyone subscribes/ such as the National Health 
Service. Whilst lawyers may claim that the contingency 
fee system permits them to take cases which would 
otherwise be impossible to raise, and equally that they 
will not raise speculative cases since their work would 
remain unpaid, there seems little logical doubt that it 
does have an impact on litigation-conscious America, 
particularly where awards are made by juries.[157]
Moreover, it is a challengeable assumption that 
defensive medicine is a necessary outcome of increased 
litigation. In evidence to the Pearson Commission, it 
was the medical profession itself which argued for 
retention of the negligence based action as a desirable 
means of sustaining professional accountability.[158] 
Successful allegations of negligence against doctors must 
surely also represent that professional accountability. 
Equally, although perhaps more contentiously, it has been 
said that defensive medicine may in fact equate to 
optimal medicine, rather than necessarily to bad
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medicine.[ 159 ] This is not a suggestion on which the 
present writer is competent to comment, beyond the mere 
fact that the expense involved in defensive medicine, 
often criticised by commentators, cannot per se serve to 
condemn the practice.
The statements of Lord Denning in Hucks v. 
Cole f 160 ] have already been mentioned, and seem to 
suggest that the aggrieved patient must demonstrate a 
degree of negligence greater than if he or she were suing 
another individual or professional. Kilner Brown's 
remarks,[161J however, may suggest that there is a 
judicial move away from accepting this. The
implications of categorising any professional group as a 
special case, as Lord Denning seems to do in this 
example, may ultimately however be more dangerous than 
helpful to those concerned. Indeed, this very point was 
made by the Pearson Commission.[162j Commenting on the 
considerable shortfall in success rates between most 
personal injury claims and those raised against doctors, 
the Pearson Commission also noted that there was an 
increase in claims against doctors, pointing out that 50 
or 60 years ago claims against doctors, were relatively 
rare.[163] They received an estimate that in recent 
years the claims against doctors and dentists were 
running at about 500 per year, and more recently the 
medical profession, has claimed that allegations have 
again substantially increased.[164 ] The Commission were 
themselves unimpressed by suggestions that defensive
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medicine would necessarily result from the raising of 
successful actions against doctors. Moreover they 
pointed out that although there has been an increase in 
claims, the total number is still a tiny proportion of 
the number actually receiving medical treatment.[165 ]
In noting the difficulties of raising successful 
actions on the basis of medical negligence, the Pearson 
Commission felt that there were a number of possible 
contributory factors over and above those already 
highlighted. These difficulties they identified as the 
difficulty of obtaining access to information; the 
problem of obtaining the help of an expert to assess what 
has happened; the reluctance of fellow professionals to 
criticise, and the fact that medical records might be so 
vague as to leave considerable scope for interpretation 
of the doctor's behaviour.[166] The Commission felt that 
shifting the burden of proof in negligence cases would 
obviate some of the problems which they outlined, for 
example, in respect of access to records and so on, but 
on the whole they felt that it would also increase claims 
and defensive medicine would become more of a 
possibility. Therefore, they did not recommend changes 
to the law.[167]
In any event, the Commission was of the opinion 
that medical accidents were more common than actual cases 
of negligence.[ 168 ] For a new scheme to be satisfactory 
it would have to take account of this. They therefore 
looked at the possibility of imposing a system of strict
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liability but felt that this would, whilst removing the 
need to prove negligence, still have three major 
First, it would necessarily preclude
for the foreseeable result of medical
second, causation would still be very
establish; and third, it might place an 
rigid set of standards on the medical 
profession and again lead to an increase in defensive
medicine.[ 169] As has been noted, in its evidence to 
the Commission the medical profession by and large 
favoured a retention of the fault-based action, since it 
claimed that acceptance of liability was one of the means 
whereby doctors can show their sense of responsibility 
and therefore claim professional freedom. To remove 
delict or tort from the equation would require a
beaurocratisation of medicine which, it was said, would 
unreasonably delimit professional practice.[170]
The Commission were largely unimpressed by such
claims and noted that the system at present tended to
expose those doctors whose behaviour was least likely to 
be reprehensible. However, in order to make special and 
different rules for doctors, it was felt that there would 
have to be a very good case made for differentiating them 
from other professionals, and that meanwhile this could 
not be done.[171] Interestingly, the British Medical 
Association itself has recently taken a position which 
seems to reverse the views presented to the Pearson
Commission, and which now seems to favour a system of
problems. 
compensation 
treatment; 
difficult to 
unreasonably
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liability without fault, such as that which exists in New 
Zealand.[172]
In the long run, the Commission's rejection of the 
strict liability scheme rested on the fact that it would 
still fail to compensate the majority of people, who were 
injured as a result of medical accident rather than 
medical negligence. Advances in medicine mean that the 
opportunity for accident expands, which might have 
rendered a no fault scheme more satisfactory. The 
effect of no-fault compensation in medical cases will be. 
considered in a subsequent chapter.[173] Ultimately, the 
decision not to recommend a no-fault scheme in this area 
was seen as a very difficult one and hinged as much on 
cost as it did on principle. The Commission, however, 
did recommend that, in view of the problems identified 
with the negligence action, the option of introducing a 
no-fault scheme should be retained and reconsidered in 
the light of experiences in Sweden and New Zealand.[174]
Conclusions
In summary, therefore, it can be seen that the entire 
test of negligence hinges on the question of whether or 
not the duties owed by a doctor to his or her patient can 
be identified. Without a clear definition of doctors' 
duties, it is impossible to assess whether or not they 
have been breached. Although there is a three-fold test 
for negligence, it has been suggested that each part of
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the test in fact is merely an aspect of the other.[175]
In other words, the duty of care concept and its 
definition are inextricably linked to all aspects of the 
definition of negligence. Logically, unless they can be 
established, there is no need to consider the final 
element of the negligence based claim - that is, that the 
breach caused the harm complained of. As has been noted, 
the judiciary can, and often do, make policy decisions 
about the nature and extent of any duty owed. Where this 
is done in an apparently disinterested manner it 
traditionally neither receives nor merits condemnation.
However, it is also important to remember that 
judicial attitudes to the individual or group under 
attack may have a significant impact on the rights of the 
individual, and on the chances of successful litigation. 
A cursory examination of duties which doctors might owe 
to their patients tends to suggest that such common sense 
duties as the ordinary citizen might expect, do not 
necessarily receive legal reinforcement. This is not, it, 
is submitted, because it would either be too onerous or 
unreasonable to impose such duties - at least not in all 
cases. Certainly to impose a duty to make an accurate 
diagnosis, or always to select successful treatment, or 
to subscribe to a certain school of thought would be an 
inappropriate burden to place on the medical profession. 
However, without going to such extremes, it might be 
possible to identify a standard which encompasses some of 
these characteristics and which protects the patient in
195
the medical enterprise. From the foregoing it might 
appear at first sight that doctors in fact have very few
clear-cut duties in respect of their patients.
The extensive use of extra-legal criteria in
determining the doctor's responsibilities to the patient 
subverts both the strict application of legal rules and 
the source from which the doctor's duties arise. Seen
from the perspective of patients' rights, it is more 
difficult to justify reduction of the level of care which 
can be expected. Moreover, as has been pointed out 
above, the extensive - perhaps even definitive in some 
cases - use of professional evidence in determining the 
ultimate issue before the court, will further enhance the 
medical profession's power in decision-making and further 
detract from the patient's capacity successfully to claim 
for harm caused.
Indeed, it might even be suggested that it is this 
very perceived protectionist attitude in medicine which 
makes the risk of patient litigation greater and which - 
if litigation does contribute to the growth of defensive 
medicine - might ultimately result in the occurrence of 
the very situation which courts claim, to strive to 
avoid. Equally, it is questionable whether or not one 
professional group should be put in a different position 
from others. It was precisely to avoid this situation 
that the Pearson Commission, clearly concerned with lack 
of success in allegations of medical negligence, 
nonetheless refused to institute a special procedure
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specifically for medicine. If it is unfair or 
unreasonable to impose a special set of standards on the 
one hand, then it is difficult to see how the current 
legal practice of so doing in medical cases can 
simultaneously be justifiable.
Clearly, not only judicial interpretation, but 
also the nature of the action made available to patients 
is significant in protecting (or otherwise) their 
rights. For the moment, however, it is appropriate to 
test the negligence action specifically against the
claims and concerns of those who argue that patients have 
a right to make choices in the medical enterprise. It 
has been suggested that the move from the assault to the 
negligence based action has radically altered both the
philosophy and the practice of medical litigation, and at 
this stage the implications of the use of negligence as a 
means of resolving disputes about consent must be 
considered in more detail.
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CONSENT AND NEGLIGENCE
CHAPTER 5
It has been indicated that the assault-based action, 
whilst showing superficial promise as a method of 
emphasising patient autonomy as a fundamental value in 
the medical enterprise, nonetheless also carries inherent 
in it substantial flaws. Not merely might it seem 
distasteful or inappropriate that it should be used 
against an essentially beneficent discipline, but also 
doubts about whether or not 'touching1 is essential to 
the allegation make it a less than universally useful 
tool. Further, of course, it would certainly be 
stretching the credibility of language were what in 
reality amounts to a failure to act by, for example, the 
doctor not providing any information about available 
therapy, to be described as an assault.[1]
Equally, the application of the negligence 
doctrine in routine cases of medical malpractice has been 
said to be somewhat less stringent than it is in other 
cases.[2] The use of extra-legal policy factors in 
decision-making, whilst not totally unusual, is 
nonetheless arguably more common and more systematic in 
medical cases, reflecting the esteem in which orthodox 
medicine and its practitioners (doubtless rightly) are 
held in the community. Indeed, as Lawson and 
Markesinis[3] note, '...it would appear that nowadays
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lawyers seem to have recourse to...policy factors 
whenever their aim is to limit rather than expand 
delictual liability.'[4] Moreover, the logic of using 
expert testimony where professional decisions are made is 
difficult to dispute, although it may present problems 
for the claimant in all allegations against professional 
groups who clearly have an interest in not criticising 
their colleagues. This is equally true of doctors.
However, the extensive use of professional expert 
evidence to test the behaviour under criticism against 
the grounds for negligence is only logical to the extent 
that the behaviour actually concerns solely professional 
matters. Moreover, even although persuasive, it would be 
unusual were the law to hand over entirely its role as 
the ultimate decision maker. It may be true that:
With matters involving technical medical 
expertise, a court should be extremely
cautious before condemning as negligent a 
procedure which was performed in accordance 
with the common professionally approved
practice.[5]
Courts nonetheless retain the right (and some might say
the duty) so to do. In a number of cases, mere 
conformity with accepted or standard practice has been 
held by courts to amount to negligence.[6] Equally, in 
cases of medical negligence the courts have made it clear 
that the doctor who stubbornly holds on to old practices 
may be considered negligent.[7]
In medical cases, however, the situation for the
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aggrieved patient is further compounded by the fact that 
the courts hold to the principle laid down in Hunter v. 
Hanley.f81 Thus, deviation from normal practice is not 
necessarily negligent.[9] Essentially, therefore, 
although on the one hand the courts retain the right to 
insist on good, rather than merely common, practice, in 
truth the assessment even of what is good (albeit 
different or unusual) practice, will again depend on the 
evaluation of what the reasonable, competent doctor would 
have thought of this particular deviation from the 
norm.[10] Although the defending doctor is placed in 
such cases in the situation of proving that the deviation 
was reasonable,[ 11] this shift in the burden of proof 
will only be significant if other doctors are prepared to 
criticise. Without belabouring the point, the comments 
made above [12] in respect of expert evidence should be 
borne in mind.
The Essentials of Consent
If questions of consent are to be dealt with in a similar 
way to matters of operational malpractice, then whether 
or not a fellow professional would have disclosed the 
information will be of crucial, if not determinative, 
concern. In order to assess the merit of such an 
approach, however, it is necessary to consider in more 
depth precisely what constitutes consent, and - perhaps
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even more fundamentally - the rationale for consent 
rules.
To give legally valid consent, a person must be 
both sciens and volens. [1'3] Thus, he or she must have 
the capacity to consent - such capacity is central to the 
issue. The capacity of the sane, adult human being is 
not in doubt - special cases will be considered 
below.[14] For the purposes of the present discussion, 
however, the prototype will be the sane adult. Moreover, 
it must be the case that what is consented to is 
something which is capable of being consented to.[15] 
Thus, in the criminal law, it is established that it is 
not possible legally to consent to assault or 
murder.[16] As has been seen, however, the criminal law 
is rarely, if ever, used in questions relating to medical 
practice. Most forms of therapy are capable of being 
consented to, although doubts have been raised about 
some. Lord Denning, for example, held the firm view that 
- even if voluntary - sterilisation was beyond the range 
of therapy which could be consented to.[17] However, 
this view was not shared by his colleagues in this case 
and sterilisation has become a relatively routine part of 
medical practice. Indeed, it has been claimed that it 
now represents one of the most commonly used forms of 
contraception.[18] Its legality on a voluntary basis is 
therefore scarcely in doubt.
It can safely be assumed, therefore, that even the 
most invasive therapy can be consented to by the patient
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who is both scions and volens. Even procedures such as 
heart transplantation which place the patient at 
considerable risk are clearly not illegal in se. Indeed, 
it is substantially the case that debates about the legal 
standing of therapy currently relate rather to the 
quality of the consent given than to the nature of the 
therapy itself. The essence of the problem, then, 
relates to whether or not the doctor can take advantage 
of the maxim volenti non fit iniuriafl91 - that is, one 
cannot successfully claim damages where there has been a 
voluntary assumption of risk of the kind of happening 
which subsequently eventuates. In order for this plea to 
be successful, it is necessary that the risk was both 
known and accepted. This involves both information 
disclosure and acceptance of risk. A person cannot be 
said to have voluntarily accepted a risk if he or she was 
unaware of the possibility of the risk actually 
occurring. As Scott, L.J. said in Bowa ter v. Rowley 
Regis BCf201:
In regard to the doctrine volenti non fit 
\ injuria, I would add one reflection of a 
general kind. That general maxim has to be 
applied with especially careful regard to the 
varying facts of human affairs and human 
nature in any particular case, just because
it is concerned with the intangible factors
of mind and will. For the purpose of the 
rule, if it be a rule, a man cannot be said 
to be truly "willing" unless he is in a
position to choose freely; and freedom of 
choice predicates, not only full knowledge of 
the circumstances upon which the exercise of 
choice is conditioned, in order that he may
be able to choose wisely, but the absence
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from his mind of any feeling of constraint, 
in order that nothing shall interfere with 
the freedom of his will.[21]
\ The voluntariness of acceptance of risk can, in 
the case of the patient, be dealt with first. It is 
clear that, in many cases, the patient who accepts 
therapy does so not entirely free from some kind of 
duress. This pressure, however, stems not necessarily 
from the doctor, but more importantly (and perhaps 
unavoidably) from the illness itself. Patients may, for 
example, fear surgery, and may certainly prefer not to 
undertake it in normal circumstances, but the need for 
surgery is the result of illness, and therefore something 
to which they will generally give consent. Although the 
voluntariness of consent may, therefore, be theoretically 
more questionable than in a less threatening situation, 
it would make a nonsense of medical practice and health 
care in general were it to be suggested that it should 
not satisfy the volens requirement. Indeed, disputes 
about the quality of consent centre primarily on the 
sciens aspect - that is on whether or not the patient 
actually was sufficiently knowledgeable about the risks 
to offer meaningful or valid consent.
Information
In relation to this it is obviously necessary that 
information is disclosed on which the patient can base
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his or her decision. Relevant information about known 
risks (and benefits) must form a substantial part of 
ensuring that the patient is in a position to accept (or, 
on the contrary, reject) therapy, and it is the provision 
of this information which renders the subsequent therapy 
both morally justified and legally protected. This 
aspect of the interaction of doctor and patient, 
therefore, is substantially what is the issue when a
reference is made to 'informed' consent. As Robertson 
says
...the doctrine of informed consent is a 
legal concept which imposes a duty on the 
doctor to explain to his patient, not only
the nature of the proposed treatment, but 
also the dangers and risks inherent 
therein.[22]
By the making of such disclosure, the patient is
\
placed in the position to offer a meaningful and real 
consent, and to become an active participant in choices 
about his or her health care. The duty to make such
disclosure is placed on the doctor because he or she is, 
by the nature of his or her professional skills, in 
possession the of relevant information. But this does 
not minimise the input of the would be autonomous
patient, and demands that '[mjedical personnel are not 
justified in substituting their best medical judgments 
for patients' informed decisions.'[23] A commitment to 
patient participation, however, does not answer the 
question as to the extent of information which must be 
disclosed.
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If information disclosure is genuinely to protect 
patient autonomy, then obviously all relevant information 
should be disclosed. Thus, every known risk - whatever 
its statistical probability - should be made known to the 
patient, since every risk might have a significant effect 
on that individual. Equally, every known benefit should 
be made known. Of course, doctors are not, as has been 
seen, legally liable in negligence for failing to keep 
abreast of developments even in their own field, although 
best practice might suggest that they should do so.[24] 
The impractibility of so doing, however, makes it 
sensible and fair not to require total knowledge of every 
conceivable article, book, and so on, which could be 
relevant. This is not to say that doctors need not 
follow the major articles and reports in respect of their 
disciplines, but it is reasonable that they should not be 
expected to go to ridiculous lengths. This, of course, 
will obviously have an impact on their knowledge of the 
nature and the range of risks which are attached to a 
given procedure, and which they can, therefore, disclose 
to their patients.
All therapies contain some risks. For example, 
there is a risk of allergic or idiosyncratic reaction to 
all drugs. Equally, every anaesthetic carries a risk, to 
say nothing of the risks inherent in surgery itself. 
Some risks may reasonably be thought to be within the 
knowledge of every physician - for example, the small 
risk of death under general anaesthetic - but others will
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be more specifically related to the individual selected 
form of therapy. If the doctor is not legally or 
professionally bound to keep totally up-to-date with his 
or her specialism, then reasonably also, he or she will 
not necessarily be expected to be aware of every 
conceivable risk inherent in every possible therapy. To 
some extent, therefore, the amount of disclosure which 
should or can be made will initially be limited by the 
knowledge of the individual doctor.
If patient autonomy is adequately to be protected, 
however, then there must be a standard which facilitates 
that autonomy - that is the standard for disclosure 
should be set by courts with patient autonomy to the 
fore. This, if taken to its logical conclusion, would 
require two distinct types of information disclosure.
Disclosure of Therapeutic Alternatives
As has been seen, doctors exercise their professional 
skills both in diagnosis and in selecting appropriate 
therapy. However, in some - perhaps many - situations 
there are alternatives in therapy, each carrying their 
own risks and their own benefits. Patieht autonomy is as 
importantly protected by the capacity to participate in 
knowing choices about the type of therapy, as it is by 
having the capacity to decide whether or not to accept 
the recommended therapy. This is not to suggest that the 
patient has the technical skills to know the available
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choices, but merely, and more reasonably, to indicate 
that where alternatives exist the patient must be put in 
a position to evaluate the relative risks and benefits of 
these choices. As has been said, 1[e]very human being of 
adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what 
shall be done with his own body.'[25] It is not 
inconceivable that a patient may be prepared to accept 
the risks associated with one therapeutic option but not 
with another. This is because:
In many circumstances patients can make 
adequate choices about medical treatment only 
when they consider non-medical benefits and 
harms in addition to the medical benefits and 
harms which may accrue from these choices.[26]
The availability of therapeutic alternatives is a 
not uncommon feature of medical practice. Moreover, 
doctors themselves may differ on diagnosis and 
appropriate therapy. As was noted in the case of Hunter 
v. Hanley. '[i]n the realm of diagnosis and treatment 
there is ample scope for genuine difference of 
opinion.'[27] If patient autonomy is to be offered 
adequate protection, however, it is for the patient - of 
course on medical advice - to select the therapy most 
suited to their emotional, personal or financial 
situation. When the law protects this freedom it offers 
more than a mere theoretical commitment to autonomy. 
However, in both the United States and the United 
Kingdom, concern has been expressed that such an attitude
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is not common, or at least not routine. As Shultz put it:
The law's response to pressures for a greater 
recognition of patient autonomy has been 
ambivalent. Existing rules repudiate the 
view that the mere hiring of a doctor 
transfers all authority from patient to 
doctor. Yet full vindication of patient 
autonomy interests would necessitate placing 
final authority regarding important decisions 
in the hand of any patient, having the 
capacity and the desire to exercise it.[28]
, Equally, in the United Kingdom, this 'vindication 
of patient autonomy' has not always been obvious in 
situations which involve therapeutic choice. The most 
notable example of this can be found in the case of 
Hatcher v. Black.[29] In this case a doctor diagnosed a 
thyroid complaint, a condition susceptible to treatment 
either by drug or surgical therapy. Each of these 
therapies involved its own distinct risks, but in 
addition to the risks, the therapeutic benefits 
differed. In the case of drug therapy, it was the 
opinion of the doctor that, if successful, its success 
would be less be that of successful surgery. 
Accordingly, he selected surgery as the right medical 
option, and failed to inform his patient of the existence 
of an alternative. This denial of therapeutic option was 
not criticised by the court, on the grounds of 
professional judgement. Yet denial of the opportunity 
to make therapeutic choices is as autonomy reducing as is 
any other denial of information.
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Disclosure of Risks and Benefits
It is not common for doctors to minimise the potential 
benefits of therapy, but it is equally not common for 
them to emphasise the risks. What has been called the 
‘therapeutic imperative' dictates much of medical 
practice. If medicine has a potential cure, then it 
makes medical sense to use the appropriate therapy in 
order to effect that cure, and not to deter the patient 
by explaining the potential risks. At a purely 
professional level, it may be rational to view the 
desirability of information disclosure in this way, but 
in terms of patient autonomy it can only be denounced as 
paternalism. As has been seen earlier, [30] the reasons 
often given for not disclosing risks can be defeated when 
the professional standard is given less than optimum 
weight and consideration. If patient autonomy is 
crucial, then even information which prevents therapy 
must be disclosed. In other words, account must be taken 
of the fact that, for patient autonomy to be adequately 
protected, there must a standard set not by medicine but
by a legal system concerned about patients' rights to
\ 1
make choices in therapeutic encounters.
On the strict autonomy model then, all risks - and 
not merely some of them - must be disclosed if the 
patient is to be free to make personalised and meaningful 
decisions. That this is not common practice will be seen 
in more detail below, but for the moment there is one
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further consideration which follows from this claim. It 
is routine for courts and doctors to adopt a form of 
assessment of medical behaviour which equates to the kind 
of paternalism described, for example, by Buchanan.[31] 
Even ywhere it is accepted in principle that risks should 
be disclosed, a further refinement is often used which 
minimises the nature of the risks themselves. Thus, it 
may be said that 'real' or 'material' or 'substantial' 
risks should be disclosed, but that by implication, those 
risks which do not fit into these categories need not 
be. Of course, if this is to be an acceptable
modification of patient autonomy, it is necessary to 
formulate a test for 'realness' and so on. The 
materiality of a risk, it seems to be assumed, depends on 
the medically definable and determinable characteristics 
of the risk. If this were not so, then the patient would 
have to be informed of each risk in order that he or she 
could decide on whether or not it actually was real or 
material. Thus, the choice of risks to be disclosed
remains very much the province of the doctor. But what 
implications does this have?
Clearly, since the physician in most cases will 
not also be the patient, it is necessary for the doctor 
to make calculations about the materiality of the risk, 
and this can only be done in a limited number of ways,
none of which are satisfactory for the vindication of
patient autonomy. On the one hand, the doctor may decide 
that his or her knowledge of the patient is sufficient
230
for a decision to be made that only certain risks 
actually matter. This is open to objection on the very 
obvious ground that the doctor can never know the full 
facts of the patient's life, nor what values the patient 
places on certain aspects of that life.[32] This kind of 
assessment, therefore, amounts to little more than 
guesswork, and is unacceptable to those who have 
knowledgeable decision-making as a goal.
Equally problematic, but less open to allegations
of the casual importation of uninformed value judgement,
is the use of scientifically known or knowable fact. A
given therapy, for example, may be known to have a 5%
risk of causing a skin rash, a 1% risk of causing severe
headache and a 0.2% risk of causing paralysis or death.
There are two possible 'scientific' ways of approaching
this range of possible effects. One, and the most
obvious, is to use statistical method and to consider as
substantial only that which is statistically 
\ ■ 
significant. On this form of calculation, the patient
would be informed of the two greatest risks, but not of
the smallest statistical one. In terms of patient
autonomy, this is obviously unsatisfactory since it omits
to provide the patient with some information, and, in
particular, information which might seem to the patient
to be the most significant - that is the small, but
nonetheless real, chance of paralysis or death. Using
this approach then, the patient is denied access to
information which may be vital in the decision whether or
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not to accept therapy. Of course, the standard arguments 
about unnecessarily frightening patients, or possibly 
deterring patients from accepting therapy, could be, and 
are, used to explain the making of such a choice, but for 
the reasons discussed above, they scarcely justify 
it. [33] It is not irrational for people to attempt to 
avoid even a very small risk of possible death, and 
indeed in wearing seat belts or minimised flying time, 
many people do this routinely.
The alternative use of the statistical probability 
equation is equally open to objection. This approach 
could suggest that only the gravest of possible risks 
should be disclosed. In this calculation, the patient 
would be told of the small risk of paralysis or death, 
but not necessarily of the possibility of headache or 
skin rash. Whilst this is equally autonomy-reducing, it 
has one further possible side effect which can have a 
major impact on patient care. That is, the patient who 
is unaware that these are possibilities may suffer 
considerable distress, and require further medical time, 
if he or she is not aware that what is happening is a 
result of the current therapy and not a manifestation of 
a new and unpleasant illness. Patient care is, it has 
been claimed, enhanced by respect for the patient, and 
this simple example serves to show one situation in which 
that conclusion is validated.
Thus, it can be concluded that patient autonomy is 
only protected where there is a meaningful choice made by
232
the patient, on the basis of adequate information, about 
which of the available therapies is acceptable and as to 
whether or not to participate in any therapy at all. 
Disclosure of risks and benefits protects not only the 
patient but also the doctor. No subsequent allegation of 
a lack of real consent can succeed where the doctor has 
respected his or her patient sufficiently to make such a 
disclosure, and to discuss the implications of accepting 
or rejecting therapy with the patient. This latter point 
is also highly significant, since it must be remembered 
that advocates of full disclosure do not simply advocate 
disclosure of risk. It is equally essential that the 
patient is given access to information about potential 
benefits. in order to permit the making of a choice which 
takes, account of these competing factors. When this is 
borne in mind, fears that patients will routinely reject 
therapy become not merely insulting to the common sense 
of patients, but minimised considerably.
Patient Understanding
There remains, however, one considerable problem - one 
argument for the paternalistic model of medicine which 
could be more problematic to dispose of. It may be 
claimed that, since patients cannot understand highly 
technical information, the provision of that information 
is a meaningless and time-consuming farce. If the 
rationale for information disclosure is to enable the
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patient to make a knowing (albeit not necessarily a 
•rational') choice, then what, it might be asked, is the 
value of disclosure without understanding? And if the 
patient does indeed lack the technical skills him or 
herself to undertake the medical enterprise, then how 
could he or she truly understand the information? If 
such understanding is indeed impossible, then what is the 
point in making the disclosure? And, could it ever be 
reasonable to make the doctor subject to a duty to ensure 
patient understanding, because, if not, then surely 
information could be disclosed in highly technical terms 
which would render the patient no more capable of making 
a knowing choice, and therefore in no better a position 
to protect his or her autonomy?
These questions were formally, and it is submitted 
appropriately, answered in Canterbury v. Spence,f341 and 
the answers given there serve to explain why it is that 
the emphasis in this discussion has been on the duty to 
disclose, rather than on 'informed consent'. As the 
court said:
In duty to disclose cases, the focus of 
attention is more properly on the nature and 
content of the physician's divulgence than 
the patient's understanding and consent. 
Adequate disclosure and informed consent are, 
of course, two sides of the same coin. The 
former is a sine qua non of the latter. But 
the vital enquiry on duty to disclose relates 
to the physician's performance of an 
obligation, while one of the difficulties 
with analysis in terms of 'informed consent' 
is its tendency to imply that what is
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decisive is the degree of the patient's 
comprehension.[35]
Thus the duty to disclose, when based on the patient's 
right to receive information, can be tested independently 
of patient understanding, however desirable that 
understanding may be. The doctor fulfils his or her 
obligation by making the disclosure in a reasonable way. 
so as to facilitate patient understanding, even given 
that it cannot be guaranteed. As the court further
said, '...the physician discharges the duty when he makes
\
a reasonable effort to convey sufficient information, 
although the patient, without fault of the physician, may 
not fully grasp it.'[36] In any event, the problems 
perceived in patient understanding may be overstated 
since it is not the technicalities of drug action or 
surgical technique which alone constitute information 
which is autonomy-enhancing, although some patients may 
be sufficiently interested to want to know about these 
also. It is the risk of hair loss, or voice loss, or 
other disability which concerns the average patient, and 
not the mechanics of the therapy, except where these are 
inseparable from the risk itself. Nor, of course, is the 
doctor obliged to inform the patient that there is a risk 
that he or she might perform the therapy in a negligent 
manner.[37]
This is not to say, however, that the question of 
patient understanding is totally irrelevant. Some 
writers, indeed, whilst insisting on the necessity of
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information disclosure, equally maintain that disclosure 
without understanding is useless and merely a parody of 
patient involvement. For example, Robertson[38] has said 
that:
The doctrine of informed consent can only 
become meaningful in terms of the patient's 
right to self-determination if he actually 
comprehends the information which is 
disclosed to him - without such comprehension 
the patient is not given the opportunity 
which he requires, in order to make a 
rational decision. Even accepting that the 
patient's right to self-determination 
dictates only that he be given a reasonable 
opportunity of making a rational decision as 
to proposed medical treatment, the extent of 
the patient's comprehension of the disclosed 
information should still be a vital issue. 
The opportunity given may be 'reasonable' if 
viewed from the standpoint of the doctor, in 
terms of the information which he has 
disclosed, but that opportunity becomes 
wholly unreasonable for the purpose for which 
it is given and completely meaningless, if 
viewed from the patient's standpoint if he 
fails to understand the information given to 
him.[39]
This emphasis on patient understanding is not, however,
shared by all commentators. The act of disclosure is
itself seen by some as adequately protecting patient 
autonomy, particularly where the disclosure is couched in 
terms which the average patient could understand.
Indeed, with due respect to Robertson, it might be said
that he falls into two of the traps which medical 
paternalism also does. First, he makes the assumption 
that information which should be disclosed is difficult 
information - almost certainly because it is technical.
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It is not clear, however, that this is in fact the case. 
Certainly, the patient consults the doctor because the 
doctor possesses technical skills, but the impact of the 
exercise of these skills is not solely to bring about a 
technical result. Rather, it effects a cure, brings
relief or, in unfortunate cases, causes harm. None of
\
these are technical matters, as experienced by the 
patient, although they may be brought about by the 
exercise of technical skills.
If this is accepted, then the second fallacy in 
this type of argument becomes clear - namely, that the 
average patient cannot understand the information which 
is in fact relevant to him or her - that he or she may or 
will recover, that the best that will be done is to 
relieve discomfort, or that there may be some harmful 
side effects of treatment. In other words, what renders 
the standard patient competent to give consent is the 
fact that he or she can understand (given the 
information) the likely personal impact of his or her 
choice. If Robertson's argument were to be pursued to 
its logical conclusion, and only those who could 
understand the technical impact of therapy were able to 
give real consent, then no one, bar a doctor in the same 
specialism and at an equal or superior level of skill, 
could legally offer a meaningful consent. This is a 
reductio ad absurdum of the whole context in which 
consent is considered.
Robertson's view that, in the American courts at
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least:
the doctrine of informed consent is a 
legal mechanism whose function has simply 
been to expand the liability of the medical 
profession, in order to compensate a greater 
number of victims of medical accident.[40]
is doubtless valid, but this does not detract from the 
symbolic, the practical or the moral position which 
demands that such consent is in fact provided. Even if 
the desire to expand liability has become a highly 
significant rationale for the use of the doctrine in the 
United States, or indeed in other jurisdictions. it 
cannot be totally separated from issues of patient 
autonomy. The desire to expand liability, therefore, 
merely indicates legal recognition of the value of the 
interests at stake.
This is not, of course, to minimise Robertson's 
excellent consideration of the consent question, and in 
particular it is not to underestimate the problems which
patient comprehension can pose to the autonomy theorist.
\
The technical gap between doctor and patient is great and 
even non-technical information may be misunderstood by 
patients. Finding a way of evaluating patient 
understanding is, however, unlikely. Certainly, the 
patient could sit an examination based on what he or she 
was told but this is merely ludicrous. In any event, not 
even the autonomy theorist would want to place a duty on 
the doctor to ensure understanding, since, logically.
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failure in this duty (for reasons which could relate to 
the patient and not the doctor) would result in the
possibility of a law suit against the doctor solely
*
because of the patient's incapacity. Clearly this is not 
to be taken seriously.
However, the duty to disclose information can be 
seen as one which should be exercised in a professional 
manner - professional, that is, in the broadest sense. 
Most professionals are routinely faced with the problem 
of ensuring client understanding, and this can be, in 
many, if not most, situations, achieved by explanation 
which avoids technical jargon, and by providing the 
relevant information in a relatively stress-free 
setting. Of course, the doctor will usually be dealing 
with a situation which does involve stress, but this does 
not excuse him or her from seeking to achieve the 
standard of professional behaviour which it is reasonable 
to expect from any group possessing special skills. The 
transmission of information is a vital aspect of much 
professional practice, and can and should be done 
sensitively and with due regard to the information gap 
between any professional and any client.
There remains, however, one further problem 
concerning patient autonomy as described by 
Robertson,[41] and that is the apparent significance 
which he gives to rational decision-making. Dependence 
on rationality may open the door to yet further tests of 
the efficacy and desirability of information disclosure.
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which again resemble to some extent the reasons sometimes 
presented for non-disclosure by the professions
themselves.[42] Whilst it is true that the patient
\
requires information which permits him or her to make a 
rational decision, it is not clear that the making of a 
rational decision is the delimitation of his or her 
rights to autonomy or self-determination, nor that the 
rationality or otherwise of the decision should be used 
as a yardstick against which the merit of disclosure can 
be tested. Except in situations where there is a clear 
risk to others involved in patient decision-making, it is 
not, in the first place, clear that self-determination is 
intimately connected with making rational choices. 
Indeed it is plausible to argue that the right to 
self-determination necessarily includes the right to act 
irrationally. Moreover, the concept of rationality is in 
itself problematic, and may be particularly so in the 
case of decisions about therapy.
The decision as to what is a rational choice in 
this situation, as in others, is seldom value-free. In 
the abstract, it may be thought to be rational to choose 
possible or probable cure over continued ill health. But 
where this choice involves the acceptance of therapy, its 
rationality may be challengeable. It has been claimed, 
for example, that a substantial proportion of all illness 
is self-limiting.[43] In other words, a large percentage 
of complaints for which people consult doctors would go 
away if left alone. Many of the most common reasons for
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consultation are widely believed to be susceptible to 
environmental or other change (that is to be capable of 
political or non-scientific resolution).[44] In these 
terms, it may be rational not merely to avoid therapy, 
but, given the inevitable risks of many diagnostic 
techniques and therapies, to avoid treatment altogether - 
at least in these cases. Of course, this is a rather 
extreme position and not one which most people would 
recommend, but it serves to highlight one of the 
potential variations on rationality which should command 
some consideration.
More serious consideration may, however, be 
merited in respect of the rationality question, where the 
choice taken is to prefer illness to therapy, even where 
the therapy is known to have a reasonable or certain 
chance of success. In this situation, rationality could 
be viewed in two distinct ways. Where cure is possible, 
probable or certain, it might be said to be rational to 
accept the therapy. Thus, it could be argued, there is 
no purpose served, and indeed harm may be caused to the 
patient, by disclosing the inevitable risks of that 
therapy. It is not, in this view, in the interests of 
patient care to distress the patient so that therapy is 
rejected or to emphasise the risk factor with the same 
possible outcome. This v i e w h a s  received considerable 
judicial backing notably in the case of Bolam v. Friern 
Hospital Management Committee,f451 where McNair, J made 
the following remarks to the jury:
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Members of the jury, although it is a matter 
entirely for you, you may well think that 
when dealing with a mentally sick man and 
having a strong belief that his only hope of 
cure is ECT treatment, a doctor cannot be 
criticised if he does not stress the dangers 
which he believes to be minimal involved in 
that treatment.[46}
Although this case involved a patient whose mental health 
was unstable,, there was no suggestion that he did not 
have the legal capacity to consent. What was in dispute 
was whether or not a warning as to the existence of 
specific risks (which were known, albeit unusual) should 
have been given. Here, the judge chose to believe (as 
did the jury) that the statistical improbability of the 
risk occurring minimised any duty to make disclosure, but 
the decision also shows the extent to which the
therapeutic imperative (and the rationality of accepting 
treatment) was given credence. The fact that the therapy 
was seen medically as a viable and good option, invested 
it with a level of credibility which apparently overrode 
the patient's right to know. The second possible
interpretation can be seen here also - that is, that it 
is rational to accept medical decisions about the 
appropriateness of therapy.
The view that accepting medically recommended 
treatment is the rational decision, often sits uneasily 
with the desire to maximise patient autonomy. What is
medically rational may be personally irrational. The 
only person in the doctor/patient relationship who can,
in fact, determine what is rational is the person in
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possession of the totality of personal details - that 
the patient. As Shultz[47] says:
is
Medical choice increasingly depends on 
factors that transcend professional training 
and knowledge. As medicine has become able 
to extend life, delay and redefine death, 
harvest and transplant organs, correct 
abnormality within the womb, enable 
artificial reproduction and trace genetic 
defect, questions about values have come to 
the fore in medical decision-making. Health 
care choices involve profound questions that 
are not finally referable to professional 
expertise.[48]
This leads to the fundamental question as to what
it is that truly characterises that aspect of the
\
doctor/patient relationship which relates to disclosure 
of information and the provision or withholding of 
consent. Few would doubt that much of what is 
characteristic of the doctor/patient relationship is the 
use of professional (technical) skills, nor that the 
exercise of these skills should seldom, if ever, be 
circumscribed by non-professionals. The decision as to 
whether this or that antibiotic is specific to this or 
that particular infection is scarcely one which courts 
are qualified to make or to judge. Equally, the mere 
fact that one doctor may legitimately prefer one to the 
other on technical grounds is not in dispute. These 
matters relate to professional competence and the level 
of technical information possessed by the skilled 
practitioner. As Giesen[49] puts it:
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The determination of the standards of medical
science may ....  be difficult. Medical
science is (as any science) characterised by 
some scientific controversies. It must be 
emphasised in this context that the lawyer 
(and especially the judge) cannot and must 
not presume to decide controversies of 
medical science. In such cases, especially, 
the courts can do nothing other than act in 
accordance with the practical experiences of 
the medical profession, rather than with the 
theoretical and dogmatic arguments put 
forward by this or another school.[50j
Thus, courts cannot presume to know, where different 
opinions on technical matters are competently held, or 
scientifically justified, which school of medical thought 
is the appropriate or correct one. However, it does not 
follow that a court cannot decide that this or that 
particular practice has failed to meet the legally 
required duty of care.
More important, however, for the purposes of this 
discussion, is the question whether - even accepting the 
above statement of the law's role - what is being dealt 
with in controversies over information disclosure and 
consent is in fact a technical question at all. On the 
answer to this question hinges both the relevant legal 
machinery and the very form of decision-making itself.
What is Consent?
From the outset, it has been claimed here that the rules 
about, consent which exist in developed legal systems are 
rules designed to perform a specific purpose. That
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purpose is to permit the patient the continued exercise 
of self-determination or autonomy. Whereas illness may 
be autonomy reducing - and this is particularly the case 
in certain types of ill health[51] - autonomous, choices 
can also be made within the context of the patient's 
interaction with medicine. It has also been suggested 
that the doctor's duty to obtain the consent of his or
her patient is a duty which derives from the patient's
right. The delineation of that duty therefore is 
dependent on recognition of, and respect for, such a 
right.
To this extent, therefore, the duty to obtain
consent is one which transcends the doctor's professional 
(technical) expertise. Its boundaries cannot be drawn 
solely by reference to this expertise, although it is its 
possession which puts the doctor in the situation whereby 
he or she is under the duty in question. But the duty is 
not dependent exclusively on technical skills, although 
it may have some link with them. Rather, the duty - its 
nature and content - is specifically correlated to the 
right from which it derives. To put it another way, 
there is a very real question as to whether or not the 
duty can be defined without first establishing the 
corresponding right. As Skegg, for example, has said:
There is nothing especially 'medical' about
the requirement that a doctor must obtain a
patient's consent ...... These requirements
are imposed not in the interests of the
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patient's health, but in the interests of 
individual liberty.[52]
It is important, therefore, that this crucial distinction 
between the types of duties which doctors owe to their 
patients is borne in mind. On the one hand, there is the 
set of technical duties, described above, and on the 
other there is the moral or ethical (but also legal) duty 
which demands information disclosure, defined not by the 
amount of information which the doctor thinks the patient 
should know, could handle or might want to know, but by 
the amount of information which the patient needs to have 
in order that the making of an autonomous choice is
possible. The role of law in our society makes the legal
process the commonest and most effective mechanism for 
providing such definition - for filling out the qualities 
of the duty owed and protecting the patient whose rights 
are breached. As has been said in a number of cases this 
requires a standard for disclosure which is set by law 
and not by professionals.[53] This implicit recognition 
of the significance of the right under consideration 
lends weight to the claim that in considering questions 
of consent, what is in issue is something more valuable, 
and • certainly more difficult to define, than a 
professionally given assessment of the technical manner 
in which acquired skills should have been, or were
actually, used.
Moreover, it has been central to this discussion
that the law can perform two major functions in offering
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or withholding such protection. First, the law can make 
available a form of action appropriate to the provision 
of redress, and second it can adopt a disinterested 
stance in the protection of the patient, by setting
standards which reflect the source of the action. It has 
already been claimed that - however sound the reasoning - 
the shift from the assault-based action to the negligence 
action has substantially limited the availability of 
redress for invasion of bodily or mental integrity, and 
may also have served to obfuscate the issue under
consideration. The difficulties of proof which 
characterise the negligence action, and the requirement 
that measurable harm was caused, coupled with the need to 
establish causation, have been shown to raise fairly 
major hurdles to a successful action. This is 
particularly so in medical cases, not only because of 
conservative judicial decision-making, but also because 
of preconceptions about the value of therapy and the 
logic of accepting treatment which evidently pervade much 
of judicial, and indeed societal, thinking. The 
potential impact of these factors should not be 
underestimated. As Harris[54] says:
If individual and collective freedoms and 
genuine equality between sections of the
  population are to be pressed for and
protected, then the law has an important part 
to play. Its use as an ideological weapon
must be exposed, but its force as a
limitation upon power must be recognized.[55]
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However, despite the problems associated with the 
form of action now deemed appropriate, flexibility of 
decision-making remains possible.[56] But this is only 
true where the courts are constantly reminded of the 
rationale for consent rules and where the distinction 
between technical medical questions and autonomy 
enhancing practice is remembered. Thus, the use of the 
negligence action in cases involving disputes about the 
provision or quality of consent, requires consideration, 
if its efficacy in these cases is to be assessed. In 
reviewing these cases, it seems to make sense to begin 
with a consideration of the approach which has been 
adopted in the United States, where the doctrine of 
'informed consent' originated and is widely believed to 
have been most thoroughly developed, before turning to 
consideration of the application of consent roles in the 
British context.
Development of Consent Doctrines - U S A
The rules governing the negligence action in both the 
U.S.A. and the United Kingdom are developed from roughly 
similar legal traditions and not surprisingly, therefore, 
tend to be parallel. Yet, United States courts have 
occasionally shown a more aggressive stance in cases 
which they see as involving issues of fundamental values 
and rights. It is scarcely surprising, then, that 
American jurisprudence seems to have been more overtly
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concerned with patient choice - hence the development of 
what  ^has come to be called 'informed consent'.[57] 
However, there are interpretational problems in the -use 
of the word 'informed' which can make it a less than 
satisfactory qualification of consent. Thus, throughout 
this discussion, the writer will prefer the terminology 
of 'real' or 'meaningful' consent based on information 
disclosure - disclosure primarily of risk but including 
disclosure of potential benefits. The latter of these is 
in any event uncontroversially a routine part of medical 
treatment and consultation. It is, therefore, with the 
former - that is disclosure of risks - that this section 
is primarily concerned.
The classic statement in Schloendorff T 58 ] as early 
as 1914 demonstrates the concern which American courts 
have shown for issues of personal autonomy. At a 
theoretical level, it is the case that all developed 
jurisdictions share this concern, but it is also crucial 
that the retoric of rights-protection is translated into 
the reality of securing those rights. As Shultz notes:
Individuality and autonomy have long been 
central values in Anglo-American society and 
law. In general, the more intense and 
personal the consequences of the choice and 
the less direct or significant the impact of 
that choice upon others, the more compelling 
the claim to autonomy in the making of a 
given decision. Under this criterion, the 
case for respecting patient autonomy and 
decisions about health and bodily fate is 
very strong.[59]
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In 1918, in the case of Hunter v. Burroughs, [6QJ 
the court made it clear that the doctor has a duty 1 in 
the exercise of ordinary care to warn a patient of the 
danger of possible bad consequences of using a 
remedy.'[61] As concern about patient autonomy grew, and 
as doctors became more frequent subjects of challenge in 
the courts, these somewhat loose and ill-defined 
statements became more closely defined, and the shape of 
what was to become the doctrine of consent became more 
clear. Perhaps the most significant case at this early 
stage was the case of Salqo v. Leland Stanford!'62 1 in 
which possibly the first real attempt was made to outline 
the scope of the doctrine. As the court said:
A physician violates his duty to his patient 
and subjects himself to liability if he 
\ withholds any facts which are necessary to 
form the basis of an intelligent consent by
the patient to the proposed treatment.[63]
From this innovative statement, however, are also 
apparent some of the difficulties of the use of 
'informed' as legally accepted terminology in deciding on 
the validity of a given consent.
If 'informed' is to be used in constant
conjunction with consent, then it must have a meaning
relevant to the description of a legally acceptable 
consent. 'Informed', of course, could be said only to
imply that information has been given and received. 
However, implicit in the above judgement is a further
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qualification which merits consideration as it is 
inherent, apparently, in the entire doctrine of 'informed 
consent', and renders this straightforward assumption 
less easily tenable.
The court, by phrasing the doctrine in this way, 
left the door wide open for the kind of interpretation 
which has, in fact, subsequently proved to be problematic 
for the aggrieved patient. 'Informed consent' depends on 
disclosure of information which enables a patient to make 
an 'intelligent' choice, not simply to make a choice. 
However, what are those facts which are necessary to make 
an 'intelligent' decision? What indeed, is. an 
•intelligent' decision? In effect, the court described 
what seemed to be a set of conditions for safeguarding 
patient autonomy, but additionally gave a hostage to 
fortune by countenancing, not full disclosure, but rather 
disclosure which facilitates an 'intelligent' choice. 
This could readily be taken to infer that the quality of 
the disclosure will, at least in part, be implied from 
the quality of the decision. Given what has already 
been said about the rationality of patient choice, it 
may, then, be arguable that an 'intelligent' choice is 
one approved by physicians. If this interpretation is 
adopted, then doctors would not be liable for failing to 
disclose information which would prevent acceptance of 
therapy. In other words, a decision on the questions 
posed above could be taken by reference to the views of 
the physician, subject only to the caveat that a duty to
\
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disclose does exist. However, it would be well to bear
in mind that ' [ejxperts may blind themselves by 
expertise. The courts should protect the citizen 
against risks which professional men and others may
ignore.•[64]
This case is also atypical in that the court's 
view was that failure to obtain informed consent rendered 
the doctor liable in trespass rather than negligence. In 
Natanson v. Kline [65] (1960) the court reaffirmed the
duty of the physician to make reasonable disclosure of 
risks, but regarded the decision as to whether or not 
disclosure was reasonable as one to be taken within the 
negligence framework. The shift to the negligence 
action has already been described as one which
de-emphasises patient autonomy. However, it is at least
logical for the court to accept a substantial, or at 
least important, medical input into the decision as to 
what and whether to disclose when the case is decided on 
the basis of reference to medical duties, and only 
tangentially on the question of patient's rights. The 
shift to the negligence action, therefore, can be seen as 
having the almost inevitable (and certainly logical) 
consequence of moving the focus of interest from patient 
autonomy to the standards accepted in medical practice.
These cases, however, were landmark decisions in 
the development of disclosure rules. Not only did they 
herald legal concern about consent in medicine, but they 
also profferred both a definition (of a sort) of what
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consent rules should be, and a statement as to the 
appropriate form of action. This had wide reaching 
consequences, not only for the nature of the proof 
required for a successful action, but also for the types 
of evidence which could decide the case. That is. 
placing information disclosure firmly within the 
negligence framework emphasised that the crucial question 
is whether or not a doctor has failed in a duty (which 
his or her colleagues have a role in defining) - thus 
shifting the ultimate responsibility for therapeutic 
decisions from the competent patient, and placing some 
(occasionally major) decision-making control firmly in 
the hands of the doctor.
Emerging from these cases also is what has come to 
be called the 'reasonable doctor' standard, or the
professional test for negligence. In other words, the 
'realness' or validity of apparent consent depends not on 
what the instant patient claims to have wanted to know, 
but rather on whether or not physicians regard the
failure to disclose a given piece of information as
having been professionally reasonable. Inevitably, 
therefore, this places the definition of 'reasonableness' 
for these purposes firmly within the framework of
professional assessment, and renders the court's ultimate
\
function of deciding on whether or not it actually was 
reasonable, vulnerable to medical pressure. Thus, unlike 
the common sense view which can be taken of the 
'reasonable man', courts must weigh heavily medical
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evidence of current practice in deciding what the 
reasonable doctor would have done or what he or she 
should be held liable for. Policy considerations, 
described above,[66] are therefore as likely to be 
imported into the area of information disclosure as they 
are into technical issues in medical behaviour. The 
courts in the United States were, at this stage, 
unwilling to make a distinction between the technical and 
the moral aspects of medical behaviour. Unwilling, 
therefore, to consider information disclosure as more 
than - perhaps even distinct from - the doctor's general 
professional duty of care to the patient.
The 'reasonable doctor' test received considerable 
support over the next few years and indeed continues to 
be the standard used in most American States.[67] 
However, the issue did not die there and other courts 
were prepared to reconsider this formulation of the 
appropriate values and interests involved in information 
disclosure. The most significant of these cases was the 
landmark decision in Canterbury v. Spence [68]in 1972. 
In this case, the court addressed itself to the rationale 
for disclosure rules and in so doing placed considerable 
emphasis on the right of the patient to receive 
information - a right which admittedly could only be 
satisfied by the doctor fulfilling a correlative duty to 
make that disclosure, but one, nonetheless, which 
generated, rather than was subordinate to, the duty. In 
so doing, the court distinguished neatly between these
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aspects of medical practice which are called technical 
and those which are not. As the court said:
The context in which the duty of risk 
disclosure arises is invariably the occasion 
for the decision as to whether a particular 
treatment procedure is to be undertaken. To 
the physician, whose training enables a 
self-satisfying evaluation, the answer may 
seem clear, but it is the prerogative of the 
patient, not the physician, to determine for 
himself the direction in which his interests 
seem to lie. To enable the patient to chart 
his course understandably, some familiarity 
with the therapeutic alternatives and their 
hazards becomes essential.[69J
At first sight, the decision in Canterbury seems 
to redress the balance in favour of patient's rights. By 
making the distinction between medical practice and the 
moral nature of the medical enterprise, they moved 
towards the very basis of consent rules and requirements 
about information disclosure. Indeed, the court 
explicitly acknowledged this distinction by indicating 
that interests other than the purely medical are 
intimately connected with the ultimate assessment of
liability. As the court put it:
\
We agree that the physician's non-compliance 
with the professional custom to reveal, like 
any other departure from prevailing medical 
practice, may give rise to liability to the 
patient. We do not agree that the patient's 
cause of action is dependent upon the 
existence and non-performance of a relevant 
professional tradition.[70]
Thus, although medical evidence as to standard practice
255
is informative, it need not be regarded by the court as 
being definitive of good or acceptable practice. Indeed, 
without adopting an aggressive position, the court made 
clear, its concern that such should not be the case,
seeing 'formidable obstacles to acceptance of the notion
that the physician's obligation to disclose is either 
germinated or limited by medical practice'.[71]
But what are these obstacles, if they do not 
indicate that what is being dealt with is an issue bigger 
than medical choice about the need for, and type of, 
therapy? If the therapeutic imperative is not to be 
dominant, on what grounds is this so? Quite simply, the 
overriding value of therapy - whilst it may be agreed 
upon by the medical world - is not, and cannot be, the 
most significant characteristic in disputes about
non-disclosure, if such disclosure is required as a means
of safeguarding the rights of patients - rights which go 
beyond the fact of illness, alleviation of symptoms, or 
even potential or probable cure. What is significant is 
the right of the patient to autonomy and this right is 
one which is not minimised in the standard medical 
interaction, nor is it one which can be described by 
physicians themselves. As the court said, '[r]espect for 
the patient's right of self-determination on particular 
therapy demands a standard set by law rather than one 
which physicians may or may not impose upon 
themselves.'[72] This was not intended either to 
devalue therapy or to criticise medical practitioners.
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but rather to demonstrate the significance of the values 
to be protected by information disclosure - values which 
the law reserves the right to assess, and has the
ultimate duty to secure.
Thus far, the court seemed to be unequivocally 
interested in patients' rights, albeit within the context 
of negligence analysis. This reference to patient
autonomy as the fundamental value in non-disclosure cases 
has been echoed in a number of subsequent decisions,
although it has not routinely formed the basis of
decisions in many American States, nor in other countries
throughout the world.[73] Indeed, despite a plea for 
acceptance of the Canterbury Test by Lord Scarman in 
Sidaway,f741 it remains by no means the standard test 
used. This is so despite the manifest philosophical
problems in the 'prudent doctor' test.
In fact, however, the Canterbury case itself
\
.»
showed unfortunate equivocation, resembling that seen in
the 'reasonable doctor' test. The court continued to 
emphasise the significance of choice-making by the
patient but was forced to confirm the difficulties 
inherent in deciding how this could be protected. At 
first sight, it might seem logical that the emphasis on 
self-determination so evident in this case, would 
inevitably lead to the conclusion that all information 
which is within the knowledge of the doctor should be 
disclosed to the patient. At a theoretical level, it 
would seem that only in this way can the patient's
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autonomy actually be protected. Each possible risk,
however, slight - statistically or in terms of its
consequences - might be valued by a patient in a way 
quite distinct from the weight accorded to it by a doctor 
or a court. This the court accepted.[75] However, there 
were further considerations taken to be significant, not 
least the role of the law itself. The court was faced
with the task of formulating a definition of consent
which was 'informed' or real but which permitted 
cooperation rather than confrontation between the doctor 
and the law. Indeed, the judgement ab initio shows 
marginal ambivalence to the issue of patients' rights to 
information disclosure - an ambivalence which is central 
to the standard ultimately formulated.
A number of factors seem to have contributed to 
this. Much concern, for example, has been expressed 
about the extent to which the liability of physicians 
would be expanded were the patient able to claim that the 
omission of any one piece of information resulted in 
liability to the patient. Patients, it has been 
suggested, could thereby give vent to their 
understandable disappointment, or even bitterness, where 
their contact with medicine goes wrong. Naturally, it is 
said, the patient will complain when something bad 
happens, but this cannot, it is contended, be given 
ultimate credence. [76] It was in this respect that the 
court ran up against its most significant difficulty in 
formulating an appropriate standard. On the one hand, in
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repudiating the professional test, the court placed 
considerable emphasis on the rights of the patient. On 
the other, however, too severe a standard would place the 
entire practice of medicine at risk, by denying clinical 
freedom and generating excessive litigation.
Moreover, it was clear that problems could arise 
in settling appropriately and satisfactorily the question 
of causation. As has been said, where the appropriate 
basis of the action is negligence, it is necessary not 
only to decide what the duty owed actually was, and
whether or not it was breached, but it must also be shown
\
that the breach caused harm. In allegations that 
information disclosure was not adequate this may be 
problematic. The patient may be aggrieved if all 
information is not disclosed, on grounds which sit 
uncomfortably within the negligence framework or which 
are not compensable in negligence analysis. He or she 
may feel that his or her right to self-determination was 
shown insufficient respect where a risk was concealed, 
even if that risk does not actually occur. Thus, despite 
the fact that damages for invasion of personal integrity 
might be relatively small, nonetheless, the patient may 
feel that he or she should be entitled to register a 
complaint through the court process, and that he or she 
would be justified in obtaining some compensation for the 
unwarranted assumption of authority over integrity.
However, there are limitations on the type of 
damage which is legally recognised, and this may pose
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considerable problems for the patient.[77] Further, 
there is a problem in squaring respect for human rights 
with what it is that the negligence action is designed to 
achieve. Even where it is accepted that the basis of 
disclosure rules is the patient's right to 
self-determination, the very nature of the negligence 
action demands some form of rationalisation. The action 
is ill-designed to cater for the immediate concerns of 
the individual, since the ultimate determination of 
whether or not there is negligence rests, not on 
theoretical considerations, but on an assessment of the 
extent or the manner in which duties were carried out.
Despite this court's concession that the provision 
of information about risks was something wider than the 
merely technical, courts have long failed to make this 
distinction. Consider, for example, the views of Mr. 
Justice Woodhouse in the case of Smith v. Auckland 
Hospital Board.T781
If the issue in the case was the maintenance 
of the individual's right of
self-determination, the matter would quickly 
resolve itself. But it is not. This is a 
question within the duty of care concept in 
negligence . . . Negligence is not concerned 
with injury to dignity, but to the body or 
property. In order to estimate whether a 
contingency in the treatment was of 
sufficient significance to give rise to a 
duty of care to discuss it in order to avoid 
the forseeable risk of likely injury. The 
\ philosophical consideration could not be 
allowed to submerge every other.[79]
If the source of the action is indeed not solely the
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protection of integrity, then inevitably the patient,
whose case consists of an allegation that his or her 
integrity was invaded, will have little hope of
success. In any event, it is vital that there is a
causal relationship between the wrong complained of and 
the subsequent harm.[80] In a situation where the 
patient’s claim is satisfied by demonstrating that risks 
were not disclosed (not that they actually occurred), the 
source of the harm complained of is relatively 
straightforward - essentially a matter of fact. However, 
policy considerations can and do influence decisions, and 
courts have continued to balk at the provision of 
redress, and the imputation of negligence, where no 
measurable harm has actually arisen. The patient will, 
in these circumstances, find the negligence action
considerably less than sympathetic to their claims. As 
was said in the case of Dess_i[81] in 1980:
Support for the subjective theory [of 
consent] derives from the broad principle 
underlying informed consent that a man is the 
master of his own body and may deal with it 
in whatever way he wishes, however 
irrational.[82]
In this case, as in Canterbury v. Spence,[83] this 
approach was, however, not ultimately held to be 
practical. Not only was there concern about the 
perceived likelihood of patients not telling precisely 
the truth, or at least being influenced by hindsight, but 
also the law's own need to have consistently applicable
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tests against which behaviour can be measured, means that 
a subjective test sits ill with negligence analysis.
Whilst some courts have been unprepared to give 
credibility to the professional test, it was imperative 
that a test was available for use. This test, developed 
in Canterbury v. Spence, [84] has come to be called the 
‘prudent patient' test - an objective test. However 
theoretically problematic it may seem to be to reconcile 
patient autonomy with anything other than a subjective 
test, such reconciliation was felt to be necessary, both 
to protect the general beneficence of medicine and the 
medical act, and to satisfy the rules of the law itself. 
Thus, the court made a brave attempt to marry two 
apparently conflicting aims. The formula was put thus:
True consent to what happens to oneself is 
the informed exercise of a choice and that 
entails and opportunity to evaluate 
knowledgeably the options available and the 
risks attendant upon each. The average 
patient has little or no understanding of the 
medical arts and ordinarily has only his 
physician to whom he can look for 
enlightenment with which to reach an 
intelligent choice. From these almost 
axiomatic considerations springs the need, 
and in turn the requirement, of a reasonable 
divulgence by physician to patient to make 
such a decision possible.[85]
The crucial feature of this last passage from the 
judgement of the court is the insertion of the words 
'reasonable' before 'divulgence' and 'intelligent' before 
•choice'. 'Intelligent' choices may take a number of 
forms, and are open to considerable variations of
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interpretation. If 'intelligent' choices are measured at 
the personal level then they may be defined as 
•intelligent' or rational even where the doctor or the 
judge might have decided in a different way. Equally, 
what is 'reasonable' disclosure will depend on the 
premise from which analysis begins. To the patient, 
•reasonable' disclosure might mean full disclosure, 
whereas to the doctor 'reasonable' might merely mean 
disclosure only of information which gives the patient a 
broad notion of the possible risks, or some of them, but 
which equally does not deter the patient from accepting 
therapy. Provision of further information, following 
this argument, might seem to be folly - merely serving to 
increase the possibility that the patient will make an 
unintelligent or medically irrational choice.
That the court was aware of these possibilities is 
not in doubt, and if it was to maintain the 
appropriateness of these qualifications, and of the use 
of negligence analysis, then some definition of what was 
meant by these ambivalent words was necessary. It was 
in undertaking this exercise that the movement away from 
strict adherence to patient autonomy was most 
observable. As the court in Dessi put it:
To inject a reasonable man standard into this 
[subjective] determination arguably
undermines the patient's right to make his 
own decision. While this is a theoretically 
appealing rationale it ignores the practical 
problem with reliability of proof.[86]
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In reality, this statement recognises the very problems 
which the Canterbury test sought to overcome. 
Dissatisfaction with merely acting on the word of the 
patient, and the corresponding fear of an unacceptable 
increase in litigation and expansion of liability, were 
thought to vindicate both the use of the negligence 
action and the setting of objective tests.
On the one hand, of course, this approach may 
serve to protect the patient by offering a standard which 
is separable - at least in theory - from the professional 
test. That is, it is a standard set by law. On the 
other hand, however, it generates the need for 
rationalised assessment of what the reasonable patient 
would have wanted in the way of disclosure. Even if 
this standard is set by law, it will almost inevitably be 
distanced to some extent from the views of the individual 
patient. Indeed, it is interesting to note that Mr.
Justice Woodhouse himself, whose judgement in Smith [87]
\
reinforced the professional test, and suggested that the 
negligence action was appropriate, became, several years 
later, one of the major critics of the negligence action, 
noting amongst other things, its incapacity to make 
decisions in the instant case, and its need to 
rationalise decision-making to the extent that neither is 
the individual satisfied nor is there truly an assessment 
of the behaviour of the individual defender.[88 ]
The court in Canterbury.T891 therefore, sought to 
offer a formulation which both satified the requirements
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of the negligence action itself, and represented a way of 
avoiding the over-expansion of liability which could 
result from a legal requirement to make full disclosure 
to patients. This is the 'prudent patient' test, 
formulated in this way:
...the test for determining whether a 
particular peril must be divulged is its
materiality to the patient's decision: all
risks potentially affecting the decision must 
be unmasked. And to safeguard the patient's 
interest in achieving his own determination 
on treatment, the law must itself set the
standard of adequate disclosure.[90]
However, this formulation evidently fails to answer the 
question as to how, without actually making the
disclosure, it can be known whether or not any given 
piece of information would have a potential effect on the 
patient's decision. Who decides this? It is here that
the move from the rhetoric of rights to the hard 
practicalities of 'realism' can be seen. Were commitment 
to patient autonomy truly regarded as the fundamental 
interest for protection, then - whatever the problems of 
proof - full disclosure would inevitably be required. 
The fact that patients might argue with hindsight in the 
subsequent court hearing, in essence poses no more 
difficulty than the assessment of witness credibility and 
conflicts of interest which are so often required of 
courts and juries.[91]
Inevitably, however, within negligence analysis.
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when the patient has identified the particular risk of 
which they were not informed, and which they claim would 
have affected their decision, the question of 
reasonableness must be addressed. This, of course, is 
only true in actions where the mere fact of 
non-disclosure is not the crucial factor. Absolute 
commitment to the rights of the patient would obviate the 
need to decide whether or not the patient was reasonable 
in claiming that he or she would have refused therapy had 
a particular risk or cluster of risks been disclosed. 
The issue would then become one of fact and evidence of 
non-disclosure would be sufficient to establish 
liability. Moreoever, reasonableness also features in
the assessment of whether or not the risk should have
\
been disclosed.
The major breakthrough, however, in the Canterbury 
judgement, relates to the court's insistence that the 
decision as to reasonableness is separable from 
professional (medical) assessment. As the court said:
The disclosure doctrine, like others marking 
lines between permissable and inpermissable 
behaviour in medical practice is in essence a 
requirement of conduct prudent under the 
circumstances. Whenever non-disclosure of 
particular risk information is open to debate 
by reasonable minded men, the issue is for 
the finder of the facts.[92]
By this statement the court made it clear that, although 
the question did not hinge on whether or not disclosure 
had been made, the assessment of whether or not
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disclosure was appropriate in the circumstances was one 
which was properly made by the court. In other words, 
evidence that the doctor acted in good faith, and was not 
acting outside the bounds of his professionalism, could 
be, but would not necessarily be, sufficient for him or 
her to avoid liability.
However, by admitting the possibility that there 
may be circumstances in which non-disclosure is both 
prudent and justifiable, the court opened the door to the 
professional test. Thus, it was unprepared to import a 
subjective test, preferring an objective one, which, 
whilst admittedly much more commonly used in judicial 
decision-making, and fitting in much more easily with the 
format of the negligence action, nonetheless diminishes 
the right of the individual patient. The court regarded
it as preferable that, although '....  the very purpose
of the disclosure rule is to protect the patient against 
consequences which, if known, he would have avoided by 
foregoing the treatment [93] the actual quality of
disclosure should be tested on an objective standard.
Thus, the decision as to whether or not the 
patient would have avoided the therapy is undertaken by 
an objective analysis of what the reasonable or prudent 
patient would have regarded as significant, incorporating 
assessment of witness (i.e. patient) credibility. Whilst 
effectively saying that the patient's evidence as to 
whether or not he or she would have regarded the risk as 
significant could not necessarily be trusted, the court
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was nonetheless prepared to give considerable credibility 
to its own view of what would be significant, even 
although it is inevitably distanced from the views and 
circumstances of the particular patient. Although this 
may overtly diminish the input of the medical profession, 
it merely substitutes a further professional test
albeit the impressions of the judges rather than the 
doctors. As the court said:
\ Better it is we believe to resolve the 
causality issue on an objective basis: in
terms of what a prudent person in the
patient's position would have decided if
suitably informed of all perils bearing 
significance.[94]
The court effectively, therefore, enunciated a 
two-fold doctrine. Although generally assumed under the 
one heading - that of the ‘prudent patient' test - in 
effect it includes two vital elements. In the first 
place, the question of which risks should be disclosed, 
is tailored to what resembles a variation on the 
reasonable doctor standard - a standard which the court 
actually sought to defeat. That is, the court approved 
the proposition that disclosure should be of material 
risk, not of every risk.[95] The decision as to what is 
a material risk is to be made in accordance with the 
definition given by Waltz and Scheuneman[96] of which the 
court expressly approved. Thus, a risk is material when:
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....a reasonable person, in what the 
physician knows or should know to be the 
patient's position, would likely to attach 
significance to the risk or cluster of risks 
in deciding whether or not to forego the 
proposed therapy.[97]
Materiality of risk is therefore is dependent on medical 
knowledge - even medical speculation. The actual wishes 
of the patient are subsumed in a variation of 'doctor 
knows best*. The standard of disclosure under the 
‘prudent patient' test is, therefore, not so dramatically 
different from that demanded by the professional 
standard, since in both cases medical judgement as to 
what needs to, or should, be disclosed is given legal 
sanction.
Moreover, in expressly accepting the concept of 
therapeutic privilege, and thus permitting the doctor to 
decide that risks should not be disclosed because the 
doctor regards them as risks which would distress the 
patient or which might deter the patient from therapy, 
the doctor is in real terms given considerable 
discretion. Ultimately, the position is tautologous. If 
the patient is to be given the benefit of risk disclosure 
because he or she has a right to decide whether or not to 
accept therapy, it is strange indeed that the doctor may 
equally not disclose risks because they may put the 
patient off the therapy. The doctor may be shielded 
therefore by invoking therapeutic privilege so long as 
there was nothing else in his or her behaviour which was 
unreasonable or negligent. This, despite the fact that
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the court did attempt to distinguish the purely medical 
aspect of the doctor-patient relationship from its other 
characteristics by noting that '[i]t is evident that many 
of the issues typically involved in non-disclosure cases 
do not reside peculiarly within the medical
domain.' [98]
\ However, even under the 'prudent patient' test the 
reasonableness of the doctor's non-disclosure plays a 
significant part in estimating whether or not it is 
valid, and in this aspect also there is similarity to the 
'prudent doctor' test. Just as the latter distances the 
need for disclosure from the instant patient, so too does 
the former. Not only does the patient have no immediate 
rights, therefore, but the assessment of what is a
prudent patient will involve assessment of whether or not 
the therapy, in the eyes of the courts - and given the
doctor's claims about the reasonableness of 
non-disclosure and the anticipated benefits of therapy - 
should have gone ahead.
To some extent, therefore, the 'prudent' patient 
will be someone who makes a medically (or legally) 
rational decision, and the group most likely to provide 
at least persuasive evidence in this assessment will, of 
course, be doctors themselves. It is arguable,
therefore, that the distinction between the 'prudent 
doctor' test and the 'prudent patient' test may not be so 
substantial as was first thought. In any event, 
evidently neither test was prepared to countenance full
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disclosure, whatever its theoretical soundness. In the 
face of perceived difficulties of proof, and the 
undoubted value assumed in therapy, the patient becomes 
less of an individual whose own emotional and financial 
considerations are crucial to the information which they 
need, and more someone whose views, however strong, are 
susceptible to external 'objective* decision-making.
Conclusions
In summary, therefore, the American courts have remained 
relatively committed to a medicalised assessment of the 
limitations of reasonable risk disclosure. This, despite 
the fact that the court in Canterbury acknowledged the 
difficulties of using professional tests. As Robertson 
points out:
Two reasons in addition to the patient's 
right to self-determination, were given by 
the court to justify this departure from the 
established view that the meaning of 
"reasonable disclosure" was a matter for the 
medical profession to determine. First, it 
was thought that a standard of disclosure 
based on the custom of the medical profession 
could be a facade for non-disclosure. 
Secondly, the court felt that the question of 
what risks a person would regard as material 
was an issue which could be determined 
without special knowledge of medical 
science.[99]
However, even in their reformulation of the appropriate 
test, medical evidence carries weight. In any event the 
most significant exception to rules demanding disclosure
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that of therapeutic privilege[100] - re-emphasises 
medical assessment of behaviour as a highly significant 
criterion in decision-making. This permits of a 
reincorporation of the kinds of paternalistic 
explanations for non-disclosure discussed above, and can 
serve to validate the importance of professional rather 
than personal choice.
In the United States, therefore, it seems that the 
shift to the negligence action did not - at a theoretical 
level at least - necessarily involve a complete disregard 
for the value to be attached to patient's rights, and in 
particular to the right of self-determination. However, 
a standard against which the doctor's duties could 
routinely be measured was necessary. Indeed, quite apart 
from the requirements of the negligence action itself, it 
could be argued that, were an objective approach not 
taken, then the doctor would be placed in an unusual 
position by the law - a position which would certainly 
render him or her more vulnerable than the ordinary 
citizen to whom the 'reasonable man' standard is 
applied. In other words, the use of an objective test 
could be seen as essential if doctors are not to be 
penalised merely because they are physicians.
It could be argued, however, that medicine itself 
is more intrusive than other disciplines, and its 
implications (whether successful or not) are such that 
what the law must protect is so fundamental a value in 
itself, that differential treatment can be justified -
272
much along the lines of the rule that the higher the risk 
of the enterprise, the higher the standard of care which 
is to be expected.[ 101] When this argument is coupled 
with the value generally ascribed to the capacity to
exercise self-determination, then it could be concluded 
that the importation of special rules is merited on these 
grounds alone, even if this does involve a deviation from 
the legal norm. However, whether or not this last is
accepted, the negligence action seems unsuited to
calculations which would result in increased protection 
of fundamental rights.
It has been seen that American courts have 
directed not inconsiderable attention to the nature of 
the test to be applied. The development of the 'prudent 
doctor' test and the 'prudent patient' test show a 
commitment to the resolution of what is genuinely an 
immensely complex area of debate. However, both also
reflect inherent difficulties where what is under 
consideration is not the factual question of whether or 
not information was disclosed, but rather an 'objective' 
assessment of the correlation between rights and duties. 
The 'prudent doctor' test, in particular, which still 
obtains in the majority of states, highlights just such a 
difficulty. Emphasis on standard or reasonable medical 
practice serves the medical profession well, but scarcely 
satisfies a real concern for patient's rights. It is, in 
effect, to give priority to the duty, rather than the 
right from which the duty is derivative, and inevitably
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it permits the extensive and primary use of medical 
evidence. This is so, even although courts maintain 
their right to decide that standard practice is not 
appropriate or satisfactory-[102]
Dependence on reasonableness also introduces 
further problems which the patient would have to 
overcome. Even if it is the court, and not the medical 
profession, which decides on reasonableness, expert 
evidence will be required. As with most professions, 
and this was noted in Canterbury v. Spence. f 1031 it is 
often very difficult to obtain expert testimony which 
would suggest that a professional colleague has been 
negligent, and the evidence of an expert - if one can be 
found - is likely to be given with the possible 
implications of a finding of negligence very much in 
mind. It would be disingenuous to pretend that such 
evidence will not weigh heavily with a court.
The 'objective' test also maximises the distance 
between the rights of the individual patient and the 
amount of information to which he or she is entitled, 
requiring a rationalised view of the instant doctor's 
behaviour. The description of a given patient's rights, 
and indeed of all patients' rights, is inappropriately 
based on the description of what is professionally 
acceptable - even professionally optimal - behaviour.
Moreover, as already has been noted, practices 
which develop may not in themselves be negligent. 
Courts will be loath, therefore, to regard them as
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professionally or legally culpable, because ultimately 
they serve the interests of medical care and do not 
prejudice reasonable medical practice. However, from the 
patient's point of view, they may be unacceptable, 
invasive and personally unsatisfactory. The intervention 
of medicine, therefore, may cause the patient harm, 
without being bad practice in strictly medical terms. 
The assertion that the provision of information is only 
tenuously linked to the technical behaviour of the doctor 
is thus reinforced.
At first sight, the use of the 'prudent patient' 
test seems to offer a greater protection to the patient. 
However, as has been shown, in effect - and even 
discounting the exceptions to the rule - it too equates, 
in part, to a type of professional standard. Implicit in 
it are fundamental value judgements, which start from the 
assumption that not all information need be disclosed. 
Moreover, whereas the reasonableness test is generally 
used in the negligence action to assess the behaviour of 
the person defending the action, it is here also used in 
respect of the person claiming to have been harmed. In 
other situations this is common only where there is a 
suggestion of contributory negligence. This can
scarcely be an issue, however, in cases concerning 
non-disclosure of risks. The court, therefore, must 
speculate on two matters fundamental to the case.
On the one hand, they must guess what the 
reasonable or prudent patient is, and what information
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would have affected his or her choice. In fact - even 
with a highly credible patient witness - the court may be 
prepared to decide that the information was not material 
to the decision, or rather that the information should 
not have been regarded as vital. On the other hand, and 
again because the negligence action focuses on doctors' 
duties, they must also decide whether non-disclosure 
demonstrates actual negligence - that is breach of the 
doctor's duty of care to that particular patient, or to 
patients in general. Thus, the question in issue becomes 
divorced from the patient's immediate rights.
Neither of the above assessments is solely a 
question of fact. Rather they are value-judgements 
which permit of the incorporation of numerous extra-legal 
factors into the equation - factors which often seem to 
value therapy over non-therapy, and an otherwise 
competent and highly respected professional over an 
aggrieved 'consumer'. When the exceptions to the 
position are admitted, and in particular that of 
'therapeutic privilege', it is even more evident that 
professional evidence and standards play a highly 
significant role in the ultimate determination of the 
case.
It can be concluded therefore, that the 'prudent 
patient' test is some improvement on the 'prudent doctor* 
test in the protection of patients' rights, but it by no 
means represents the radical alternative which it is 
often represented as doing. Talk of human rights in this
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area, therefore, can be said on occasion merely to have 
disguised the continued use of policy considerations, 
rather than offering real protection to the patient. It 
may be the case, as Robertson suggests, that the 
acceptance of the concept of ‘informed consent' by 
American courts represents a desire to expand the 
liability of the medical profession,[104] but it is 
submitted that it has scarcely achieved this, except in 
cases where the failure to disclose is so gross as to 
have, in any event, satisfied many of the criteria which 
could stimulate assault analysis.
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supra cit.; see also, Seidelson, 'Medical 
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at p. 784.
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supra cit.
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c.f. Dessi v. U.S.A. 489 F. Supp. 722 (1980)
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however irrational. To inject a reasonable man 
standard into this determination arguably 
undermines the patient's right to make his own 
decision. While this is a theoretically appealing 
rationale, it ignores the practical problem with 
reliability of proof.' (emphasis added) 
for discussion, see Walker, op.cit.; Street on 
Torts. op.cit.; Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort. 
op.cit.; Atiyah, P.S., Accidents. Compensation
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N and the Law. (3rd Ed.) London, Weidenfeld & 
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81. supra cit.
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84. supra cit.
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understandings and intentions of the parties are 
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at p.790 
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■ ibid., at p. 780 
at p.792
loc.cit., at p. 106.
thus, an exception was allowed 'when 
risk-disclosure poses such a threat of detriment 
to the patient as to become unfeasible or 
contraindicated from a medical point of view.', at 
pp.788-9. This exception was also supported by 
Lord Scarman in Sidaway. supra cit.
Muir v. Glasgow Corporation 1943 S.C. (H.L.) 3,
per Lord Macmillan at p. 10: 'Those who engage in
operations inherently dangerous must take 
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see also, Paris v. Stepney Borough Council [1951]
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All E.R. 1248; Gilmour v. Simpson 1958 S.C. 477. 
For further discussion, see Walker, op.cit. at 
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102. c.f. Sir John Donaldson in Sidaway, supra cit., at 
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skilled and experienced medical man.'; but see
also the importance given to medical assessment in 
Kenny v. Lockwood, supra cit., per Hodgins, J.A. 
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Court in this case...to decide on the extent and 
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CONSENT IN THE U K
CHAPTER 6
British courts routinely show less verbal concern for 
questions of human rights, but this is not to say that 
they do not recognise them, nor that they do not regard 
them as significant. Merely, their language differs from 
that of their American counterparts. Thus, it is equally 
fundamental to British law and legal process that basic 
rights are protected, and that remedies are made 
available to redress legitimate grievances. The form of 
the available remedy will, as in the United States, play 
a part in determining the ease with which redress can be 
obtained. As has been noted, British courts have also 
moved from the assault based action to the negligence 
action in response to criteria similar to those which 
influenced the United States courts.[1] Moreover, the 
tests for negligence in the United Kingdom are in general 
equivalent to the tests used in the United States.[2]
It has been suggested above,[3] however, that 
there remains a distinction between the negligence action 
in general and the negligence action in medical cases. 
Where the alleged negligence is a failure in information 
disclosure there is reason to assume that any apparent 
differentiation will equally apply here. In other 
words, unless the issue of disclosure is regarded as a
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special and separate issue, the use of extra-legal
criteria will be evident also in cases concerning the 
validity and quality of consent.
British courts have in fact, until recently 
apparently given little consideration to the question of 
what information must be disclosed before a medical 
consent is real and effective.[4] The negligence action 
has long been preferred and what is generally under 
consideration, therefore, is primarily whether or not the 
doctor acted in a professionally acceptable way. 
Robertson[5] suggests that there effectively was no 
doctrine specifically applying to the disclosure of
information in British law until the 1970s, and the case 
of Chatterton v. Gerson.f61 This, of course, does not 
mean that such matters were not considered in the past, 
but rather that no special status had been accorded to 
the question of consent by British courts, even in those 
cases where it was central to the issue.
The leading cases which Robertson uses to 
substantiate this suggestion are the cases of Hatcher v. 
Black[7] and Bolam v. Friern Hospital Management 
Committee.f 81 Both, according to Robertson, demonstrate 
that there was no comprehensive or comprehensible 
doctrine relating to 'informed' or real consent in
medical cases.[9] Indeed, in neither case was there an
enunciation of a special doctrine of consent - whatever 
its terminology - and in fact the emphasis on patient's 
rights which could be encapsulated in such a doctrine.
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and reinforced by judicial pronouncement, seems to be 
quite clearly lacking.
Whilst their American colleagues struggled to find 
an acceptable test to measure the extent of necessary 
disclosure and the situations in which it must, could, or 
should be made, British courts tended to remain 
comfortable with a relatively simplistic professional 
model. The two significant characteristics of the 
application of the negligence action in medical cases in 
the United Kingdom have been the almost overwhelming 
weight placed on medical judgement and the deference
shown to orthodox medicine and its therapies. Thus, even 
the Royal Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation 
for Personal Injury (Pearson Commission),(10J when 
considering problems of disclosure suggested that, '[a] 
balance has to be maintained between the possible 
consequences of treatment and the possible outcome if 
treatment is not carried out.'[11] In other words, what 
is weighed in the scales of justice when it is alleged
that insufficient information has been disclosed, will 
inevitably bear in mind the potential benefit of therapy, 
even where this conflicts with the perspective of the 
individual patient raising the complaint. This deference 
to the medical view has been identified by a number of
writers and is by no means a trivial point. Klass,[12]
for example, suggests that this attitude is one possible 
reason for the huge (and he considers excessive) 
prescription of drugs in the United Kingdom. Failure to
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challenge the practice of medical practitioners, even in 
the routine transaction has led, or may lead, to general 
societal unwillingness to challenge other aspects of 
medicine.
British courts, therefore, have seldom 
contemplated with any degree of seriousness a deviation 
from the professional test, which is generally used in 
medical cases as definitive, rather than merely 
persuasive. Thus, the professional standard sets the 
initial pace, and when combined with a desire to protect 
and advance the 'good* of orthodox medicine, provides a
strong disincentive to admit the validity of challenges
to medical behaviour. There was. in the United Kingdom,
therefore, neither the desire, nor the apparent need, to
consider the possible application of an equivalent to the 
'prudent patient' test.
It was said above that the use of the term 
'informed' ' to qualify 'consent' was in many ways
problematic. and that for this reason it would not
routinely be used in this discussion.[13J Indeed, it has 
been expressly stated in one English case that informed
consent forms no part of the English law[14] - nor, one
can reasonably assume, of Scottish law.[15] The
difficulties inherent in the use of the concept of being
'informed' will be further discussed below, but for the
moment it is necessary only to point out that although
eschewing 'informed' consent, British courts do not deny 
the importance of a real or legal consent - merely they 
\
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reject the terminology. As Robertson notes:
It is firmly established in English law that, 
in the absence of exceptional circumstances, 
such as an emergency situation, a doctor must 
obtain the consent of his patient before 
undertaking treatment involving physical 
contact with his patient.[16]
This, however, does not mean merely an overt consent, but 
rather entails a more complex assessment of the nature 
and extent of the information disclosed or withheld in 
order to decide whether or not the patient was both 
sciens and volens.[17] The significance of this relates 
to the fact that the defence of volenti non fit 
injuriaf181 will apply where risks are in fact consented 
to. The doctor who obtains a real consent both protects 
him or herself against allegations of illegality, and 
safeguards the moral nature of his or her intervention.
As the court said in Bowater v. Rowley Regis B.C.fl9]:
In regard to the doctrine volenti non fit 
in juria. I would add one reflection of a 
general kind. That general maxim has to be 
applied with especially careful regard to the 
varying facts of human affairs and human 
nature in any particular case, just because 
it is concerned with the intangible factors 
of mind and will....A man cannot be said to 
be truly "willing" unless he is in a position 
to choose freely; and freedom of choice 
predicates... full knowledge of the
circumstances upon which the exercise of 
choice is conditioned...[20]
However, as been noted, interpretation of what 
amounts to a real consent to therapy depends on the
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assessment of the quality, nature and extent of necessary
information disclosure - ultimately, in cases of dispute, 
assessment by the law. Thus, the method by which 
challenges are made and the tests applied in decision 
making will play a crucial role in determining the amount 
of information disclosure which is legally necessary, and 
thereby will describe the extent to which the patient has 
rights to information, and by implication, the extent to 
which the patient can expect his or her right to 
self-determination in medicine to be upheld by the law.
The earlier cases such as Hatcherf 21] and 
Bolam,[22] did not distinguish the provision of 
information from any other aspect of the doctor's duty of 
care to his or her patient. No consideration was given 
to the possibility that there was a difference between 
technical skills and non-technical skills, nor that the 
interests protected by rules about disclosure might be of 
more significance than the possibility, or even 
probability, of cure or relief of suffering. Thus, 
although both cases discussed the question of disclosure, 
they also gave considerable credence to the kinds of 
arguments so successfully challenged by Buchanan.[23] In
Bolam,f 241 for example, the judge suggested to the jury
\
that where the doctor feels that the therapy in question 
is the only hope of cure or alleviation of symptoms, and 
fears that the patient may be put off the therapy if all 
the risks are made known, then they might not wish to 
criticise the doctor for failing to inform the patient of
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the risks - as indeed the jury did not. As this case 
plays a significant role in future decisions, it is worth 
considering it in more detail.
The patient in question was suffering from 
depression, and ultimately the doctor formed the view 
that the treatment most likely to offer a cure was 
electroconvulsive therapy. In administering this therapy 
there were two schools of thought. One advocated the use 
of muscle-relaxants to prevent fracture in the 
convulsions which are inherent in the treatment and the 
other did not. Doubtless there were sound scientific 
reasons underlying each school of thought. The doctor in 
the instant case subscribed to the view that muscle 
relaxants were not necessary, and there was no suggestion 
that he was negligent in holding this position. However, 
he equally did not warn the patient of the risks of 
fracture which he knew to be possible, although, in his 
view, not highly probable. In the event, the patient did 
sustain fractures, and sued on the basis that he was 
inadequately informed. In deciding that the doctor was 
not negligent in having failed to warn of a known risk, a 
number of interesting points emerged.
First, the fact that the patient was mentally 
disturbed, which might in other circumstances have 
indicated that he could not have legally consented 
whatever information was disclosed, was used instead as a 
reason, or a justification, for non-disclosure of 
information, thus minimising his already tenuous capacity
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to give a real consent. Moreover, the court at no stage 
challenged the validity of the assertion that 
electroconvulsive therapy is in fact therapeutically 
valuable. And, finally, the court made it clear that the 
fact that a doctor differs in practice from his 
colleagues does not render him negligent, unless the 
deviation is such that a reasonably competent doctor 
would not have made it - following the rule in Hunter v. 
Hanley.f 251 The obligation to make disclosure was not 
denied, but the court chose to see it as defined not in 
terms of patients* rights, but rather - and very 
specifically - in terms of doctors' duties. The 
obligation of the doctor, therefore, is merely to act in 
a reasonably skilful manner in the exercise of his or her 
profession. Duties in respect of the provision of 
information and the exercise of technical skills, are not 
therefore distinguished in any way, and *... the issue of 
whether this duty encompasses the giving of information 
relating to risks inherent in the treatment is a 
question, not of law, but of reasonable medical 
judgement.'[26]
Again, therefore, the central element in assessing 
the quality of medical behaviour was deemed to be the 
evidence as to whether or not other doctors, as 
representatives of a responsible body of medical opinion, 
would or would not have made disclosure. There are two • 
vital points here. First, the court, of course, can 
reserve the right to decide that any professional
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practice is negligent, since professional practice is 
founded on criteria, and rooted in traditions, which are 
not necessarily those of the law. Negligence is a legal 
concept legally defined, and serves a purpose far beyond 
that which is sought by the development of professional 
practices and techniques. [27] The law can, and in some 
situations does, fly in the face of professional practice 
in the interests of justice.[28] In Bolam.f291 however,
the court seemed content to bind its own hands and feet
to the professional standard, and to shut off the
possibility that the law might set different standards. 
In many ways, this attitude is reminiscent of that taken 
in R. v. Arthur,[30] where the problems of accepting such 
attitudes are perhaps more overt.
In the latter case, there were clear and 
undeniable problems - morally at least - in merely 
accepting current medical practice as the best standard 
to be set. Here, the medical practice which was
supported was the deliberate non-treatment of handicapped 
babies, where prognosis was poor and the parents did not 
wish the child to survive. Whatever side of the moral 
debate one might wish to choose, it is surely surprising 
to hear a judge directing the jury that they should think 
long and hard before deciding that standard medical 
practice was criminal. It is not clear why this should 
be the case, when the intention and the effect of the 
practice was to kill (normally illegal), and this was not 
disputed.[31] Moreover, standard practice is a concept
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scarcely relevant to the criminal law, and yet it 
featured significantly in the trial and subsequent 
acquittal.
This case could be said to illustrate the 
reluctance of courts to set their own standards in 
medical cases, even in the face of what would otherwise 
be a criminal offence. Merely as an hypothesis, then, 
how much less likely are they to insist that standard 
practice is negligent, where the situation is, at least
at first sight, much less potentially dangerous and much 
more closely tied to normal medical practice, that is, to 
decisions about therapy, rather than to killing (or 
letting die)? Indeed, in Bolam,f321 there was no serious 
suggestion that medical evidence as to practice should be 
anything other than determinative of the issue. Nor was 
the possibility of deciding between the merits of 
individual practices seriously countenanced by the
court.[33] The so-called Bolam Test, which emerged from 
this case, indicated that where a doctor acts in
accordance with a school of thought accepted as 
reasonable by a responsible body of medical opinion, then 
he or she will not be negligent. The effect of this is 
that the assessment of what amounts to evidence
satisfying the legal concept of negligence is determined 
substantially by the medical profession, and its 
boundaries are essentially set by medical practice. This 
is problematic enough in allegations of technical 
negligence, [34] but how much more problematic when it is 
not the doctor's
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skills as a practitioner which are under scrutiny, but 
his or her response to, and respect for, his patients' 
rights?
In setting this standard for decision-making, 
Bolam was the landmark decision in British jurisprudence 
for some considerable time, although its status could 
have been challenged by a superior court. However, the
use of the professional test clearly provided the British 
courts with a manageable instrument, which fitted in well 
with the nature of the negligence action and with their 
own preconceptions about the impact of negligence 
litigation on the practice of orthodox medicine. Scant 
attention was paid to the claims of patients to have 
rights in this interaction. Not, that is, rights to a 
cure, but certainly rights to be respected as human
beings and to make choices about their own therapy based 
on a sufficiency of information. Moreover, the Bolam
test has found extensive support in subsequent cases, 
making it the cornerstone of decision-making in cases of 
this sort.[35]
In Thake v. Maurice,[36] for example, the court
held out the possibility that the surgeon in question 
could have provided himself with a legal excuse for his 
somewhat vague explanation had he claimed that it was not 
common practice to give any more clear an explanation. 
As Kerr, L.J. said:
1 It would have been open to the defendant to 
qualify the answers which he gave either in 
cross-examination or re-examination, by
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saying that he did not believe that it was 
the general practice to give any such warning 
or that other surgeons might consider this to 
be necessary. He was given the opportunity 
of doing so in a later part of his 
cross-examination when it was suggested to 
him that he might not have given the warning 
because this might have caused worry or 
concern to the plaintiffs, but he did not 
accept this. Accordingly, ... in the present 
case there was nothing to be placed in the 
balance against the need for the warning 
which the defendant himself recognised in his 
evidence.[37]
In sum, therefore, the British courts have made no
real pretence at setting anything other than a
\
professional test for disclosure. The emphasis is on the 
doctor's duty and not on the patient's rights, thus 
making the evidence of fellow professionals of similar 
significance in disclosure cases as it is in cases 
involving the application of technical skills. In fact, 
only Sir John Donaldson in the Court of Appeal judgement 
in Sidawav. f 381 and Lord Scarman[39] in the House of 
Lords made any real attempt to override the dominance of 
professional evidence. The courts, however, have 
nonetheless laid down the rough tests to which they hold 
doctors accountable,[40J and it is therefore possible to 
argue that there remains the possibility of the courts 
not placing overriding emphasis on the evidence of the 
doctor and his or her fellow professionals, and that they 
can and will consider the question of whether or not a 
doctor's non-disclosure was negligent in the light of 
alternative criteria. If this were indeed the case, then 
the concern generated by the use of the professional test
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might at best be misplaced, and at worst exaggerated. 
What, therefore, do the courts have to say about 
disclosure, independently of the medical profession?
The Duty to Disclose
As has already been noted, the duty to make disclosure to 
a patient is, in British law, apparently an aspect simply 
of the doctor's professional duty of care towards his or 
her patient. Nonetheless, this need not mean that the 
court have no say in its definition. Despite the
translation of patients' rights into doctors' duties, 
which seems to be an unavoidable implication of the shift 
from assault to negligence, the courts could nonetheless
play a substantial role in protecting patients' rights,
even in an action which may apparently be inherently
ill-suited to this. In other words, the law could, by
setting sufficiently clear and unequivocal tests, still 
assess the question of disclosure with a relatively
critical eye. Even where the professional test takes 
priority, this remains possible.
What then is the standard set by British courts?
Accepting that neither Bolam[41] nor Hatcherf421 did any 
more \ than indicate that the courts would pay primary
attention to evidence of other doctors and to the 
therapeutic imperative, the case of Chatterton v. 
Gersori[43] seems to have been the first to make a real 
attempt at defining what information should, in the
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abstract, be disclosed to the patient in order to make 
the consent of the patient both technically possible and 
legally meaningful. ChattertonT 441 also made it clear 
that, save in cases of gross failure to disclose, the 
appropriate form of action lies in negligence. The court
stated the doctor's duty of care thus,:
\
In my judgement there is no obligation on the 
doctor to canvass with the patient anything 
other than the inherent implications of the 
particular operation that he intends to carry 
out. He is certainly under no obligation to 
say that if he operates incompetently he will 
do damage. The fundamental assumption is 
that he knows his job and that he will do it 
properly but he ought to warn of what may 
happen by misfortune however well the
operation is performed, if there is a real 
risk of misfortune inherent in the
procedure.[45]
This statement of what information need be disclosed 
poses a number of problems for the disaffected patient. 
On the one hand, the assessment of what is a 'real' risk 
could be made on the basis of a statistical calculation, 
a method already criticised as unsatisfactory.[46] 
Further, as Robertson notes:
The adoption of this standard negligence 
formula in the present context can be seen to 
imply that the doctor's duty to disclose the 
"real risk" of the operation stems from his 
overall duty to exercise reasonable care in 
the treatment of his patient. The doctor is 
under a duty to take reasonable care to avoid 
exposing his patient to any foreseeable risk 
of injury, and, as the decided cases 
indicate, "foreseeable risk" is equated with 
"real risk". Thus, it would follow that the 
source of the duty to inform the patient of
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the "real" risk inherent in the proposed 
treatment is simply the overall duty of care 
arising from the doctor-patient
relationship.[47]
Thus, even the apparent freedom of the court to decide
what is 'real' risk, nonetheless requires an assessment
which is intimately linked with what is reasonable
medical practice in the circumstances, since the 
obligation to disclose is merely one aspect of the
doctor's overall duty of care. Clearly this has 
implications for patients' rights. Indeed, if this is 
the test applied, and Chatterton has consistently been 
referred to with approval by subsequent courts,[48] the:
....disclosure of risks inherent in the 
proposed treatment will be seen as a product 
of the doctor's duty of care rather than as a 
product of the patient's right to 
self-determination. Thus, since the doctor's 
duty of care is defined in terms of acting as 
a reasonable doctor, there is a danger that 
in the future English courts will see the 
duty to disclose inherent risks as stemming 
from the fact that reasonable doctors 
disclose such risks (which may be subject to 
rebuttal by medical evidence) rather than 
from the fact that the patients' right to 
self-determination demands such
disclosure.[49]
Although somewhat vague, therefore, it can be seen that 
the risks which British courts expect the doctor to 
disclose are those which a reasonable doctor would regard 
as 'real'. As noted in Chatterton, [501 this does not 
include the possibility of negligent performance. The 
doctor has to show that his or her behaviour in not
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disclosing the risk was legitimate, either because the 
risk 'was not real or because his or her professional 
colleagues would not have disclosed it. Evidence of 
either of these would satisfy the court that there was no 
negligence. To deal with the latter first, it was noted 
in Canterbury v. Spence r 511 that there are known 
difficulties in obtaining evidence from a doctor or group 
of doctors which would indicate that a fellow 
professional had been negligent. Moreover, taking into 
account the terms of the Bolam test, it is not necessary 
to show that all doctors would support the position - 
only that a reasonable body of medical opinion would. 
Thus, even if one group of reasonable medical 
practitioners would have disclosed the information, the 
doctor who fails to make such disclosure will not be 
negligent if one other body of reasonable medical opinion 
would not have disclosed it. Since medical practice 
changes, and, as was said in Thake v. Maurice, ' [o]f all 
the sciences medicine is one of the least exact',[52] 
then it is not unlikely that there will exist a body of 
responsible opinion which does not regard the failure to 
disclose as being in any way reprehensible.
Moreover, the courts have imported a further 
refinement of the standard required, which removes the 
assessment of what information needs to be disclosed even 
further from the actual patient in question, and which 
makes his or her allegation that he or she would have 
regarded the risks as 'real' or important subject to even
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more caveats. This further device equates broadly to the 
‘prudent1 or reasonable patient test. In other words, 
not only is the doctor's behaviour judged in essence by 
what his or her colleagues have to say about what is 
acceptable medical practice, but there are further 
assumptions made both about what the reasonable patient 
would have known already, and about what he or she would 
have wished to know. In the case of Thake v. 
Maurice,[53] Nourse, L.J., portrayed both the court's 
role, and its dilemma, thus:
The function of the court in ascertaining 
objectively the meaning of words used by 
contracting parties is one of every day 
occurrence but is often extremely difficult 
to discharge it where the subjective 
understandings and intentions of the parties 
' are clear and opposed .... In the end, the 
question seems to be reduced to one of 
determining the extent of the knowledge which 
is to be attributed to the reasonable person 
standing in the position of the 
plaintiffs.[54]
In this case, the particular question hinged on 
whether or not the reasonable patient would have 
understood that tissues, once severed, as in a vasectomy, 
could regrow and rejoin, thus naturally reversing the 
effects of the sterilisation. The court accepted that it 
would not be rational to suppose that:
...a reasonable person standing in the 
position of the plaintiffs would have known 
that the vasectomy is an operation whose 
success depends on a healing of human tissue 
which cannot be guaranteed. To suppose that
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would be to credit him with omniscience 
beyond all reason.[55]
In this statement there seems to be some hope for the 
patient. The fact that the vast majority of medical acts 
involve technical information which the patient could not 
know without the implication of 'omniscience beyond all 
reason' might make it seem likely that failure to 
disclose such information would result in liability on 
the part of the doctor. However, the court immediately 
qualified this statement, and in so doing considerably 
undermined its significance for the patient. Nourse, 
L.J. continued:
But it does seem to me to be reasonable to 
credit him with the more general knowledge 
that in medical science, all things, or 
nearly all things, are uncertain. That 
knowledge is part of the general experience 
of mankind, and in my view it makes no 
difference whether what has to be considered 
is some form of medical or surgical treatment 
or the excision, apparently final, of a 
section of the vas. Doubtless the general 
experience of mankind will acknowledge the 
certainty that a limb, once amputated, has 
gone forever. Such has been the observation 
from time immemorial of a species to whom the 
spectacle of war and suffering is 
commonplace. But where an operation is of 
modern origin, its effects untried over 
several generations, would a reasonable 
person, confronted even with the words and 
demonstrations of the defendant in this case, 
believe that there was not one chance in ten 
thousand that the object would not be 
achieved?[56]
Clearly, this question could readily be answered in the 
affirmative, although the judge chose to answer it in the
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negative. It is surely stretching what the reasonable 
patient might know, to suggest that it is common 
knowledge that, in effect, when parts of the body are cut 
to separate them, they can regrow - the example of the 
amputated limb which the judge himself introduced could, 
with respect, equally have served to reach the opposite 
conclusion. Moreover, it is not entirely clear at what 
point something becomes so routine or well tried that the 
reasonable patient knows or should know what are its
chances of complete success. Indeed, the court may be
\
thought to have introduced this as a rather unsubtle way 
of avoiding, or attempting to avoid, liability. Why, and 
indeed how, should the average patient have access to
such information?
In this case, the judges seem to have become 
confused between whether or not a doctor guarantees the
absolute success of therapy (which admittedly he or she
does not, and cannot), and whether or not the risk of 
failure is known to the patient. There was no suggestion 
in this case that the parties would have rejected the
therapy had they known the risk of failure, but rather
that - had they been alert to this possiblity -
subsequent difficulties and grief could have been 
avoided. In other words, the plaintiffs' subsequent
freedom to make decisions and to avoid hazard, was
severely affected by the failure to give them adequate 
information - information which would be demanded out of 
respect for their moral autonomy. In this case, damages
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were obtained but they were obtained rather on the basis 
of future limitation of freedom of choice and costs 
associated with this than on the basis of instant failure 
to disclose.
Sidaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital Governors & Othersr57]
The impact of the Bo lam test on the development of a 
theoretical position supporting or defending patients' 
rights to information has been substantial. However, it 
was open to a superior court to modify or overrule this 
test and to substitute an alternative. Indeed, in an 
article preceeding the Sidaway case, Robertson made what 
amounts to a plea for consideration of this very 
point.[58] As he said:
Given that the duty to disclose is regarded 
as part of the overall duty of care, it seems 
likely that courts will be willing to accept 
that a doctor may be justified in withholding 
information concerning the risks of proposed 
treatment if he reasonably believes the 
performance of the treatment to be in his 
patient's best interests and the patient is 
likely to refuse the treatment if warned of 
the risks. This is a potentially 
far-reaching proposition which militates 
against the basic premise that the decision 
to undergo medical treatment should 
ultimately be that of the patient and not 
that of the doctor. It is hoped that it is a 
\ proposition that English courts will accept 
only in the most exceptional
circumstances.[59]
Thus, it was hoped that the courts would only rarely ally 
themselves too completely to the interests of the
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professional group involved. After all, it would be 
scarcely surprising if doctors were not often to regard 
therapy as almost inevitably a good thing, or to view 
disclosure of therapeutic alternatives as unnecessary.
To accept this, however, is to ignore the potentially 
opposing view of the patient who may - if fully informed
of the likely risks of benefits and therapy - nonetheless
\
wish to reject the treatment in question, or to accept a 
therapy which is not medically optimal.
The Bolam Test gives rise to the concern that the 
disinterested decision-making which can reasonably be 
expected in a court of law, will effectively be subject 
to control by the interested professional group, and that 
thereby the rights of the individual patient will take a 
poor second place to the interest of the doctor in 
exercising his or her clinical judgement. Whatever the 
motivation of the doctor, and however potentially 
beneficial the therapy, the choice is that of the 
patient, and it is for the law to set a standard which 
clearly takes account of patients' rights in this 
matter. Clearly, the Bolam Test is more concerned with 
professional consensus and standards than it is with the 
rights of any patient. Indeed, the therpeutic imperative 
was given substantial credibility by the court, as was 
the professional assessment of negligence.
The House of Lords, however, was recently given 
the opportunity in the Sidawayf601 case to pronounce once 
and for all on the nature and extent of disclosure which
311
is legally acceptable, and on the rationale of rules 
about disclosure. The Bolam test could, if found 
wanting, have been modified or overruled, and emphasis 
placed firmly on patients' rights. Indeed, the court 
were well aware of the problems confronting them, having 
extensively consulted evidence from a number of 
jurisdictions and academic writings. Interestingly, the 
members of the court, whilst reaching the same 
conclusions as to liability, did so by different routes. 
Moreover, in the lower courts, the judgements were so 
varied that there was some difficulty in reconciling them 
to each other, and in reconciling some of the judgements 
to the ultimate decision.[61]
The Sidaway case presented unusual difficulties of 
proof, in that the physician whose behaviour was the 
subject of the complaint had died in the period between 
the source of the action and its resolution. Of 
necessity, therefore, the court was required to speculate 
on occasion, but this did not prevent Their Lordships
from pronouncing clearly on the question of consent to
\
medical treatment and the tests to be applied. From the 
perspective of the patient, the most supportive judgement 
was that of Lord Scarman. who - although not dissenting 
from the ultimate decision - nonetheless was prepared to 
go considerably further towards the Canterburyf62 ] test 
than were his colleagues. It is important, therefore, to 
consider the facts of the case, and the judgements in 
turn, since they now provide a clear statement of law for
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the United Kingdom as a whole, although courts may seek 
to distinguish this judgement.[63] Indeed, Brazier[64]
claims that Sidaway has not finally settled the law in
\
this area.
The majority judgment of the Lords is by no 
means the end of the controversy over how 
much the doctor must tell. Indeed, all that 
this prolonged litigation may have achieved 
is that the transatlantic test that what the 
patient should be told should be judged by 
what the reasonable patient would want to 
know was rejected by the majority in the 
House of Lords.'[65]
The plaintiff, Mrs Amy Sidaway, suffered 
persistent pain in her neck and shoulders and was 
advised by her doctor (since deceased) that surgery on 
her spinal column offered the possibility of relief of 
the pain. The surgeon warned Mrs Sidaway of some, but 
not all, of the risks of the therapy. There were two 
risks specific to the surgery in contemplation. The 
first, concerned possible damage to the nerve roots in 
the area of the operation, and the second concerned 
possible damage to the spinal cord which might be slight 
or very serious. The estimated likelihood of either 
sort of damage occurring was statistically calculated by 
one witness as between 1% and 2%. However, if either 
risk did occur then the potential injury could be 
severe. The medical witnesses, whilst accepting that 
these were real risks of the operation, nonetheless 
assessed the likelihood of their eventuating as small.
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and in particular felt that the latter risk was even
less likely to occur - estimated as being a probability 
of less than 1%.
In the event, however, the spinal cord was 
damaged and the plaintiff claimed that no warning had 
been given to her of the possible risk of this 
happening. Thus, the surgeon in question was alleged to 
have been in breach of his duty of care to Mrs Sidaway. 
In the unfortunate circumstances of the surgeon's death, 
it was only possible for the court to speculate as to 
whether or not he had in fact given a warning as to the 
possibility of this particular type of risk occurring. 
But the court was able to consider what the test of
breach of duty in such cases should be, and this they
did at some length. Lord Scarman's judgement represents 
the most radical approach and was considered by some to 
be a sign that the courts were opening up to protection 
of patients' rights. Lords Diplock, Keith and Bridge, 
however, presented a different picture, and one which is 
more clearly in line with earlier decisions. It is to 
their judgements that discussion will turn first, and 
thereafter consideration will be made of the extent to
which Lord Scarman's opinion, had it been that of the 
majority, would have given priority to the rights of the 
patient.
It is also worth, at this point, distinguishing 
two separate strands of concern. To date, the 
discussion here has concentrated on the emphasis placed
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by negligence analysis on patients' rights'. This is, 
of course, a very substantial part of the overall
picture. There is, however, one further important
characteristic of the shift from assault to negligence 
which has so far not been considered in much depth, and 
that is the question of causation. This omission has 
been deliberate, and will be rectified later.[66]
For the moment, however, attention will be
focussed on the first of these - that is, the manner in
which the House of Lords defined the balance between 
patients' rights and doctors' duties, since this in fact 
the elementary stage at which attitudes are shaped. It 
is from this calculation that the first two aspects of 
the successful negligence action are firmed up - that
is, the existence of the duty of care and the shape that 
duty takes. The causation element logically follows 
this.
It has been claimed that the Bolam Test shows
scant regard for patients' rights - indeed, it could be
said that if a right does emerge from this case it is
equivalent to a 'right' to receive treatment. This is 
an area fraught with difficulty, and certain aspects of 
this so-called 'right to treatment' will be considered 
below.[67] For the moment it is sufficient to note that 
the therapeutic imperative took clear pride of place in 
the formulation of the Bolam Test.
In his judgement in the Sidaway case. Lord 
Diplock, in the first few sentences, seems to take the
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professional priority for granted. In his introductory 
remarks he seems to presume that decisions will be taken 
by doctors for their patients, noting that there are 
risks attached to all therapy, but that:
All these are matters which the doctor will 
have taken into consideration in determining, 
in the exercise of his professional skill and 
judgement, that it is in the patient* s 
interests that he should take the risk
involved and undergo the treatment
recommended by the doctor.[681(Emphasis added)
The fundamental assumption, therefore, would seem to be
that it is for the doctor to weigh in the balance what
\
risks the patient should be prepared to take in the 
interests of the possibility of improvement. [69]
Lord Diplock accepted that it was not certain 
whether or not the doctor in this case had weighed up 
these risks or whether or not he had passed them on to 
Mrs Sidaway, but in any event, these considerations were 
not regarded by him as having major importance or 
meriting serious consideration. In Lord Diplock*s view 
there was one crucial piece of evidence on which he based 
his judgement, and this was, in line with the Bolam Test, 
the evidence of other doctors as to whether or not they 
would have disclosed the information of whose lack Mrs 
Sidaway subsequently complained. As he said, although 
the court did not know exactly what the particular doctor 
had done:
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What we do know, however, and this is in my 
view determinative of this appeal, is that 
all the expert witnesses specialising in
neurology ....  agreed that there was a
responsible body of medical opinion which 
would have undertaken the operation at the 
time the neurosurgeon did and would have 
warned the patient of the risk involved in 
the operation in substantially the same terms 
as the trial judge found on the balance of 
probabilities the neurosurgeon had done, i.e. 
without specific reference to risk of injury 
of the spinal cord.[70]
In other words, even although the trial judge was, in 
fact, in no position to decide what the doctor actually 
did, and even although his decision flew in the face of 
the evidence given by Mrs Sidaway, who was actually there 
to give evidence of what she had been told, the relevant 
factor was not whether or not the warning actually had 
been given, but the fact that the other expert witnesses 
would equally not have disclosed this risk.
Interestingly, Lord Diplock was vociferous in his 
praise for the Bolam Test on grounds which were scarcely 
under consideration in this case, where what was under 
consideration was whether or not disclosure of 
information had been made, and whether or not any lack of 
disclosure was negligent. However, courts seem to find 
the spectre of defensive medicine an irresistible tool in 
their decision-making in medical cases, and whatever its
relevance (or lack of it) here. Lord Diplock asserted the
\
importance of avoiding the 'American disease’ in no 
uncertain terms. Moreover, he declined to draw any 
distinction between the exercise of technical skills and
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the exercise of others. As he said:
In English jurisprudence the doctor's 
relationship wi.th his patient which gives 
rise to the normal duty of care to exercise 
his skill and judgement to improve the 
patient's health in any particular respect in 
which the patient has sought his aid, has 
hitherto been treated as a single 
comprehensive duty covering all the ways in 
which a doctor is called on to exercise his 
skill and judgement in the improvement of the 
physical or mental condition of the patient 
for which his services either as a general 
practitioner or as a specialist have been 
engaged. This general duty is not subject to 
dissection into a number of component parts 
to which different criteria of what satisfies 
the duty of care apply such as diagnosis, 
treatment and advice (including warning of 
any risks of something going wrong, however 
skillfully the treatment advised is carried 
out).[71]
There are a number of interesting features of this 
assertion, not least that it follows immediately after a 
passage in which one is reminded that medicine changes 
and that we should not seek to inhibit such change. 
Might the law not equally require to modify itself to 
deal with novel and important situations?
In any event, the judge's refusal to separate the 
two distinct aspects of the doctor's duty - that is, on 
the one hand the use of his or her professional skills in 
diagnosis and identification of the appropriate range of 
therapy, and on the other hand the more human, and less 
technical, duty to respect the autonomy of another, by 
honestly placing the choices before the patient - bodes 
ill for any serious consideration of patients' rights.
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Indeed, it seems - as did the Bolam case[72] - to suggest 
that, if the patient has a right at all, it is the right 
to be treated if the doctor thinks this is a good idea - 
no more than that. Where it is impossible, however, to 
disagree with Lord Diplock, is in his somewhat scathing 
account of the use of the concept of 'informed consent' 
which - as has been noted above - is generally so beset 
with caveats as to be rather meaningless. As Lord
Diplock asked, what is the purpose of a doctrine of this 
sort when it effectively introduces the notion of the 
'objective' or 'reasonable' patient, thus making the 
assumption that some risks, but not all, need be 
disclosed? As he enquired:
On what logical or juristic basis can the 
need for informed consent be confined to some 
risks and not extended to others that are 
also real and who decides which risks fall
into which class?[73j
This, of course, is an excellent question, but as a
reason for applying the Bolam Test, it is scarcely 
convincing. The alternative for the House of Lords was 
not, and never was, the mere unthinking adoption of tests 
which Lord Diplock made quite clear were 
jurisprudentially foreign to English law. It is not 
beyond the capacity of the law to reject both tests and 
come up with another, and yet the tone of his judgement 
seems to suggest that adoption of one or other of the 
established tests was indeed the sole option he
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perceived.
In any event. Lord Diplock was unimpressed by the 
suggestion that it was possible to differentiate aspects 
of the doctor's behaviour into those which arise from his 
or her professional expertise, and those with which he or 
she is imbued because he or she is a person who has such 
expertise and therefore is the only person in the 
position to make explanations. This distinction he 
dismissed.
To decide what risks the existence of which a 
patient should be voluntarily warned and the 
terms in which such warning, if any, should 
be given, having regard to the effect that
the warning may have, is as much an exercise 
in professional skill and judgement as any 
other part of the doctor's comprehensive duty 
of care to the individual patient and expert 
medical evidence in this matter should be 
treated in just the same way.[74]
However, merely to assert that this is so does not make 
it so. Distinctions can be, and have been, drawn, to 
which Lord Diplock was apparently disinclined to attend. 
Moreover, hidden in these words is more than just a
simple statement that the disclosure of information is a 
technical matter - a proposition which when put thus
seems to lose some of its superficial credibility.
The decision as to whether or not to disclose 
information can only be regarded as part of the
professional exercise of the doctor's skills as a doctor, 
if it is thought likely to have a significant impact on 
the patient's choice as to whether or not to accept the
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therapy - in fact, only if it is thought likely that the 
patient would not agree with the professional assessment 
made by the doctor that therapy should be undertaken. 
When seen in this light, the statement in effect is 
suggesting that, when the doctor thinks - in the exercise 
of his or her professional judgement - that the patient 
should undergo a particular therapy, then the patient 
should not be given the opportunity of declining it. In 
other words, the perceived value of therapy (even with 
the oft repeated caveat that it might not be successful) 
takes precedence over the patient's rights to reject 
therapy, however medically irrational this may seem, and 
to exercise his or her self-determination knowledgeably 
and in a calculated fashion. The same will apply to 
choices in respect of therapeutic alternatives.
Equally, it is submitted with respect, that the 
concurring opinions of Lords Keith and Bridge failed to 
distinguish between the exercise of technical, and other, 
aspects of the doctor's role. In referring with approval 
to the judgement in Hunter v. Hanleyf7 5 1 that, 1 [i]n the 
realm of diagnosis and treatment there is ample scope for 
genuine difference of opinion and one man clearly is not 
negligent merely because his conclusion differs from that 
of other professional men ....'',[76] and in applying this 
to the disagreement among the experts in this case as to 
whether or not the information would have been disclosed 
by them, the learned judges mistook the nature of 
information disclosure and the requirements therefor.
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The test in Hunter v. Hanley[77] (that of failing to act 
as a doctor of ordinary skill acting with ordinary care) 
may be a sound basis for deciding technical matters, but 
it scarcely applies to non-technical ones. This is not
to say that Lord Bridge, for example, does not recognise 
that alternative positions are tenable. There are, he 
noted, several possible options to be considered. As he 
said:
It could be argued that if the patient's
consent is to be fully informed, the doctor 
must specifically warn him of all risks 
involved in the treatment offered, unless he 
has some sound clinical reason not to do so. 
Logically, this would seem to be the extreme 
to which a truly objective criterion of the 
doctor's duty would lead.[78]
To dismiss this possibility, as Lord Bridge does, because 
it is not a feature of any jurisdiction to which the 
court was referred, seems somewhat disingenuous. 
However, neither was Lord Bridge prepared, at least 
overtly, to support what he saw as the opposite side of
this extreme - that is, that doctors should not disclose
information merely because to do so would alarm the 
patient. Unfortunately, not only does he fail to make a 
distinction between the technical and non-technical 
impact of a doctor's practice, even whilst accepting the 
importance of the patient's right to self-determination, 
but he then makes the fundamental mistake of assuming 
that the nature of the information to be disclosed is of 
a technical sort.
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Indeed, there is a certain ambivalence in his 
judgement, which, paradoxically perhaps, makes it clear 
which of the interests under consideration is seen as 
being more valuable. Lord Bridge agrees that the prime 
matter for consideration is patient autonomy, and 
acknowledges its value, but considers its attainment to 
be served best by the clinical judgement of the instant 
doctor and his or her colleagues. Nonetheless, he has 
some sympathy with the court in the Canadian case of 
Reibl v. Hughes. T79 1 and expressly refers to what is 
perhaps one of the best known statements of the rights of 
patients in this area. In this case, Laskin, C.J.C. said:
To allow expert medical evidence to determine 
what risks are material and, hence, should be 
disclosed and, correlatively, what risks are 
not material is to hand over to the medical 
profession the entire question of the scope 
of the duty of disclosure. including the 
question whether there has been a breach of 
that duty. Expert medical evidence is, of 
course, relevant to findings as to the risks 
that reside in or are a result of recommended 
surgery or other treatment. They will also 
have a bearing on their materiality but this 
is not a question that has to be concluded on 
the basis of the expert medical evidence 
alone. The issue under consideration is a 
different issue from that involved where the 
question is whether the doctor carried out 
his professional activities by applicable 
professional standards. What is under 
consideration here is the patient's right to 
know what risks are involved in undergoing or 
foregoing certain surgery or other 
treatment.[80]
In his judgement. Lord Bridge apparently fully 
appreciated the force of this reasoning, but then
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introduced a caveat which in effect so dilutes the 
reasoning purportedly accepted as to make it 
significantly different. This caveat is that of 
'clinical judgement' and is described by Lord Bridge as 
'..... a decision what degree of disclosure of risks is 
best calculated to assist a particular patient to make a 
rational choice whether or not to undergo a particular
therapy.....'[81] Thus, he concludes, the Bolam Test is 
the appropriate basis for decision-making.
This can only be the case if two pre-suppositions 
are accepted, which at no stage appear in the reasoning 
of Laskin, C.J.C., a judgement with which Lord Bridge 
nonetheless claims to be in sympathy. First, it is 
necessary to accept that the issue is the exercise solely 
of technical professional skills when assessing the
acceptable level of disclosure. If the argument 
presented by Laskin is in fact accepted, then, whilst
medical evidence may contribute to the test of 
materiality, it is the patient's right that is definitive 
of it.
Further, Lord Bridge assumes the necessity of 
making a rational choice. It has been said above[81] 
that rationality need not be a definitive criterion when 
the patient's right to self-determination is being 
protected, and this need not be rehearsed again here. 
However, it is worth considering the extent to which 
•rational' in this context, and subject to these tests
means 'personally rational* or 'medically rational'. If
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clinical judgement can be used to withhold information, 
then one must ask why? Presumably this is so because it 
might distress the patient, or might put him or her off 
the therapy which the doctor regards as being 
appropriate.
Now, the self-determining patient might well 
regard his or her distress at certain types of possible 
risk as being highly relevant to the making of a 
personally rational decision, yet the court seems to be 
suggesting that, rather than that possible distress 
forming an important aspect of the decision, it should 
simply be avoided. Equally, if the risks associated with 
the medical choice are such that they might deter the 
patient from undertaking the therapy, then it is not 
necessarily irrational to choose not to undertake them. 
What is referred to as being 'rational', then, would seem 
to be what is medically rational - in other words, what 
has been referred to earlier as the therapeutic 
imperative. Thus, in this judgement apparent sympathy 
with Laskin's viewpoint merely serves to disguise the 
underlying value given to medical choice and medical 
judgement.
Lords Diplock, Keith and Bridge were in 
substantial agreement that the Bolam Test - presuming as 
it does the supremacy of medical judgement, and assuming 
the disclosure question to be one which is merely an 
aspect of the doctor's overall duty of care to his or her 
patient - was the appropiate test to use in such cases.
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Lord Templeman reached substantially the same conclusion,
but by a somewhat different route. He placed
considerable emphasis on the fact that the reasonable 
patient could be expected to know that major surgery was 
potentially risky, and also on the skill of the doctor in 
balancing the risks and benefits and coming up with a
recommendation which was in the patient's best 
interests. He accepted that the ultimate decision was 
that of the patient, but emphasised that this did not 
mean that the patient should be told of all the risks.
As he put it:
The relationship between doctor and patient 
is contractual in origin, the doctor 
performing services in consideration of fees 
payable by the patient. The doctor, obedient 
to the high standards set by the medical 
profession, imliedly contracts to act at all 
times in the best interests of . the patient. 
No doctor in his senses would impliedly 
contract at the same time to give to the 
patient all the information available to the 
doctor as a result of the doctor's training 
and experience and as a result of the 
doctor's diagnosis of the patient. An 
obligation to give a patient all the 
information available to the doctor would 
often be inconsistent with the doctor's 
contractual obligation to have regard to the 
patient's best interests.[83]
It is submitted that this last sentence is both an 
overstatement, and a serious misunderstanding of the best
interests of the patient. It may be true that, on
occasion, information may cause the patient more
suffering, and indeed one writer has suggested, that in
such cases, disclosure of that information could itself
326
amount to a kind of negligence.[84] However, to suggest 
that this is often or routinely the case is to translate
mere speculation into legal principle, and is also to
\ :
reinforce the suggestion that distress caused to the 
patient by the possibility of the occurrence of a 
particular risk is not relevant to the decision, when in 
fact in some cases it may be the crucial and legitimate 
determinant of the patient's choice. Moreover, Lord 
Templeman also seems to imply that the best interests of 
the patient will 'often' be impeded by disclosure, 
apparently assuming that the medical choice will
generally be in the patient's best interests - but how 
can this be so if a risk occurred which would have 
deterred the patient from therapy in the first place?
Although couched in slightly different terms from 
his colleagues. Lord Templeman's judgement also 
introduces a particular view of the nature of the choice 
that the patient is entitled to make. As Lord Bridge 
referred to 'rational' choices, so Lord Templeman 
considered that information disclosure should be
constrained by the need to obtain 'balanced' choice.[85] 
But, this 'balance' seems heavily weighted in favour of 
medical choice, although it is apparently conceded that 
the patient may make a choice which is not 'balanced'. 
In viewing the issue from the perspective of the doctor's 
duty it is, of course, not illogical to suggest that the
major criterion should be the exercise of the doctor's
skills in restoring, or seeking to restore, health.
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However, if seen from the perspective of patient 
autonomy, then the choice as to whether or not the chance 
of restoration of health is worth the risks entailed by 
therapy is not a medical one but a highly personal one, 
which cannot effectively be undertaken without 
information.
However, in the nature of the negligence action, 
it is the doctor's duties which are under consideration, 
and the patient's rights seem to play a secondary role. 
Lord Templeman, regarding the primary good as the
restoration of the patient's health, put the test to be 
applied thus:
In order to make a balanced judgement if he 
chooses to do so, the patient needs to be 
aware of the general dangers and of any 
special dangers in each case, without 
exaggeration or concealment. At the end of 
the day, the doctor, bearing in mind the best 
interests of the patient and bearing in mind 
the patient's right to information which will 
enable the patient to make a balanced 
judgement, must decide what information 
should be given to the patient and in what 
terms that information should be couched.[86]
Whilst not expressly approving the Bolam Test, 
this latest formulation of the doctor's duty does 
nonetheless countenance deliberate non-disclosure of
information, and indeed justifies it. Moreover, the 
clinical judgement of the doctor will seldom be readily 
open to challenge, and therefore his or her view of what 
information is necessary for the patient to make a 
balanced judgement will necessarily be given considerable 
weight. This test, therefore, also implies that the
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doctor is the primary guardian of what would be a 
balanced judgement by a given patient and effectively 
precludes argument as to the doctor's assessment, since 
if it is made in good faith, and in what the doctor (and 
his colleagues) believe to be the best interests of the 
patient, the fact that the decision for therapy 
subsequently turns out to have harmed the patient - and, 
it could be argued, was therefore not in his or her best 
interests - is not relevant.
From the patient's perspective, perhaps the most 
reassuring judgement was that of Lord Scarman, who, 
although agreeing with the final decision of the court on 
this particular set of facts, nonetheless took a 
radically different view of the fundamental issue for 
concern.\ Whilst Lord Templeman did not expressly accept 
the Bolam Test, neither did he expressly reject it, and 
it could be argued that the effect of his approach would, 
in any event, be roughly similar. Lord Scarman, in 
urging his colleagues to an acceptance of the Canterbury 
Test,[87] seems, however, to be giving primacy to the 
rights of the patient rather than being prepared to 
accept conventional medical wisdom as determinative of 
the issue. Although his view did not prevail, his 
reasoning is nonetheless worthy of consideration. Lord 
Scarman started from the question as to whether or not 
the professional test, which is used in assessing matters 
of professional skill, was indeed the appropriate test in 
matters of disclosure. He indicated that, if the
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professional test was deemed appopriate, then:
The implications of this view of the law are 
disturbing. It. leaves the determination of a 
legal duty to the judgement of doctors 
It would be a strange conclusion if courts 
should be led to conclude that our law, which 
undoubtedly recognises the right of the 
patient to decide whether he will accept or 
reject the treatment proposed, should permit 
the doctors to determine whether and in what 
circumstances a duty arises, requiring the 
doctor to warn his patient of the risks 
inherent in the treatment which he 
proposes.[88]
Moreover, and in direct contrast to Lord Diplock's view. 
Lord Scarman could see no reason why novelty should be a 
bar to contemplating legal change. As he said:
The common law is adaptable. It would not 
otherwise have survived over the centuries of 
its existence .... It would be irony indeed 
if a judicial development [that is, the 
\ negligence action] for which the opportunity 
was the presence in the law of a flexible 
remedy should result now in rigidly confining 
the law's remedy to situations and 
relationships already ruled on by the 
judges.[89]
This was a significant aspect of Lord Scarman's 
judgement because, even although the Canterbury Test may 
be subject to its own difficulties, the possibility of 
amendment and modification of judicial reasoning in such 
cases remained open if his view was adopted. As he put 
it:
If, therefore, the failure to warn a patient 
of the risks inherent in the operation which
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is recommended does constitute, a failure to 
respect the patient's right to make his own 
decision, I can see no reason in principle 
why, if the risk materialises and injury or 
damage is caused, the law should not 
recognise and enforce a right in the patient 
to compensation by way of damages.[90]
Lord Scarman, in approving the Canterbury Test, 
and rejecting the Bolam Test, provides his own 
formulation of the nature of the enterprise.
It is a sound and reasonable proposition that 
the doctor should be required to exercise 
care in respect of the patient's right of 
decision. He must acknowledge that in very 
many cases factors other than the purely 
medical will play a significant part in his
patient's decision-making process ..... The
doctor's duty can be seen, therefore, to be 
one which requires him not only to advise as 
to medical treatment but also to provide his 
patient with the information needed to enable 
the patient to consider and balance the 
medical advantages and risks alongside other 
relevant matters, such as, for example, his 
family, business or social responsibilities 
of which the doctor may be only partially, if 
at ail, informed.[91]
Throughout this entire case this remains the 
single suggestion that there are matters other than the 
purely medical which might be of sufficient weight to 
affect decisions about therapy, and is the only 
profferred standard which values the patient's personal 
considerations equally with the medical. To this extent, 
it represents a radical departure from the views of 
previous courts, and indeed from those of his 
colleagues.
This is not to say, however, that Lord Scarman
331
would decide the issue without reference to medical 
opinion, merely that he would not give it the primacy 
that it seems otherwise to have. Again, this view is 
very much in line with the Canterbury Test which, in his 
view, provides a good standard, since:
Without excluding medical evidence they set a 
standard and formulate a test of the doctor's 
duty, the effect of which is that the court 
determines the scope of the duty and decides 
whether the doctor has acted in breach of his 
duty.[92]
Indeed, Lord Scarman was fulsome in his praise for the 
Canterbury test referring to it as, '...... a legal truth
which too much judicial reliance on medical judgment 
tends to obscure.'[93] And he continues, differentiating 
the technical from the non-technical:
In a medical negligence case where the issue 
is as to the advice and information given to 
the patient as to the treatment proposed, the 
available options and the risk, the court is 
concerned primarily with the patient's 
rights. The doctor's duty arises from the 
patient's right. If one considers the scope 
of the doctor's duty by beginning with the 
right of the patient to make his own decision 
whether he will or will not undergo the 
treatment proposed, the right to be informed 
of significant risks and the doctor's 
corresponding duty are easy to understand, 
for the proper implementation of the right 
requires that the doctor be under a duty to 
inform his patient of the material risks 
inherent in the treatment.[94]
Unfortunately, this seemingly unequivocal assertion of 
the patient's rights is, as in Canterburyf951 itself, in
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Lord Scarman's view also, subject to the exception of 
therapeutic privilege which can effectively limit the 
nature and extent of the disclosure which the doctor 
must, in practice, make.
Equally, Lord Scarman recognised that the decision 
as to what is a material risk should ideally be based on 
what was material to the given patient. This, however, 
he ultimately rejected as being Utopian, preferring the 
equivalent of the 'prudent patient' test. However, 
whilst accepting that this permits considerable 
opportunity for the reintroduction and re-emphasising of 
medical evidence. Lord Scarman nonetheless maintained the 
view vthat the ultimate decision remains legal and not 
medical. The extent to which it is Utopian to regard it 
as a possibility or a probability that medical evidence 
would be discounted in these circumstances, and that the 
court would effectively condemn an established medical 
view, remains open, since unfortunately Lord Scarman was 
content to rest there.
In any event, even if the court did make such a 
radical departure from its general practice. Lord Scarman 
holds out one further possible defence for the doctor. 
That is, '...the defence that he reasonably regarded it 
to be against the best interests of his patient to 
disclose....'[96J Thus, from the apparently definitive 
commitment to the rights of the patient, what remains is 
a vague rule with a series of exceptions, which render 
the general rules significantly less meaningful.
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Summary
The SidawayT971 case has been considered in considerable 
detail for the main reason that it must now represent the 
law of England, and would certainly be taken as highly 
influential in Scotland, given that it is a decision of 
the House of Lords, which is clear and unequivocal in its 
majority terms.[98] What then are the implications of 
the application of this judgement for the claim, accepted 
by all of the judges, that the patient does indeed have 
rights in the medical enterprise to decide on whether or 
not therapy recommended by his or her doctor should be 
accepted? It is submitted that the adoption at the 
highest level of the Bolam Test renders it virtually 
impossible for the patient to succeed in claiming damages 
where the assertion is that his or her decision was based 
on inadequate disclosure of information. Part of this 
submission relates to the kind of proof demanded of the 
patient in such cases, and part to the question of 
causation.
In terms of the Bolam Test. the patient, in order 
to succeed, would need to establish that no responsible 
body of medical opinion would have withheld the 
information which was withheld in the present case. Not, 
it should be noted that there is a body of responsible 
medical opinion which would support the patient's claim
that the information should have been disclosed, a task -
\
given the differences of opinion demonstrated in the 
Bolamf991 case itself - in which it would by no means be
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impossible to succeed. The test, on the contrary, 
demands only evidence that there is a responsible body of 
opinion which would have supported non-disclosure, and if 
this can be found the patient's case falls. Given the 
fact that cases are seldom defended unless there is 
expert evidence to support the doctor,[100J the patient 
will almost inevitably be faced with just such a body of 
opinion.
Moreover, the difficulties of finding
professionals who would be critical of their colleagues
\
is well known, and has been discussed above. In any 
event, the patient may find it difficult to find a doctor 
willing to say in a court of law, that he or she would 
have acted in a manner different from his or her
professional colleague. The emphasis on clinical 
judgement, and the primary assumption that the doctor 
will inevitably act in good faith and in the best
interests of his or her patient, renders the difficulty 
of proof even more substantial. In fact, only those 
cases which amount to a gross failure to disclose, and
which would, in any event, following Chatterton v. 
Gerson,f1011 have the potential to be raised in assault, 
would be likely to be susceptible of the kind of proof
which the patient is required to show in terms of the 
Bolam Test.
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Causation
Even assuming that such evidence could be made available, 
and that the case continues to be heard under the aegis 
of the negligence action, there remains one further 
test. As in all allegations of negligence, it must be 
shown that the negligent act caused the harm complained 
of - that is, there remains the question of causation. 
At first sight, this may seem relatively unproblematic.
In general, causation is established by the fact that had 
the person not been negligent then the harm would not 
have occurred. In questions relating to disclosure, 
however, it can be extremely problematic.
If a risk is inherent in a given therapeutic or 
diagnostic procedure, then its disclosure to the patient 
may render the doctor non-negligent, but it could not by 
definition be avoided. Conversely, the negligence of 
the doctor who does not disclose the risk is less clearly 
capable of correlation to the harm which occurred, since 
it could have occurred in any event. Indeed, the only 
clear link here would be if the disclosure resulted in 
every case in the patient rejecting the therapy - a 
situation which is clearly ridiculous. In other words, 
therefore, the link between non-disclosure and the 
eventuation of harm is somewhat tenuous.
For this reason, the patient must rely on showing 
that he or she would in fact have rejected the medical 
act had the information been disclosed and this may be
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extremely difficult to do. Whilst the patient may well 
allege that, had he or she been informed of the
possibility of the risk which in fact eventuated, then 
the therapy would have been rejected, as the court noted 
in Canterbury v. Spence,r1021 there are difficulties in 
deciding against what kind of test such an assertion 
should be measured. It is thought to be too easy for the 
patient to act with hindsight, and in the face of what 
could amount to a severe disability, and therefore to 
suggest that he or she would not have consented.
Therefore, yet one more test has to be imposed, whether 
or not overtly, in assessing not merely the credibility 
of the witness, but also the likelihood of disclosure of 
the risk actually having deterred the patient from
proceeding with the therapy. As Robertson notes:
In testing the plaintiff's credibility and 
reliability (since the patient himself may 
have difficulty in deciding retrospectively 
whether he would have undergone the treatment 
despite the risks) the court will have to 
introduce a certain degree of objectivity. 
Thus, the extent to which the treatment was 
truly 'elective' and the magnitude and nature 
of the risk involved are likely to be crucial 
factors in determining whether or not the 
patient would have consented to the treatment 
had he been informed of the risk.[103]
Thus, the court will not address itself to the 
issue of whether or not this particular patient would 
have agreed to therapy knowing the risks, but rather to 
the question of whether or not it would have been 
reasonable for him or her to attach significance to
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them. In making such judgements the court will, of 
course, have some concern for the credibility of the
witness/patient, but since the court is also charged with 
establishing the duty of the doctor, it will necessarily 
also be interested in an assessment of whether or not the 
doctor was negligent in his or her assumptions about the 
need for disclosure. In other words, , there is a clear 
Catch 22.
On the one hand, the courts will allow that the
doctors can, in the exercise of clinical judgement,
decide (without being negligent) that a particular risk 
may deter a patient from therapy or cause unnecesary 
distress, and yet on the other, it purports to make an 
objective assessment of whether or not the risk would 
have been relevant to the patient's decision and 
therefore should have been disclosed. In other words, if 
the doctor acted in good faith, and in accordance with a 
professionally acceptable standard, in not disclosing the 
risks';, how - in terms of the negligence action, as
limited in particular by the Bolam Test - could the court 
subsequently agree that the patient would not have gone 
ahead had the risk been disclosed, thereby establishing 
the element of causation? Given the combined use of 
therapeutic privilege and clinical judgement, the patient 
seems to be in an impossible position, even assuming that 
there is evidence that no responsible body of medical 
opinion would have withheld information about the risk.
Quite apart from this problem, of course, the
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court^ - which is as removed from the patient as is the 
doctor - will effectively substitute its own view of what 
the 'reasonable patient' would have regarded as an 
acceptable risk for the view of the doctor or the 
patient. Thus, whatever the patient says, if the judge 
in question would not have regarded the risk as 
unacceptable (and this calculation may be based on 
statistics, or on a judicial view of the patient's 
postion, or mere personal bias) then it is unlikely that 
the link between non-disclosure and the ultimate damage 
will readily be established. Of course, if the 
likelihood of the risk actually occurring is particularly 
remote (statistically) then it may be difficult to claim 
that it is more than a mere fluke, thus rendering a 
common sense view of what causation is rather more 
difficult to satisfy. In any event, it can be seen that 
the use of the Bolam Test makes it unlikely that courts 
will have to consider this question, since the 
difficulties of establishing that the duty of care was in 
fact breached are on their own almost insurmountable. 
Whatever the problems with the Canterbury Test, it at 
least permits of the possibility, if not the probability, 
of success.
Moreover, causation may be further complicated by 
the fact that harm must be shown. Where the treatment 
did not harm the patient, and the patient is rather 
complaining about the denial of a right to make a choice, 
this last must be a recognised and distinct right, breach
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of which is understood as causing legally recognised 
harm.[104J The patient who has sustained damage 
(physical) will at least be able to point to this - it is 
measurable and undeniably equates to legal harm. 
However, the patient who complains of an insult to 
integrity is claiming compensation for a harm which will 
only be recognised if the right to self-determination in 
medicine is accepted as a legally vindicable interest.
Of course, physical harm is not the only basis on which 
compensation may be successfully sought. As Winfield 
and Jolowicz[105] puts it:
In the law of tort, there is a growing body 
of case law where negligent defendants have 
\ been held liable even though they have not 
injured the plaintiff or his property by any 
positive act and where their conduct seems 
most naturally expressed in terms of failure 
to ensure the receipt of expected 
benefits.[106J
Although an intensive analysis of the heads of damages is 
not within the scope of this discussion, the point that 
legal recognition of the type of harm is crucial to the 
availability of compensation, cannot be ignored. This 
serves to distinguish further between the value of 
actions in trespass/battery/assault and those raised in 
negligence.As Winfield and Jolowiczf1071 further notes:
Whereas most torts require damage resulting 
to the plaintiff which is not too remote a 
consequence of the defendant's conduct, a 
few, such as trespass in some, or perhaps 
all, of its various forms and libel, do not
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require proof of actual damage.'[108]
The Enquiring Patient
Courts in both the United States and the United Kingdom, 
therefore, seem prepared to accept that the decision as 
to what information should be disclosed is substantially 
a matter of medical judgement. The extent to which 
medical opinion plays a decisive role varies from the 
rather tentative assertion of patients' rights in 
Canterbury, r 109-1 to an outright commitment to reasonable 
medical practice in BolamfllOl and Sidaway.fill] 
Equally, in no case is it suggested that all information 
should be disclosed, albeit that this is based not on 
principle but on practicality. The most commonly used 
rationale is as follows: The 'average' patient can be
assumed to know that therapy (and particularly surgery) 
carries with it an element of risk. Only those risks 
special to the particular therapy, and decided (by the 
doctor) to be real or material need be disclosed. This 
limitation is justified on the practical basis of the 
difficulty of disclosing all risks, and on the more 
esoteric one that doctors can legitimately decide that it 
is not in their patients' interests to know certain 
information.
Courts, therefore, in adopting this approach, are 
in a - postion to speculate in a manner in which they 
apparently regard as unacceptable in other aspects of
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decision-making. In the recent case of Blyth v.
Bloomsbury Health Authority,f112 ] the patient - a trained 
nurse - was deemed to require less careful warnings since 
she might be presumed to know of the medical indications 
of an adverse reaction to therapy. Whether or not she 
actually knew this information was apparently less 
relevant than the fact that she could have. Has the
position now been reached where there is a 'specialist 
patient' test?
In any event, if it is true that the withholding 
of information can be in the patient's best interests, 
then would this not be true whatever the situation of the 
patient? In particular, would it not remain true whether 
or not the patient asks for the information? Here, the
fallacy of this type of justification for 
non-disclosure becomes clear. Indeed the most
consistent judicial approach is to be found in the
judgement of Lord Denning in the case of Hatcher v. 
Black, [111] a decision which is so open to criticism as 
to be routinely rejected. In this case a doctor 
deliberately answered a direct and straightforward 
question about a particular type of risk, falsely. Lord 
Denning held the doctor to be entitled so to do 'in the 
best interests of the patient', on the assumption that 
had the risk been dislosed, and had the doctor then been 
forced to disclose the existence of alternative therapy 
which did not carry this risk, the patient might have 
rejected the doctor's choice of treatment. Whilst
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morally open to question, this decision is at least 
consistent with the contention that the doctor is 
entitled to withhold information on the basis that it 
would distress the patient, or deter him or her from 
therapy - whether or not questions are asked.
However, the majority of American and British 
decisions make precisely this distinction between the 
patient who asks questions and the patient who does not. 
It is paradoxical that there seems to be more concern 
about the doctor actively lying to the patient than there 
is about the doctor who presents a false picture by 
omission. Blythf1141 ties the 'specialist patient' 
intimately to the enquiring patient. As was said:
As the plaintiff was in my judgement, seeking 
information and as she was someone with 
nursing qualifications who could be trusted 
not to act irrationally because of what she 
was told, she was, in my opinion, entitled to 
be given such information as was available to 
the hospital.[115]
There are a number of interesting and interlinking
strands to this statement. In the first place it would
\
seem that it was the qualification of the patient 
(herself medically oriented) which entitled her to the 
information, presumably on the assumption that she would 
nonetheless have opted for the medical recommendation. 
Equally, the fact that she asked a straight question 
(which might, of course, be possible only where some 
medical information is already known) meant that she
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acquired rights, even to potentially distressing 
information, which would be denied in other 
circumstances. The view that the enquiring patient
should be answered honestly by the doctor, and should be
\
given the information which the doctor would otherwise 
have been legally and professionally justified in 
withholding, is paradoxical. Yet, it also has received 
wide support. Although dismissed out of hand in 
Canterbury,F1161 it is generally accepted as an exception 
to the rule that the doctor is the master of the
instance.
Whilst it may seem morally satisfying that a
patient who asks questions should be told the truth and 
not a lie, this merely begs the fundamental question. If 
courts would otherwise have upheld non-disclosure, as 
seems almost certain, then there must presumably be good 
grounds for so doing. These grounds are legally accepted
as being that it is not in the patient's interests to
know this information. How, then, does it become in the 
patient's interests merely because the question occurs to 
him or her, perhaps fortuitously? In truth, of course, 
the 'average' patient consults a doctor because he or she 
does not have access to certain information. In view of 
this, it is unlikely that the patient will know what 
questions to ask of the doctor, and yet if he or she does 
stumble on the right question, there is an immediate 
(albeit extremely random) attribution of rights to which 
their fellow patients are not entitled.
344
Of course, it could be said that the fact that 
the patient asked a particular question about a possible 
risk is not dependent on medical knowledge, since it has 
been argued that the information to be disclosed is 
personal rather than technical. Thus, if it is true that 
the patient should be told of risks, and that these risks 
are not merely technical risks, then the ordinary patient 
will ask the right questions because no medical knowledge 
is necessary to the formulation of the question, or 
concern about the particular risk. However, this
argument is somewhat naive, since in truth the likelihood 
of, for example, drug therapy resulting in brain damage 
or paralysis is scarcely within the contemplation of the 
patient, although it may be known to the doctor in 
respect of a particular drug. The patient can, of 
course, appreciate the impact on his/her life of the risk
of brain damage, but it would take some technical skill
\
or knowledge for him or her to think of asking the 
question. In any event, the patient is under no duty to 
question, since the doctor is the party with duties in 
the medical enterprise. Patient distress, so convenient 
a reason for non-disclosure is more validly used as an 
issue when assessing whether or not the patient who has 
no medical knowledge and may be suffering from a 
distressing illness should also be expected, if his or 
her rights are to be vindicated, to ask the right 
question. To rely on this would certainly be morally 
unacceptable, and would be to discriminate between the
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aggressive or assertive patient and the patient who is 
cowed by involvement in the medical enterprise, or by the 
fact of illness. Verbal acuity, or personal confidence, 
scarcely seem sound reasons for the attribution of 
specific and significant rights. Yet, courts seem happy 
to make the assumption that the patient does become 
entitled to more (even distressing or deterring) 
information, merely because they have the nous to have 
asked for it.
In the Sidawayf!171 case, for example, the 
enquiring patient was singled out for special 
consideration by some of the judges. Indeed such 
differentiation was also significant in the Bolam[118] 
decision which they followed by a majority. As MacNair, 
J. put it:
Having considered [the evidence on this 
point], you have to make up your minds 
whether it has been proved to your 
satisfaction that when the defendents adopted 
the practice they did (namely, the practice 
of saying very little and waiting for 
questions from the patient), they were 
falling below a proper standard of competent 
professional opinion on this question of 
whether or not it is right to warn.[119]
In Sidaway, Lord Diplock, for example, also draws such a 
distinction:
... when it comes to warning about risks, the 
kind of training and experience that a judge 
will have undergone at the Bar makes it 
natural for him to say (correctly) it is my 
right to decide whether any particular thing
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is done to my body and I want to be fully 
informed of any risks there may be involved
of which I am not already aware from my
general knowledge as a highly educated man of 
experience, so that I may form my own
judgement whether to refuse the advised 
treatment or not. No doubt, if the patient 
in fact manifested this attitude by means of 
questioning, the doctor would tell him 
whatever it was the patient wants to know
 [120]
Leaving aside the question as to whether or not 
only 'highly educated' people can correctly say they have 
a right to make choices about what is to be done to their 
bodies, there remains no justification for distinguishing 
between the person who asks and the person who doesn't. 
If rights are attributed because the person is entitled 
to respect for his or her self-determination, then only 
stringently applied and compelling reasons would justify 
invasion. Failure to ask a question, which in any event 
lack of technical information may preclude one from 
having the capacity to formulate, can scarcely be 
regarded as a legitimate basis for the withholding of 
information which may have a significant impact on the 
capacity to exercise the right of self-determination. 
Although differing in the basis of his decision from the 
majority. Lord Templeman also drew a similar 
distinction.
Mrs Sidaway could have asked questions. If 
she had done so, she could and should have 
been informed that there was an aggregate 
risk of between 1% and 2% of some damage 
either to the spinal cord or to a nerve root 
resulting in injury which might vary from
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irritation to paralysis.[121]
It is arrogance indeed to claim on the one hand 
that the patient is likely to act irrationally if all 
information is disclosed, or that the doctor should avoid 
telling the patient of risks which might upset him or 
her, and yet, on the other hand, to demand that, in order 
to maintain his or her capacity to make self-determining 
choices, the patient is virtually under an obligation to 
ask relevant and specific questions. But it is not 
altogether unusual to find courts demanding just such 
standards from patients. This point was raised 
approvingly in, for example, O 'Malley-Williams v. Board 
of Governors of the National Hospital for Nervous 
Diseases, f 1221 and the same distinction was drawn in Lee 
v. South West Thames A.H.A.ri23l
At least one Canadian case has further refined 
this test, and since it seems to be completely in line 
with the attitude of British courts it is worthy of
consideration as likely to be supported. In describing 
the doctor's duty of disclosure in the case of of Lepp v. 
Hopp,f124J the court explained it thus:
The law draws a distinction between the
general duty of disclosure imposed on a 
surgeon when he is obtaining a patient's
consent to surgery and the duty of disclosure 
he is under when he responds to specific
questions from his patient ... When specific 
questions are directed to the surgeon he must 
\ make a full and fair disclosure in response 
to them. This duty requires the surgeon to 
disclose risks which are mere possibilities
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if the patient's questions reasonably direct
the surgeon's attention to risks of that 
nature and if they are such that the surgeon, 
in all of the circumstances, could reasonably 
foresee would effect the patient's decision.
[125] (Emphasis added).
In other words, not only the non-enquiring patient, but, 
to a lesser extent perhaps, even the enquiring patient, 
will be subject to the doctor's assessment of whether or 
not a risk would be material to the patient him or 
herself.
In any event, as Robertson points out,[126] both
this and other similar decisions (such as Smith v.
Auckland Hospital Board [127]) rely on an arguable
interpretation of the rule in Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd. v. 
Heller & Partners Ltd.,[128] which permits the person who 
is asked questions the option of silence. Robertson
argues, however, that the doctor/patient relationship 
differs from the standard contractual one in a 
significant and determinative manner - that is that there 
is a pre-existing duty of care on the doctor which 
'deprives the doctor of the "option of silence" and which 
requires him to answer the question with reasonable 
care.'[129]
It is, therefore, a highly dubious proposition
that the patient who asks questions is entitled by this
mere fact to additional autonomy-enhancing information.
Were the truth or dishonesty of the doctor the central 
issue, then failure to answer a direct question might 
well take on a major significance. However, what is at
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issue here is a far greater consideration - that of the 
patient's right to self-determination, and this cannot be 
dependent on the patient having sufficient preliminary 
knowledge, or even plain courage, to ask the right 
question, nor on his or her capacity to challenge or 
question medical authority. As Robertson says, '[t]he 
law should seek to ensure that, in relation to disclosure 
of risks inherent in proposed treatment, the onus lies 
with the doctor and not with the patient.'[130] To this 
end, the view of the court in Canterbury v. Spence[131] 
bears repetition and consideration. The court said:
We discard the thought that the patient 
should ask for information before the 
physician is required to disclose. Caveat 
emptor is not the norm for the consumer of 
medical services. The duty to disclose is 
more than a call to speak merely on the 
patient's request or merely to answer the 
patient's questions; it is a duty to 
volunteer if necessary, the information the 
patient needs for an intelligent 
decision.[132]
There is yet one further aspect of medicine in 
which information disclosure is critical, and it merits 
consideration as a separate issue since it shows evidence 
of some difference in emphasis which apparently relates, 
perhaps not surprisingly, to the nature of the
enterprise. This area is the experimental use of
treatment either in pursuit of an immediate therapeutic 
goal, or in the wider context of research for scientific 
knowledge. Although the complexities of experimentation
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and concerns about scientific method, are very 
significant issues, a detailed analysis of them lies 
beyond the scope of this discussion.[133] However, some 
consideration can briefly be made of the protection 
offered to patients' rights in novel or experimental
situations.
Experimentation
The principles governing human experimentation can be 
found in the Declaration of Helsinki, promulgated by the 
World Medical Association.[134] The Declaration makes 
it a prerequisite of professional care in the 
experimental situation that the doctor should '[i]f at 
all possible, consistent with patient psychology, .... 
obtain the patient's freely given consent after the
patient has been given a full explanation.'[135] In 
this situation (therapeutic research) the aim is to 
provide benefit to the patient by the use of alternative 
or innovative therapy. The motivation of the doctor and 
the aim of the intervention are exactly the same as in 
the routine medical interaction, the difference being
only that the therapy is relatively untested, or untested 
on that particular condition. In non-therapeutic
research, where the aim is the advancement of knowledge, 
the Declaration is even more firm, demanding that 'the 
nature, the purpose, and the risk of clinical research
must be explained to the subject by the doctor,'[136J and
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continuing, '[cjlinical research on a human being cannot 
be undertaken without his free consent, after he has been 
fully informed ....'[137]
The patient, therefore, is offered clear 
protection from unwilling or unknowing involvement in
research or experimentation, even where the choice of 
radical or new therapy is thought to be directly for his
or her benefit. The Declaration - particularly in that
part dealing with non-therapeutic research - makes clear 
and unequivocal statements recognising the rights of the 
subject to exercise his or her power of choice, and to
respect for his or her 'personal i n t e g r i t y [138] Thus,
the morality of experimentation is seen to depend heavily
on the patient being given the opportunity, through 
information, to exercise choice. The unwilling or
unknowing patient will not, therefore, be a participant 
in either therapeutic or non-therapeutic research - in 
recognition of precisely those rights which, it has been 
claimed above, pertain in all medical situations.[139]
\ Advances in therapy are seen as desirable - by
doctors and patients alike. No advances, it is claimed, 
are likely without experimentation[140] and ultimately 
this requires human subjects. Species differences mean 
that, even after full laboratory and animal testing, 
there must be a human 'guinea-pig' before the effect on 
humans of a new therapy can be truly known. [141] Like 
medicine itself, then, experimentation - with its 
potential for advances in both instant and long-term
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patient care - is generally regarded as 'good*.
However, although it has been said earlier that 
orthodox medicine and its techniques are routinely not 
questioned, and are substantially left to the judgement 
of doctors themselves, there are aspects to the use of 
human beings in the experimental situation which are 
widely perceived as differentiating it from other medical 
events. This perception has arisen most forcefully from 
the well-documented programmes of the Nazi doctors in the 
course of the Second World War.[142] The international
outcry which followed exposure of their callous use of 
human beings was such that experimentation itself became 
seen as a potentially dubious enterprise. As a result of 
this, the status of the individual human being in 
experiments became a matter of considerable concern, as 
can be seen from the strong terms of the Declaration of 
Helsinki. Whether therapeutic or non-therapeutic, the 
use of human subjects in medical experiments generated 
strict moral codes reflecting the rights of the 
individual, and guaranteeing these rights as of primary 
significance.
Thus, medicine itself was prepared to acknowledge 
the moral status of the patient - at least in this 
situation - unequivocally and firmly. Indeed, the main 
control of experimentation in the United Kingdom comes 
substantially from medicine itself,[143] not because of a 
belief that doctors will in fact behave in the same way 
as did the Nazi doctors, but as a reaffirmation of the 
\
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rights of the individual and the duties of the doctor in 
protecting these rights. The Declaration of Helsinki, as 
an international, and thereby effectively unenforcable, 
set of guidelines, provides merely the broad framework 
within which experiments can be carried out. As a truly 
effective moral code it has a number of obvious failings, 
notably the caveats concerning consent,[144] but it does 
perform an important symbolic function in protecting the 
status of the individual, in reminding doctors of the 
need to make full disclosure of risks and benefits, in 
demanding the careful weighing up of benefits which they 
hope to obtain against the possible risks to the patient, 
and of the dependent nature of the doctor-patient 
relationship which makes it easier for the doctor 
without necessarily having any intention so to do - to 
command the consent of the patient because of the trust 
with which he or she is invested by the patient.[145]
In recognition of these possible difficulties, 
this remains one of the best policed areas of medical 
practice - interestingly, substantially policed by the 
profession itself, rather than the law. The 
recommendations of the Royal Colleges,[146] which 
resulted in the setting up of Research Ethical Committees 
in all hospitals where research is undertaken, were 
entirely motivated by the medical profession, and despite 
merely being recommendations, and therefore not legally 
enforcable, all hospitals undertaking research now have 
such Committees. In theory at least, these Committees
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satisfy many of the constraints which it might seem 
desirable to place on medicine in its role as scientific 
experimenter. The function of the Committees is to 
scrutinise research proposals, not merely for their 
clinical potential but also for their morality and the 
ethics of the way in which they are conducted. [147] This 
is done, not solely to protect medicine, but rather to 
protect the patient. Even more significantly, these 
Committees are to have lay representation,[148 ] an 
acknowledgement of the fact that decisions may not 
necessarily be good merely because they are taken by 
expert clinicians.
In the United Kingdom, the law's practical 
intervention has been dependent on the type of 
experimentation. Case law has adapted to deal with 
therapeutic innovation,[149] whilst statute covers 
products associated with medicine which require clinical 
trials.[150J The Medicines Act 1968 established the 
Committee on Safety of Medicines[151] which has, amongst 
other responsibilities, the task of scrutinising and 
ultimate decision-making in respect of clinical trials 
(experiments) of new pharmaceutical entities. Although 
the operation of both Research Ethical Committees and the 
Committee on Safety of Medicines has been 
criticised,[153] their existence has not. Indeed, their 
existence and functions represent the clearest possible 
statement of the value to be attached to the human 
subject. Given these safeguards, and the code of ethics
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which doctors are expected to follow, the doctor who 
comes to his or her patient seeking involvement in 
experimental procedures, has arguably been already 
required to consider in more depth than usual the 
implications of the proposed intervention. It might 
seem, therefore, that there is no additional need for
rules about consent.
\
The proposed action, in therapeutic experiments 
is, like all medical intervention, designed to help the 
patient, and the newness of the therapy does not alter 
this motivation. In non-therapeutic research, the doctor 
will have had to consider most seriously his or her own 
estimate of the risks and benefits, as well as that of 
the relevant Research Ethical Committee. Why, then, is 
there the considerable emphasis on disclosure of 
information, and the suggestion that consent should be 
based on the fullest information and preferably in 
writing? The likely explanation is that the doctor is 
here concerned about the rights of the patient, and 
understands that these rights can best be protected by 
information disclosure facilitating free and knowing 
choice.
This is, however, no less true in the standard 
medical act. The patient has rights there also, rights 
which are equally valuable and do not solely depend on 
the nature of the intervention. Indeed, it has been said 
by some that all medical acts are essentially
experimental, since their outcome is seldom absolutely
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certain.[153] Concern for the patients' rights in 
standard medical practice would surely also demand the 
fullest possible disclosure. Moreover, to insist on, and 
to value, information disclosure in the experimental 
situation, defeats at least one of the arguments 
routinely used to limit information disclosure in the 
normal medical act.
As discussed above,[154] it is sometimes argued 
that disclosure is irrelevant or unnecessary because the 
patient is unlikely to understand the information. Thus, 
it is said, to insist on disclosure is merely wasteful of 
time and may be distressing to the patient. If this is 
to be a credible reason for non-disclosure, then it is 
not clear why doctors themselves regard disclosure as 
being significant in therapeutic experimentation, which 
very closely resembles the normal medical act. The only 
major difference in fact, is in the choice of therapy. 
Moreover, if the patient is unlikely to understand the 
information in the normal situation, on what basis can it 
seriously be considered that information, particularly in 
the non-therapeutic experimental situation will be more 
likely to be understood, and therefore that its provision 
is more valuable?
Thus, whilst non-therapeutic experimentation may 
represent a distinct category, even given that there may 
be a desire for knowledge also inherent in therapeutic 
experimentation, the accepted significance of consent 
provisions in the therapeutic experiment seems to be
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based on no more and no less a foundation than it should 
be in the standard medical transaction. In fact, it 
could \ even be argued that there is less, rather than 
more, to be gained from information disclosure in 
experimental situations, since standard risks can be made 
known to the patient where the therapy is well tried and 
tested, but in an experiment, by its nature, there may be 
unforeseen and unforeseeable consequences. The patient 
in the experimental situation is consenting blind in some 
cases and is potentially under great duress from the 
pressure of ill health, which may be so severe as to 
merit radical, innovative therapy. Information
disclosure in other circumstances, however, can result in 
the patient being genuinely aware of known risks and 
benefits, and the information, therefore, may serve the 
purpose for which rules about consent were formulated.
The Law and Experiments
Experiments may be therapeutic or non-therapeutic, and 
the regulation - if any - provided by the law will differ 
according to the type of innovation. The therapeutic 
experiment involves ‘deviational, unpractised or 
unaccepted treatment',[155] in the interests of patient 
care. It seems more than likely that - outside the area 
of medical products - this represents the most common 
experimental encounter, and, of course, although scrutiny 
by the law is ultimately possible, '...the decision as to
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types of therapy and the responsibility for success or 
failure rest entirely with the clinician.'[156]
Choice of therapy is seen in most circumstances as 
being within the clinical competence or clinical freedom 
of the doctor. Thus, in Hatcher v. Black,f1571 there was 
no criticism of the doctor for failing to disclose the 
alternative therapy which was available, even although a 
strict adherence to patients' rights would demand, not 
just disclosure of risks and benefits, but also 
disclosure of therapeutic options. The choice of therapy 
is seen as intimately linked to the exercise of the 
doctor's technical skills and, therefore, as primarily, 
if not totally, within his or her competence alone. 
Criticism of a choice of therapy which is experimental
will be governed by the same rules which apply in
reaching decisions about other aspects of the doctor's
\
clinical role - namely, almost exclusively through the 
negligence action, and on the evidence of other 
professionals as to the reasonableness of the choice.
Thus, although patients' rights to 'personal
integrity' or autonomy form the central theme of the
ethical codes which concern themselves with 
experimentation. the law is more concerned with the 
reasonableness of the deviation from the norm than it is 
with the insult to the integrity of the individual.
The leading case in this area is the case of 
Hunter v. Hanley.f1581 where the test for establishing
liability in such cases was clearly enunciated. However,
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the law should, in the experimental situation as in the 
classic medical interaction, not merely be concerned with 
the technical aspect of the therapy. Doctors can be 
reassured by the rule in Hunter v. Hanley, r 1591 at least 
as far as the technical situation is concerned, but a 
further, and just as significant, aspect of the medical 
act must also be taken into account - that is the 
provision of information and the obtaining of consent.
If the doctor is to fulfil his or her obligation 
to respect the patient, and to meet the demands of the 
ethical code promulgated in the Declaration of Helsinki, 
then information must be given to the patient, and a real 
consent provided. The law's concern here will be the 
same as in all other medical situations. As Meyers says, 
where
.... truly knowing and voluntary consent of 
the patient or subject has been obtained 
prior to any medical experimentation, the 
primary concern of the law has been satisfied
and ....  the law should thereafter be
concerned only with the method in which the 
experimentation is carried out and its effect 
and result ....[160]
In matters of therapeutic choice, therefore, respect for 
the patients's rights demands information as to the 
perceived risks and benefits, the fact that alternative 
therapy is available, and the doctor's reasons for opting 
for an innovative treatment. In this way, a
knowledgeable consent can be offered or withheld.
However, it remains the case that most
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experimentation is carried out in an effort to improve 
and refine clinical care. Thus, the doctor will normally 
only experiment when it is his or her view that standard 
therapy has failed and that the alternative has the 
potential to benefit the patient. Here, of course, lies 
the dilemma. Often innovative choice will only be 
considered where the situation in which the patient finds 
him or herself is very serious. Equally, however, 
whatever the motivation. the very nature of the 
enterprise renders it fundamentally difficult for real
consent to be obtained, since not only will the risks and
\
benefits possibly be unknown, but the patient may be 
under considerable pressure to accept the doctor's 
choice. If it is accepted that the negligence action is 
- at least given current decision-making - inherently 
flawed as device which can provide genuine scope for 
patients to redress grievances, then it will be equally 
flawed where the damage to the patient (emotional or 
physical) is the result of therapeutic
experimentation.[161]
However, not all experimental encounters are of 
this sort. Non-therapeutic research - that is, 
experiments which seek knowledge for future use - overtly 
pose more moral problems, and yet represent a very real 
opportunity for clinical advance.
Medical science relies on research and 
experimentation as do all other sciences, to 
advance its knowledge in man's fight against
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sickness and disease. Inevitably such 
experimentation must utilise human subjects 
if it is to have primary significance. For 
any new therapy, drug or treatment, there 
must always be the first patient or 
subject.[162]
In non-therapeutic experimentation, the role of the law 
is substantially to regulate experimentation with medical 
products. Decisions as to the morality of certain types 
of experiment will be made by Research Ethical 
Committees, but the doctor must fall back on the code of 
behaviour laid down by his own professional body and the 
the terms of the Declaration of Helsinki in most cases.
In its role as protector of individuals and their 
rights, the law must have concern both for the nature and 
quality of consent in experimentation and for the aims of 
the experiment. It has been said, for example, that:
A philosophy of medicine is needed to help 
clarify medicine's goals in relationship to 
those of the technological civilisation. 
Medicine suffers from an abundance of means 
and a poverty of ends.[163]
Equally, it might be said, the law is slow to 
respond to the challenge presented by medicine. If 
medicine does 'suffer from a poverty of ends', then the 
public can only be adequately protected by a legal system
which scrutinises practice carefully, and which reacts
\
quickly and sensitively to protect the rights of the 
individual. The fact that the law's intervention in this 
area is minimal must be problematic. Whilst the medical
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profession has been sufficiently concerned to impose an 
additional layer of scrutiny to that of the clinical 
judgement of the instant doctor, this has not been
adopted in law and therefore carries only professional 
sanctions. The patient who seeks redress in such 
situations will require to attempt this through the use 
of the> negligence action, which has many drawbacks as a 
method for redressing grievances, both in general and in 
the specific example of medicine. How much more complex 
is the decision making process where experimental
procedures are carried out?
When the Pearson Commissionf164] considered this, 
it is worth noting that they made one of their rare 
recommendations for a change in the basis of liability. 
In the case of the volunteer for non-therapeutic
experiments, the Commission recommended that liability 
should be on a strict basis, thus ending the practice of 
depending on ex gratia payments, and ensuring that the 
burden facing the damaged volunteer is considerably 
lightened.[165J A system based on strict liability would 
remove the need to prove fault, which can be extremely 
difficult for any aggrieved person, and which - it has
been suggested - may be particularly difficult for the 
patient. Although causation, that is the link between 
the act and the subsequent damage, may remain a problem, 
there is no doubt that the burden on the pursuer would be 
less in a strict liability scheme. This recommendation 
was made in recognition of the service that volunteers
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for medical research do for the community.[166]
Having said this, even if it is accepted that real 
consent is impossible to achieve in experimental 
situations, the need to discuss what is* known seems 
particularly urgent. The emphasis, however, on what 
other doctors would or would not have told the patient - 
an emphasis which runs through the negligence action[167] 
- makes it seems unlikely that the patient's rights will 
be adequately protected. The Declaration of Helsinki 
makes no mention of standard practice, and this is the 
code of ethics guiding both therapeutic and 
non-therapeutic experiments. What it is concerned with 
is the protection of the integrity of the individual - 
something which the law must also respect, one would have
thought, as a matter of principle rather than as
\
derivative from professional practice.
No less than in the standard medical act, the use 
of the negligence action in experimental situations 
permits of the importation of extra-legal factors into
the decision whether or not the behaviour in question 
was, or was not. acceptable. Far from primary concern 
being shown for patients' rights, rather it is said that
the search for knowledge and experience should not be
inhibited by ' . ..undue apprehension or charges of
negligence for the consequences to a patient of treatment 
or diagnosis where such may diverge from the normal.'[168]
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Conclusions
It is clear from the above discussion that there are a 
number of difficulties attached to the negligence action 
in general - difficulties which relate in part to the 
attitudes of the courts, and in part to the nature of the 
action itself. Thus, the inclusion of the duty to 
disclose information in the doctor's general duty of care 
may prove to be the most problematic hurdle for the 
aggrieved patient. If is it the case, as Robertson 
suggests, that the development of the concept of informed 
consent by American courts was as much a device to expand 
the liability of the medical profession as it was 
anything else,[169] then even here it can be seen to have 
been, relatively speaking, a failure.
The extensive use of the professional test in the 
United States, as in the United Kingdom, makes successful 
challenge of non-disclosure unlikely, unless the failure 
to disclose was so great as to amount, in any event, to 
an assault, or to trespass against the person.[170] Even 
the development of other tests, such as the 'prudent 
patient' test, is not a complete answer. The nature of 
the proof required of the patient, and the 
rationalisation of behaviour inherent in the negligence 
action, remove the matter for consideration far from the 
individual aggrieved patient and render it subject to 
tests which are designed to be objective. However, as
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with all so-called objective tests, there remains the 
potential to incorporate policy, personal and 
professional prejudice and subjective assessments by 
courts and experts. That the finder of fact in the
•prudent patient' test is the court rather than the
doctor, will be small comfort if it is borne in mind that
courts have in the past demonstrated their own bias in
favour of medicine as a 'good', and through this
assessment have often deferred to doctors as a group and 
as individuals.
Of course, the use of an 'objective' test is an 
inevitable outcome of the use of the negligence-based
action. This action is neither designed nor equipped to 
deal with purely subjective information, nor is it used 
other than to assess rationalised duties, and to decide 
on a reasonable basis what the duty is, and whether or
not it has been breached. Even in those cases where
there are clear statements to the effect that the law and 
not the medical profession sets the standard of care to 
be followed, there is little doubt as to the weight given 
to medical evidence.[171] Moreover, the use of 
therapeutic privilege, advocated even in the most radical 
judgements,[172] sufficiently reduces the impact of any 
theoretical attention to patient's rights as to render it 
merely rhetorical.
With the notable exception of the court in 
Canterbury v. Spence,T173 1 and the limited number of 
cases following it, emphasis in the United States has
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concentrated on 'informed consent' - a term much used 
even in cases in the United Kingdom. However, the use of 
this terminology can be misleading and gives rise to its 
own difficulties. What is really in issue is observance 
of the duty to disclose, which is a necessary 
precondition of real consent, and this duty can be 
separated from the question of 'informed' consent. For 
example, as will be shown below, a duty to disclose 
information may be thought to exist even in a situation 
where there is doubt as to the recipient's legal capacity 
to offer a real consent.[174]
That is, the duty arises independently of 
considerations such as clinical judgement, and is a clear 
and unequivocal vindication of the patient's rights. The 
negligence-based action is, it has been suggested, 
ill-equipped to deal with something as contentious and 
potentially abstract as the rights of the individual, 
where these are rights developed from morality, rather 
than stated in law or custom. Moreover, the structure of 
the action means that the decision inevitably reflects 
what some patient - the 'reasonable' patient - would have 
decided, and not what the instant patient would have done 
had information been shared. As a means of protecting 
individual freedoms, given that individuals are 
idiosyncratic, the negligence action cannot, as currently 
applied, be satisfactory.
Moreover, there is the fundamental difficulty 
that, not content with imposing one level of objectivity
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that is the 'reasonable doctor' .test - courts are 
further willing to impose yet one more test - that of 
what information the 'reasonable patient' would have
regarded as being of significance. Since apparently the 
individual's statement of what he or she would have found 
significant is not convincing,[175] the actual outcome is 
unlikely to be based on direct attention to individual 
rights. Indeed, given the nature of the negligence 
action, it is difficult to see how it could.
In any case, the noted reluctance of the judiciary 
in the United Kingdom to expand the liability of the 
medical profession[176] makes it less than likely that - 
even were significant change within the negligence 
framework possible - the position would be radically 
altered.[177] Whilst it is possible to argue with 
Robertson's plea for the use of the doctrine of 'informed 
consent' by British courts, for the reasons outlined 
above, the same remarks, if applied to a doctrine which 
concentrated on disclosure rather than on the subsequent 
offering of consent, would be valid. As Robertson says:
It is submitted that the doctrine of informed 
consent is unikely to develop in this country 
and that consequently it will prove to be of 
limited scope in affording compensation to 
the victims of medical accidents. It is to 
be regretted that the law should seek to 
restrict the doctrine of informed consent in 
this way, since this belies the importance to 
be attached to the patient's fundamental 
right to decide whether to undergo proposed 
medical treatment. For this to happen, much 
less emphasis would have to be placed on 
concepts such as "accepted medical practice"
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and "best interests of the patient" as 
reasons for excusing non-disclosure. 
However, regardless of the importance of the 
patient's right in relation to the decision 
to undergo medical treatment, one cannot 
avoid the fact that the doctrine of informed 
consent, expanding as it does the liability 
of the medical profession, is the servant of 
judicial policy regarding such expansion. It 
is the judicial policy, rather than the 
importance of the patient's right to 
determine his own medical treatment, that 
will dictate the future development of the 
doctrine of informed consent in this 
country.[178J
Given the attitude to medical negligence described 
in an earlier chapter,[179] it seems even more unlikely 
at present that a move will be made in the United Kingdom 
to expand liability in this way. A situation has been 
reached whereby the judiciary, who themselves developed 
the negligence action, have also kept a tight control on 
its expansion. In medical cases, fear of extra-legal 
consequences such as the spread of defensive medicine, 
and consideration of extra-legal factors such as the good 
of medicine as a discipline and the impact of a finding 
of negligence on the doctor's position, are routinely 
used to deny liability. In the specific case of consent, 
the Bolam Test sets hurdles for the patient which, it is 
submitted, make it relatively certain that no claim will 
succeed unless the failure to disclose information is so 
gross as in any event to merit consideration under 
assault analysis.
If the question under examination is concerned 
with patients' rights, however, then the issue is not
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whether or not the patient would have rejected therapy, 
but whether or not the doctor is entitled to use the 
defence of volenti. For this to apply, the patient must 
have been informed of the type of risk(s) to which 
exposure was possible, and must have agreed to accept 
them. This is a test much more readily susceptible of 
proof, and in a sense much less objectionable, than that 
of reasonable or accepted medical practice. However, to 
consider the question from this perspective seems to be
beyond the imagination of current decision-making
\ ■
practices in the United Kingdom or in the United States. 
Moreover, the sanctioning of the Bolam Test by the House 
of Lords[180J renders its application in the future even 
less likely.
It can be concluded, therefore, that as presently 
applied, the negligence action is unsuited to a 
vindication of patients' rights. Its lack of suitability 
is as much a matter of judicial attitude as it is an 
aspect of the nature of the action itself, although both 
contribute to the problems faced by the disaffected 
patient. The negligence action lacks the capacity for 
subjectivity which an adherence to individual rights 
would demand, and judicial fears and attitudes, however, 
well or ill-founded, serve merely to increase the 
distance between the claimant and possible damages. As 
Skegg notes:
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At present some English judges are likely to 
treat such evidence [of a common and approved 
practice] as conclusive, if the patient 
brings an action in which he challenges a 
doctor's failure to provide him with adequate 
information about a proposed procedure.[181]
One can only agree with him that it would be
 regrettable, if in future the English
courts did not play a more important role in 
protecting the interests of patients who wish 
to be able to reach an informed decision 
about whether to consent to medical
procedures...[182]
even if one does not necessarily agree that it would also 
be 'surprising'.[183]
One particular legal process has increasingly been 
claimed to be a more appropriate basis for attributing 
liability - avoiding the problems of the assault and the 
negligence based actions. This mechanism, it is
claimed, could deal with the difficulties faced by
patients and would avoid excessive judicial or medical 
impact on the assessment of the adequacy of information 
disclosure.
This would be a system of liability which did not 
depend on fault, and therefore did not require proof of 
the very factors which have been said to be particularly 
difficult for patients in traditional systems. There 
are, of course, a number of difficulties which centre on 
this innovative type of system, not least that some might 
argue that it is the attribution of personal fault which 
renders the claim for damages moral. Moreoever, it
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might be said, that a no-fault system provides little
incentive to practitioners to consider the human rights 
involved in their practice since the state, and not they 
as individuals, will meet any award.
The most comprehensive no fault system in the
world exists in New Zealand, and is worthy of careful
consideration in order to assess its value a) as a scheme 
which routinely provides satisfactory compensation and b) 
as a system which generates or reinforces concern about 
human rights in sensitive and important interactions.
The next section will consider its operation with
particular interest in its effect on patients' rights to
information disclosure in medicine.
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Liability Without FauIt - the New Zea1and Experience
Chapter 7
In most legal systems throughout the world, liability for 
damage caused is attributed on a .personal' basis, 
primarily through the law of tort/delict. Although 
liability may arise in some cases through other systems, 
such as strict liability schemes, the standard legal 
mechanism for obtaining -'compensation is through the use 
of a civil action maintaining corporate or individual 
fault. The tort or delict of negligence is a relative 
newcomer to the panoply of available actions,[1] but it 
is perhaps the one which has attracted the most comment 
and criticism.
However the fault based action also has a number of 
attractions in that it is claimed to serve purposes which 
are cherished by the law. It is seen by some as having 
a deterrent effect, demonstrating the unpleasant and 
potentially expensive consequences of certain types of 
behaviour . [22 It is also in theory an action which 
brings home to the tortfeasor his or her own behaviour 
and thereby renders him or her personally accountable to 
make good the harm complained of. Nonetheless it also 
has many critics who see it as a costly, protracted and 
ultimately unpredictable method of compensating 
victims. Further, political and economic considerations
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may render its inherent dependence on the personal 
attribution of fault and the individual payment of 
compensation, distasteful.
In recent years, there has been an upsurge of public 
interest in, and concern about, victims in society. 
Whilst this concern has often concentrated on relatively 
specific groups - such as the victims of crime[3] - there 
would seem nonetheless to be a generalised perception 
that victims are inadequately dealt with by the existing 
legal processes. In hew Zealand, it was partly this 
concern which generated the impetus for the creation of 
the world's most far-reaching and comprehensive 
alternative system of liability - the accident 
compensation scheme. In 1972, following the
recommendations of the Report of the Committee of Inquiry 
into Personal Injury in hew Zealand (VJoodhouse 
Report),L 4 3 the hew Zealand legislators passed the 
Accident Compensation Act - subsequently amended a number 
of times, culminating in the Accident Compensation Act 
1982 which is designed as consolidating legislation. 
The crucial and most interesting features of this scheme, 
which has its fair share of advocates and critics, are 
that eligibility is based on tests which, exclude the need 
to prove fault, and that payment of compensation is made 
by the state and not by the individual. This chapter 
will trace the development of the scheme and discuss some 
of the benefits and drawbacks, of compensation without 
fault, with particular reference to its effects in the
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doctor/patient relationship.
The Woodhouse Report
New Zealand has a fine history of social legislation,
having adopted one of the '■ world's earliest forms of 
welfare state. It is a small ana relatively close 
community in which the idea of community involvement in 
the welfare of citizens is both respected and 
meaningful. In seme ways, therefore, it may be seen as 
the ideal community for the type of scheme i^roposed by 
Yvocdhouse, which depends heavily' on the' community 
accepting a particular view of a benevolent state to 
which all citizens contribute, and from -which - all have- 
equal entitlement for help. Indeed, there is little 
doubt that the Vvcodhouse proposals were -as much a
reflection of a political view as they were of a purely 
legal reform.
The Commission was, in fact, given a very narrow 
remit within which to consider what alternatives, if any, 
there might be to the existing systems cf liability.
The terms of the remit were to:-
'...inquire into, investigate, and report on the 
following matters:
1. Any need for change in the law relating to 
claims for compensation or damages in respect of 
persons incapacitated or killed in employment.
2. The institution and administration of a 
scheme for the payment of compensation or 
damages, in whole or in part, by periodic 
payments, in respect of persons incapacitated or
killed in employment.[5]
The aim ot the government then was fundamentally to 
establish what could be described as a superior system of 
compensation for the work force - presumably in view of 
the economic impact of injuries at work - rather than to 
establish a wholesale alternative scheme of liability for 
all. Wcodliouse, however, chose to interpret his remit 
in a far wider way and succeeded thereby in including all 
citizens within'his recommendations. All members of the 
community were viewed by boodhouse as "past, present or 
potential workers or, as in the case of housewives, as 
people whose support was essential for the continuation 
of a healthy work force. |_6J By this essentially 
political sleight of hand, no-cne was to be excluded from 
the operation of the new scheme merely by reason of their 
status or actual financial contribution to the state.
There were two main thrusts to the Vvoodhcuse 
recommendations, both of which can be described as 
essentially political. The first depends on an economic 
assessment of worth. Ihe maintenance of a viable work­
force was seen as essential to the economic well-being of 
the state and special facilities could therefore be 
justified for maintaining their health and welfare. As 
the Keport says:
If the well-being c-f the work force is 
neglected, the economy must suffer injury. For 
this reason the nation has not merely a clear 
duty but also a vested interest in urging
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forward the physical and economic rehabilitation 
of every adult citizen whose activities bear on 
the general welfare.[7]
The welfare of the individual, in these terms, becomes 
vital substantially because it contributes to the welfare 
of the state.
However, perhaps the more important aspect of the 
Iv'oodhouse Keport was its political -view, of the role of 
state (and by definition each individual member of the 
state) in assuring the physical well-being of all 
citizens. It is this commitment to community
involvement and responsibility which, it is submitted, 
actually predicted the type of scheme which Woodhouse was 
to recommend. The inevitable inteiest of the state in 
the well-being of citizens is more, in the view of the 
Report, than merely an economic one. It is also a moral 
commitment which demands the involvement of all in the 
welfare of all. Thus, the logical paymaster in the new* 
scheme becomes government rather than the individual.
In the Vvoodhouse view, all citizens are potential victims 
of society's need and demand for progress. As the 
Report puts it:
The toll of personal injury is one of the 
disastrous incidents of social progress, and the 
statistically inevitable victims are entitled to 
receive a co-ordinated response from the nation 
as a whole.LBj
As a political philosophy this becomes a convincing 
argument for community responsibility which is,
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nonetheless, dependent on the nature of the actual state 
to which it is applied. Under certain political
regimes, the emphasis on state as the benefactor and 
guardian of all would be unacceptable. The blame for 
harm inherent in such a view would be eschewed by some 
who would prefer to view damage, in 'many' cases at least, 
solely as being the 'statistically inevitable' outcome of 
personal misbehaviour rather than as representing the 
results of a communal acceptance of risk in the interests 
of advancement.
However, whether or not it is actually society's 
demands for progress which' create risk, the hoodhouse 
view has found acceptance by a number of commentators.
As Gaskins, Krcnick and Vosburgli put it:
...society as a whole should pay the cost of 
progress as well as reap the benefits. Justice 
demands that principles of equity be invoked to 
determine the standard of payment; what an 
individual actually loses when a community 
adopts a given way of life should be restored by 
the community. Such restoration is the right 
of the individual by virtue of being a victim, 
and no further test of eligibility should be 
required. Such rights exist for all on a 
universal basis.[9]
Such then is the philosophy to which V/oodhouse adhered, 
and regardless of whether or not it is politically 
acceptable to all, it nonetheless contains the potential 
for the creation of a comprehensive ana accessible system
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Zealand scheme - compensation in these ■'terms need not be
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merely financial. It is a known, but apparently 
unavoidable, implication of the fault based system that 
its remedies remain almost exclusively financial.[10] 
The involvement of the state as direct controller of the 
system of redress in New Zealand provides the potential 
for all the resources of that state to be involved in the 
process. Rehabilitation, then, is a plausible
c on comm i tan t of such a scheme, and satisfies both of the 
main thrusts of the Report itself. Restoration, or 
maintenance by accident prevention, of a healthy work 
force may be achieved in part by the replacement of 
individual financial loss, but may also be facilitated by 
the availability of retraining and other related 
schemes. Accident prevention, through the systematic 
collection of relevant data, and by the imposition of 
sanctions on, for example, companies v/ith a bad safety 
record, become not merely possible adjuncts to a system 
of liability but rather an integral part of it.
Financial compensation, whilst important, becomes in 
some ways the tail end of a state organised and funded 
process rather than the rationale for the whole scheme.
The system in theory is designed as much to avoid injury 
to individuals as it is to ensure mitigation of any loss 
which does arise. In order to achieve these aims 
however, substantial changes were necessary in the 
existing legal, and perhaps even political, 
establishment. Surprisingly perhaps, the Woodhouse
recommendations which made such changes seem morally
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inevitable neither arose out of major public discontent 
nor resulted in the type of fierce debate which might 
have been anticipated. As Palmer notes, '[pjerhaps the 
most surprising conclusion to emerge from the hew Zealand 
experience is that, although the proposed reform was 
massive, it never became a major political issue.'[11J 
No powerful interest group made the failures of the 
pre-existing system of liability a rallying cry, unlike 
many other legal reforms which have been generated by 
public discontent, and few interest groups seriously 
disputed the wisdom of the changes proposed.
Certainly, the Report itself reads convincingly and 
those in political agreement with its aims would find its 
recommendations haid to dispute. Equally, it is 
reassuring about the costs of the scheme - a reassurance 
which may have played a significant part in the absence 
of overt hostility to its recommendations. Having set a 
clear philosophical tone, Woodhcuse was then free to turn 
his attention to the pre-existing legal structure, to 
expose its problems and to make practical suggestions for 
improvement. It was, of course, vital to the
acceptability of the new scheme that the old one was 
thoroughly discredited, and the Report spares no effort 
doing so. In the view of the Commission there are four 
main criticisms of the common lav; action:
They describe the philcsphy on which it depends
as illogical, the verdicts as entirely uncertain
and affected by mere chance, the procedure as
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costly and slow moving, and the nature of the
award and the whole process as an impediment to 
rehabilitation.L12]
Fault is declared to be a 'legal f ict ion1[13 j in the 
sense that its force in evidencing a moral attribution of 
responsibility is now dissipated, and that, in view of 
the number of alternative processes of decision-making 
which actually operate in most developed communities, it 
no longer satisfies any practical purpose in such an
attribution. hather, according to the Report:
The moral basis for the application of the fault 
principle cannot be explained in terms of the
legal conception of negligence because the test 
of negligence is objective and
impersonal.....Nobody can predict with any
assurance the outcome of a damages action.[14]
The fault based action according to the. Koodhouse Report 
and indeed to many ether of its critics, requires too 
much of the victim. Litigation is expensive and 
protracted and the outcome uncertain. By its nature, it 
is argued, it not only fails to bring home to the 
wrongdoer personal accountability for his or her actions 
or omissions, but it also leaves many people
uncompensated. The difficulties of proving fault mean 
that those who 'either lack the proof of fault or who are 
the victims of what lawyers pleasantly call "an act of 
God"'[15j are left without redress. The use of the 
negligence action as a means of securing the welfare of 
the work force was therefore seen as relatively
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ineffective, and as a means of satisfying the 
responsibility of the community, absolutely useless. It 
is, to the Commission, self-evident that this is a random 
and perhaps even distasteful basis cn which to obtain 
justice for the victims of modern society. As the
Report says:
The fact should be faced that despite the 
moralising which has enabled the fault theory to 
develop it is really not possible to equate 
negligence as an independent tort with moral 
blameworthiness. Negligence is tested not in 
terms of the state of mind or attitude of the
actual defendant, but impersonally against the 
(occasionally remarkable) performance of a 
theoretical individual described as the
"reasonable man of ordinary prudence".[16J
By its very nature the negligence action could never
achieve the aims of the Woodhouse Commission - of course 
it was not designed to do so. Its emphasis on personal 
responsibility, its expense and uncertainties could never 
provide assistance for all those who might need it. 
Nor, as has already been noted, is there any necessary 
element of rehabilitation in this type of action. All 
in all, one of the major sources of restitution is
systematically dismissed as unsatisfactory by the 
Report.
Apart from the technical legal changes introduced by 
the new scheme, it was also instrumental in 'allowing 
what had been a private dispute between individuals in 
the legal system to become a problem in public law 
involving welfare issues'.[17] Through this scheme the
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community assumes the mantle of protection for the
individual by using its resources to prevent loss and
compensate injury. Although the system is contributed 
to by individuals through, for example, a form of road
tax, it is the state which bears the major burden. This
is seen as serving the interests of both state and
individual.
However convincingly Woodhouse attacks the negligence 
action, commentators have noted that his attack can be 
criticised methodologically. Unlike the Royal
Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation for 
Personal Injury (Pearson Commission)[18] in the United 
Kingdom, it is argued by some that scant attention was
paid by Woodhouse to an actual detailed analysis of the 
success or failure of cases taken under the common 
law.[19J Equally, as Palmer points out:
There are serious methodological reasons for
doubting that a survey of cases filed ir.i court
can adequately reflect the performance of a 
system in which almost all cases are settled 
with no proceedings being filed in court.[20]
Woodhouse was not, however, so naive as to fail entirely 
to take account of these points. Indeed, in the view of 
the Commission, the fact that so many cases were settled 
out of court was in itself a kind of indictment on the 
common law action. It was felt that such settlements 
often merely reflected the unwillingness cf the people 
concerned to risk the vagaries of the common lav;
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action. Any settlement may be better than no award at
all. In any event, it may be that the only cases in
which the rules of the fault based action are strictly 
adhered to are those cases which end up in a court of
law. Other factors may also influence the making of out 
of court settlements,L21J and in some ways therefore, 
there is a certain sense in using the court cases as at 
least an indication of the limitations of this system of 
obtaining redress.
Despite such methodological criticisms, 'few' urould
argue that the fault based system is ideal. Even the
strongest defenders of tort or delict have been critical 
of some of its manifestations, and its death knell was 
surely sounded in Dew Zealand when the Woodhouse 
Commission reported. The attack made by the Woodhouse
Report on the negligence action is powerful and
convincing - as indeed it had to be. As Palmer
noted,L22] anything less than 'a compelling case against
the common lav;1 might have left room for compromise
solutions which would affect both eligibility for
compensation and the financial underpinnings of the new 
scheme which broadly sought to appropriate available 
funds to itself. The case, therefore, had to be
'utterly devastating'L23] and in view of the adoption of
the Woodhouse proposals, one assumes that it was indeed 
convincing.
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Hie Accident Compensation Scheme
With the apparent support - or at least without the overt 
hostility - of the community in Dev/ Zealand, the 
Woodhouse proposals substantially unamended became law 
with the passing of the Accident Compensation Act 1972. 
The scheme commenced operation in 1974, and the 
legislation subsequently required a number of amendments, 
culminating in the consolidating legislation of 
1982.[24j The amendments to the legislation were 
reflections of the, perhaps inevitable, teething problems 
of the scheme, and were by and large designed as a means
of including, rather than excluding, certain groups in
the community, and of clarifying terminology.
The legislation set up the basic structure of the 
system and outlined the basis for eligibility. The mere 
fact that eligibility had to be described points 
instantly to one of the problems of the system. The 
Woodhouse Report, despite its radical political and
economic vision, itself demonstrated what might be seen 
as inconsistencies which were translated into the
legislation. Eligibility is based on damage resulting 
from 'personal injury by accident' which is defined as 
follows:
'"Personal injury by accident" -
(a) Includes -
(i) The physical and mental consequences of any
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such injury or of the accident:
(ii) Medical, surgical, dental, or first aid 
misadventure:
(iii) I n c a p a c i t y r e su l ti n g  f r o m o c c u p a t i o n a l  
disease or
industrial deafness to the extent that cover extends 
in respct of the disease or industrial deafness...
(iv) Actual bodily harm (including pregnancy and 
mental or nervous shock) arising by any act or 
omission of any other person which- is within the
description of any of the offence specified in 
sections 128, 132, and 201 of the Crimes Act 1961,
irrespective of whether or not any person is charged 
with the offence and notwithstanding that the 
offender was legally incapable of forming a criminal
intent:
(b) Except as provided in the last preceding
paragraph, does not include -
(i) Damage to the body or mind caused by a
cardio-vascular or cerebro-vascular episode unless 
the episode is the result of effort, strain, or
stress that is abnormal, excessive, or unusual for 
the person suffering it, and the effort, strain, or 
stress arises out of and in the course of the 
employment of that person:
(ii) Damage to the body or mind caused exclusively 
by disease, infection, or the ageing process'L25]
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The exclusion of disease from the definition of personal 
injury by accident reflects the views of the Woodhouse 
Commission itself[26] and has proved to be problematic 
for some of those seeking to obtain redress for harm.
Indeed, in view of the expressed commitment of the
Woodhouse Report to maintaining a healthy and effective 
work force, it is difficult to justify this exclusion on
any grounds other than the purely economic. The person
who is sick is no less disabled from fulfilling his or 
her role in the community. Equally, although the 
welfare state makes provisions for the sick these same 
provisions also apply to the injured and cannot therefore 
provide a reason for the differentiation. In any event, 
the Woodhouse Report itself made the statement that 'all 
injured persons should receive compensation from any 
community financed scheme on the same uniform method c-f. 
assessment, regardless of the causes which give rise to 
their injuries. 1[27J
The vision of Woodhouse seems considerably modified 
by this exclusion, and in fact it is worth noting that 
when Mr. Justice Woodhouse subsequently chaired a similar 
Commission in Australia,[28j no such distinction was made 
- a recognition perhaps of the toll of personal suffering 
and community losses which can be occasioned by the 
making of such an intricate and discriminatory 
distinction.
At first sight, however, the definition cf personal 
injury by accident - even whilst containing this
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inconsistency - seems a relatively straightforward basis 
on which to assess eligibility. Unfortunately this has 
not always proved to be the case, and indeed Cripps has 
claimed that:
The meaning of 'accident' for the purposes of 
the Act has been a fundamental problem which has 
not been simplified by legislative definition. 
However, it is clear that merely because an 
injury is unexpected and caused by negligence it 
will not necessarily be covered by the Act.[29]
As with most permissive legislation, and in particular 
where the central definition is relatively vague, 
interpretation may serve to limit or expand 
eligibility. In some ways it would seem that the 
decision-makers in the accident compensation scheme have 
adopted a restrictive rather than a liberal 
interpretation of what amounts to 'accident' and have 
thereby limited the availability of cover under the 
scheme.[30] Palmer suggests that:
To begin with the idea was to spell everything 
cut so people would know their lights. Hie 
trend of the amendments has been to give more 
and more discretion to the Commission sc that 
certainty is lost but the obscurity remains.
At present neither clarity nor predictability 
exist.[31]
It is ironic that this is one cf the criticisms also 
often levelled at the common law action.
The interpretation of 'accident' was intially based 
on the definition contained in the British case of Jones
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v. Secretary o£ State for Cocial Servicesi. 3 2 ] and related 
to an unlooked-for or undesigned event. Despite the 
Accident Compensation Corporation's advice to the medical 
profession that "|_a]s a matter of general principle 
personal injury by accident means any form of damage to
the human system which is unexpected and which was not 
designed by the person injurea'1.33] such apparent clarity 
merely disguises actual interpretational variations. 
For example, in one case[34] it was said that, 
'[ajccident should be interpreted in its ordinary and
popular meaning, as normally denoting an unlooked-for 
mishap or untoward event which is neither expected nor
designed', and one moreover which is 'capable cf being
described as occurring at seme particular time rather 
than by gradual process'. However in yet another
relatively contemporaneous case it was said that:
If a happening is accidental merely because it 
is a happening by chance then I suppose it must 
be conceded that the happening is an accident 
but only to the extent that it is a chance. 
The daily life of every one of us is packed with 
chance happenings, fortuitous occurrences, 
coincidences, etc. of every conceivable kind. 
All these may be claimed by the pedants or 
grammarians as 'accidents' in that they occur 
otherwise that by design. Each is in fact a 
chance happening and I cannot conceive that in 
selecting 'accident' as the basic criterion for 
the operation of trie Accident Compensation Act 
the legislature intended that the word embrace 
all chance happenings. I would regard the 
argument that as virtually all accidents are 
chance happenings therefore all the chance 
happenings of everyday life are accidents as 
fallacious.L35j
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One must ask why, in view, of the rationale for the 
accident compensation scheme, such an argument should be 
deemed to be fallacious? Unlike its predecessor, the no 
fault system purports to be concerned with the effects of 
incidents rather than with their causes. It seeks, in 
theory at least, to include rather than to exclude. 
Indeed, if it is to be both philosophically sound and 
pragmatically effective it must provide the widest cover 
for the work force (as broadly defined by Woodhouse).
If a narrow definition of accident is adopted some - 
perhaps many - will go uncompensated by the scheme, which 
will then find itself sharing at least that 
characteristic with the system it replaced.[36]
Moreover, concern may be reinforced if the scheme
adopts an inflexible and narrow approach, since the
\
effect of its introduction was to remove certain options 
from the potential litigant. Removal of sensitive and 
complex matters from courts of law (whilst not absolute) 
nonetheless is central to the system and may be its 
greatest strength or its greatest weakness. Which of 
these it turns cut to be will depend substantially on the 
attitudes of decision-makers. Eligibility depends on 
evidence of 'personal injury by accident' Yvhich requires 
first, that there is an injury, and second that the 
injury resulted from this event which was in the nature 
of an accident. Morecever, the accident must result
from an external cause and be an event, not a process.
As Lord Diplcck said in Jones v. Secretary of State for
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Social Services:L373
It cannot be the personal injury itself which is 
described as the cause. It must be something 
external which has some physiological or 
psychological effect on that part of the 
sufferer's anatomy which sustains the actual 
trauma, or some bodily activity of the sufferer 
which would be perceptible to an observer if cne 
were present. It is convenient to call this 
external event or bodily activity the causative 
element.L38J
Moreover, and again this may be seen as a fundamental
illogicality, the existence of the accident compensation 
scheme does not preclude the use of a residual common lav; 
action. Merely it precludes the use cf this form of
action where the injury complained of results from 
personal injury by accident. The retention of the 
common law action may be a surprise to some - surprising 
because its retention seems to suggest from the outset 
that there will be those, who have the necessary proof of 
injury, but who will nonetheless not be included in the 
scheme. Thus, the Vvoodhouse vision cf a form of social 
insurance offering real, meaningful and readily
accessible compensation, was ab initio acknowledged, in 
the cases of the sick and cf some cf those who are 
injured, not in fact to be comprehensive at all.
It may be inevitable that the decision-makers in a 
state funded scheme have an interest in limiting the
availability of awards. Financial considerations will 
be likely to' weigh heavily, even although - as in the 
case of'the accident compensation scheme - there
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is evidence not of financial stringencies but rather of 
considerable reserves.[39] Exclusions made either by 
the legislature or by decision-makers have, however, a 
substantial impact on the instrumental success of the 
scheme, rendering some of its apparent radicalism as much
symbolic as real. As hlar put it:
The ambiguities in the concept of personal 
injury by accident, the lack cf adequate 
statutory definition, and the absolute exclusion 
from the program's coverage of these persons 
disabled not as a result of accident, but as a
result of disease, infection, or the ageing 
process have combined to present the -New Zealand 
program with its most serious ideological, 
administrative and practical difficulties.[40]
As has been noted, there are special difficulties 
associated with the exclusion of sickness from the 
scheme, in part derivative from the problems of 
interpreting what amounts to 'accident1. The
implementation of a narrow, legalistic interpretation of 
'accident' may be the result of a number of factors which 
take little or no account of the philosophical 
underpinnings of the scheme itself. Financial
constraints may have an impact, as may interpretational 
variations based on policy grounds, just as they do in
fault based systems.[41] For example, economic
considerations may be particularly important when the 
state and not the individual bears the cost of awards. 
Whilst there is evidence cf a high success rate in claims 
made to the Accident Compensation Corporation[42] (as
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indeed, there is even under the fault-based system[43]), 
'[wjhen the Accident Compensation Commission decides 
whether there has oeen a personal injury by accident it 
is making a decision about its own money and 
resources ' .[44j Although it would seem cur rently that 
the Accident Compensation Corporation faces no 
devastating financial problems, there is nonethless seme 
evidence that decisions are being taken on the basis of 
criteria which are theoretically foreign to the nature of 
the scheme. Palmer, for example, a noted commentator on 
the no fault scheme, notes with some concern that, at 
least in some cases:
There is a ring of the old tort lav; in the 
language used in the review decisions which talk 
about 'risk' ana 'remoteness'. The approach 
seems to be misconceived. The aim of
extirpating the common law action must be kept 
to the forefront or thinking on the subject.[45]
As has been noted, the definition of accident for the 
purposes of the scheme excludes sickness or disease and 
also pregnancy unless arising from a criminal offence. 
'Accident' is deemed to be an event and net a process, 
lcgichlly excluding these categories. However there are 
also claimants who will be excluded on the grounds that 
their damage is the result of disease, even where actual 
harm came to light following an event in the nature of an 
accident. Moreover, whilst the distinction between 
accident and sickness may in some cases be clear, in 
others it may be highly problematic and result in fine
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decisions being n.ade. In one appeal case it was said 
that:
The boundary line between an accident injury and 
a disease injury may be hard to discern at times 
but there is no doubt that the legislature 
requires the line to be drawn and the 
interpreter of the Act must take cogniscance of 
this.L46J
Although there seemed to be no formidable opposition 
to the introduction of the accident compensation scheme/ 
little systematic work has been done to assess the views 
of those either who have been given cover under the 
scheme, or those who have been lefused it. Financial 
compensation under the Few Zealand system is generally 
made by way of periodic payments approximating to 80% of 
salary, with a limited lump sum also available in some 
cases.[47J Inevitably, in monetary terms, such awards 
will compare unfavourably with the sometimes substantial 
awards made in those countries which adhere to the tort 
or delict system. Thus, whilst those who aie excluded 
from the new scheme might well be expected to demonstrate 
the same dissatisfaction as those unsuccessful under the 
tort system, those who have received awards under the 
accident compensation scheme might also feel that the 
financial limits set render compensation less than 
completely satisfactory. As Klar[48J notes, quoting 
work undertaken by Lloyd-Bcstock,[49] there seems to be 
an ingrained attitude - at least in those communities 
where the common law action remains the primary source of
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redress - that lump sum (and substantial) awards are an 
inherent and desireable feature of compensation. If 
this is so, it may lead to theoretical cr emotional 
dissatisfaction with a system not based on fault, and 
moreover to rejection as unsatisfactory of periodic 
awards of damages which relate to actual need rather than 
to projected loss.
Under the Hew Zealand scheme, damages are by 
definition related to needs not deeds, and are designed 
to mitigate less rather than to indulge in the bind of 
assessment of quantum which is a feature of common law
actions. The system 'aims rather at providing a wide 
range of benefits which are designed to cushion the 
effects of an accident1.L50J Compensation takes on a 
somewhat different complexion, being less concerned with 
mere financial recompense and more interested in 
rehabilitating victims and minimising financial 
difficulties. Moreover, the potential for deterrence, 
which is claimed by some to be a desirable feature of the 
negligence action, is expressly rejected by Wcodhouse. 
Avoidance of accidents is central to the accident
compensation scheme, but is not seen as likely to be
achieved through any minimal deterrent effect which the 
common law action might have. Rather, state resources 
should be used to create meaningful accident 
prevention. However, it is disappointing that both the
collection of data about accident prevention (which is 
inevitably tied up with such a system of 'social
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insurance') and rehabilitation seem to have been in 
practice less important in Hew Zealand them was initially 
anticipated.
There are, moreover, further and very fundamental 
concerns generally expressed by tort lawyers about the 
nature of the accident compensation scheme. The right 
to raise an action in the traditional manner through 
courts of law is jealously guarded by proponents of the 
tort or delict system, and the general removal of this
right under the no fault system is regarded by some as 
one of its most worrying features. As Klar says:
The challenge presented to tort lawyers by the
program's abolition of common law rights for
personal injury victims is obvious: can the
cause of action be eliminated without any 
appreciable harms to the society and in tact 
with benefits to the society as promised by tort 
law aboliticnists?[51]
One way of answering this question is to examine any
practical shortfalls of the new system and to attack them 
as ideologically central to the system itself. Thus, if 
the no fault system fails actually to provide 
comprehensive cover - as it dees - then it can be argued 
that it has failed to provide an adequate and effective 
structure which could justify the excision of actions 
based in tort or delict. This type of attack
interestingly bears a close resemblance to the kind of 
argument often used against the tort or delict system. 
Proponents of the no fault approach might equally argue
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that the mere existence c£ a right to sue in courts is 
not by itself the mechanism which provides vital 
protection for the individual. Lather the facilitation 
of general compensation is what is crucial to the 
credibility of any scheme/ and this cannot be achieved 
through tort or delict. .Whilst both arguments have some
weight/ it should be noted that when used against the no
\ •
fault system they are largely functional. When used 
against the fault based action, however, they are 
essentially philosophical and therefore more difficult to 
rectify within existing structures.
In defence of the tort or delict system it should be 
noted that it was never designed to compensate everyone 
and it is therefore scarcely an appropriate criticism 
that it fails to do so. Those opposed to the continued 
use of actions in tort or delict may well wish to argue, 
then, that the very rationale for the action is itself 
wrong, since every injured or damaged citizen should be 
entitled to assistance from the state - precisely the 
type of argument used by \vccdhouse. However, it is 
unarguable that the accident compensation scheme did 
purport to offer comprehensive cover, and the fact that 
it dees not is a valid structural, if not theoretical, 
criticism.
Moreover, given the fact that the intended 
comprehensive nature of the Lew Zealand scheme meant the 
sweeping away of the common lav/ action in all cases of 
personal injury by accident, it is essential to its
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credibility that internal decision making should not be 
rigid and inflexible. After all, if the scope of the 
scheme is narrowed by refining terminological 
interpretation, then not only ..will, some citizens have no 
recourse through this system, but because of the 
limitations on the use of the residual common law action, 
they will also have no right of action through the civil 
courts unless fault can be proved ana their injury was 
not caused by 'accident'.
Although much of the critical comment on the no fault 
system relates to its practical failures, there is still 
a philosophical problem felt strongly by some. It will 
never, it is claimed, 'substitute for the common law 
cause of action' and will 'reflect neither its ideology 
nor its functional ob jectives ' . (.52 j But it was never,, 
of course, intended to do this. Indeed the Wcodhouse 
Report was as critical of the objectives of the common 
lav; action, as it was of its practical manifestations. 
The aim of the accident compensation scheme was precisely 
to remove these elements from consideration and to 
replace them witn a comprehensive and humane system of 
victim support. Indeed, much of the ideology of the 
common law action could not be accommodated within a 
state funded and comprehensive system of social 
insurance.
Further criticism can, however, be levelled at the 
philosophical underpinnings of the scheme. Whilst the 
Woodhcuse Report focussed its critical attention on the
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negligence action, there were, of course, other possible 
actions available under the common lav:. However, the
institution of the accident compensation scheme
\
essentially swept the common law board clean where the 
injury complained of could be deemed to have been caused 
by accident. As Klar says:
...the legislation bars all civil proceedings 
which relate to damages arising directly or 
indirectly from personal injury and death by 
accident, and not merely actions which would 
have been based on negligence lav:. This 
includes actions in occupier's liability, 
product', liability, nuisance, strict liability, 
intentional torts, and so on. Causes of action 
which have never been the subject of criticism 
from tort law opponents, and which do not share 
the same defects as negligence law, have been 
eliminated.[53]
This must be a considerable cause for concern, and the
problems associated with it can only be obviated by a 
truly comprehensive and non-discriminatory scheme, or 
perhaps even mitigated by a mixed system of liability 
which excludes the problems of the negligence action 
while ensuring that the difficulties of the other forms 
of action are mitigated by legal change * It is the fact
of compensation which is said to be crucial in Hew
Zealand, rather than the form of action necessary to
obtain it - at least where- the system operated conforms 
to fundamental principles. The exclusions from
eligibility under the Lew Zealand scheme would seem to 
weaken its imjjact considerably. Rigid or narrow
interpretation of eligibility serves merely to render the
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scheme unsatisfactory and inflexible. L54] Whilst extra 
legal factors are routinely.imported,' or expert testimony 
used as definitive of the issue, in medical negligence 
cases, decisions in tne accident compensation scheme may 
additionally be open to bureaucratic or political 
influence. Thus, policy factors could equally influence 
the operation of a no fault system. The following 
section will consider the place of the patient in the no 
fault system, and seek to identify whether - unlike the 
systems described above - this scheme offers a framework 
within which the patient's rights are adequately 
protected in medical matters.
Medical Misadventure[55]
It is the purpose of this section to focus on the 
particular example of medical misadventure as a means of 
analysing what, if any, are the problems facing 
decision-makers and claimants under the new scheme of 
liability in Lew Zealand. Cne area of particular
interest in jurisdictions retaining common lav: actions
has been that which relates to medical negligence. [_56]
In some countries there is said to be an explosion in 
litigation of this sort, and patients and others have
sometimes been disaffected by the attitudes adopted by
courts in such claims.[57j In Woodhouse's terms, 
medicine might be seen as an area in which his
justification for state compensation is peculiarly
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appropriate. Medicine is a clear example oi society's 
desires for progress, it is an inherently risky process 
and, therefore, one might think, an area in which claims 
would be frequent, whatever the skills of the doctor.
Policy factors in common law countries have been used 
to expand the liability of some individuals and groups, 
but there is a recurring suggestion that '[tjhere lias 
been a surprisingly strong emphasis on policy, not so
much to expand, but rather to limit, the application of
negligence to doctors. ' [58J The Pearson Commission in 
the United Kingdom noted this trend indirectly in its 
assessment of success rates in personal Injury
actions.[5Sj Whilst the general success rate was high, 
in medical cases it was considerably lower, ana although 
there may be a number of factors involved in this finding 
(in particular that settlements are often made out of
court) it would nonetheless at first sight seem likely 
that the victims of medical accident (which the Pearson
Commission felt to be the largest cjroup[6(j]} would be 
considerably benefited by a system such as the accident
compensation scheme. bo longer would the medical
profession be subjected to ever-increasing public
allegations of negligence in their high-risk .practice, 
nor would patients find themselves dissatisfied with the 
legal process, when claims are heard privately, need not 
depend on allegations of professional fault and are 
settled relatively quickly.
Courts in the United Kingdom have frequently referred
\
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to the problems generated by a laissez-faire attitude to 
medical claims, and condemned the impact of readily 
available compensation on health care.[61j Substantial
awards of damages have come under fire also as having an
impact on the profession and on the provision of health 
care.[62] Under the Lew Zealand scheme such problems
would, in theory, have less relevance. The doctor would
pay no more in terms of insurance were the patient to be 
compensated, his or her reputation would remain intact, 
the patient would receive some (periodically reassessed) 
assistance, and since awards are designed to cushion 
rather than to replace loss there would be no need for
the huge lump sum awards increasingly made in some
countries.[63]
Lot only the terminology, but also the underlying 
assumptions of the negligence action wer.e modified, if 
not dismissed, by the Woodhouse Commission. 
'Misadventure' was used to cover the unlooked-for
side-effects of medical treatment thus avoiding the value 
judgements inherent in the terminology of negligence. 
Theoretically, as Blair points out:
It is plain that 'medical misadventure' is 
broader in meaning than medical negligence and
that to qualify for compensation...it is
sufficient for a claimant to show a causal 
relationship between a medical mishap amounting 
to medical misadventure and his injury.[C4]
Misadventure, therefore, contains no necessary element of 
negligence although clearly it could. Bather it is an
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'event arising out of medical treatment which causes 
undesigned injury to a patient which may not be regarded 
as an illness flowing naturally from the 
treatmentL65] The Accident Compensation Corporation 
itself gives to doctors an apparently straightforward 
account of what is meant by medical misadventure:
The effect of the definition is that it is not 
necessary to show that there lias been negligence 
on the part of a medical practitioner before a 
claim will lie for medical misadventure. The 
definition embraces the cases where the correct 
procedures were carried out but where a 
mischance or accident, unexpected and undesigned 
occurred.L66j
This seems quite straightforward, and if there is no need 
to establish negligence then the assumption must be that 
patients are more likely to receive compensation under 
the accident compensation scheme. But is this so?
What any citizen has to establish in order to be 
compensated under the scheme is that his or her damage 
was the result of personal injury by accident (an
unexpected or unlooked for event), that it did not 
therefore amount to sickness or disease, and - in the
case of the patient - one possible way of showing this is 
to demonstrate that the injury was the result of medical 
misadventure, which was designed as an example of what 
could be personal injury by accident. It was net a 
different definition of personal injury by accident nor
was it intended to impose a further evidential burden
added on the victim.
An analysis of some of the cases which have been
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decided under the accident compensation scheme will serve 
to demonstrate whether or not the patient is more likely 
to be compensated within the framework of these 
determining factors. Whilst the two elements (personal 
injury by accident and medical misadventure) were not 
necessarily devised as different and distinct, it is 
intended in this section to deal with them in a separate 
manner in as much as this is possible. Thus,
consideration will first be made of personal injury by 
accident in the context of its relationship to sickness 
and disease, and secondly of medical misadventure, and in 
particular the unexpected nature of the event.
Accident and Disease
The difficulty [of defining accident] is especially
apparent in the area of response to medical and 
surgical treatment. People differ widely in their
inherent attributes, their life styles, their dietary 
habits and so on. The reaction therefore to
particular medical or surgical treatment is likely to 
differ widely from individual to individual.[67]
This statement makes clear some of the difficulties 
particularly associated with distinguishing between
'accident' and sickness, which have already been noted. 
Further, it points to the special problems which occur 
when the accident arises as a part, or as the result, of 
medical treatment. Ucwhere is it more difficult to make 
such a differentiation than in this context, where 
injuries or damage may arise spontaneously in the course
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cf treatment. When reviewing some of the cases, there 
a’re two points to bear in mind. B'irst, that a 
distinction has been made between accident and disease, 
and that this will be maintained by the decision 
makers. Second, that accident must be an unlooked-for 
and unexpected event (according to Woodhouse, 
unlooked-for by, and unexpected to, the person to whom it 
happens) arising from an external cause.
The difference between accident and disease is made 
clear, in one case, in which it was held that the 
development of an embolus after surgery was not an 
‘accident1 even although the patient did not expect 
it.L6&] Such a development is by its nature a process 
of sickness or disease - not an accident. Not only is 
it a progressive condition, but it is also a known 
possibility of surgery and theiefoie not accidental. 
The second point will be considered later.[69] The 
distinction between accident and disease is jjarticularly 
problematic in medical cases, primarily because the 
results of badly or inadequately administered treatment, 
or of a failure to treat, may often manifest themselves 
as a complication or continuation of the pre-existing 
disease.
Under the common law, it is possible, although rare, 
for doctors to be held liable for a failure in diagnosis 
if this is negligently done.L70] The responsibilities 
of doctors include a duty to treat reasonably, which may 
include accurate assessment of condition.L71] Although
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failure to diagnose is not always negligent, it may be, 
depending on the circumstances of the case. One 
immediate problem of the accident compensation scheme (as 
far as the patient is concerned) is that there is almost 
no way (even where there is negligence) that a failure to 
treat or diagnose can be deemed to be personal injury by 
accident. The reasoning is as follows:- whatever harm 
has been caused as the result of failing to make an 
accurate diagnosis or omitting to treat is harm which 
resulted from the original illness itself. Eecause 
illness is not accident, then it cannot be compensated 
under the scheme. Although there remains a residual 
right to raise a common law action, only rarely will the 
courts be prepared to hold a doctor liable in these 
circumstances. The patient is, therefore, practically 
denied redress for what may be major disabilities. As 
one Appeal Decision put it '...one must be satisfied that 
the omission by the doctor to either diagnose the disease 
or to discover the condition during the operation process 
materially contributed to the death.'[72] The test is, 
therefore, very stringent, and difficult to meet. As 
one Review Decision points out:
...a failure to diagnose leading to the true 
ailment not receiving medical treatment can 
rarely, if ever, be the foundation for a claim 
under the Act, in that the patient's condition 
remains attributable to the ailment alone.[73]
Although the outcome is achieved by a different route,
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the intact of the new scheme is much the same as that of 
the common law. Failure to treat or diagnose will 
virtually never be compensable under the Accident
Compensation Acts. In fact, it may be the case that the 
patient has a relatively better chance of success under 
the common law, an outcome surely not designed or
predicted by the accident compensation scheme.
Nor are problems solely associated with clear 
failures to treat or diagnose. Where the patient 
involved has a pre-existing condition which comes to 
light or is exacerbated by an event in the nature of an 
accident, there may be further difficulties in assessing 
what actually is the cause of the harm. It is worth
noting that only in cases such as these is cause actually 
relevant to the assessment of eligibility, and that this 
results from the problematic distinction between accident 
and disease. A clear example is the case of a person
with a pre-existing back condition which is exacerbated 
by a fall. Now, vast numbers of people-, especially 
among the older groups in the community, will have some
back problems as the body begins to wear down. The fall
\
is an accident within the meaning of the Act, but the 
actual harm is the result of the pre-existing back 
condition. Thus the person will not receive
compensation under the scheme because the damage is 
caused by illness and not accident.
A second problem for the patient relates to an
inherent attribute of an 'accident' for the purposes of 
the scheme - that is, its unexpectedness. As has been 
seen, the Wocdhouse Commission related the unexpectedness 
element directly to the person concerned. Thus, if 
something unexpected and caused by external events occurs 
then compensation follows. In the normal run of the 
mill case this will be precisely the situation. There 
is, however, a notable difference in the case of those 
unexpectedly injured in the course of medical 
treatment. Consider this statement:
It is against human experience that the results 
of medical treatment will always be 
favourable.... There must be tew significant 
medical treatments that do not contain some risk 
of the results being contrary to hopes and 
expectations and some risk of developments 
adverse to the patient's condition. The
likelihood of the risk eventuating, the gravity 
of the possible consequences, and the balance 
struck between those attendant risks and the 
advantages that might be gained, are factors 
influencing the decision as to whether the 
treatment should be given and accepted. But if 
adverse developments or results are known to 
reasonably informed medical opinion to 
constitute a known risk of the treatment, and 
that risk then materialises, can it be said that 
those adverse risks are personal injury by 
accident? In my view a person who accepts (or 
in some cases is deemed to accept) medical 
treatment is to be regarded as accepting the 
possibility that the known risks may 
eventuate. It is not to be considered as an 
'accident' to him if the consequences that are 
at risk do in fact occur.[74j
There are a number of interesting features in this 
welhused and authoritative statement. B'irst, it seems 
to make it clear that only those risks which are
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unexpected will be covered by the scheme. This, of 
course, is entirely in line with the Woodhouse view and 
the routine interpretation of accident under the Act. 
However, Woodhouse also made it clear that the 
unexpectedness element was personal to the victim. 
Here, however, is a situation where the unexpectedness 
question was determined by reference to the state of 
knowledge of a third party. In other words, if the 
doctor knows of a risk, even if patient does not, then 
the occurrence of that risk (which is unexpected as far 
as the patient is concerned) is not deemed to be personal 
injury by accident.
Moreover, the further implications of this approach 
are of particular concern, given that there are important 
reasons for acknowledging the rights of patients which 
have stimulated most jurisdictions throughout the world 
to make serious attempts to develop a doctrine of consent 
which is meaningful to the patient. Lack of consent to 
treatment clearly cannot be covered by the scheme unless 
it is particularly gross - for example, carrying out a 
different operation from the one to which consent was 
given. There is also in the above statement a clear 
view that patients may be deemed to have consented to 
treatment whether or not they have been informed of the 
likelihood, of certain (perhaps major) risks. It is 
precisely this which is inimical to the development of 
appropriate doctrines about consent in medical treatment, 
and to protection of the right here described to make
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decisions based on adequate disclosure of information.
In the same case, a rule of thumb was given which has 
been used in most subsequent cases, and which is also 
worthy of note. Normal risks of medical treatment 
(whether or not they are unexpected by the patient) will 
not constitute personal injury by accident, but:
...it is possible that seme adverse consequences 
of medical treatment might be so rare or so 
grave that they should fairly be regarded as 
constituting personal injury by accident. I 
would consider that entitlement would be granted 
in such circumstances only if the following 
qualifications were met:
(a) the risk that eventuated was a rare and
remote one;
(b) such risk would not reasonably be taken
into account when considering the wisdom of the 
treatment proposed;
(c) the consequences were grave and totally
disproportionate to the significance' normally 
attached to the treatment;
(d) such consequences were clearly beyond the
extent of adverse consequences that would 
normally and reasonably be contemplated as 
included within the risk.L75]
The impact of this view, which has been accepted by
subsequent decision-makers, is clear. First, there
\
is the requirement that the risk has to be rare, 
grave or remote. The outcome of this is that only 
the most serious and unusual risks could ever 
constitute personal injury by accident. Moreover, 
the rarity of the risk means that - in this view - 
it would not normally be considered, that is it need 
not even be disclosed to the patient. If this is 
sc, the patient would seem to have no protection
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against doctors minimising or omitting to inform 
them of known risks which might well have affected 
the choice as to whether or not to undergo the 
treatment.[76]
Nor can the frequent use of words like 
'reasonable1 have more than a symbolic meaning, 
since it is unclear in the accident compensation 
scheme whether 'reasonably taken into account'
relates to the patient or the doctor. In view of
\
the general tenor of this decision, it would seem 
that, most likely, it does not relate to the 
patient, but rather to the doctor. In this 
respect, the test resembles that used in some other 
jurisdictions where the criteria for assessing the 
propriety of non-disclosure are related clearly to 
the 'reasonable doctor' standard.[77] The
development in New Zealand of anything approaching a 
doctrine of 'informed' or real consent is therefore 
unlikely. There is no incentive for doctors to
make any kind of disclosure to the patient of risks 
which they fear may deter the patient from 
undergoing the doctor's chosen therapy.[78] 
Equally, if the patient is disabled by a known risk 
whether or not he or she is told about it, any 
disability will not be covered by the the accident 
compensation scheme. Of course, failure to develop 
a doctrine about consent may be less significant if 
compensation is in any event available, since there
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is no implication that doctors maliciously tail to 
make disclosure. Although it would not vindicate 
the right described here, it would at least permit 
of redress. However, even under the accident
compensation scheme - given that it does seem to 
apply tests for exclusion from compensation - an 
acceptance of the patient's right to receive 
information may be crucial.
Medical Misadventure Revisited
What then is medical misadventure? It is not 
disease, and it is net failure by the doctor to make 
an accurate diagnosis or to treat. Nor is it 
related to the eventuation of disability through one 
of the risks of medical treatment actually ocurring 
- even if the risk was unknown to the patient. In 
fact, the circumstances which would entitle the 
patient to compensation under this scheme relate 
very closely to those which would be compensable 
under the fault based system, which the accident 
compensation scheme was created to replace. The 
authoritative definition of medical misadventure is 
contained in one review case, and is as follows:
Medical misadventure is when
(a) a person suffers bodily or mental injury 
or damage in the course of, and as part of, the 
administering to that person of medical aid, 
care or attention, and
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(b) such injury or damage is caused by
mischance or accident, unexpected and 
undesigned, in the nature of a medical error or 
medical mishap.[79]
This statement equates medical misadventure to situations 
where there is medical error or medical mishap. It is 
worth noting that the word 'negligence' is never used in 
this context. Inaeea it is clear that the intention of 
the legislators was that misadventure should amount to 
more than just negligence. As has been said:
It is plain that medical misadventure is broader 
in meaning than medical negligence. If
Parliament had intended that cover for this kind 
of injury was to be restricted to that resulting 
from negligence, it would have used the well 
understood word 'negligence' rather than invent 
the phrase 'medical misadventure'.[80]
If the term 'medical misadventure' is broader in meaning 
than medical negligence then one would anticipate that 
this would inevitably mean that more cases would fit 
within its terms. The fact that fault need not be 
proved might also encourage liberal decision-making 
within the system since the doctor's reputation, so often 
raised as an issue under the common law’, [81 j would not be 
damaged where no attribution of fault is made. However, 
it has been seen that the term may in fact not be 
significantly wider than medical negligence, ana it is 
submitted that - in fact - the two correspond rather 
closely. Indeed, Palmer lias noted that in these cases 
there is a clear similarity between the tests used for
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medical misadventure and those used lor medical 
negligence.[82J
Since it is now the trend in most legal systems that 
a failure to obtain real consent is dealt withunder the 
lav/s of negligence rather than as a form of assault, [83] 
then there is a major emphasis on the reasonableness of 
any failure to make disclosure. As lias been seen, 
reasonableness is often decided with specific reference 
to what doctors (or a reputable body of medical opinion) 
regard as being reasonable, rather th a n .what the patient 
regards as reasonable.[84] Even in those jurisdictions 
which apply the reasonable patient standard, medical 
evidence is vitally important to the assessment of the 
likelihood of risk eventuation, which in turn affects 
what the reasonable patient might be expected to 
do.[85] Under the accident compensation scheme, the 
same types of assessment are made, with the crucial 
difference that even failure to disclose material risks 
would not necessarily render the doctor liable. The 
doctor's knowledge is what is central to the definition 
of medical misadventure since it is crucially dependent 
on the concept of 'accident'.
The patient, then, is under two major 
disadvantages. First, since the effect of medical 
behaviour may be that his or her disease continues 
unabated, this will remain uncompensated since it is not 
a personal injury by accident. Moreoever, there is no 
pretence at developing a consistent ideology in relation
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to obtaining meaningful consent since the patient is the 
only person whose knowledge of risk is irrelevant to the 
calculation of unexpectedness which is central to the 
definition of accident. Since any action raised at 
common law under the residual power has little chance of 
success, given the tests used for negligence,[86] then 
the patient is seriously disadvantaged when excluded from 
the scheme.
Medical misadventure, then, is certainly not intended 
to be the same as medical negligence, although there is a 
certain similarity in the tests used to establish them. 
Moreover, it may even be that in some cases the 
interpretation of misadventure is narrower than the 
interpretation of negligence. Misadventure is defined 
in terms of medical error or mishap, terms which have 
been authoritatively reviewed in one leading decision.
1. 'Medical errcr ' means the failure of a 
person involved in the administering of medical 
aid, care or attention to observe a standard of 
care and skill reasonably to be expected of him 
in the circumstances. Medical error can relate 
to the correctness, the propriety, the adequacy, 
and the quality of the medical aid, care or 
attention given. Error may arise either in the 
performance of that aid, care or attention, or 
in the diagnosis, judgement, or preparation that 
leads to it. It arises only if the service to 
the patient is of a lower standard than was 
reasonably to be expected in the 
circumstances.... The test may be considered 
similar to the test of negligence in the common 
law system, but it is not intended that they 
should necessarily coincide, (emphasis added-)
2. 'Medical mishap' ...as a generalisation, 
but not as a definition, 'medical mishap' 
normally describes the situation when tlier e is 
the intervention or intrusion into the
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administering ot medical aid, care or attention 
of some unexpected and undesigned incident, 
event or circumstance, of a medical nature, that 
has harmful consequences to the patient.[87]
Ultimately, then, medical misadventure can be described 
in altiost exactly the same teims as medical negligence. 
The above definitions explain circumstances in which - 
even under the common law - a claim for damages has a 
reasonable chance of success, the latter by the use of 
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur .[88] Clearly, 
'medical error' relates very closely to the accepted view 
of negligence, and 'medical mishap' seems to envisage 
situations where, tor example, a swab is left behind in a 
patient or a surgical instrument breaks and causes 
harm.[89]
Indeed, in many of the accident compensation 
decisions on medical cases there is a striking similarity 
between the kinds of tests used for medical misadventure 
and those used in assessing negligence under other 
systems. However, there is a further problem for the 
claimant under the accident compensation scheme in that 
the damage caused has to be in the nature of an accident 
and not a continuation of the existing ill-health. In 
many cases, as has been seen, it may be that the 
necessary distinction will be haid to make. Damage may 
not readily be attributable either to accident or to the 
pre- existing complaint, and where there is doubt as to 
attribution, the scales will weigh in favour of 
disease. As Blair puts it:
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If the medical evidence is in such terms as to 
leave the Commission with the impression that, 
as between accident and disease, the scales are 
evenly balanced, then it cannot be successfully 
contended that the condition laid down by the 
statute has been met, and the claim for 
compensation is therefore not established.[SOJ
Narrow decision making is sometimes claimed to be a 
feature of medical negligence cases in some jurisdictions 
and seems to be not uncommon in the accident compensation 
scheme, to the clear detriment of the patient. However, 
the patient in the accident compensation scheme is 
perhaps even more disadvantaged than his or her 
counterpart in the common lav;. Whether or not the 
doctrine of informed consent is officially recognised in 
British courts,L91] there is nonetheless a commitment in 
general to its aims, however ineffectively that 
commitment may be translated into practice. The Lev; 
Zealand scheme seems almost to provide a disincentive to 
the obtaining of informed consent. Further, the patient 
who is unsuccessful under the accident compensation 
scheme may well be reluctant to attempt a subsequent 
claim by using the residual right of action, having 
perhaps already been through a process of hearings and 
appeals. The well-known vagaries of the negligence 
action - paradoxically so heavily criticised by the 
Woodhouse Report[92] - may well be more strongly felt 
when one process has already been tried and has failed.
It seems clear that by making the distinction between 
accident and disease, the intention of the legislators
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and the Vvocdhouse Commission was to limit the 
availability of compensation to certain groups. It has 
already been pointed out that this distinction is 
philosophically illogical and pragmatically
problematic. In the case of the injured patient these 
problems would seem to be exacerbated by the apparent 
reluctance of decision-makers to award compensation in 
medical cases. As Hughes says:
...it is suggested that there has been an 
unfortunate tendency to restrict the concept of 
'medical misadventure' rather than approaching 
it in a liberal way so as to incorporate an 
expanded 'injury* element in the definition of 
'personal injury by accident.[93j
The disaffected patient is, then, unlikely to be more 
readily compensated under the accident compensation 
scheme than under the negligence action, and indeed may 
sometimes be in a worse position given the range of 
qualifications which apply to medical cases.
Moreover, there is a further problem in respect of 
the level of awards made under the new scheme. It is 
axiomatic that damage resulting from medical treatment 
may well be more severe than the level of negligence or 
misadventure which it represents. In ether words, a 
small slip by a doctor, or the occurrence of an 
unavoidable risk, may result in major and grave damage to 
the patient. Under the tort or delict system the extent 
of the damage and the long-term prospects of the patient 
form part of the assessment of damages.[94] This has
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been criticised in a number of British cases as 
representing too substantial an award when, the person is 
incapable of understanding or experiencing the loss,[95] 
although it is a well established feature of the 
negligence action. The hew Zealand scheme deals
expressly with this type of award. Mot.-, only are damages 
awarded according to needs (up to certain limits) but 
substantial financial awards are expressely restricted by 
the legislation in respect of all groups, and in 
particular those who have no awareness of that loss. As 
Blair says:
It should be noted that the section expressly 
provides that the Commission, in assessing 
compensation, shall have regard to the injured 
person's knowledge and awareness of his injury 
and loss.... In the common law there has been 
some controversy regarding the amount of 
compensation that should be awarded for pain and 
suffering and loss of amenities when the 
accident victim has little or no awareness of 
his loss. However, it now seems to be accepted 
that in such circumstances only moderate 
compensation under this heading should be 
awarded.[96j
Thus, compensation will be subject to limitations on the 
grounds that the person injured does not understand the 
change in circumstances. Klar sees this as a real 
problem of the new scheme, and claims that therefore 
'there has been a very uneven replacement of common law 
rights by accident compensation rights'.[97] 
Limitations on awards apply, of course, to all claimants 
under the scheme, and there is little doubt that some may
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be disaffected by the considerably lower awards likely to
be made. Klar, in fact, claims that the level of
compensation is highly significant to the very nature of 
the accident compensation system in that: ---
It is clear from the attempts made by victims 
who have been intentionally or recklessly 
injured to use the common law rights of action, 
that the social justice aimed for by the 
Vvooahouse proposals has resulted in grave 
injustice to some. This ought not to be a 
feature of social reform.[98J
The level of award made may well be problematic to those
who were reared on the common law system, but it is to be
hoped that the problem is resolved in future generations, 
since it may be that dissatisfaction in this area is as 
much a function of outdated expectations as it is a 
critical point about social justice.
Accident Compensation and the Doctor
It is not, however, only the patient who may suffer as a 
result of restrictive interpretation of the accident 
compensation scheme. Dismissal of a claim by a patient 
may well result in a civil action in negligence being 
brought against the doctor placing him or her in much the 
same position as his or her colleagues in other 
jurisdictions. It has frequently been pointed out that, 
given the system of medical insurance offered by defence 
organisations, it is only the doctor who seems to have a
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defence who will end up in a court of lav;. [99] Equally, 
if damage is not deemed to be personal injury by accident 
in the accident compensation scheme an action at common 
lav; may still lie, and the doctor remains at risk of 
civil action. As Osborne notes ' [i]t is still open to a 
patient to bring an action in negligence against a 
doctor, surgeon or hospital so long as the patient cannot 
be said to have suffered personal injury by 
accident.1[100j Marrow interpretation does not
necessarily serve the interests of medicine - indeed it 
may serve to leave the physician in a vulnerable 
position.
Summary
The Vvoodhouse condemnation of the negligence action 
coupled with the desire to include more people within the
ambit of accident compensation demanded the use of a less
\
narrow and value laden terminology than that of 
negligence. To confine the award of compensation to 
circumstances equating to negligence, with the 
implication of fault, runs completely contrary to the 
ideology of the scheme. Equally, in theory at least, no 
special allowances are made for any group whose behaviour 
may contribute to the occurrence of harm to others. 
Certainly doctors are given no special status under the 
Accident Compensation Acts, and the patient may therefore 
expect to be treated in the same way as any other
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potential claimant.
Unlike the tort or delict system, which concerns
itself with factors extraneous to the actual harm, the 
accident compensation scheme should be indifferent to 
them. Whilst judges, and indeed some commentators, in 
the common law jurisdictions of the world have expressed
disquiet about the impact on the practice of medicine of
a finding of negligence in respect of a doctor,[101]
theoretically such concern is foreign to the New Zealand 
scheme and should not contribute to the assessment of 
eligibility for compensation.
However, there is some evidence that:'[t]he 
Commission has interpreted the new phrase [medical 
misadventure] cautiously with the result that doctors 
remain at common law risk to some extent if the
interpretation be correct.'[102J Indeed, the evidence 
tends to suggest that 'medical misadventure' has been 
interpreted not merely as an example of personal injury 
by accident, but almost as a further test to be applied 
in establishing eligibility for compensation under the
scheme. This is most clearly demonstrated in cases 
relating to the risk factor involved in all medical 
treatment.
Statements from decision-makers in the accident 
compensation scheme and in cases relating to it are
remarkably similar to those used by some judges in the
tort or delict system. For example in A. C. C. v. 
Auckland Hospital Board[103] the judge almost echoes the
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words of Lord Denning in the case of Roe v. Ministry of 
Health|_104j by saying that '[i]t is the nature of medical 
and surgical treatment that unexpected and abnormal 
consequences may follow...1[105] The expectation that 
adverse consequences may follow medical treatment is 
deemed to have an impact on their status as 'accidents' 
or 'misadventure' for the purposes of compensation. For 
example, the judge continued:
Where there is an unsatisfactory outcome of 
treatment which can be classified as merely 
within the normal range of medical or surgical 
failure attendant upon the most felicitous 
treatment, it could not be held to be a 
misadventure.[106]
There is, as Palmer says, 'a ring of the old tort
lav;'[107] in such a statement - almost as if the impact 
of the occurrence of the risk on the patient is less 
significant than the interests of medicine or the 
protection of the reputation of the doctor. Under the
accident compensation scheme such factors should be 
irrelevant. Nonetheless '[t]he Commission by its
restrictive interpretation seems concerned to avoid 
sliding down the slippery slope and compensating illness 
or death every time medical treatment fails.'[108]
Since the outcome of failed or risky medical
treatment may be illness, then the distinction
incorporated into the legislation between accident and 
disease becomes relevant. Whilst this distinction has 
been described as ilogical, it may be less problematic if
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consistently applied. Thus the patient may seem to be 
in no worse a position than anyone else whose disability 
or loss flows from sickness rather than accident. 
However the patient _is in a different position, partly 
because he or she is almost by definition already ill and 
the problems of distinguishing between illness and
accident are therefore exacerbated. As Klar points out
there is a kind of rough and ready distinction drawn by
the Corporation, but this distinction is not without
problems.[109]
Thus, the intervention of medicine is not usually
deemed to be an external event for the purposes of the 
scheme, even although the risk which actually occurs and 
causes damage is not a feature of the pre-existing 
disease, but rather of the treatment for that disease.
In other words, if A suffers harm or loss as the result
of an illness then he or she is clearly excluded from
cover under the accident compensation scheme - all the 
symptoms relate exclusively to the illness and are not
compensable. However, if A seeks treatment, then any
damaging side-effects are risks not of the illness but of
\
the treatment. If this distinction were accepted by the 
Accident Compensation Corporation, then A could be 
compensated in the latter case since the treatment is 
external to the disease for these purposes. This,
however, has not been the interpretation adopted,[110]
and in fact A would not be compensated in the latter case
unless the risks were so rare and so crave as not to be
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anticipated even by the doctor.
Moreover, there is a difficulty with the concept of 
'unexpectedness' which is central to the definition of 
accident used in the scheme. To say that adverse 
side-effects are not 'unexpected' rather than not known 
may be to stretch the unexpectedness factor 
considerably. Even where the patient is informed of 
possible risks, it may, in cases where the risk factor is 
small, be stretching common sense too far to suggest that 
because they are known they are also expected. Indeed, 
if one looks at other categories of claim it can be seen 
that foreknowledge of possible risk is not held to render 
the harm 'expected'. For example, the well-known risk 
to participants in certain contact sports does not
preclude compensation in the event of that risk 
occurring. One can only hypothesise that the essential 
difference between the two cases relates to the
involvement of a third party, that is the doctor. If
this is so, then there would seem to be - even under the
accident compensation scheme - an apparent reluctance to 
attribute responsibility for harm to medicine, perhaps 
because it is seen as itself a social 'good'. The only 
other possible explanation would seem to relate to the 
involvement of a third party, whoever, that may be. 
However, there is third party involvement in other 
situations yet it is not deemed to affect the claims of 
the damaged individual.
In medical cases, some relatively sophisticated
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interpretation of language has been indulged in as a 
means of avoiding the admission that the damaging event 
was an accident and therefore compensable. For example, 
in one Review case it was said:
In relation to many forms of medical or surgical 
treatment there are known complications or 
consequences and some of them may, when they 
occur, be unexpected by the patient although 
anticipated by the doctor or surgeon....That 
degree of unexpectedness, however, does not mean 
that the complications or consequences must not 
only be adverse to the patient's well-being but 
must also have been unexpected by the doctor or 
surgeon giving the treatment.[Ill]
It is open to question why such an interpretation should 
be adopted by the Accident Compensation Corporation. 
Moreover there is no necessary implication in any other 
type of claim that a risk has been accepted, whether or 
not the person was aware of its existence, merely because 
someone else knew of the possibility of the risk 
eventuating. What such an interpretation seems to do is 
to reinforce the notion that patients tacitly accept the 
risks of treatment whether or not these are fully or 
partially explained to them. In other words, this 
interpretation may be a straightforward adoption of some 
of the arguments, currently raging in the common law, 
into the new scheme. One further possible explanation 
for narrowing the scope of liability in this area is the 
desire (again common in other jurisdictions) to avoid the 
ascription of liability in medical cases.
It 'should be noted, however, that the accident
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compensation scheme is not in theory concerned with the 
ascription of liability but rather with the amelioration 
of loss and harm. The concept of personal liability/ 
which is central to the tortious or delictual action, is 
not of relevance in this system, except, it would appear, 
in medical cases. If this is the case, then it can be
seen that in cases involving patients the decision-makers
are considering 'blame' or 'fault' and taking account of 
factors extraneous to the claim itself in assessing 
eligibility. The adoption of such an approach leaves 
the patient in a vulnerable position. Denied access to 
the accident compensation scheme, he or she is left only 
with the option of using the residual common ;law 
action. Yet Woodhouse was highly critical of this 
action, and it has been claimed that it is often 
particularly unsuccessful in medical cases.[112]
Conclusions
As a result of the interpretation used by the
decision-makers in the accident compensation scheme, some 
citizens, by virtue of their already vulnerable position, 
become even more vulnerable. They cannot claim
successfully where no treatment is given or where the 
wrong treatment is provided. They must face the 
inherently tricky task of showing that their injuries 
result from accident and not disease. Without resorting 
eventually to the tort based action they cannot claim in
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respect- of a lack of real consent to treatment, and they 
are forced to accept risks which may never have been 
disclosed to them. In many cases they will be thrown 
back on the much-maligned negligence action. The aims 
of Woodhouse to support and rehabilitate the work force 
cannot be achieved in this way.
There are further implications flowing from this 
interpretation which also have serious repercussions for 
all patients. There is clearly no incentive within the 
scheme to protect the patient's right to make knowing 
choices about the desirability of treatment from his or
her point of view if consent (or at least acceptance of 
risks and benefits) is implied from acceptance of the 
treatment. Problems of information disclosure will be 
left to the common law with the possible exception of
those cases where consent was given to one treatment but 
another was actually undertaken. Lven under systems
which use the traditional approach such cases are given 
special protection,L113] but they will amount to only a 
very small proportion of the total potential cases.
In any event, failure to disclose the existence of a 
known risk which may have affected a patient's choice,
but which did not in fact eventuate can never be
\
compensable under the accident compensation scheme, since 
it does not and cannot equate with the definition of
eligibility. Evidently, if the insult is to integrity 
and does not result in incapacitation from work, then 
there is no rationale for compensation in Woodhouse's
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terms. Thus, changes in interpretation could offer 
compensation in cases where harm resulted, but could 
never provide a vindication of the abstract right, since 
the kind of harm caused is not legally recognised.
A broad interpretation of personal injury by accident 
and medical misadventure would include negligence as well 
as other accidental mishaps which occur in medical 
practice. It would also minimise the common law risks 
to the doctor and ensure compensation for the patient who 
is damaged whether or not by anyone's fault. However a 
review of decisions would suggest that in fact only 
limited categories of medical events are deemed to be 
included in the cover offered by the accident 
compensation scheme. These are roughly as follows
1. Situations where the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur 
would have been applied under the common law;
2. Accidental damage to, or breaking of, implements used
in the medical transaction;
3. Acts of operational negligence.
The situations excluded would be: -
1. Failure to treat or diagnose accurately;
2. The occurrence of risks known to the doctor but not 
necessarily to the patient;
3. 1‘ailure to obtain make disclosure of sufficient 
information to permit a morally satisfactory decision 
by a patient.
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Thus, the new scheme neither covers all aspects of what 
might have been negligence under the pre-exisiting system 
nor does it cover all situations which would equate to a 
common sense view of what amounts to 'accident'. As 
Cripps says:
The proposition that personal injury caused by
negligence is not synonymous with personal
injury caused by accident, and hence may not be 
covered by the Act, has been accepted by the
Authority and by the Courts. Although such 
acceptance appears at first sight to run
contrary to the intention of the legislation to 
abolish the negligence proceeding for personal 
injury, it illustrates yet again the 
difficulties involved in clearly defining the 
term 'accident' for the purposes of the Act.[114]
Misguided attempts to protect the conventional practice 
of medicine and the unfortunate distinction between
accident and illness conspire to leave both doctor and
\
patient in a vulnerable position. In this area, 
accident compensation decisions bear a striking 
resemblance to their counterparts in common law 
jurisdictions and only enlightened decision-making will 
alter this unsatisfactory situation. Effective cover 
will only be available when a wide interpretation is used 
and the distinction between accident and sickness is 
removed.
Of course, it is relatively simple - perhaps even 
tempting - to criticise innovative legal schemes. The 
status quo is comfortable, even although it may be the
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subject of complaint when it fails. Lespite the obvious 
problems of the system of liability operating in most 
developed countries, there is security and reassurance in 
the old, and philosophical and practical doubts about the 
new. Compromisers seek some middle course hoping for 
the best of both worlds. Indeed, it is no exaggeration 
to say that the tort or delict system has, in many 
countries, succumbed to demands for change and that a 
kind of mixed system of liability applies in many 
jurisdictions already. This has the advantage of 
satisfying the defenders of the old and the visionaries 
of the new. But it must not be forgotten that the 
common law has changed primarily as the result of 
external pressures. It is not necessarily the case that 
the system itself is so structured as to make change 
simple, rather that the imjjetus for change often comes 
from pressure groups distressed by the sometimes 
long-term deprivation of individuals or groups. As 
liability has been extended, mere groups have been 
included - for example children born damaged who 
sustained injury pre-birth, or as a result of 
pre-conception harm to their parents.[115J The type of 
action to be raised may have changed, as in the United 
Kingdom with the introduction of a strict liability 
system for vaccine damaged children.[116J However, not 
only do these schemes have their internal drawbacks, but 
many victims will still remain uncompensated.[117] In a 
welfare state, this may seem to be less problematic than
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in other communities, but this is only to beg the
fundamental question of society's actual concern for the 
damaged, the weak and the vulnerable. Mere piecemeal 
pension-type payments may be entirely unsatisfactory, and 
the private law nature of the system ensures that 
rehabilitation need not be a priority.
The philosophy of the Woodhouse heport seems to 
reflect society's concern for its citizens, and to 
restate convincingly its responsibility for them. All 
systems have their drawbacks. Largely, however, they 
may be defined in terms of the extent to which they 
contain significant restrictions and limitations on 
eligibility. The more the system excludes, the less 
will be the satisfaction with the system itself. 
Woodhouse, unfortunately made the same fundamental error
of introducing exclusions as have other less radical 
schemes. Universal inclusion would render disputes 
about eligibility, fault and causation obsolete - major 
difficulties for any pursuer in traditional systems, and 
surprisingly not entirely foreign to the accident 
compensation scheme.
Having said this, however, it is worth noting that
criticism of the accident compensation scheme is 
relatively rare in Lev/ Zealand. It may be that this
reflects a general satisfaction with the scheme, although 
the more cynical have reflected that:
...the economic investment in the program and
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the emotional commitment to it have turned 
accident compensation into something of a "hands 
off" issue. Many people, especially
politicians, are acutely aware that to a certain 
extent Mew Zealand's international reputation is 
at stake when tampering with accident
compensation.[118]
Whilst this might be accurate, it is also the case that 
the system - with all its flaws - does present a view of 
state as essentially benign and supportive. Moreover, 
its effect has not just been the somewhat negative one 
commented on by some tort lawyers. Whilst much of its 
impact may be symbolic, it has nonetheless ensured that 
many people who would otherwise not have received any 
compensation, are now in a position to obtain the help 
they need. There is scope for improvement, of course, 
but the improvements needed are practical rather than 
philosophical and in some ways, therefore, easier to 
achieve. A return to the fault based system is 
unlikely, and would in any event solve no problems. 
Furthermore, the fault based action reflects a particular 
view of compensation which would now seem to be 
politically at least - obsolete in Mew Zealand. As 
Lloyd-Bostock says:
The question of whether or not the law should 
provide compensation on the basis of fault 
ultimately comes down to value judgements about 
what kind of society, we want to live in, and 
what principles and priorities are reflected in 
our lives.[119]
Mew Zealand has indeed made a brave commitment to a set
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of priorities which are not so readily identifiable in 
states which demand personal accountability as the 
primary means of allocating blame - which is essential to 
the fault based action - and force private funding of 
compensation despite the knowledge that many victims will 
not be helped by this process, and that new victims may 
be added to the list through the personal hardship of 
having to pay damages. It is to be hoped that smugness 
does not affect the accident compensation scheme - there 
is a way to go. Nonetheless the scheme's philosophy 
satisfies the moral intuitions of many and may, with 
detailed self-analysis and informed self-criticism, yet 
prove to be the bold, humane and truly comprehensive 
system which was intended.
For the patient, however, the major problems are 
structural, and depend less on the vagaries of 
extra-legal concerns than in other areas of concern. 
Where violation of autonomy forms the basis of a 
grievance, the system, by definition arid interpretation, 
seems unsuited to the vindication of patients' rights, 
and to offer less chance of success even than negligence 
analysis. Certainly, the development of a meaningful 
doctrine of consent based on information disclosure and 
satisfying the patient's rights in medicine, seems to be 
unlikely and may indeed be ultimately impossible.
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THE SPECIAL GROUPS
CHAPTER 8
It has been claimed that the right to consent to medical 
treatment is a right of considerable importance for the 
would-be autonomous human being.[1] That the law at 
present seems, in most if not all jurisdictions, to be 
ill-equipped to handle this right effectively or 
sensitively is a subject for concern. This is the case, 
not merely because there is something inherently valuable 
in the abstract about the claim to self-determination in 
medicine, but also because only direct access to this 
right protects the citizen from his or her vulnerability 
to the power of medicine, and stimulates his or her 
capacity to challenge professional paternalism which, 
however well intentioned, can be, and often is, a face-on 
threat to autonomy.
However, there are some groups of individuals 
within communities for whom the significance of the right 
may be either downgraded or denied. It has, for example, 
been a most important aspect of the right as formulated 
here, that its primary significance lies in its capacity 
to facilitate self-determination, or perhaps to express 
self-determination in a clear and uncompromising way and 
in a manner consistent with the rights of the individual 
to liberty and privacy as aspects of that right. Thus, 
it seems clear, the capacity to act in a self-determining
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manner is central to the right as described. In so far 
as this goes, however, it is obvious that describing the 
right in this way leaves one open to the charge that it 
would therefore have a limited application. Those groups 
whose autonomy is in doubt could, in these terms, find 
themselves clearly outside the scope of the right and 
denied the protection which it is claimed it can offer.
If this were, therefore, an inevitable conclusion, 
then clearly, both practically and theoretically, it 
could have serious implications for the right itself. At 
a practical level it would, unless legal or social change 
were instituted, automatically exclude groups such as 
children, the mentally ill and the mentally handicapped, 
and deny to them the respect and protection which being 
within the ambit of the right can provide. At a 
theoretical level, it could challenge the very claim that 
there is a fundamental right to participation in 
therapeutic choice, firmly based in information 
disclosure, and demanding that disclosure whether or not 
is is actively sought in individual circumstances. At 
best, therefore, the right becomes merely something which 
is of interest to certain privileged groups, and at worst 
it loses the universality which is said to characterise a 
human right and distinguish it from a mere interest. If 
this position is adopted, then one might well question 
the importance of information disclosure, since it 
appears to be relevant only to certain groups in the 
community. Moreover, it might be further noted that
462
these groups probably equate fairly closely to those with
whom the doctor would most likely share information in
any event, since they are the rational, sensible and
intelligent members of the community who could be 
trusted, even perhaps by paternalists, to take the
'right* decision and not overreact.
So, it could be concluded, detailed discussion of 
the right to information disclosure and the value of the 
resulting therapeutic partnership, whilst perhaps of 
academic interest, is, in meaningful terms, a redundant 
and unnecessary exercise, since ultimately all that it 
amounts to is a reaffirmation of the way in which a 
•good' doctor would in any event treat a 'good' patient. 
For the rest, paternalism is essential - a necessary 
evil, perhaps, but necessary nonetheless. To draw such a 
conclusion, however, would be seriously to misunderstand 
the value of the application of the right, and further to 
make seriously erroneous deductions from the state of 
current legal and social thinking. Moreover, to adhere 
to this position is to place an intimidating amount of 
power in the hands of one professional group. Even a 
right based on capacity for, or interest in, making 
autonomous choices need not be so limited as to make 
blanket exclusions of such a sweeping nature as this.
In considering the special position of these 
groups, therefore, it will be argued that it is not the 
case that their status in se denies them access to 
information disclosure and decision-making, although this
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may be the outcome in some limited circumstances. 
Rather, it will be claimed, it is clear that current laws 
do countenance and validate autonomy-enhancing behaviour 
by these groups, and it will further be shown that 
recognition of the importance of the right may lead to 
expansion rather than contraction of the numbers of these 
currently privileged individuals.
The blanket assumption that a right firmly based 
on autonomy has no relevance for these groups is based on 
a number of misconceptions. The first of these is that 
the setting of a legal barrier, or the classification of 
mental condition, necessarily justifies differential 
treatment, and the second is the assumption that the law 
invests its created barriers with an almost mystical 
force which demands that they are always applied without 
analysis.
In any event the law is somewhat complex in regard 
to those who are regarded as incapax^CZ] As Walker[3J 
notes:
The whole private law is stated by reference 
to the individual who is bodily and mentally 
capax. and every person is presumed capax 
. ... If not under curatory an incapacax may 
sue and be sued himself, his capacity and 
responsibility in relation to the matter in 
issue being a question of fact. It is always 
a question of fact whether the alleged 
incapax did or did not , at the material 
time, have the mental capacity to appreciate 
the legal force of the transaction he was 
entering into.....'[4]
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The groups who are routinely regarded as incapax are 
those with whom this section is predominantly 
concerned. They will, however, be so defined by 
reference to a general categorisation which may or may 
not be definitive of their legal standing. In other 
words, boundaries may be created which practically 
describe groups, but it need not be assumed that their 
force is overwhelming when deciding whether or not the 
decision of an individual can or should be binding.
The law routinely sets barriers. often 
acknowledging their essential arbritariness, and 
certainly noting that their applicability may change with 
changing circumstances and social mores.[5] However, 
where guidelines do seem to be required (for example the
legal statement of the age at which a child may be
criminally responsible[6]) their purpose may or may not
be to raise an irrebuttable presumption. In the case of
the above example, the presumption i_s irrebuttable, 
because of the potentially unacceptable consequences of
individual and subjective judicial or prosecutorial 
decision-making about the imponderable, and because of
the consequences of a finding of responsibility. Other 
legal barriers, however are designed to establish what
should be the case. For example, the presumption that a
child under the age of 16 years cannot legally consent to 
intercourse is more of a device to avoid exploitation and 
to express what society thinks behaviour should be, than 
it is a presumption of the same sort as that made in
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respect of criminal responsibility. Absolute certainty 
in the application of the law is achieved by the former, 
and relative certainty by the latter.
However, whether the magical age of majority (the 
age at which a person becomes fully responsible for all 
of his or her behaviour and is therefore also accorded 
the full panoply of civil rights), is fixed at 16 or at 
18 or even at 21, there is little doubt that contemporary 
law seems reluctant to make a blanket assumption that 
below this age no rights (and equally no
responsibilities) can be attributed.[7] However, it is 
clear that their very existence presents some 
difficulties for those who would wish to argue for an
extensively applicable right to consent to medical 
treatment or to withhold that consent. If they are
narrowly interpreted, then the implication logically 
seems to be that those who have not reached the barrier 
age lack the legal capacity to enter into certain 
agreements, or to choose a sexual partner, for example.
They are thus effectively denied the status of autonomy, 
and by definitiion could not therefore be legally able to 
make autonomous choices about health care. If this 
interpretation is applied, all children will be denied 
the protection offered by the right because they are not 
legally autonomous. Decisions will be taken by other 
authorised people on their behalf and the child's own 
decision will be given no weight.
However, the right to consent to medical treatment
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is not necessarily dependent on legal definition of 
capacity, nor is there any imperative that artificially
created barriers must be applied in a rigid and
inflexible manner. Indeed, it has been claimed supra
that the right to consent is not routinely applied by 
courts even in respect of those whose legal capacity is 
not in any doubt. In other words, the right itself
cannot simply be defeated by the fact that the law fails 
to acknowledge it in all circumstances where it has value 
and merit. The mere existence of legal hurdles (in the 
form, for example, of temporary legal disability or 
decision making practices) does not defeat the right, if 
indeed the right has an intrinsic worth.
Even those most closely wedded to medical
paternalism would scarcely adopt such a position, for to 
do so would render all of us vulnerable to
disinformation, misinformation or no information at all. 
It can safely be argued, therefore, that there is a 
significance to be attached to a therapeutic alliance, 
even where legal systems are reluctant to give outright 
support to it, and even where those legal systems limit 
its applicability.
Equally, the mere diagnosis of mental illness need 
not absolutely deny autonomy to the affected individual, 
and indeed the law routinely makes no such 
assumption. [8] This can be shown by two methods. On the
one hand, the law has clarified the rights of the
mentally ill to give or withhold consent in certain
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circumstances, [9 J and on the other the law will not 
inevitably accept psychiatric diagnosis.[10] The 
significance of this latter point is most clearly 
observed in the criminal law, which permits legal 
responsibility for otherwise criminal activity to be 
elided on evidence of mental disorder.[11] However, not 
all mental disorders have this effect.[12] not all 
psychiatric assessment of mental condition is accepted, 
and the court is free to ignore even uncontested medical
evidence of mental disorder and substitute its own
' \
assessment of the state of mind (and legal
responsibility) of the accused.[13] The law is not, 
therefore, entirely unused to assessing medical
categorisation and, sometimes, finding it wanting as a 
yardstick for the attribution or denial of civil or human, 
rights or responsibilities. There is, therefore, no
blanket assumption to be made merely as a result of the
fact of diagnosis, and this affects the right and the 
capacity of the individual to claim autonomy, accept 
responsibility and make self-determining choices.
Before considering these groups in more detail, 
therefore, at least one conclusion can be drawn. The law 
is already prepared to look beyond the apparent 
certainties of age or mental condition. As Lord Scarman 
made clear in the case of Gillickfl41 the law must be 
prepared to take account of changing attitudes even when 
faced with apparent legal truisms.[15] Given the extent 
to which the law (through judicial discretion and
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decision-making) has altered the face of rights and their 
applicabilityr[16] it would be difficult to argue that
they cannot, or should not, take account both of changing
circumstances and of forceful theoretical arguments which 
accord with a satisfactory moral position. It can 
legitimately be argued, therefore, that the mere
appearance of blanket denial of autonomy in certain 
groups neither reflects in fact the current legal 
position nor need it affect the claim that the right to 
consent to medical treatment is a right of considerable 
sigificance, whose application should not be unthinkingly 
or needlessly restricted. Indeed, consideration of those 
groups for whom the application of the right may seem 
problematic, will, rather than denying the value and
applicability of the right, highlight even more clearly 
the inherent importance of its vindication.
Children and Medical Treatment
The position of children in law can perhaps best be 
described as confused. This confusion arises 
substantially from the tradition of parental control and 
custody over children.[17] Where parent and child 
confilict, it is tempting to assume value in the adult 
perspective, and in any event, since adults are charged 
with the responsibility for ensuring the well-being of 
children, and for managing their affairs,[18] it seems 
logical to attribute decision-making powers to them;
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Only in the most extreme cases, for example in cases of 
child abuse, will parents lose their control over 
children. As Walker puts it:
Parental rights and powers are of two kinds, 
that of guiding and directing the persons of 
children under full age, and that of legal 
administration, of managing their property 
and legal business or advising thereon.[19]
In Scots Law, therefore, the parental role is either, in 
effect, one of control or one of guidance. Walker 
further notes that the extent to which the parental role 
is either all-powerful or merely advisory depends on the 
age of the child.
So long as the child is a pupil, the father 
had at common law, and now each parent has, 
the right of custody, and the power and 
authority to regulate the child's upbringing 
and discipline and govern its person; this 
power is diminished but not ended when the 
pupil child becomes minor, and terminates 
when the minor child becomes major.[20]
English law too, although based in a different 
tradition and not recognising concepts of minority in 
precisely the same way as Scots Law,[21] nonetheless has 
long acknowledged the limitations on parental authority. 
As Lord Denning, for example, noted:
 the legal right of a parent to the
custody of a child ends at the eighteenth 
birthday and even up till then, it is a 
dwindling right which the courts will 
hesitate to enforce against the wishes, of the 
child, the older he is. It starts with a
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right of control and ends with little more 
than advice.[22]
Since it is the custody right which gives parents the 
authority to make decisions on behalf of, or in the best 
interests of, the child, then there is considerable 
significance in the view that this right is not only not 
absolute, but is also diminishing. That it is not 
absolute is shown by the fact that courts can and will 
step in where parents are thought to be abusing their 
position. [23] That it is dwindling may be shown where 
courts place weight on the views of a child, in matters, 
for example, of custody after divorce.[24]
However, the fact of parental authority, however 
much it dwindles even when someone is under age, does 
mean that the authority to be given to the views of 
children is often preliminarily subject to scrutiny, not 
in terms of children's rights but rather in terms of 
parents' rights.[25] In other words, the current legal 
assumption may be expressed in such a way as to imply 
that the choice of the parent, so long as it is not 
overtly against the best interests of the child, is the 
choice which has force. It is necessary, therefore, to 
consider at this stage the extent to which parents do 
have rights over their children with particular reference 
to medical matters. Although it may be morality which 
attributes theoretical status to individuals, the 
response of the law to demands for, e.g. autonomy, has a 
primary significance in the actual extent to which rights
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can be vindicated.
It has already been noted that the fundamental 
problem in the attribution of rights to children is the 
fact that autonomy based rights are presumed to require 
actual, as opposed to potential, capacity for autonomy. 
The attribution of many fundamental rights to adults is 
based on their capacity for autonomy - hence the 
purported justification for the exclusion of the mentally 
ill or children, for example. The restrictions placed on 
children reflect a recognition of the fact that they may 
not yet have achieved that level of maturity and 
understanding of consequences enabling them to make 
decisions which will be upheld whether or not they seem 
to the outsider to be the best decisions. It is this 
dubiety which routinely invokes the use of parental 
authority as a proxy decision-making tool (this applies 
equally to those who stand in loco parentis to the 
child).
However, the law is no longer - if, indeed, it
ever was - prepared to draw such a clear-cut line as
\
this. This is not to deny the role of the parent or 
guardian, but rather to define it more clearly, and to 
recognise the immense variety of attributes which both 
children and their legal guardians may have. Moreover, 
it also serves to recognise the fact that children may 
have certain rights which can be vindicated even where 
parental views conflict with them. As Lord Scarman said 
in Gillick:[261
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Parental rights clearly do exist, and they do 
not wholly disappear until the age of 
majority. Parental rights relate to both the 
person and the property of the child: 
custody, care and control of the person and 
guardianship of the property of the child. 
But the common law has never treated such 
rights as sovereign or beyond review and 
control. Nor has our law ever treated the 
child as other than a person with capacities 
and rights recognised by law.' [27] (emphasis 
added)
Much of the case law in this respect has grown up
around the issue of custody after divorce. In this most
\
important matter of where the child should live and with 
which parent, courts have been increasingly prepared to 
give weight to the view of the under-age child. Respect 
is given to the wishes of the child in this issue, 
particularly where the child is older and is thought to 
be capable.of understanding the implications both of the 
situation and of the choice. It is self-evident that in 
such situations the views of the child will not equate 
with the view of one of its parents, but they nonethless 
will be given priority or at least considerable weight. 
For example, in the case of Gover v. Gover,T281 the court 
indicated that it would be unrealistic - even wrong - not 
to give 'very great and usually decisive'[29] weight to 
the views of the child. There is no reason why a similar 
view could not be taken in respect of medical treatment, 
even despite a somewhat unhappy ambivalence on the 
question of children's rights and parental rights in this 
area.
Different approaches to rights may be taken by
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states and their legal systems, and to some extent these 
differences stem from differing legal, social and 
political traditions. Countries with a written Bill of 
Rights have a relatively clear framework within which to 
operate, whilst those - like the United Kingdom - without 
such a formal statement of rights may tend to a more ad 
hoc type of decision-making, based on factors which 
relate as much to entrenched social attitudes, or even 
matters of current concern, as they do to issues of human 
rights per se. Thus, as has been noted,[30] it is 
relatively unusual for British courts to debate issues in 
the clear language of human rights, whereas in the United 
States such language is relatively commonplace.
The position in the United States does not, of
\
course, inevitably guarantee consistency of approach 
either between or among states, since interpretation of 
constitutionally guaranteed rights may vary.[31] 
However, the existence of a rights-dominated constitution 
can be said to provide a backcloth against which issues 
can be tested. Equally, challenges in courts are 
relatively more common in the United States so that 
courts have had the opportunity of testing and refining 
their approach to certain issues, for example in relation 
to the question of children's rights in general, and in 
respect of health care matters in particular. Thus, it 
has been held that children need not be subject to a 
parental refusal of treatment,[32] and that, over 
parental objection, cosmetic surgery can proceed even
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where known to be risky (because the child's right to a 
normal development would be enhanced if the surgery were 
successful).[33] Moreover, despite theoretical
prohibitions on the use of young children as organ donors 
or in experimental situations, a young child's wish to 
donate bone marrow to a sibling has been upheld because 
of the possible distress to the child should the sibling 
die.[34]
In the United States, courts, in deciding on 
health care matters, have tended to make certain 
assumptions which predispose them to view the issues 
under consideration from a particular perspective. Most 
states, therefore, have tended to view the problems 
arising in disputes over health care not from the 
perspective of children's rights pure and simple, but 
also by taking into consideration other - and sometimes 
competing - rights, such as the right to family 
integrity.[35] What is at stake, then, is primarily the 
power of the parent over the child - in other words, 
parental rights - and the extent to which the state may 
interfere in this classical privacy right.[36] That the 
resulting decision may be couched in terms of children's 
rights can be misleading. Nonetheless, the American 
child can, at least, appeal to the language of rights in 
seeking to vindicate and obtain authority for his or her 
own views.
Assessment of the extent to which their British
\
counterparts may validly claim to have rights in health
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care matters is perhaps more subtle, and is certainly 
confused by a number of court decisions.[37] Bearing in 
mind the fundamental question as to whether or not courts 
do give rights to children in health care decisions, 
there are two main scenarios which can be postulated to 
elucidate the response of the courts. Since Scottish 
courts have not confronted these issues directly, the 
main source of information will be the approach adopted 
by the English judiciary. It may, however, be argued 
that the outcome in the cases under consideration is 
likely to have been the same since the Scottish division 
into pupillarity and minority is not immediately relevant 
to them, and the matters of concern would apply in each 
jurisdiction. These scenarios are as follows: first,
where parental choice conflicts either with the views of 
the child and/or with the state's interest in health care
provision, and second, where the child's view cannot be
\
ascertained but there remains a potential conflict 
between parental decisions and the interests of the state 
(as represented by the judiciary). Both of these 
encompass situations already considered by British courts.
Despite earlier doubts as to whether or not the 
provision of contraceptive advice and treatment is indeed 
an aspect of health care, the court in the GillickT381 
case were confident that it was. The question to be 
answered, therefore, was - at least in part - the extent 
to which the child was entitled to make personal, and 
authoritative, decisions about using contraception
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without the parent necessarily being notified or involved 
in the decision-making process.
At the first hearing of the case,[39] Mr. Justice 
Woolf was in no doubt that there was here no conflict of 
rights. Parents, in his view, had responsibilities 
rather than rights, and the resolution of the problem 
depended on the status accorded to the individual 
child.[40]
Scots law adopts a number of distinctions which 
predict the extent to which the behaviour of the child 
will be given authority. Although a full discussion of 
this is not necessary here, there are characteristics of 
this distinction which are relevant to the current 
discussion. The most critical difference between Scots 
and English law is the division drawn by Scots law of the
status of childhood into pupillarity and minority. Its\ .
effect is to offer some assistance in the assessment of 
capacity to make certain decisions, even although the 
question of children's rights in health care has not been 
directly confronted by a Scottish Court.
It can safely be assumed, however, that - where 
the child is a pupil - it will be necessary that 
decisions are taken on behalf of, and in the best 
interests of, that child by other. The position of the 
pupil child is as follows:
Pupils, that is boys aged under fourteen and 
girls aged under twelve, the traditional age 
of presumed puberty, have, for reasons of
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their natural incapacity, strictly limited 
legal personality...[41]
Given this, '[a] pupil must... have a parent or other 
person to act as his tutor and administrator-in-law. 1
[42] It can, therefore, safely be deduced that
\
decisions in respect of therapy must, in the case of 
pupils, be taken by authorised others. This is, of 
course, subject to the overriding authority of the court 
to scrutinise, modify or overrule decisions which seem to 
conflict with the 'best interests of the child'.
The minor child, however, is in a different 
situation and has:
...legal personality and considerable though 
limited legal capacity and powers....He is 
capable of entering into legal transactions, 
though requiring the protection of the law by 
reason of his inferior judgement or 
discretion.[43]
The minor child in Scots law, therefore, will be given 
some authority to make decisions which have significance 
- a limited capacity to exercise autonomy is thereby 
recognised.
From the status traditionally accorded to children 
in Scots law can be inferred the likely approach of the 
courts to disputes concerning therapeutic choice. Where 
the child is a pupil, the decision of a n ;authorised adult 
will be validated subject to that decision being in the 
best interests of the child.[44] In the case of a minor 
child, subject to certain limitations designed to afford
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a degree of protection, the child will have decisions 
respected in recognition of developing capacity and 
maturity. As has been said[45]:
Whereas much of the law on the legal capacity 
of minors is concerned with the question 
whether they can make themselves liable, the 
law on consent by minors to medical treatment 
is concerned with the question whether they 
can absolve other people from liability.[46]
At present, S.H.H.D. Circular DS (79)2 seems to adopt the 
view that the age of consent to medical treatment is 
sixteen, but there are serious reasons, already 
expressed, for doubting the validity of this view in the 
case of the mature minor child. In addition, as the 
Scottish Law Commission's Consultative Memorandum [47] 
further notes:
Medical practice does not make law. If 16 
is the age of consent to medical treatment in 
Scots law then this must rest on the common 
law or on statute. It cannot rest on the 
common law because the age of 16 has no 
special significance at common law. It does 
not rest on statute because there is no 
statutory provision on this subject in 
Scotland. There appears, in short, to be no 
legal foundation for the widespread view that 
16 is the age of consent to medical treatment 
in Scotland. The question is governed by 
the common law and at common law the only 
relevant age is the age of minority - 12 for 
a girl and 14 for a boy.[48]
Since in contemporary society the perceived distinctions 
between males and females are less routinely appealed to, 
it seems likely that all children, whatever their sex.
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would be treated in a similar manner over the age of 
twelve. In any event, the Memorandum continues:
...it is by no means certain that a child
below the ages of 12 or 14 could not give 
consent, at least to certain types of medical 
treatment, which would provide an effective 
defence to a prosecution for assault or a 
civil claim for damages for assault. Much
would depend on the age and understanding of
the child and on the nature of the
treatment.[49]
The capacity of a child to consent to medical 
treatment was largely unexplored in English law beyond 
the provisions of the Family Law Reform Act 1969, s.8 of 
which states that 'the consent of a minor who has 
attained the age of sixteen years to any surgical, 
medical or dental treatment, which, in the absence of 
consent, would constitute a trespass to his person, shall 
be as effective as it would be if he were of full age.' 
However, s.8(3) of the same Act makes it clear that the 
Act does not affect the validity of any consent which 
would have been effective had the legislation not been 
passed. The court therefore was at liberty to interpret 
the legislation, as it in fact did, as implying that the 
consent of someone under sixteen could also be 
effective. [50] The decision as to the validity of any 
purported consent would, the House of Lords declared, 
rest on the maturity of the child and her capacity to 
understand the implications of her choice.[51] The child 
who is thought to be sufficiently mature is therefore
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given the status of autonomy, even although the rules may 
at first suggest that capacity depends on age and not 
maturity. In the United States also it has been held to 
be unconstitutional to make a blanket requirement of 
parental consent based solely on the fact that the child 
is under age.[52J
The position in these jurisdictions therefore 
would seem to be that the 'mature' child has the right to 
make free choices in health care matters - choices which 
will be up upheld by the courts. However, the right to 
make these choices would seem to rest also on the nature 
of what is being consented to, and so cannot be taken 
necessarily to be generally applicable even to the
•mature' child. In the United States, on the other hand,
although ' recognition of independent rights for
children is a recent development .....'[53] nonetheless:
 the scope and character of those rights
has been a focus of scholarly attention.
Children's rights have been found to include 
due process, privacy, and first amendment
rights. Additionally, the child has an
interest in family integrity and in
protection of personal autonomy and 
individual choice.[54]
British courts seem to be slightly less
theoretically developed in this area. In the Gillick 
case the ultimate value was apparently given to the 
rights of children to privacy (of a sort), and the 
decision seems to lend some credibility to the assertion 
that children do have rights in health care matters which
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are distinguishable from the parents' decision as to what 
is in the best interests of the child. The nature and
extent^ of these rights remains relatively unclear, 
although Lord Fraser at least was in no doubt as to their 
purpose. In his view:
.....parental rights to control a child do 
not exist for the benefit of the parent.
They exist for the benefit of the child and 
they are justified only in so far as they
enable the parent to perform his duties 
towards the child, and towards other children 
in the family.[55]
This statement seems to provide some flexibility 
in the assessment of the extent to which competing, or 
apparently competing, parental views can affect the 
choice of a given child. However, merely to conclude 
that parental rights diminish with the child's age, or
that they exist for the benefit of the child, indicates
something about parental rights, but very little about
the rights of children. If the effect of judgements of
this sort is to be to give children certain autonomy
rights, then the child's statement of preference
(assuming any other criteria have been met) would be 
sufficient to validate the action to which they have
consented, or to support their refusal. This, however is 
not necessarily the case, since the validity of the
decision may also have to run the gamut of a different 
set of criteria - namely, the views of the court.
On the one hand, courts have been prepared to
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countenance certain levels of independence for children 
or at least for the older child. As Lord Fraser said in 
Gillick:
It is, in my view, contrary to the ordinary 
experience of mankind, at least in Western 
Europe in the present century, to say that a 
child or young person remains in fact under 
the complete control of his parents until he 
attains the definite age of majority .... and 
that on attaining that age he suddenly 
acquires independence.[56]
Nonetheless, courts will not in fact merely accept the 
view of a child even where parental views are deemed to 
have no value or relevance.
On the contrary, it can be said that courts will 
uphold the views of the child most commonly where, 
although they conflict with parental views, they concur 
with \the view of the court as to what is 'in the best 
interests of the child*. What, therefore, even the 
Gillickf571 judgement may amount to is not so much a 
statement of rights for children in health care, but 
rather evidence of the fact that the judiciary were of 
the view that the interests of the child can sometimes be 
best served by permitting her access to contraception, 
and by encouraging or facilitating that access, even 
without reference to parental views, in circumstances 
where it is clear that the alternative is the risk of 
unwanted pregnancy. Courts, therefore, are somewhat 
loath to commit themselves to an outright championing of 
children's rights without first evaluating the impact of
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the child's decision and then pronouncing on its 
quality. This ambivalence reflects both confusion as to 
the applicability of the concept of rights, and the 
competition between on the one hand the value of allowing 
a child free reign and on the other the responsibility of 
the court to have the welfare of the child as its 
paramount consideration. Often, therefore, subjective 
judicial values are imported to replace those of the 
parent or the child.
One further matter can usefully be considered 
under this heading - a matter which testifies to the 
accuracy of the foregoing section and demonstrates 
clearly the ambivalence of the judiciary. Whether 
couched in terms of family integrity or in terms of the 
responsibilities of custody, developed jurisprudence 
traditionally pays respect to parental powers. Although 
these powers may be removed, there is generally a 
presumption that parents do and will act in their child's 
best interests - not merely physical but also moral, and 
some might say, spiritual. Careful protection is given, 
for example, to the rights of parents to choose their 
children's religious upbringing[58] - a choice which may 
not be value free in medical matters. Thus, parental 
rights in this area will be upheld unless their decision, 
and its implications, conflict with the view of others 
(notably the judiciary) as to what is in the child's best 
interests.[59] Parental refusal, on behalf of their 
children, of life-preserving medical treatment on
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religious grounds is now routinely overridden,[60] but 
the question remains, if parents have the right to make 
religious choices, on what grounds do they become
defeasible (even, it should be noted where the child
\
agrees with the parent)?
On the one hand, it could be said that the child 
has a right to life which in this situation implies a 
right to treatment, and it must always be 'in the best 
interests of the child' that this right is upheld.
Whether or not this right is always upheld by the law
will be considered later.[61] It could also be argued 
that, in the case of the 'mature' child, whilst an 
affirmative choice would probably be respected by the 
court, a negative choice defeats the presumption of 
maturity and therefore places the onus back on the court
to safeguard the potential autonomy of the child in the
face of parental or individual irresponsibility. 
Whichever is the correct interpretation, and it seems in 
the light of recent decisions more likely to be the
latter than the former, it represents in no way a
recognition of children's rights as such, but merely 
indicates that where the child behaves in accordance 
either with the views of its parents, or the views of the 
court, that choice will be upheld. The attitude of
British courts, therefore seems to be at best ambivalent 
to the question of children's rights.
Of course, it is possible to argue that children 
do have rights, but that decisions are taken for them in
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order that they may ultimately be able to do so for 
themselves. In line with this view, children should have 
their fundamental rights protected so that they can reach 
maturity and then make their own choices. If this is the 
case, then the age of the child is irrelevant - what
matters is that the child should be permitted to reach 
the age at which people are free to take their own 
decisions, however irrational they may appear to others. 
Thus, respect for the most important of all rights - the 
right to life - would become a prerequisite of this 
approach. Although children (particularly the very 
young) have no way of expressing a preference for life
over death, the law is entitled to assume it, either 
because it enhances the child's opportunity of choosing 
for him or herself in the future, or because it must
always be 'in the best interests of the child' to be 
alive^rather than dead. Indeed, in actions for 'wrongful 
life',[62] which are rejected by British courts,[63] the 
courts have made it clear that it can never be worse to
be alive than dead.[64] Thus, apparently
uncontentiously, the law must at least in this situation 
attribute rights to children, whatever the views of their 
parents. But is this the reality?
British courts have recently taken two decisions 
which, although at first sight in conflict with each 
other, in fact display similar characteristics and which 
can serve as illustrations of the second postulated 
scenario. In the case of R v Arthur,[65] a doctor - with
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parental consent and authority - failed to operate to 
remove an intestinal blockage in a Down's Syndrome 
child. Without the surgery, the child would inevitably 
die and all parties were in agreement that this was the 
appropriate outcome (except, of course, the child). The 
doctor instructed that the child should receive nursing 
care only, and in due course, he died. At the subsequent 
trial of the doctor for murder (subsequently reduced to 
attempted murder) the court was apparently impressed by a 
number of arguments, not least of which was that the 
parents had cooperated in the taking of the decision, and 
agreed with it. In view of the earlier discussion of the 
courts' attitude to parental refusal of life-saving 
therapy this decision seems somewhat strange, not to say 
paradoxical. If rights are attributed to children, then 
this case seems to suggest that they are not attributed 
without differentiation. In fact, of course, both judge 
and jury were reluctant to hold the doctor criminally 
responsible for his behaviour in the exercise of his 
profession,[66] and in any event they sympathised with 
the views of the parents - quite a different situation 
from that where they disagree, but nonetheless very 
little to do with children's rights.
The second case referred to above seems at first 
sight to contradict the Arthur decision. In Re B (a 
minor)T671 the court, in the face of medical and parental 
objections, did authorise the removal of a similar 
intestinal blockage in a Down's Syndrome child, and
\
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apparently vindicated the child's right to life. 
However, on closer examination, the court was consideraby 
more ambivalent than this. This child was saved because 
her 'quality of life' after sugery would not be 
unsupportable - not because she had a right to life. A 
further example of the overriding of parental wishes can 
be found in the case of Re I) (a minor) f 681 in which case, 
having asserted the fundamental right of the citizen to 
reproduce,[69] the court refused to permit the 
sterilisation of an 11 year old child, even given medical 
and parental consent. Again, however, the court did not 
in fact make a general statement of rights for children, 
but rather felt that in this particular case, the child 
would eventually reach a condition in which she would be 
legally capable of consenting to marriage, and that 
therefore she would be entitled to recognition of her 
right under the European Convention on Human Rights[70] 
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,[71] to 
marry and found a family.
In terms of the kind of right described here, 
therefore, it can be seen that current attitudes would 
not facilitate its routine application to children unless 
a) the child is 'mature' and b) the child's decision 
accords either with that of the parents or that of the 
court. Yet, the position overtly adopted by courts seems 
to differ from this somewhat bleak analysis. Lord 
Brandon, for example, in the case of R v D f721 said:
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In the case of the very young child, it would 
not have the understanding or the 
intelligence to give its consent, so that the 
absence of consent would be a necessary 
inference from its age. In the case of an 
older child, however, it must, I think, be a 
question of fact for the jury whether the 
child concerned has sufficient understanding 
and intelligence to give its consent
 While the matter will always be for the
jury alone to decide, I should not expect a 
jury to find at all frequently that a child 
under 14 had sufficient understanding and 
intelligence to give its consent.[73]
Or, as Lord Scarman put it in the Gillickf741 case:
.. ... I would hold as a matter of law that 
the parental right to determine whether or 
not their minor child below the age of 16 
will have medical treatment terminates if and 
when the child achieves a sufficient 
understanding and intelligence to enable him 
or her to understand fully what is 
proposed.[75]
As has been seen, therefore, courts are apparently 
reluctant to commit themselves to an overt recognition of 
children's rights per se. However, they are prepared, in 
certain circumstances, and provided that certain criteria 
are satisfied, to acknowledge the validity of a given 
child's viewpoint. In terms of the right as formulated 
here, however, the imposition of additional criteria 
might seem to be discriminatory, and therefore to defeat 
the right itself. More important would seem to be the, 
perhaps natural, conservatism of the court system. To 
intervene in family life is admittedly not something to 
be undertaken lightly, but neither is the denial of a 
basic right - that is the right to be given and be
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permitted to use information in relation to matters 
affecting the individual's health. Moreover, a 
reluctance to weigh the child's over the parent's view 
may simply reflect a failure to understand the 
significance of individuality. It has been said, for
example, that:
\
Courts tend to view the family as a unit and 
to assume that the parents' interests are the 
same as the child's. It is possible, 
however, to separate the interests of parents 
and child: a parental decision regarding a
child's medical care is, in effect, 
"other-regarding" and not "self-regarding".
Even if the decision purports to be in the 
child's best interests, it is still made by 
someone external to the child.[76]
At the moment, therefore, it is not overstating 
matters to say that the courts (if somewhat grudgingly) 
are prepared to give a certain amount of autonomy to 
certain individual children. The child's position at law 
is evidently rather complex. On the one hand the law 
seems prepared to concede that the mature child can make 
autonomous choices about a number of matters, including 
health care, while on the other, this concession 
apparently rests not on a clear attribution of rights to 
children but rather on the court's assessment of a number 
of other factors. Thus, rather than assuming the 
capacity to exercise a given right, as the law would 
theoretically do with adults, a number of other criteria 
have to be satisfied before a child will be given the 
benefit of the protection afforded by the right.
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Most notably, the court has to be satisfied that 
the child is sufficiently 'mature' (however that is 
defined) and that the child's choice is in his or her 
'best interests', as decided either by the parents or by 
the court. Rights, it would appear, can presently be 
restricted by such qualifications. Thus, there are 
evident difficulties for those who would wish to ascribe 
the right here defined to those under the age of 16. 
This right is dependent on autonomy - indeed, it may even 
be said that it is justified by autonomy. The discussion 
of the position of children in the law would not seem to 
indicate, however, that British courts are prepared to 
give serious consideration to the question of whether or 
not children, factually as opposed to legally, are 
autonomous. However, it is clear that there is a move
V
away from a blanket assumption that children are not 
autonomous, towards acceptance that some of them may be. 
Nonetheless, such autonomy as is granted seems likely, at 
present, to be limited - most especially by the apparent 
truth that children will be given decision making powers 
only where their choice is thought to be rational. Now, 
it was also central to the right as described that it 
encompasses the right to behave in a manner which, 
medically at least, could be considered 'irrational'.[77] 
If, therefore, so substantial a group as children 
are apparently excluded from the right, then one might 
wish to argue that it becomes less of a right, and more 
of a courtesy. If this situation is to be altered then
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the problems of attribution of the right to children must 
be tackled, and in particular, two questions require to
be answered. First, are current problems insurmountable,
and second, if some concessions do require to be made to
paternalism, do they sabotage the right?
By accepting, in some cases, that children can 
consent, or withhold consent, in respect of medical 
treatment, the courts may be said to be accepting that, 
at least in certain circumstances, children may validly 
make choices about health care. In this respect, at
least, they may be said to recognise a limited 
applicability of the right, and by so doing they are 
demanding that all aspects of the right are satisfied.
Thus, the child may be protected at least by that aspect 
of the right which relates to information disclosure. In 
other words, at least part of the right is required 
before the child can make any kind of a choice. However, 
clearly information disclosure per se is insufficient to 
satisfy the right, since it is the authority to act on 
that information which permits the making of autonomous
decisions. Merely to say that children have the right to 
information, therefore, would not be sufficient for those 
who would argue for children's rights in health care.
Thus, the more contentious aspect of the right
becomes particularly important. If, however, the child's 
choice is only given credibility when it accords with 
what others regard as rational or appropriate, then the 
child is severely disadvantaged. The addition of
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qualifications about maturity and intelligence when 
coupled with this apparent requirement of rationality 
both restricts access to information and limits freedom 
of choice. It is, in fact, almost double jeopardy for 
the child. On the one hand, he or she needs to convince 
that he or she is intelligent and mature, and thereby 
merits information disclosure, whilst on the other hand 
if that information is used 'unsatisfactorily' or 
'irrationally' by the child in reaching a conclusion on 
it, then they may be redefined as insufficiently mature 
to make a valid choice. The welfare model which 
dominates child law serves to restrict freedom of choice 
unless that choice satisfies the opinions of others. 
Thus, • an affirmative decision by a child to opt for 
therapy would likely receive support in the way that a
negative decision may not and yet, as Hoggett says:
..... the capacity to consent must logically 
include the capacity to dissent: if, then,
parental control is diminished to the extent
that the child herself has acquired capacity, 
the parents should have no power to insist
  a duty to provide adequate medical aid
does not necessarily import a power to force 
it upon a competent child who has rejected 
it.[78]
However, the value of the right to consent to
medical treatment is not in itself modified or defeated 
by current decision-making parameters, nor by apparent 
current confusions as to the status to be accorded to 
children. Indeed, the courts themselves have been
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ambivalent about the standing of parental decision-making 
in respect of treament for their children. In the 
Arthur[79] case, the court was impressed with the fact 
that the parents opposed therapy, whilst in Re D (a 
minor) (wardship proceedings)[801 and Re B (a minor)[811 
the courts were prepared to go against parental views. 
Moreover, in the case of Re B (a minor) (wardship 
proceedings) (sterilization)[821 the court made it clear 
that parents alone could not make decisions about the 
sterilisation of their children, and that the authority 
of the court was needed for such a major step, 
particularly where a human right was involved.
If it is, therefore, accepted that parents do not 
have absolute rights over their children (even, it would 
appear over a very young child), then it can also be 
accepted that courts have neither a supervisory monopoly 
on what is in the best interests of the child, nor do 
they require to deny the application of rights, at least 
to the child who is capable of expressing a view. To 
accept this, would be to alter the basis of
decision-making in respect of children and to permit and
authorise the child to make treatment decisions more 
often than is currently the case - particularly where the 
child's choice is to reject therapy. It is submitted
that the real barrier to such a position is the confusion 
engendered by the apparent rigidity of the law's adoption 
of an age at which maturity and discretion can be
attributed.
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As has been noted, even the courts themselves are 
reluctant to assume any finality associated with mere
age, but there seems, nonethless, to be a knock-on effect
\ .
from age-barriers which makes courts suspicious of at 
least of some of the decisions which children may wish to 
make. Cases concerning children under this age require 
the courts to consider two issues which may well 
conflict: first, the child's claims to have the right to
make decisions which he or she regards as appropriate, 
and second, the court's own responsibility to act in the 
best interests of the child. Clearly, there is as much 
scope for disagreement between courts and children as 
there is between parents and children.
However, de-emphasising the artificial age barrier 
could pave the way for more children to be accorded the 
authority to make autonomous choices which is so central 
to the right as described, and need not threaten either 
the family unit, or the protective role of the courts. 
It is conventional wisdom that children mature at 
different rates, and some would claim that they mature 
younger in contemporary society. For courts to begin by 
making the assumption of maturity (where the child can 
express a view), rather than the assumption of 
immaturity, would be to respect this, would not be an 
unusual judicial step and would adequately reflect the 
position of children in contemporary society. Lord 
Fraser, indeed, would seem to have acknowledged the need 
for the law to take account of this position, when he
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said '[sjocial customs change, and the law ought to, and 
does in fact, have regard to such changes where they are 
of major importance.'[83]
Further support for the suggestion that the law 
does in fact acknowledge the autonomy of the child can be 
gleaned from the fact that the age of criminal 
responsibility is considerably lower than the apparent 
age of consent to medical treatment, and yet the 
attribution of criminal responsibility implies that the 
child is capable both of making choices to behave in a 
given way and of bearing the consequences (however harsh) 
of that behaviour. In other words, children already are 
credited with the capacity to make self-determining 
choices at a very early age, and indeed, a Scottish court 
has held, a child of 5 to be capable of behaviour which 
amounts to contributory negligence.[84]
Further, it is not apparent that the age at which 
a child is presumed capable of making choices in the 
important area of health care need be set at the age at 
which most children would be capable of so doing (e.g. 
16). To make a preliminary presumption of authority 
below that age would not defeat the role of the court in 
having the welfare of the child as its paramount 
consideration. Merely, it would require justification 
for not accepting the child's views, rather than as at 
present almost requiring justification for accepting 
them. In doing this, the courts or parents would be 
required to show a good or compelling reason why the
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child's view should not be authoritative, and this could 
be done in a consistent and logical manner and within a 
clear framework.
The advantages of this approach are many, not 
least  ^that the protection of the right to consent to 
medical treatment would be afforded to a greater number 
of young people. Moreover, were the question to be 
approached from this perspective, more certainty may be 
introduced into the law, since it would be necessary to 
elaborate the reasons for invalidation of the child's 
position, thereby providing guidelines for future 
resolution of disputes.
It is admitted, however, that this approach also 
expressly countenances that here are some children whose 
views would be overridden, and this leads to the second 
question posed supra, namely, does the acceptance of 
limitations defeat the right itself? It is conceded that 
it may, in the case of children - or at least some 
children - be necessary to consider whether or not their 
choice is in fact based on both adequate disclosure of 
information and on an understanding of that information 
and the implications of the choice. It would, for 
example, be evident nonsense to suggest that a baby 
should have the practical right to make choices about 
therapy. However, it may also be thought that:
If a consent is real provided that the 
patient understands in broad terms what is 
proposed and agrees to it, then logically the
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capacity required of the patient to give that 
consent should not be great. A child who is 
capable of understanding the proposed 
treatment in such terms should be able to 
give her own consent.[85]
Moreover, making the fundamental assumption for 
rather than against capacity both extends the ambit of 
the right and removes the essential discrimination which 
is inherent in current attitudes. It further defeats 
some of the paternalism which is evident in judicial or 
parental decision-making, and permits children access to 
information about their health care and the freedom to 
make decisions which they regard as being in their best 
interests. To place some limitations on a given child's 
legal capacity to make such decisions does not, 
therefore, sabotage the right. Rather it may be said to 
enhance it, since the assumption of the value of free 
decision-making re-emphasises the importance which is 
attached to the right itself. It is submitted, however, 
that for the moment the debate is approached from an 
erroneous perspective, which both diminishes the value of 
the right and fails to reflect the differential 
capacities of children.
Limitations may, therefore, be. placed on the 
exercise of the right without affecting its fundamental 
significance. Indeed, these limitations may well be 
invoked as a recognition of the value of autonomy. For 
example, courts may only choose to intervene where the 
decision made by the child would deny him or her the
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capacity to become autonomous. As Hoggett puts it:
The distinction between knowing what is 
involved and having the capacity to make a 
wise decision is an important one. In the 
case of an adult, it is axiomatic that 
understanding, not wisdom, is all that is 
required for a man may go to the devil if he 
chooses. Perhaps in the case of a child, it 
is permissable to ask for more, on the ground 
that the first and paramount consideration 
throughout the law is the welfare of the 
child herself, so that the only treatment 
which anyone may permit is that which will 
promote her welfare.[86]
Adoption of the right in the case of children would, 
therefore, imply in the one case that parents could not 
authorise medical behaviour which causes the death of 
their child. But the converse could equally be said to 
be true - that is, that the only situation in which 
someone may interfere with the decision of a child is 
where the child's decision is a threat to his or her 
welfare, a threat, moreover which, since the overriding 
of the child's choice repesents the denial of a right, 
must be grave.
In conclusion, therefore, the fact that some 
limitations may have to be placed on a child's capacity 
to exercise the right to consent or not to medical 
treatment need not be seen as fatal to the right itself. 
Nor is it inimical to the claim that the right should be 
extended to children, and that this should be the 
cornerstone of decision-making in this area. It is not 
unusual for rights, even those which are said to be
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fundamental, to be nonetheless subject to some 
limitation,[87] but conflict is resolved from the 
perspective that the right is in operation and that it 
does have value. Thus, good reasons have to be shown for 
interference with its exercise. There is no reason why 
such an approach should not equally be applied to 
children's rights in health care.
Consent and the Mentally 111
The example of children is a significant one for the 
purposes of this discussion, because children are 
generally subject to disabilities very similar to those 
which affect other groups whose autonomy may be in 
doubt. If one can legitimately argue that the rationale 
underlying decision-making in respect of children should 
depend on the presumption of capacity, and that 
limitation of that capacity should demand stringent and 
consistent application of formal rules, then it is 
relatively simple to argue the same case for the mentally 
ill and the mentally handicapped.[88] The crucial 
characteristic shared by each group is the apparent 
simplicity of making certain blanket assumptions of lack 
of capacity from which deviations must be justified, 
whereas the thrust of this argument is that the most 
efficacious way of protecting these groups without going 
to the extreme of denying them basic rights is to assume 
capacity, and to demand proof of its lack.
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Accepting the validity of the approach adopted 
regarding children, requires relatively brief 
consideration of the other groups. It has already been 
noted that the law is not obliged slavishly to follow 
medical diagnosis of mental ill health. Nor need it 
anticipate that such diagnosis, where accurate, implies 
any more than the illness itself - in other words, it 
need not be a predictor of legal capacity or moral 
autonomy. If this is accepted, then even the 
anti-psychiatrists, such as Szasz,[89] would be satisfied 
with the appropriate legal response. As Mason and McCall 
Smith note:
The imposition of involuntary treatment will 
not ..... be appropriate in all cases. It is 
important to recognise that there will be
circumstances in which, although the patient 
is mentally ill, the illness need not have 
rendered him totally incompetent to make 
decisions.[90]
Thus, for example, it need not be assumed that a person 
is always incompetent merely because of the fact of
involuntary admission.
As Campbell[91] notes, however, there may be some 
for whom treatment in the absence of consent is the only 
potentially autonomy-enhancing strategy. To accept this 
view is to adopt a modified account of autonomy theory, 
admittedly, but it need not be fatal to the demand for
patients' rights in health care, when its use isY
carefully monitored and closely defined to apply in only
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the most extreme situations. As Campbell says, there 
would seem to be situations where an over-dependence on 
autonomy theories may result in significant harm to some 
patients who are acutely disturbed and distressed.[92] 
With due respect, this may be a valid position in respect 
of some very extreme cases, but the implications of 
adopting it as a more general approach would be
unacceptable. Doubtless Campbell would agree that
\
caution must always be exercised in making such 
presumptions where the potential outcome amounts to an
invasion of the integrity of the subject. The position 
adopted by those who would advocate a 'right to
treatment' which incorporates treatment without consent 
or against the wishes of the individual may be
justifiable, but, it is submitted, it must be of limited 
applicability. Moreover, it demands more clarification 
than a simple claim that, adopting such a view may enable 
someone to lead a normal life or will relieve suffering. 
The concept of normality is both relative and subjective, 
and must be carefully considered if the proponents of
this view are not, in fact, to be forced into a position 
of merely enforcing their view of normality on others. 
Equally, whilst it may be true that, in some cases, the 
welfare of the patient may suffer if autonomy is taken as 
inevitably the major 'good',[93] it is necessary to 
consider seriously what i_s welfare. These decisions, it 
is suggested in this discussion, should be made, if they 
must be, against a backdrop of respect for autonomy.
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As with children, the fact that there are some 
members of the group for whom consent (or indeed refusal) 
based on information disclosure is little more than a 
charade, need not affect the validity of the claim of 
others (perhaps the majority) that they have the right to 
make free choices about their therapy. Just as children, 
in terms of this right, may have to be permitted to make 
choices which to others seem 'irrational', even harmful, 
so too the mentally ill may wish to refuse therapy which 
might improve their condition.
Indeed there are some characteristics of mental 
illness which may add to the pressure to accept that the 
mentally ill should be permitted access to the right. 
Not least of these is the very uncertainty of psychiatry 
itself.[94] This uncertainty begins with diagnosis and 
ends with therapy. Indeed, it is this uncertainty which 
is one of the commonest justifications used by the law to 
ignore categorisation when convenient. Equally, and 
perhaps even more significantly, psychiatric therapy 
remains of uncertain value, at least where society values
'scientific' quantification of result. Finally, on this
\
point, there can be little doubt that all psychiatric 
treament is designed to modify behaviour. For this 
reason, its use is subject to a number of questions which 
do not apply, for example, to the treatment of a broken 
leg.
The situation of the mentally ill in respect of 
medical treatment, and their capacity to consent or not,
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fact .that legislation now clarifies the position of
was, if anything, less certain that that of the 'sane' 
adult human being until relatively recently. Some might 
argue, in fact, that there is an inherent paradox in the
the
most seriously mentally ill, and in particular that it 
specifically permits the imposition of certain therapy 
only with their consent,[95] whereas the adult who does 
not suffer from mental illness is required to run the 
gamut of the forensic lottery if he or she wishes to 
attempt a vindication of rights. Just as with those 
children who are incapable of expressing their opinion, 
it is necessary for some acutely mentally ill people, who 
effectively also cannot express their opinion, that 
decisions are taken on their behalf, by competent and 
disinterested authorities, which have at least the chance 
of bringing about a position in which they may become 
autonomous. Whilst this may be relatively more dubious 
in regard to the mentally ill, given the uncertain 
benefits of the therapy, it may equally be regarded as 
right-enhancing rather than right-denying. It is for 
this reason that some theorists, whilst opposed to 
paternalism in se. may nonethless argue that some of the 
mentally ill have a right to therapy - indeed, this may 
be the most important human right which can be ascribed 
to them, since through this right may come the right to 
autonomy, to liberty and perhaps even to life itself.[96] 
This much may be uncontentious, and it is 
certainly not the task of this discussion to describe
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definitive parameters of where lines should be drawn. 
Nonethless, the general proposition can be accepted 
without denying the value or the general applicability of 
the right to consent, or withhold consent, to medical 
treatment. Indeed, it should be noted that the 
legislation mentioned supra relates only to those who are 
detained as a result of serious mental illness,[97] the 
presumption being that. unless the facts of the 
individual case prove to be different, the rest of those 
who are diagnosed as suffering from some form of mental 
illness will, and can, be treated in a similar manner to 
the remainder of the community. That this may not be 
entirely satisfactory will be considered in the 
conclusion of this discussion, but that the position 
could be satisfactory can scarcely be in doubt.
Again, therefore, it seems clear that there is 
great merit, as with children, in assuming capacity, and 
requiring compelling evidence which would deny that 
assumption, since the capacity of those diagnosed as 
mentally ill, even accepting the diagnosis, will vary. 
To make a blanket assumption is to deny a valued human 
right without appropriate consideration, and, if for no 
reason other than that, cannot easily be countenanced, 
and is certainly difficult to justify. The model 
proposed in respect of children, therefore, can equally 
well be used in respect of the mentally ill in the 
community. Such an assumption would; it is submitted, 
also serve to alleviate some of the difficulties
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confronted by those who are responsible for interpreting 
the terminology of legislation, and would place the 
right to autonomous decision-making about therapy in the 
forefront of the debate.
Of course, the crucial difference between the 
incapacity of children and that of the mentally incapax 
is clearly that the one is only temporarily incapacitated 
by age, whilst the other's incapacity stems from the very 
reason for which it is sought to impose treatment. This 
certainly lends some credibility to the position of those 
who would value a right to treatment, and who might 
equally seek to differentiate the child from the mentally 
ill. It is not denied that there may be some 
significance in this distinction, but it jis doubted that 
the distinction can be used routinely to undervalue other 
human rights - indeed, even those who would seek to 
justify a right to treatment would not go this far.[98] 
What is crucial, therefore, is that a right, such as the 
right to treatment, which amounts to a denial of free 
will, but includes the possiblity of restoring it, should 
be subject to careful scrutiny and sparingly relied upon.
Thus, whilst there is no doubt that a conflict may 
exist between the right described here and other 
positions which also seek to enhance autonomy, there does 
seem to be a mechanism whereby compromise can be 
reached. In those cases where treatment ils. contemplated 
without consent the decision taken should be made from 
the perspective that autonomy, in medicine as in other
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areas of life, has a priority, and it must be a decision 
which can be, and is, justified by reference to clearly 
defined legal regulation, developed for the protection of 
the individual.
If this position, however, is to be of benefit to 
the mentally ill, at least in the first instance legal 
systems must value autonomy rights in medicine for the 
‘normal* citizen, since there can be no point in 
appealing to the 'normal' position where it is in itself 
unsatisfactory. With particular reference to the 
mentally ill, and against this backdrop, it may be 
desirable to seek the 'evolution of a form of psychiatric 
practice which is both sensitive to human rights and 
which is, at the same time, subject to an element of lay 
and legal control.'[99]
One further group remains to be considered, 
however, before conclusions can legitimately be reached 
about the general applicability of the right to consent 
to medical treatment, or the right to withhold consent,
based on adequate information disclosure. Perhaps more
\
than any other group, the mentally handicapped present a 
problem for the law, and because of this, for those who 
would argue for legal recognition of autonomy-enhancing 
rights in medicine. The complexities of the position 
regarding the mentally handicapped, therefore, require 
some analysis in this context.
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Consent and the Mentally Handicapped
In many ways, it is true to say, that a separate body of 
law has not been created for the mentally handicapped. 
As Ward says:
  an understanding of the law of children
helps with the less well developed law of the 
mentally handicapped, and indeed there has 
been a tendency for aspects of the law of the 
mentally handicapped to be stated by 
referring to equivalent concepts in the law 
of children.[100]
It is also clear that, both in the common law and in 
statute, the mentally handicapped are sometimes dealt 
with as if they were indistinguishable from the mentally 
ill.[101] This confusion, or lack of distinction, can 
have unfortunate consequences, particularly in the latter 
case, since the crucial distinction remains that the 
mentally ill may be treated with some hope of success, 
whereas mental handicap would seem more likely to be a 
life-long condition for which no therapy is available.
Perhaps through a lack of understanding of the 
nature of mental handicap, the law - as with children and 
the mentally ill - may find it tempting to assume general 
disability, an assumption which denies legal standing to 
the whole group. Yet:
When it comes to mental incapacity, we have 
at one extreme the normal adult of full 
capacity, and at the other extreme the person 
completely lacking legal capacity. In
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'< between these extremes is an area of partial 
legal capacity, which, broadly speaking, is 
an area in which people have capacity for 
some legal purposes and not for others. This 
area of partial incapacity is not sub-divided 
in the law, and it therefore covers the whole 
spectrum from mild mental incapability until 
one crosses the threshold of complete legal 
incapacity [102]
However, it is clear that, as with children and 
the mentally ill, the law tends not to make entirely 
blanket assumptions about capacity, considering each 
individual case very much on its merits. This ad hoc 
type of decision-making may indeed be necessary given the 
range and variety of degrees and types of handicap. 
Indeed:
..... the law has never sought to draw
clearcut boundaries across the chart, so as 
to create categories similar to the 
age-groups of children. There are no
generalised “packages" of law which apply to 
any particular range of disability. The law 
does not generalise to any great extent. It 
will define whether a particular individual 
has legal capacity for one particular 
purpose, at one particular time, and in one 
particular set of circumstances. It will
define whether one particular form of legal 
intervention is or is not appropriate.[103]
However, it will be argued here, as in the sections 
dealing with the other groups who have some legal 
disabilities, that even ad hoc decision-making is, and 
should be, undertaken against a background of respect for 
human rights.
In December 1971, the General Assembly of the 
United Nations adopted a charter of Rights for the
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Mentally Handicapped Person.ri041 The first and 
fundamental right contained in this agreement is as 
follows: 'The mentally retarded person has the same
basic rights as other citizens of the same country and 
same age.'[105] Naturally, the charter does acknowledge 
that there may also be need for a right to proper medical 
care and 'physical restoration',[106] but its general 
sense requires acceptance of the moral equivalence of the 
mentally handicapped. This assertion of rights is 
important on two counts. On the one hand, the law - as 
has been said - seems somewhat confused, perhaps even 
ambivalent, concerning the status to be accorded to the 
mentally handicapped, and on the other this group has 
been historically vulnerable to exploitation. In some 
situations, this exploitation has been condoned by the 
law.[107]
In terms of therapeutic medical intervention, 
there seems little doubt that the handicapped person 
would be treated in the same way as a child. In terms of 
detention or reception into guardianship, their position 
is similar to that of the mentally ill. [108] In other 
words, they are always vulnerable to the assumptions of 
others as to their best interests, or to legal 
presumptions which categorise their decision-making in 
such a way as to validate it only in a situation where it 
seems rational - 'rationality* being closely linked with 
the view of the parent or guardian on the one hand, and
the law on the other.
\
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Like the other groups referred to in this section, 
the handicapped are also vulnerable to non-therapeutic 
intervention. The position of the handicapped in respect 
of basic human rights can, despite the United Nations 
agreement, be described as ambivalent. The discussion, 
supra of the cases of R v. Arthur f 1091 and Re B (a 
minor) f 1101 shows clearly that the fact of handicap can 
be sufficient to encourage juries and courts to make 
assumptions about the value of those lives. If, it might 
be asked, the attribution of the basic right to life is 
not .always made in respect of the handicapped, then on 
what grounds could it make sense to insist on the 
attribution of admittedly less fundamental rights? This 
question can. of course, be answered relatively simply by 
reference to the argument that the fact that something 
happens currently need not imply its permanence or its 
correctness, and the section dealing with the rights of 
children may be called on in support of the view that to 
adopt a different, rights dominated, view may well 
relieve these problems.
The handicapped (in this case including the 
physically handicapped) are, of course at risk from the 
moment of conception. The Abortion Act 1967, bearing in 
mind the tragedy of Thalidomide, was at pains to permit 
the termination of any seriously handicapped pregnancy. 
Genetic screening being as sophisticated as it now is 
makes the detection of handicap in the womb more 
possible, and genetic counselling may either facilitate
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the decision to avoid a pregnancy where handicap is 
likely, or may provide the adult with the opportunity to 
choose abortion where the foetus is known to be suffering 
from severe handicap.[IllJ It is worthy of note that the 
section, which permits termination where severe handicap 
is shown, is the only section in the Act which authorises 
termination solely on the basis of this fact. Other 
terminations can only be authorised where the risk to the 
mother of carrying the child to term is greater than the 
risk of termination, or where the health of other 
children in the family would also suffer.[112] However, 
the fact that a child may be born with severe handicap is 
sufficient to merit termination of the pregnancy. Some 
of the handicapped, therefore, will not even be permitted 
to be born.
After birth, their rights are equally suspect. 
Although the utilitarian, such as Glover,[113] might 
argue that babies, having no interest in life, therefore 
can have no right to it, this scarcely reflects common 
morality or general law.[114] Indeed it is interesting 
that this argument is only used in regard to those who 
are not 'normal'. Any legal system which condoned or 
even countenanced the routine killing (whether by act or
omission) of healthy and 'normal' babies would be
\
regarded as an international scandal. Not even the 
consequential utilitarian argument that to terminate the 
life of a damaged baby may maximise the general good by 
encouraging the parents to have a subsequent (healthy)
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one,[115] can be taken seriously. unless the first
argument is accepted.
The comments made in respect of children and the 
mentally ill can equally be taken to apply to the 
handicapped, although it may be true to say that, at 
least in some situations, the needs of the handicapped
for the law to take a clear position on human rights are,
if anything, even more acute. Perhaps more than any 
other of these vulnerable groups, the handicapped are at 
risk, not merely of therapeutic decisions being made 
without reference to. or despite, their wishes, but also 
of the imposition of a non-therapeutic measure. Thus, 
they are used here as an example of the potential for 
non-therapeutic intrusion since they remain the group
most strongly represented in this area. Analysis of 
their position can be conducted by reference to a number 
of jurisdictions and highlights a number of revealing 
attitudes which, it is submitted, serve to reinforce the 
need to maintain at all times an awareness of, and 
respect for, human rights.
It is important at this stage to remember the. 
distinction drawn supra between therapeutic and 
non-therapeutic medical intervention,[116] and to bear in 
mind also that the distinction between the two, outside 
of the experimental situation, can be blurred - indeed, 
can be manipulated. Whilst 'therapeutic* is generally 
taken to imply something which is of benefit to the 
patient, and 'non-therapeutic' as something which may
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benefit knowledge and/or future patients, there is very 
real sense in which the former could be, and is. 
interpreted in a somewhat different way. The assumption 
behind the use of the term • therapeutic V is that it 
represents treatment of a medical condition and offers 
hope of benefit. Thus, chemotherapy, however unpleasant, 
may offer a hope of cure and is therefore therapeutic.
However, therapy which is designed to avoid social 
difficulties may also be forced into the framework of
•therapeutic* treatment, unless courts are very careful,
and it is here that the vulnerability of the mentally 
handicapped is at its most acute. The courts of a number 
of jurisdictions have, in recent years, been asked to 
consider precisely this issue in respect, most often, of 
a request to sterilise a mentally handicapped woman in 
order, not to cure a pre-existing physical condition, but 
on the social ground that she may be unable to cope with 
a pregnancy, cannot be trusted to take contraception, and 
would be unable to look after any child born, the
alternative being the trauma of an abortion.[117]
One thing at least is clear, however. Unlike the 
apparent, albeit limited, power of parents to make
therapeutic choices in respect of at least some of their 
children, courts are loath to permit the making of such a 
major decision as sterilisation without the proper legal 
formalities being undertaken. This attitude reflects the 
United Nations view, which in Article VII[118] makes the 
following comment:
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Some mentally retarded persons may be unable, 
due to the severity of their handicap to 
exercise for themselves all of their rights 
in a meaningful way. For others, 
modification of some or all of these rights 
is appropriate. The procedure used for 
modification or denial of rights must contain
proper leqal safequards aqainst every form of
abuse, must be based on an evaluation of the
social capability of the mentally retarted
person by qualified experts and must be
subiect to periodic reviews and to the riqht
of appeal to hiqher authorities.1(emphasis
added)
Thus, legal systems which demand court approval of 
proposed sterilisation of the mentally handicapped
provide at least some of the safeguards demanded by the 
United Nations. However, against a philosophy which is 
prepared to stretch the concept of 'therapeutic'
treatment, and which places less than sufficient weight 
on the value of certain human rights, the mere fact of 
court authorisation - whilst complying with the letter of 
the commitment - may not, in fact, meet its philosophy. 
Whether or not the handicapped person is an adult or a 
child will, in some jurisdictions, make an apparent 
difference to the capacity of courts to intervene. In 
England, for example, the use of wardship proceedings is 
thought to be competent only up to the age of majority, 
but not beyond, although recently a court has been 
prepared to authorise sterilisation and pregnancy
termination on a young mentally handicapped 
woman. [119] In Scotland, the authority to make major 
decisions ceases at the age of majority.[120] In
Canada, those over the age of 18 will be dealt with under
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the power of parens patriae, which essentially depends on 
the same type of decision-making. [121] In the United 
States, appeal may be made on behalf of the handicapped 
person by reference to Constitutional rights which it is 
held apply equally to all citizens.[122]
The history of involuntary sterilisation of the 
handicapped is a long one. [123] In the early part of 
this century (and in some states until comparatively 
recently) some United States courts were prepared to 
authorise sterilisation, and to deny the
unconstitutionality of laws permitting its.
enforcement.[124] These decisions must be seen against 
the background of the rapid rise of the eugenics movement 
in that country and its adoption by a large, and
interestingly disparate, number of groups and
\
individuals. For a time, therefore ‘[b]irth control 
became an issue primarily in as much as it related to 
forcing those who could or would not voluntarily control 
their reproductive capacities, not to breed.'[125]
Nor was compulsory sterilisation randomly used. 
There was a very definite bias towards sterilising those 
who, it was said, would either weaken the genetic stock 
of the country or who would, in any event, scarcely miss 
the capacity to breed or note the denial of a human 
right.[126] Thus, involuntary sterilisation:
..... by 1950 had accounted for the
sterilisation of over 50,000 persons in 
America, 20,000 in California alone. By 1964
the accumulative total had reached 63,678. 
Of these persons, 27,917 were sterilised on 
grounds of mental illness, 32,374 on grounds 
of mental deficiency and some 2,387 on other 
grounds.[127]
The attitude towards the handicapped, therefore, 
however genetically unsophisticated, was that there was a 
real probability that their offspring would be as much of 
a drain on the state as they themselves were seen as 
being, and that in any event, they probably did not have 
rights in this area and wouldn't notice their removal 
even assuming they had them.[128] In Buck v.Bell.[129] 
for example, a case which involved the compulsory 
sterilisation of a mentally defective young woman, the
court had this to say:
\
We have seen more than once that the public 
welfare may call upon the best citizens for 
their lives. It would be strange if it could 
not call on those who already sap the 
strength of the State for these lesser 
sacrifices, often not felt to be such by 
those concerned, in order to avoid our being 
swamped with incompetence. It is better for 
all the world, if instead of waiting to 
execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to 
let them starve for their imbecility, society 
can prevent those who are manifestly unfit 
from continuing their kind.'[130] (emphasis 
added)
Again in State v. Troutman,[131] the court doubted even 
the existence of rights in the mentally defective, 
saying: ' [i]f there be any natural right for natively
mental defectives to beget children, that right gives way 
to the police power of the State in protecting the common
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welfare ..... ' [132]
With the exposure of the eugenics movement as 
scientifically dubious, and the well-documented 
atrocities of the Nazi regime, the United States began, 
however, to move away from overt and involuntary 
intrusion into the procreative practices of the mentally 
unsound. Cases such as Carey v . Population Services 
International.T1331 and Skinner v. Oklahoma.f134] 
asserted the existence of a human right to procreate 
whose restriction demanded considerable and compelling 
justification. This was not, however, an entirely 
wholehearted move, although in the case of Katie Relf et 
al. v. Caspar Weinberger et al. in 1974 the court sounded 
a note of caution:
We should not drift into a policy which has 
unfathomed implications and which permanently 
deprives unwilling or immature citizens of 
their ability to procreate without adequate 
safeguards and a legislative determination of 
the appropriate standards in light of the 
general welfare and individual rights.[135]
A mere two years later, however, a North Carolina 
court concluded that mental retardation, was an 
identifiable category, and given that 'such persons are 
in fact different from the general population' they 'may 
rationally be accorded different treatment for their 
benefit and for the benefit of the public. ' [136] It is 
clear from these more recent decisions that the grounds 
on which courts are prepared to authorise sterilisation
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of the mentally handicapped are not in fact always 
therapeutic athough they may partially be so. In effect, 
they were concerned with the 'general welfare' as much as 
with the individual. In some cases, they may also have 
been concerned for the specific welfare of, for example, 
a parent who may feel that a sexually active handicapped 
dependent who becomes pregnant, or runs the risk of so 
doing, places a great strain on them, and may mean that 
they have to bring up any subsequent child.
Y
Indeed, courts in the United States have further 
blurred the distinction between therapeutic and 
non-therapeutic medical intervention by, in some cases, 
apparently assuming that the risk of pregnancy alone is 
sufficient to merit the sterilisation being considereed 
as therapeutic and not merely contraceptive. For
example, no clear distinction between the two was made in 
the 1976 case of In Matter of Sallmaier. f!371 where the
court said:
The decision to exercise parens patriae must 
relfect the welfare of society as a whole, 
but mainly it must balance the individual's 
right to be free from interference against 
the individual's need to be treated. if
treatment would in fact be in his best
interest.[138] (emphasis added)
Canadian courts too have considered these
questions, most recently in the case of "Eve". [139] In 
this case, the court was unprepared to adopt a
disingenuous approach to the nature of therapeutic and
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non-therapeutic treatment of the mentally handicapped. 
"Eve" is an adult who suffers from mental handicap, and 
who, it was thought, ran the risk of pregnancy. Her own 
capacity was such that she could not legally give her
consent to the operation herself, and the court was asked 
to exercise its parens patriae jurisdiction to authorise 
the surgery (in this case, sterilisation by means of 
hysterectomy).
The court noted that the proposed surgery was
•admittedly non-therapeutic',[140] that is, it was not
needed to deal with a medical condition, but merely to 
provide effective contraception. The purpose of the
surgery was explained by the court as follows:
One such [non-therapeutic] purpose is to 
deprive Eve of the capacity to become 
pregnant so as to save her from the possible 
trauma of giving birth and from the resultant 
obligations of becoming a parent, a task the 
evidence indicates she is not capable of 
fulfilling ..... it should be noted that 
there is no evidence that giving birth would 
be more difficult for Eve than for any other 
woman. A second purpose of the sterilization 
is to relieve Mrs. E. [Eve's elderly mother] 
of anxiety about the possiblity of Eve's 
becoming pregnant and of having to care for 
any child Eve might bear.[141]
\
In reaching its decision, the court undertook a 
thorough review of English, American and Canadian cases 
and provides an excellent analysis of the law and the 
points of principle which are central to the debate. 
LaForest, J., who delivered the judgement of the court, 
noted for example the extreme caution which courts must
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use in exercising their parens patriae powers,
particularly where the exercise of that power would 
affect fundamental rights.[142] Noting that the scope of 
the power was historically unlimited, he was unprepared
to concede that this entailed authority to make any
decision. Rather:
...it by no means follows that the discretion 
to exercise it is unlimited. It must be
exercised in accordance with its underlying 
principle ..... It is a discretion, too, that 
must at all times be exercised with great 
caution, a caution that must be redoubled as 
the seriousness of the matter increases.[143]
In particular, the court considered the earlier 
decision in Re K .f1441 where the Court of Appeal in 
British Columbia ordered that a hysterectomy be performed 
on a seriously retarded child on the basis that the 
operation was therapeutic given the child's alleged 
phobic reaction to blood which, it was thought, might 
present serious emotional problems at the onset of 
menstruation. In taking this decision, the court was at 
pains to point out that their conclusion hinged on the 
individual circumstances of the case, Anderson, J.A. 
saying 'I say now, as forcefully as 1 can, this case 
cannot and must not be regarded as a precedent to be 
followed in cases involving sterilization of mentally 
disabled persons for contraceptive purposes.'[145]
Faced with a considerable weight of evidence in 
respect of the impact of sterilisation, the fact of its
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irreversibility and with their concern for basic human 
rights, the court in "Eve" concluded that the operation 
could not be authorised by them. As the court said:
 the decision involves values in an area
where our social history clouds our vision 
and encourages many to perceive the mentally
handicapped as somewhat less than h u m a n .....
Moreover, the imlications of sterilization 
are always serious.[146]
The court had the advantage of consulting a report of the 
Law Commission of Canada,[147] which reviewed the 
available evidence in respect of sterilisation, and felt 
able to reach certain conclusions on its use in a 
non-therapeutic context in the case of the mentally 
handicapped. They stated for example that:
 like anyone else, the mentally
handicapped have individually varying 
reactions to sterilization. Sex and 
parenthood hold the same significance for 
them as for other people and their 
misconceptions and misunderstandings are also 
similar ..... The psychological impact of 
sterilization is likely to be particularly 
damaging in cases where it is a result of 
coercion and when the mentally handicapped 
have had no children.[148]
The court in "Eve" therefore, concluded that:
The grave intrusion on a person's rights and 
the certain physical damage that ensues from 
non-therapeutic sterilization without
consent, when compared to the highly 
questionable advantages that can result from 
it, have persuaded me that it can never 
safely be determined that such a procedure is 
for the benefit of that person. Accordingly,
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\ the procedure should never be authorised for 
non-therapeutic purposes under the parens 
patriae jurisdiciton.‘[149]
For the purposes of English law, Scottish courts 
not having directly considered the problem, it is worthy
of note that this thoroughly reasoned and rights
dominated judgement refered with considerable favour to 
the judgement of Mrs Justice Heilbron in the case of Re D 
(a minor) (wardship proceedings).f1501 The facts of this 
case relate to the proposed sterilization of an 11 year 
old girl who suffered from a syndrome which, amongst 
other disabilities, resulted in mental handicap. Both 
the girl's mother and her doctors had agreed that 
sterilisation was approriate in order to avoid the risk 
of pregnancy and the problems of the girl being unable to 
care for any child which she might have. The decision to 
sterilise was challenged and wardship proceedings were 
raised in order to place the child within the protection 
of the courts.
The wardship jurisdiction is designed to protect 
those who are thought to be incapable of protecting 
themselves, and its scope is wide. As Latey, J. said in 
Re X (a minor);f1511'
'..... the powers of the court in this
particular jurisdiction have been described
as being of the widest nature. That the 
courts are available to protect children from 
injury whenever they properly can is no 
modern development.[152]
523
Protection of the interests of a child can be given a 
relatively wide interpretation, as in the case of Re S v. 
McC: W. v. WL,, [153] where the court authorised, in
exercise of its protective jurisdiction over an infant, 
the taking of blood tests from a husband, his wife and
child in an attempt to ascertain paternity.
As the court noted in "Eve". however, the fact 
that the jurisdiction is wide does not mean that the 
court can authorise activities which are outside the 
underlying principles, and to this extent they were in 
agreement with Mrs. Justice Heilbron's decision in Re D 
(a minor) (wardship proceedings).f1541 Both of these 
judgements relied heavily on a rights dominated approach 
in order to deny the validity of non-consensuai,
non-therapeutic sterilisation of a mentally handicapped 
person. Mrs. Justice Heilbron presents the matter thus:
It is apparent ....  that the jurisdiction to
do what is considered necessary for the 
protection of an infant is to be exercised 
carefully and within limits ..... The type of 
operation proposed is one which involves the 
deprivation of a basic human right, namely 
the right of a woman to reproduce, and 
therefore it would, if performed on a woman
for non-therapeutic reasons and without her 
consent, be a violation of such a right.[155]
However, unlike the Canadian decision, this
decision left available loopholes which have now been 
taken advantage of. The court in the case of (Re B (a 
minor) (sterilization).f1561 whilst noting the decision 
in Re D with approval, nonethless felt able to
\ ■ Y
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distinguish it from the case under their consideration. 
The apparent reason for this distinction was the court's 
claim that the operation was therapeutic in nature, but 
it is questionable whether such a claim can indeed be 
justified, and in any event it reflects the position
which the court in "Eve" were at pains to criticise - 
namely, the blurring of distinctions in the interests of 
social or other considerations.
This English case concerned the proposed 
sterilisation of a 17 year old mentally handicapped girl, 
who, it was said, would at best achieve the intellectual 
and motor skills of a 5 or 6 year old. It was thought 
that she was beginning to show signs of sexual awareness 
and interest, and her mother felt that the best method of 
avoiding unwanted pregnancy would be to arrange for her 
to be sterilised. The evidence was that she would be
unable to take the contraceptive pill for medical 
reasons, but also because she might not remember to do 
so, and the court presented the alternative to this as 
being the permanent removal of her capacity to
procreate. They concluded that:
The court had jurisdiction to authorize a 
sterilization operation on a ward of court in 
wardship proceedings but it was jurisdiction 
which should be exercised ony as a last 
resort when all other forms of contraception 
had been considered. Moreover, there was no 
question of a natural parent or lqcal
authority having parental rights giving 
consent to a sterilization operation without 
first obtaining the leave of the court in 
' wardship proceedings.'[157]
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The latter aspect of their judgement seems to 
reflect the commitment to legal control which was 
advocated by the United Nations, although it may again 
reflect the letter rather than the spirit of the U.N. 
commitment,[158] unless Article 1 of that same 
declaration is intimately linked to the exercise of 
judicial authority. Moreover, the former leaves room for 
some argument. Some dubiety, for example, has already 
been expressed as to whether or not the options as 
presented by the court are in fact the only ones 
available.[159] Further, the judgement seems not to be 
disposed to consider the situation in all its gravity 
from the perspective of human rights, dismissing the 
rights argument on the basis that ‘As far as she was 
concerned, the right to reproduce would mean nothing to 
her.'[160] The dangers of making access to rights 
dependent on awareness of them, or an interest in them, 
are clear and do not require restatement here.
The court was also able to take advantage in 
reaching its decision of one major loophole in the Re D 
judgement. Despite the apparent vindication of the 
rights of the young child in that case, the decision was 
in fact considerably less rights dominated than at first 
appears. In Re D . it was confidently anticipated that
the girl would have the legal capacity to marry, and she
\
was therefore protected by the right to marry and found a 
family as propounded in the European Declaration of Human 
Rights.[161] The fact that she would be able to consent
to marry was a cornerstone of the court's decision not to 
authorise the sterilisation.
In Re B .T162] however, the young woman will 
clearly never be in that position and, unless the right 
to reproduce were considered absolute, or a real value 
were placed on the need for consent from the individual 
based on information disclosure, the court felt free to 
make the decision it did in authorising the operation. 
As a leading article in 'The Observer' noted in the 
aftermath of this case:
English law on this is in a mess. Every 
year, some dozens of handicapped girls are 
discreetly sterilised by specialists at the 
request of their parents, but nobody knows
whether it is legal or not ....  Britain
urgently needs better law and regulation for 
such cases.[163]
One could scarcely agree more.
Conclusions
This lengthy discussion of the position of the mentally 
handicapped has been undertaken to reinforce the 
vulnerability of the special groups, not only in terms of 
their involvement in therapeutic medical acts, but also 
in regard to those which either are non-therapeutic, or 
which are therpautic only by legal sleight of hand. As 
LaForest, J. says: '..... sterilization may, on
occasion, be necessary as an adjunct to treatment of a
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serious malady, but I would underline that this, of 
course, does not allow for subterfuge or for treatment of 
some marginal medical problem.'[164] (emphasis added) 
What, it is suggested, has emerged from this discussion 
is that there are two main schools of thought currently 
adopted in decision-making in these cases. Leaving aside
the now largely discredited manipulation of children, the
\
mentally ill and the mentally handicapped for social or 
eugenic reasons, the picture can be presented thus.
Most of the decisions reviewed have started from 
the presumption of incapacity - the persons so defined 
are then left with the task of establishing that they are 
capable of making decisions for themselves, a task 
seriously hampered by the initial presumption. Moreover, 
where capacity is in doubt and disputes arise, the courts 
have generally been tempted to adopt one of two 
approaches, sometimes seeking to justify the outcome in 
terms of both. These approaches are referred to as the 
•best interests approach* and the 'substituted judgement 
approach'.
In the former, particularly prevalent in cases 
relating to mentally sound children, the presumption is 
that parents or courts can decide - indeed have a 
responsibility to decide - what is in the best interests 
of a given child. That their conclusion in some cases 
may result in the child's death seems not to have been a 
matter of grave concern. Nor does it seem to be regarded 
as significant that the decision to impose or withhold
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therapy may conflict with the views or the rights of the 
child him or herself. In these cases, the preference for 
therapy over non-therapy dominates the attitude of 
society and the courts, rendering the opinion of the 
reluctant child apparently less weighty than would be 
that of a child who sought treatment in the face of 
parental objection.
This attitude also pervades much of the law in 
relation to the mentally ill, with the additional 
complication of the fact that it is argued a) that it may 
be their illness itself which makes them wish to reject 
therapy and b) that there may be, albeit in limited 
circumstances, a 'right to treatment', which by its very 
nature denies the value of the patient's choice against 
therapy. It is, therefore, 'in their best interests' to 
be treated, and not to have their own view or position
validated.
Societal concern for the best interests of those 
whose legal and moral standing is in doubt, is equally
appropriate in the case of the mentally handicapped,
\
although m  their case it can be said that the pendulum 
has swung even further away from respect for the rights 
of the individual, at least in the example of compulsory 
intervention in reproductive freedom. For all of these 
groups, competition with those in authority (either 
parents or courts) is a truly unequal struggle.
The second approach adopted would justify
treatment without consent on the grounds that, had the 
person been in a position to give or withhold consent.
they would have opted for therapy. This is often taken
as self-evident, since surely people prefer the hope of
cure or alleviation of symptoms to the prolongation of 
ill-health? Yet, if the right described in this 
discussion is to have any real meaning it must inevitably 
include the right to prefer no treatment - in other 
words, to prefer illness to the possibility of cure. 
This 'substituted judgement' approach has gained a 
certain credibility in decision-making in difficult areas 
such as these, because, it is claimed, it seems to give 
more credence to the individual's standing as a human
being than does the overtly paternalistic 'best 
interests' test. The logical flaw, however, is that the
fact that the decision is not made by the indivudal 
denies the very basis of the justification for using this 
test
To return to the "Eve" case briefly, the judge, in
\
response to advocation for the substituted judgement 
test, made the following statement:
I do not doubt that a person has a right to 
decide to be sterilized. That is his or her 
free choice. But choice presupposes that a 
person has the mental competence to make it. 
It may be a matter of debate whether a court 
should have the power to make the decision if 
that person lacks the mental capacity to do
so. But it is obviously fiction to suggest
that a decision so made is that of the mental
incompetent. What the incompetent would do
if he or she could make the choice is simply
a matter of speculation.»r1651 (emphasis 
added)
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Although sterilisation may seem to be a 
particularly intrusive action, these views can equally be 
translated into the more routine medical intervention. 
There may be additional significance attached to the 
final denial of the capacity to procreate, but there 
remains significance in all medical intervention 
undertaken without the consent of the individual. That 
significance is vested in the value of the right to make 
independent decisions, free from duress, based on 
information and in the light of the personal implications 
of the outcome. All therapy undertaken without consent 
is intrusive of the individual's integrity and invasive 
of the right to give or withhold consent.
What, then, can be concluded in respect of the 
general right from an examination of the special groups?
It was suggested at the beginning of this chapter that.
\
if tliese groups were to be routinely excluded from the 
ambit of the right, then its significance and value would 
be considerably diminished. What this discussion has, 
however, shown is that blanket assumptions need not be, 
and in fact are not, made by the law as to the capacity 
of children, the mentally ill and the mentally 
handicapped. However limited the ascription of rights, 
it nonetheless is there. Yet, there are restrictions 
imposed on access to information and on freedom to choose 
or reject therapy which may still pose problems. In 
particular, the nature of the tests adopted in the event 
of conflict present a serious threat to the number and
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range of persons who could claim the protection of the 
right. The question remains, therefore, whether or not 
this threat is inevitable and insurmountable.
There is no doubt that there are some members of 
the community who are incapable, whether by reason of age 
or mental incapacity, from taking decisions. The right 
to consent or not to medical treatment is for them not a 
reality. On the other hand, as was noted supra. the fact 
that they do not appreciate its value or cannot freely 
choose to exercise it is not in any way a negation of the 
right itself. The fact that the comatose have no known 
interest in life, and certainly cannot express a
preference for it, does not entitle those in authority to
\
authorise the removal of the right to life, nor does it 
diminish the overwhelming value placed on that right - 
indeed, it is precisely this value which precludes proxy 
decision-making of that sort in these circumstances. 
This is also true of the right to consent to or refuse 
medical treatment.
Accepting, therefore, that the right remains 
important, the fact that it may be denied to some need
not be fatal to its place on the list of rights to which
humanity can aspire. Indeed, the examples of children, 
the mentally ill and the mentally handicapped serve
rather to reinforce the need to take the right
seriously. Neither of the currently favoured approaches 
to decision-making is satisfactory, substantially because 
both begin from the wrong premise. Certainly,
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restrictions may have to be imposed, but the presumption 
should be that the right has priority. If this were the
approach adopted then fewer individuals would be 
precluded from its protection. It is admitted that such 
an approach may in some rare cases preclude therapy
altogether, but it is argued that the morality of the 
proposed therapy in these cases would in any event be 
somewhat dubious - for example, the sterilisation for 
non-therapeutic purposes of those whose consent cannot be 
obtained. The responsibility. were the right taken 
seriously, would pass from those who are vulnerable to 
those in authority, to demonstrate a manifest and
acceptable justification for proceeding without consent,
and would reinforce the rights of all individuals to have 
access to the full panoply of civil and moral rights.
These conclusions have importance for the sane, 
adult also. If the fact that courts do not presently 
respect the rights of special groups to involvement in a 
therapeutic alliance were to be considered fatal to the 
right itself, then the fact that the right is also badly 
defined, and sometimes ignored, in the case of the sane 
adult would necessarily imply the same conclusion. This 
is a position which even the most rampantly paternalistic 
would surely find unacceptable. The solution, therefore, 
lies not in the continual erosion, redefinition or
categorisation of those to whom the right is applicable, 
but in a radical re-thinking of the right itself - its 
scope, its nature, its value, and most crucially of all,
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its legal status and the corresponding mechanisms for its
vindication.
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CONCLUSIONS - A WAY FORWARD?
Chapter 9
This discussion has centred on the claim that a right to 
provide or withhold consent to medical treatment can be 
established. Such a claim is based on the respect which 
is traditionally accorded to the right of human beings to 
self-determination - a right which is routinely appealed 
to in many and varied situations as one of the 
fundamental constituents of respect for human life.
The argument here has been that this same right to 
self-determination exists in health care - indeed, that 
in matters such as health, which so fundamentally affect 
the capacity of the human being to participate 
knowledgeably in social affairs, self-determination has, 
if anything, an enhanced moral status. It has further 
been argued that even the benign and genuine motivation 
of orthodox medicine and the capabilities of its panoply 
of technological skills, cannot override the patients' 
rights to participate in therapy or experiments, or to 
withhold consent, only on a voluntary and knowing basis. 
The terminology of 'informed' consent has largely been 
eschewed since the theoretical perspective adopted here 
does not depend for its validity on patient understanding 
(which the term 'informed' is taken by some to imply and 
which may provide a justification for non-disclosure of
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difficult or highly technical information). In any 
event, direct translation of the American concept of 
'informed consent' into British law would merely serve to 
bring with it the problems currently facing the American 
patient[1j. .
The right described, therefore, is taken to be a 
fundamental one and access to it is seen as vital to the 
human being's exercise of control over his or her own 
life and health (physical and mental). Moreover, the 
logical corollary of any such right is that information 
relevant to the risks and benefits of the proposed 
therapy and its alternatives must be disclosed in order 
that the patient can make a choice as to whether or not 
to participate. As in Re Quinlanr21 the right is taken 
to incorporate the right of a competent person to refuse 
treatment. Although the right to withhold consent is 
encountered most often by implication in British cases, 
there is a wealth of American jurisprudence on this 
matter, validating the claim made here that the right 
described is dependent on the quality of the information 
disclosure and not on the outcome, that is it is not 
definable by the nature of the patient's choice. In 
cases such as In Re Quackenbushf 31 and Superintendent of 
Belchertown v SaikewiczF41. American courts have 
explicitly recognised that, although information 
disclosure may lead to refusal of therapy which is 
potentially beneficial, the value of the competent 
person's right to make such choices supersedes the
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unfortunate consequences of the withholding of consent. 
As Gostin says:
Ethically, a patient should be free to make a 
decision which may be against his medical
interests so long as he is able to understand 
the implication of that decision; the common 
law places no legal obstacle to a patient's
decision to live in great pain or even to
risk his life rather than to accept unwanted
medical treatment.[5j
Thus, even the apparent irrationality of a given decision 
is no barrier to the claim that rights should be
vindicated. Observance of the patient's right to 
information about therapy and therapeutic alternatives, 
it is claimed, far from threatening the doctor/patient
relationship could effectively enhance it. Trust
between doctor and patient depends not just on the
patient's confidence in the doctor but on the doctor's 
respect for the patient, which necessarily denies the 
therapeutic imperative in favour of the therapeutic 
alliance.[6] As Picard points out '... a breakdown in 
the doctor-patient relationship often occurs when there 
is little or no communication between the parties.'[7 J 
He reflects ruefully on the causes of a failure in 
communication which has such serious consequences for 
what Pellegrino and Thomasma[8] would call a 'good and
proper' medical act.
It is a sad irony that the circumstances of 
each party militate against clear, thorough 
communication in a relationship of serious
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consequence. The doctor is likely balancing 
commitments to other patients, colleagues and 
committees. His medical education has 
prepared him to treat the disease but not 
necessarily the person, and the day-to-day 
demands on him may make getting to know the 
patient and his concerns seem impossible or 
unimportant.[9]
Whatever the reasons, and however understandable they may 
be, it remains self-evident that the patient's right to 
information is often minimised or ignored in the current 
practice of orthodox medicine. This may be explicable 
but, it has been argued it is nonetheless unjustifiable 
in the vast majority of cases. Special groups such as 
children, the mentally ill and the mentally handicapped 
may require, and have been given,[10] special 
consideration, but even here it has been shown not only 
that lack of competence need not be presumed but also 
that courts in both Britain and the United States have in 
fact adopted a more ad[ hoc approach to decision making as 
to competence, at least in part recognising the 
importance of the voluntariness of medical intervention. 
As Gostin argues ' . ... forming categories of people in 
which the law automatically dispenses with the 
requirement of seeking consent is fraught with conceptual 
inconsistencies and practical difficulties.'[11] He 
concludes that '[tjhere can be no greater intrusion on a 
competent human being than to compel him to receive 
physicial treatment which he does not want.'[12]
Recognition of the scale of this 'intrusion' 
demands also that the apparent distinction between the
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unknowing patient and the unwilling patient is 
reassessed. Few. if any, would argue for the compulsory 
imposition of treatment, yet the converse must also be 
true - that is, that the only therapy which would be 
argued for is that which is voluntarily undertaken. In 
other words, acceptable therapy is that which is entered 
into freely, in knowledge of the possible risks and 
benefits and with information as to possible alternatives 
where these exist.
The significance of this right. therefore, is 
substantial, and the claim that it should be viewed as a 
Legally recognised and protected interest is, it is 
claimed, not defeated by the fact that on occasion its 
realisation may be impossible, for example in extreme 
cases of mental incapacity or in the case of the very 
young child who has no method of expressing an opinion. 
Where therapy is, therefore, selected by others - either 
parents or otherwise authorised adults - its imposition 
is, except in rare cases, often justified by the capacity 
of that therapy to enhance the likelihood of the incapax 
individual being capable in the future of acting in a 
self-determing manner. In other words, the ends - of 
self-determination - may sometimes, albeit unusually, be 
realised by the use of means which would otherwise be 
unacceptable. However, recognition that there may be 
some problematic cases does not detract from the 
importance of the assertion of self-determination, since 
the occasions for ignoring the specific aspect of
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self-determination arise routinely where it is only by so 
doing that self-determination can be achieved. The 
primary purpose, in such cases, of asserting the right to 
information disclosure, incorporating the choice whether 
or not to accept therapy, is to ensure that the decision 
as to the competency of an individual patient or decision 
is made against a background which demands respect for 
the right, and a correspondingly weighty and compelling 
justification for its denial.
Mere definition of the right, however, even when 
combined with justifications for its vindication, is not 
taken to be a sufficient step. As in the case of many 
other human rights, emotional or moral appeal does not 
guarantee respect. Yet if the right is of significance 
then respect for it must be sought, and failure to 
respect it must involve the imposition of sanctions 
and/or the compensation of the person whose right is 
infringed. In other words, the law must recognise and 
protect the right by giving it appropriate status in the 
hierarchy of legitimate interests. Thus, the argument 
goes on to focus on the methods available to ensure 
compliance with the terms of the right as described.
Inevitably, since ethical or professional codes 
are notoriously vague and relatively easy to ignore, 
proper vindication of the right, and sanctions for its 
breach, will be the province of the law. As Gregory says:
It is generally accepted among scholars in
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ethics that the human race, in the course of 
its cultural development, has described 
certain 'ideals' of behaviour; one hopes 
that all would conform to these high 
standards of behaviour without the need for a 
'reward or punishment' scheme. But mankind 
has become realistic enough to know that, 
although these standards might be accepted as 
ideal, they will rarely generate uniform 
compliance by individuals faced with the 
mundane, everyday problems of life .... The 
law steps in in such cases to fill the 
recognized vacuum .... to assure wherever 
possible, conformity to the ethical and moral 
ideal.'[13]
However, in reviewing the attitude of the law to this
matter, it is noted ab initio that merely 'stepping in' 
indicates little about the effect of, or rationale for, 
legal control. Thus, considerable emphasis has been
placed on the nature of the legal remedies available to 
vindicate this right, since the type of action which
legal systems make available has a great impact on the 
balance of power between pursuer (patient) and defender 
(physician). This balance is reflected by the nature and 
type of proof required by the form of action itself and 
by the capacity for subjectivity in decision-making
tribunals, and is measurably related to the value which 
is placed by these tribunals on the right itself.
Certainly the law recognises the value of autonomy 
in medicine, otherwise nu remedy would be available, but 
adequate protection demands a form of decision making 
suited to the issue itself. Thus, it is argued, an 
appropriate legal response is necessary to the 
vindication of the right. A number of different actions
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may be considered appropriate or suitable and their 
capacity to satisfy patients' rights is analysed in 
depth. The nature of the available action differs as a 
result of judicial or state policy, and the impact of 
these actions on the patient seeking redress for a 
grievance is thereby affected by the development of the 
law in respect of compensation in general, and by the 
preference of a given legal system for pertain forms of 
action. It is claimed, therefore, that it is not merely 
recognition of an important right or interest which is 
important, but that the manner in which assertions of 
abuse are settled has a major impact on the continued 
significance of rights themselves.
Until relatively recently, actions by patients 
alleging that they were inadequately informed or risks or 
alternatives in therapy were competently raised under the 
general framework of assault.[14] This action has 
considerable benefits for the patient who heed show only 
that information disclosure fell short of the required 
standard in order to succeed. However, the action also 
has many drawbacks, not least that it does not, and 
cannot, cover cases where the failure to have proper 
regard for the right involves the provision of no 
therapy. The terminology of assault is stretched beyond 
credibility when appealed to in such circumstances. In 
any event, there is a marked, and understandable, 
reluctance on the part of the judiciary - and one 
suspects the general public - to classify medical
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intervention as an assault, even if this is in fact what 
it amounts to. This distaste stems from recognition of 
the value of medical treatment, as well as from a general 
belief that the intention of the doctor is not to be 
equated with that which satifies the concept of assault. 
Connotations of criminal or malicious intent cling to the 
use of the terminology of assault, and have resulted in 
its rejection as the appropriate form of action unless 
the failure to disclose was so gross as to remove the 
assumption of beneficence and to substitute the 
presumption of deliberate and aggressive deceit.
The trend, therefore, in most jurisdictions has 
been to treat a failure to make adequate disclosure as 
remediable only under the negligence framework, an action 
which has come to dominate the law of reparation. [ 15] 
Whilst this removes some distaste from the picture, the 
shift to the negligence action - as currently interpreted 
- has been shown to have numerous disadvantages for the 
disaffected patient. The action itself ensures that 
concentration is on doctors' duties and not patients' 
rights, thus facilitating the importation of professional 
standards into what is in fact a question of respect for 
human dignity. Moreover, even where attempts have been 
made to re-emphasise the rationale which underlies the 
existence of the right of action, they have consistently 
fallen short of a vindication of full information 
disclosure, since negligence analysis, apparently 
unavoidably, demands that some weight be given to the
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quality of professional practice.[16] The reluctance of 
courts to condemn established medical behaviour results 
in a significant shortfall of success, even where it is 
admitted that information was not disclosed. Thus, 
emphasis is placed on the professional justifications for 
non-disclosure, and the right to information is watered 
down in the face of competing, but scarcely equivalent, 
values.
Moreover, the general evidential requirements of 
the negligence action mean that the patient must 
demonstrate that he or she was harmed by the alleged 
breach of duty, a task which will generally be met with 
failure where the therapy has either not worsened the 
patient's medical condition, or has provided some relief 
for it.[17J Inevitably, therefore, the basis of the 
patient's right is subjugated to the capacity of therapy 
to improve physical or mental health. By implication, 
the refusal of therapy takes on the taint of 
unreasonableness and is thereby disvalued as a 
self-determining act. A final, and supremely difficult, 
hurdle faced by the patient in the negligence action is 
that it is also necessary to convince the court that, had 
the information been disclosed, therapy would have been 
rejected. [18J In the light of the fact that this is 
essentially unproveable, and in view of the presumption 
in favour of potential relief of ill-health which arises 
in part from concentration on doctors' duties, the 
patient is unlikely to succeed.
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The nature of the negligence action itself, it is 
concluded, is apparently antipathetic to the vindication 
of fundamental rights. This is particularly true when 
decision makers are impressed by the admittedly high 
standards of a respected profession and the value of 
therapeutic intervention. Just as courts are hesitant to 
admit that non-existence could ever be preferable to 
existence,[19] so they are reluctant to place a value on 
continued ill-health, even where freely and knowledgeably 
chosen, when therapy has the potential to alleviate 
symptoms or to cure. There are, of course, further 
problems associated with the negligence action which 
apply in all cases, not merely those concerning 
information disclosure in medicine. Most notably, these 
relate to what has been called the ‘forensic 
lottery'. [20J Lack of certainty bedevils the law in this 
area. Proceedings are expensive, often protracted and
beyond the means of many.[21] Given that, in the case of 
a patient who was improperly or inadequately informed but 
who was nonetheless not physically harmed by the therapy, 
the award of damages in the event of a successful action 
would be minimal, few will have either the financial or 
the emotional capacity to undertake the uncertain, 
expensive and ultimately unsatisfactory task of suing.
Recognition of the shortcomings of the negligence 
action is growing in relation to all aspects of the
search for adequate compensation and protection of
important values. Whilst most jurisdictions have
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seemingly been unable or unwilling to dispense with or 
modify these problems, some countries have adopted a more 
radical position in an effort to minimise or obviate them 
entirely. Both Sweden and New Zealand[22] have 
instituted alternative systems of liability in order to 
provide surer and speedier access to compensation. The 
New Zealand system is the more far-reaching and radical 
of the two and is therefore singled out for 
consideration.[23] Many of the allegations which can be 
made against fault based systems are inapplicable to the 
Accident Compensation Scheme,[24] but unfortunately the 
scheme is itself essentially flawed, partly as a result 
of apparent political timidity. The exclusion of disease 
from the scheme has been heavily criticised as 
philosphically inconsistent and practically unjust. 
Moreover the system cannot in itself avoid the vagaries 
of interpretation and subjectivity of values unless clear 
and unequivocal guidance is given as to the meaning to be 
given to phrases such as 'medical misadventure'.[25J
In fact, the New Zealand system has tended to 
place the victim of medical misadventure in a situation 
paradoxically similar to that which many commentators 
argue is currently the lot of the aggrieved patient in 
fault based systems. As Mahoney[26] points out:
The restrictive interpretation which has been 
placed upon the phrase 'medical misadventure' 
has resulted in many deserving claimants 
being excluded from the aegis of the 
definition of "personal injury by accident"
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and thereby from receipt of compensation
under the Act.[27]
He does, however, see some hope for change following 
judgement of Bisson, J. In MacDonald v The Accident 
Compensation Corporation,[28] but it is by no means 
certain that this small inroad will set a pattern for 
future decision-making. Indeed, cases which preceded 
MacDonald by only a short space of time have been decided 
on the basis that '. .. unless the patient asks the doctor 
specifically about the risks the doctor is under no 
obligation to inform the patient.'[29J Moreover, it is 
likely that the existence of the scheme itself will 
dissuade a patient who has failed to satisfy the 
definition of 'personal injury by accident' from seeking 
to raise an action in the courts, which, although
technically possible, is in fact rarely resorted to, 
either because the public is unaware that a residual 
right of action remains or because of the impact on the 
individual of failure under the Accident Compensation 
Scheme.
The no fault system, therefore, both presents
novel problems for the patient who was not informed of 
risks or options in therapy, and generates its own
special ones. Admittedly, not all of the problems are 
insurmountable in theory, since they can and do depend on
the attitudes of decision makers themselves. Others,
however, such as the definition of 'accident' are central 
to the scheme itself and less easily capable of
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resolution.
What current decision making in New Zealand 
shares, in particular, with the fault based tradition is 
an apparent reluctance to award damages in cases where 
the professional practice of doctors is challenged. This 
attitude is perhaps more acute in cases dealing with 
matters of consent, since courts and tribunals may be 
reluctant to value the abstract rights of patients over 
the realities of medical intervention which, in some 
cases, has caused no measurable physical harm, or in 
others has merely produced harm which is in inherent risk 
of the therapy itself and is not attributable to 
inadequate medical care in an operational sense.
In sum, therefore, only the assault based action 
seems to concentrate on the right of the patient to 
physical and mental integrity, but it is inherently 
flawed as a means of generally vindicating the right to 
information. The other available forms of action, as 
currently interpreted, are both unsuited to the 
vindication of rights and fail to distinguish between 
operational matters (which are genuinely part of the 
doctors' professional duties) and matters which can be 
described as relating to the morality of medicine. This 
confusion results in the failure, perhaps even the 
inability, of current decision makers to vindicate the 
right of the patient to information, and the subsequent 
right to accept or reject therapy.
In all, therefore, it can be concluded that
currently used legal methods are unsuited to validation 
of the right to information disclosure in medicine. The 
development of the doctrine of 'informed* consent by
American courts, seen by some as an attempt to widen the 
liability of the medical profession,[30] has proved 
insufficiently weighty or rigorous to defeat the inherent 
problems of the fault based system. As Tancredi[31] 
says: ' [ajs a legal doctrine, informed consent has
hardly fulfilled its promise. It may have created a 
facade of patient involvement and control, when, in fact, 
the power still remains with the medical 
decision-maker.'[32J In New Zealand, as Mahoney[33] 
points out, the existence of the Accident Compensation
Scheme discourages use of the residual right of action, 
thus effectively providing no incentive for the 
development of a doctrine of consent based on the 
patient's right to information.
What, then, if any, are the options available to 
secure, through legal mechanisms, this important right?
Only if the right is accorded overt respect will it be 
adhered to rather than breached, and only through legal 
process can redress be obtained where the deterrence of 
the law has failed. As Shultz[34] says:
The law is not the only relevant tool for 
achieving such a relationship between doctor 
and patient. But ultimately the law is about 
line-drawing, and some basic division of 
authority is essential both for purposes of 
norm-setting and of dispute resolution. The 
fact that practice, time and complexity will 
embroider nuance and qualification upon the 
--------basic —structure doesnot aTter the—need for----------
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such a framework.[35j
However, the capacity for change will depend 
substantially on the jurisdiction concerned, since 
different legal systems develop and follow distinct legal 
traditions. The ease with which any jurisdiction is 
capable of vindicating patients' rights depends on its 
history and jurisprudence as much as it does on 
willingness to make appropriate modification or 
enthusiasm for change. Moreover, the very nature of the 
health care provided in any state may significantly 
affect the type and quality of available actions for 
redress.
In general terms, it can be said that current 
legal provision for redress, where the interest invaded 
is the right of the individual to make autonomous choices 
in health care matters, is at best inadequate and at 
worst inappropriate to the value of the interest to be 
protected. A review of assault based actions, negligence 
based actions and actions based on no fault serves to 
demonstrate that the interest argued for by this writer 
is protected, where it is protected, substantially in an 
indirect fashion, rather than assuming centre-stage in 
the resolution of disputes. Yet, even under these 
analyses, its importance is not doubted. Patients should 
be in a position to avail themselves of professional 
services without inevitaby rendering themselves 
vulnerable to denial of autonomy, or to assumptions that
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the invitation to exercise the professional advisory role 
automatically assumes a transfer of authority in health 
care decisions from patient to doctor. Not all of the 
legal processes outlined above in fact make this
presupposition but where they do not (as with assault 
based actions) other problems render them a less than 
satisfactory method of interest protection.
Of course, one option not so far considered in 
detail would be the raising of an action on the basis of 
the existence of a contract between doctor and patient.
In the United Kingdom, cases based on contract have 
indeed been raised, [36] and it is fair to say that the 
patient who is involved in private health care may find 
him/herself with access to significantly improved rights 
of choice since freedom of choice is central to the 
nature of a contract. Deceit, fraud or inadequacy of
information can render any contract null and void,[37] 
and the patient is theoretically in no different a 
position from that of any other contracting party. 
Further, as the court pointed out in Edgar v Lamont[38] 
the private nature of an agreement may well provide a 
remedy in contract but does not deny the existence of
delictual or tortious liability. In Thake v Maurice[39] 
the existence of a private arrangement between doctor and 
patient was taken at first instance to introduce an
implied warranty into the agreement that the service 
would fulfill the purpose for which it was undertaken, 
and a failure to indicate that success was not inevitable
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could then be taken as sufficient to lead to an award of 
damages.
The fact that an additional protection may be
offered by the existence of a contractual agreement, 
however, serves to emphasise, not the value of the
contract itself, but rather the importance to the 
agreement of information disclosure. Vindication of 
access to information is facilitated by the nature of a 
contractual arrangement, but is not generated by it.
Since the majority of health care provision in the United 
Kingdom is undertaken through the National Health
Service, the theoretical availability of contractual 
redress is, however, of limited relevance. In any event, 
there is no clear rationale for providing legal rules 
which permit some patients access to vital information, 
but deny it to others, merely on the grounds of their 
capacity to pay for the service or on the strength of 
their ideological or political commitments to health care 
provision as a whole.
In some jurisdictions, however, the availability 
of a contractual remedy will have considerably more 
significance, for example in the United States, where 
health care is essentially a private agreement between 
doctor and patient for a fee. However, the availability 
of contractual remedies depends on the classification 
made of the event under scrutiny. Issues of professional 
malpractice in the United States are routinely dealt with 
on the basis of the negligence action, and if failure to
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disclose information is perceived as an aspect of 
professional duties, rather than as a free-standing 
interest, then the temptation will be to deal with this 
matter also in terms of professional negligence, as has 
substantially been the case. As Shultz notes:
Because patients have been deemed incapable 
of individual bargaining about expert 
services, duties undertaken through a 
contract for professional care have been 
given content and specificity through 
negligence policy rather than through 
contract analysis .... although patients may 
be incapable of supervising the quality and 
administration of care, they are capable, 
indeed uniquely so, of balancing ultimate 
costs and benefits of care decisions. 
Moreover, they are capable of determining the 
extent to which they wish to allocate 
decision making authority to their doctors.
Thus, the rationale for adopting a 
standardized tort analysis does not extend to 
issues of decision making and allocation of 
authority; these matters could appropriately 
be analyzed under contract doctrine. Were 
such an approach adopted, the entire analytic 
 ^ paradigm would be reversed. Rather than an 
invasion of patient choice being one sub-type 
of injury causation within a professional 
negligence framework, professionally
negligent care would constitute one species 
of breach of contract.[40]
In Shultz's view, therefore, the use of contract analysis 
would sharpen the focus on patient's rights or interests, 
and provide direct protection rather than the rather 
indirect protection offered by the negligence framework. 
Furthermore, such a specific form of action would 
recognise the power of the consumer of health care to 
dictate specific terms, and prevent the usurpation of 
authority which is currently common in the doctor/patient
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relationship. In Shultz's argument, the presumption 
therefore should be that 'where no explicit term [in the 
agreement between doctor and patient] is agreed to,
patient control of decision-making should be the term 
implied into the contract.'[41] This, she claims is no 
significant infringement on the medical professions' role 
since at this stage their function is to advise and not 
to determine. Nor does it presume that all patients 
would wish to exercise this right. Merely it indicates 
that involvement should be the norm and not the
exception. Legal regulation in this way would protect 
the rights of those who wish to be involved, and, she 
claims, '[gjiven the tradition of medical paternalism, 
patients who wish to opt out of such responsibility could 
easily do so.'[42]
It has been said that in the United Kingdom the 
contractual remedy has a very limited role to play, and 
the British patient will in normal circumstances be
forced to use tortious or delictual remedies in matters 
relating to the alleged inadequacy of information 
disclosure. Thus, much will depend on the extent to 
which legal change is competent in tort or delict.
Any action which satisfactorily recognises the 
significance of the right to consent to medical 
treatment, after adequate and sufficient disclosure of
information, and which seeks to provide compensation 
where breach of this right occurs, must overcome the 
hurdles already outlined. In fact, the provision of
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compensation is perhaps of less significance than the 
symbolic effect of the existence of a right of action. 
Admittedly, where little practical harm has been caused, 
little will be anticipated in the way of finanacial 
restitution. However the rights and interests which 
patients have are not minimised by the fact that the 
award of compensation will not necessarily be 
substantial. As has been said, ' [a]n interest is not 
delegitimated because in a particular instance its 
invasion produced little demonstrable harm.'[43] Nor is 
it invalidated because financial compensation is 
minimal. Personal interests are routinely protected by 
law, even although the average financial award in 
personal injury cases remains low.[44]
The harm resulting from the failure adequately to 
involve the patient in important, and sometimes vital, 
therapeutic decision-making, whilst not inevitably, or 
even routinely, resulting in obvious harm, is nonetheless 
a major infringement of a basic right, toleration of 
which should not be countenanced by a rights-conscious 
society. In any event, most developed legal systems 
protect other intagible rights which broadly equate with 
the liberty and privacy of the individual.[45] The 
argument for protection in this area can therefore be 
equated with the claims of the individual to liberty and 
privacy in other intimate areas of life. As Shultz, for 
example, says: '[t]he opportunity for maximum feasible
control of medical fate would certainly seem to be as
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important an interest as control of name or likeness, 
reputation or seclusion.'[46]
In addition to this evaluation of the interests 
involved, there remains one further point to be made. 
Intrusion into the lives of citizens is sometimes made, 
and generally requires strong justification. However, 
this intrusion, by means, for example, of restrictions on 
freedom of speech, is generally undertaken by the state 
and for reasons which are thought to enhance the general 
social good by the advancement and vindication of valued- 
rights. Thus, intrusion into the right of freedom of 
speech can be justified by the impact which 
non-intervention would have on the rights of other 
citizens, and by the responsibility which the state has 
to all of its citizens.
In the case of medical practice, however, and 
except in situations which concern the control of 
diseases which threaten society as a whole,[47] the 
limitation of rights is undertaken by one professional 
group rather than by the elected representaives of a 
community, and on grounds and in circumstances which make 
effective review both of the basis of the practice and of 
its effect, extremely difficult to achieve.
Yet medical practice is not undertaken in a 
vacuum, and therapeutic choices involve a number of moral 
and social factors.[48] Whilst is is accepted that the 
physician is the more competent to make the clinically 
appropriate decision, the patient remains the participant
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who alone can take account of this clinical 
recommendation, evaluate it, and ultimately make the 
correct personal decision. The rights and interests to 
be balanced are both of major significance - that is, 
professional competence and self-determination - but the 
latter is argued here to be the more fundamental and 
wide-ranging of the two. Indeed, an accurate description
of the doctor/patient relationship indicates that the
%
doctor's professional standing and competence to act are 
derivative from, rather than descriptive of, the standing 
to be accorded to the patient.
Whilst the vindication of rights is not inevitably 
the province of the law, and given that not all interests 
are legally protec ted,[49 ] it remains nonetheless the 
case that in situations where professional practice is
challenged the most effective mechanism available to the 
aggrieved party is access to legal redress. In fact, 
there is no dispute that the law has a concrete interest 
in matters of information disclosure in medicine - an
interest which has resulted from recognition by courts of 
the potential invasiveness of therapy and the
inequalities inherent in professional/client
relationships. However, the argument here has been that, 
whilst recognising the abstract value of patient 
involvement in therapeutic decision-making, courts have
been influenced by a number of other factors into
effectively minimising the impact of this principle.
Moreover, it is argued, the nature of the legal
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procedures applied to cases of this sort has proved to be 
an effective block to the adequate balancing of rights 
between the parties to the medical act.
The final question, therefore. is whether, 
accepting the significance of the right here described, 
the law can be modified to provide a more equitable 
solution to the problems illustrated in this discussion. 
The question as to whether or not the law should take 
account of them is, it is submitted, answered both by the 
fact that the law already purports to deal with them and 
therefore clearly regards them as valid objects of legal 
consideration, and by acceptance of the value of the 
right to consent to medical treatment, as described 
here. As has been noted, however, merely to say that the 
law should deal with these dilemmas is not to identify a 
mechanism whereby it can. Although a detailed analysis 
of the possible modifications to legal process is not 
within the scope of this discussion, a review of some of 
the possibilities may serve to determine whether or not 
the assertion of patients' rights to information is a 
practical possibility in legal process, or merely an 
idealised and unattainable aspiration.
The possibilities for law reform in this area 
will, as has been noted supra. depend not merely on a 
commitment to the ideology of patient self-determination, 
but also on the nature of the jurisprudence of a given 
society. Existing attempts to protect patients' rights 
have been shown to be inadequate, partly because of the
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essential structures of the available actions and partly 
as a result of the kinds of decisions taken by courts and 
tribunals. Two main possibilities, therefore, emerge. 
First, it may be possible to identify a radical 
alternative to the forms of redress in contemporary use; 
second, one might seek to modify the presuppositions of 
decisions-makers and to emphasis the force of the 
argument for information disclosure within the most 
approrpriate existing framework. Although the purpose of 
this discussion has been to establish and flesh out the 
nature of a right to consent in medical treament, it may 
be valuable therefore to consider briefly the options 
available for its vindication through legal process.
An Alternative Form of Action?
With the exception of situations where a contract exists 
between doctor and patient, the possibilities for reform 
and the provision of an appropriate legal mechanism will 
arise primarily within the tort/delict framework. 
Although the Pearson Commission [50] suggested careful 
and continuing scrutiny of the no fault approach to 
compensation,[51] it is unlikely ever to become a viable 
alternative system in the United Kingdom, even if on no 
other grounds than cost. Moreover, it could be argued 
that the early introduction of a no fault system would 
render more difficult the legal vindication of a right to 
consent, since the scheme offers no incentive for certain
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types of behavioural reform and minimises, by its very 
philosophy, the significance of individual rights. Thus, 
although its theoretical base may be ultimately more 
satisfying than that currently espoused in most 
jurisdictions, its potential to satisfy the right as 
described here is limited.
Thus, it is to reform of the law of tort or delict 
that attention must be turned if radical alternatives are 
to be found. As was noted supra, the kind of reform to 
which communities may reasonably aspire will depend to a 
considerable extent on the nature of their legal system. 
Countries which have statements of rights built into 
their constitution may differ in their approach to 
recognition of legitimate claims and the methodology for 
their resolution from those where the legal system is 
based either on a series of equitable principles or on a 
strict adherence to judicial precedent. The
possibilities for reform may therefore be minimised or 
enhanced by the ways in which the entire system for 
redress of grievances has developed.
The United States
Although the United States is widely regarded as being in 
the vanguard of the movement for 'informed' consent, 
examination of judicial attitudes has demonstrated that 
the emphasis is often placed rather on the apparent 
acceptance or value of therapy than on the disclosure of
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information, athough this, in fact, is central to the
obtaining of a real consent. Use of the term 'informed'
has permitted the judiciary, even in the most apparently
radical decisions, to hedge their statements of rights 
with caveats which correlate professionalism, rationality 
and reasonableness.[52] Yet the United States 
Constitution guarantees all citizens fundamental rights
which certainly can include freedom from unwarranted or 
unconsented to medical treatment.
The patient in the United States has the option of 
using the right of 'privacy' as the basis for an action 
in respect of unauthorised treatment - a right which is 
taken seriously in American jurisprudence.[53] Since
privacy torts can include both the intentional and the 
negligent, there may be a way forward in this 
approach.[54J This will be particularly so where the 
attitude is taken that the failure to disclose 
information is not just an infringement of patients' 
rights but is, very often, a deliberate choice to
withhold information and therefore can be encompassed by 
the concept of intentional rather than negligent tort. 
The impact of this on the capacity for radical
decision-making is evident. If the evidence required is 
of a deliberate of knowledgeable withholding of 
information, then the question is clearly centred on the 
rights of the patient to have the information, thereby 
avoiding the trap, common in the negligence action, of 
concentration being focussed on the nature of the duty
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owed.
Certainly, it seems unlikely that an alternative 
structure for. liability will be generated, but, as Shultz 
suggests,[55] the deficiencies in the tort based system 
can be circumvented. Indeed, she continues, '[tjort 
analysis could provide adequate protection if patient 
choice became an independent and fully protected interest 
in its own right.'[56] Her excellent analysis of consent 
rules in the United States offers in conclusion a series 
of proposals for reform which would enhance the position 
of the patient in relation to information disclosure. 
These are worthy of consideration since they seem to 
offer a relatively radical alternative within the 
existing tort structure.
Most significantly Shultz seeks to restate the 
nature of the elements in information disclosure leading 
to the exercise of patient choice. Criticising the 
emphasis on the nature of the proposed medical act, and 
in particular the apparent emphasis on the physical 
invasiveness of therapy, she proposes the creation of a 
new duty to disclose which would be:
.... triggered by the possession of 
information important and relevant to the 
patient rather than by a proposal to touch.
This approach would reverse the relationship 
between information and choice that is 
created under current doctrine. At present, 
the requirement of consent determines the 
necessity of disclosure. Because, however, 
choice arises out of and depends upon 
knowledge and reflection, the essential point 
of access must be knowledge itself.[57]
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However, like most commentators, Shultz is apparently 
unwilling to make the final leap and demand full 
disclosure of information, even where that information 
might be deemed important by a given patient. in her 
scheme '.... the duty would not be to disclose all that 
the doctor knows, but only what is materially relevant to 
the patient at the time of the disclosure.'[58] Although 
this statement at first sight seems to differ little from 
statements made by the court in cases such as Canterbury 
v Spence,f 591 Shultz is prepared to go further and to 
offer some guidelines in relation to what information is 
material to the patient, which would effectively limit 
the unfettered exercise of clinical freedom to withhold 
information.
In fact, her description of 'material' information 
demanding disclosure encapsulates many of the legitimate 
aspirations of patients, and is worthy of repetition here.
The doctor should affirmatively offer the 
following information: (1) material clinical
observations or test results that describe 
the condition of the patient at any stage of 
care; (2) interpretation of this information 
by the doctor and her advisers, including 
material judgements and conclusions based on 
the data; and (3) material possible 
responses that the patient might elect in 
light of the information and the 
possibilities known to the doctor. In each 
aspect of the duty, "material" must be 
understood to extend beyond the doctor's 
certainties. " (emphasis added)[60]
Adoption of this approach, particularly given its 
emphasis on unsolicited information disclosure, would
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then place the burden of establishing the rightness of 
non-disclosure firmly on the physician. Of course, apart 
from the emphasis on the patient's rights to receive 
information, this may not seem like a particularly 
radical move away from traditional justifications for 
non-disclosure. However, there are two main
differences. First, justification for non-disclosure 
would rest only on lack of knowledge or extreme 
remoteness of risk, and second the test for this 
justification would be independently set by courts. 
Shultz's suggestions would demand that the adequacy of 
disclosure would be tested not against professional 
practice, but against the protected interest in patient 
choice. Thus, courts would be free to decide whether or 
not a patient could make an adequate choice on the basis 
of the information they received, rather than being 
forced into an anlysis of the standards of the medical 
profession. The traditional reluctance to criticise a 
highly valued professional group would, in this type of 
analysis, have less significance.
Moreover, Shultz asserts that this approach will 
facilitate the making of decisions which are relevant to 
the individual patient, and not simply to the 'prudent' 
or 'reasonable' patient. Although she concedes that 
total subjectivity cannot, and will not, be achieved by 
this scheme, her view is that, even although objective 
testing may be used, it will be used in the context of 
essentially personal choices. The court will be enabled
to make decisions based on what the particular patient 
before them would most likely have regarded as
significant, in the light of information from and about 
that patient. Testing the adequacy of information 
disclosure against both this and a backdrop which 
recognises a protected interest in patient choice, would, 
Shultz claims, better serve the legitimate demands of 
patients.[61]
The essential changes therefore would involve a 
direct creation of a protectable interest in information 
disclosure, the testing of challenges against an attitude 
which combines acceptance of its value with an assessment 
of the situation of the particular patient, and, in
effect, would facilitate a more fact-based approach to 
the resolution of disputes of this sort. Like the 
assault based action, proof of non-disclosure would 
trigger an instant asumption of the probability that a 
right has been invaded. Unlike the assault based action, 
however, physical damage is not the cornerstone of the
invasion - rather the interest in patient choice is the
yardstick, breach of which demands compensation.
Shultz equally justifies this approach against 
possible objections that patient care will inevitably 
suffer if such an onerous obligation is placed on the 
medical profession. On the one hand, she asserts:
Doctors are universally conceded to be
fiduciaries; as such they have special
duties to serve their clients' interest.
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Patients have been redefining their interests 
in the direction of more positive 
participation in decisionmaking. In the wake 
of such redefinition, the nature of the 
fiduciary obligation must also change to 
stress more advising and less deciding.[62J
On the other hand, to the argument that the health of 
both individuals and the community will suffer because 
patients may be distracted from making the 'right*
decision as a result of potentially distressing
information, Shultz responds from a distinctly
consumerist perspective. Noting the complexity of 
medical decisions, and the rights of individual to decide 
for themselves, she concludes that:
The quality of patient choice will, of 
course, depend on the quality of information 
provided by the doctor. But assuming 
adequate performance of that obligation, 
patient-made decisions should generally yield 
outcomes that are preferable as evaluted by 
the ultimate consumer, the patient.[63]
Not all jurisdictions, however, will be in a position to 
use this type of approach. Whereas the right to privacy 
has been broadly defined by United States courts, whether 
or not it is based on a constitutional guarantee, in the 
jurisdictions of the United Kindom the right is more 
finely drawn. In any event, the British approach, whilst 
concerned with protecting important interests, is less 
prone to using the broad language of human rights to 
create or to decide on a right of action.[64]
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Scotland
Although some commentators are tempted to assume that 
Scots and English law are the same, this is an 
inappropriate and unwarranted assumption.[65] In 
previous sections, the laws of both countries have 
generally been dealt with together, partly because a 
number of the cases taken as authoritative in the United 
Kingdom as a whole have been Scottish cases, and partly 
because Scottish Courts will generally regard decisions 
of the House of Lords as highly persuasive. Thus, the 
judgement in Sidaway[66] would be likely be taken as a 
statement of Scots as well as English Law.
However, the distinctions between the two systems 
may become more crucial when considering the methods by 
which redress can be sought. It would, therefore, be a 
mistake to assume that the law in each jurisdiction would 
necessarily equate, or that apparent agreement on a case 
necessarily means that the conclusion was reached from 
the same perspective.
Viscount Stair,[67] the most prestigious of the 
Scottish institutional writers, in fact adopted a most 
liberal approach to the situations in which redress could 
be sought. Indeed, the bases of liability as described 
by him would be very wide-ranging, permitting appeal to 
what would currently be referred to as human rights. 
Thus, his position could broadly be described as being 
that where there was a wrong there should be a
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remedy.[68] Working on equitable principles, Scots law 
has shown on a number of occasions its flexibitity of 
approach, most notably - in the medico-legal field - when 
considering the rights of children to sue in respect of 
damage sustained pre-natally.[69] The law of delict is 
therefore a potentially wide-ranging and ever-chaging 
part of Scots law.
From the point of view of the patient, the 
recognition of a specially protected interest in 
therapeutic choice based on information disclosure, could 
be incorporated into a branch of the law which '.... can 
apply, develop and extend existing principles [70]
As with tort, the purpose of the law of delict is 
essentially to provide an avenue for redressing civil 
wrongs, as legally defined.[71] This does not, however 
mean that only these wrongs which have been previously 
accepted will attract compensation. As Walker says:
It follows from the purpose and function of 
the law of delict that this branch of law 
must constantly be fluid and changing; it 
must constantly be ready to consider new 
kinds of losses, or losses caused in new 
ways, or fresh human claims and interests 
calling for legal protection, and to decide 
whether and on what basis and how far to 
recognise these new claims. The novelty of a 
claim must never be a complete defence to a 
claim brought ex delicto, and the state of 
the law of delict at any given time can 
represent only the adjustment accepted by the 
courts at that time and in that social and 
economic context between conflicting and 
competing interests, and the consequential 
decisions on where losses are to fall.[72]
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One of the most significant aspects of this 
statement is the indication that, not only may Scots law 
accept a novel basis for an action, where the interest to 
be protected is regarded as sufficiently meritorious in 
current circumstances, but that it need not be tied to 
any particular type of action in seeking resolution of 
the issue. Thus, the fact that negligence predominates 
in most jurisdictions as the major delict/tort need not 
tie the hands of the Scottish judiciary. Given the 
problems identified with the current format of the 
negligence action, this is good news for patients.
As in most jurisdictions, the conduct which is 
required to establish delictual liability may be by act 
or omission (where there is a legal duty to act).[73] 
Thus, recognition of an obligation to disclose 
information could ensure that where information is not 
disclosed, there is evidence of a delict and therefore a 
remedy becomes available. Of course, if the remedy lies 
within the negligence framework, at least as currently 
interpeted, then the patient remains unlikely to 
succeed. However, alternative forms of action may be 
available.
In Scots law, one of the oldest forms of action is 
the actio injuriarum.T741 As McKechnie[75] says, the 
essential aspect of this action was insult - thus, the 
classic examples would be assault or defamation. However 
he concedes that, although the real source of the Scots 
law of reparation is probably the lex Aquilia. it has 
become common to refer to the actio injuriarum as
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incorporating wider types of insult than those described 
above.[76] Even if, however the action has been confined 
to assault, for example, at least some of the cases of 
alleged inadequacy of information could be covered. 
However, as has been noted, this would not provide a 
sufficiently radical alternative.
It would seem that - whatever the source - this 
ancient right of action will now be conceded to include 
'wilful aggression on the personality of another 
....'[77] Redress may be sought under this action for 
the insult itself, since '....actual loss or damage is 
not an essential of actionability, so that an action lies 
even though no pecuniary loss be proved.‘[78] Thus, if 
this action - which depends on proof of the event rather 
than proof of fault - is to be a proposed as a competent 
alternative it is necessary to examine what amounts to 
'wilful aggression*.
The dictionary definition of 'wilful' requires 
that something is 'done intentionally'.[79J In the case 
of non-disclosure of information, this would incorporate 
withholding knowledge which is relevant to the protection 
of the patient's right to self-determination, and of 
which the doctor is aware. Thus, the doctor could not 
be liable for failing to disclose information of which he 
or she is not in possession, athough in some 
circumstances an action in negligence might arise if the 
doctor should have known of the information.[80] The 
doctor who knows information, and chooses not to disclose
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it for whatever reason, is, logically, acting 
deliberately, and therefore wilfully, and liability for 
this behaviour could be encapsulated by the terminology 
of the actio iniuriarum. But can this behaviour also be 
seen as 'aggression'?
Aggression is generally taken to involve a hostile 
act, although it need not involve physical violence. If 
the narrowness of the distinction between the unwilling 
patient (the imposition of treatment on whom would 
certainly be seen as aggression) and the unknowing
patient, which was highlighted supra,T 811 is accepted,
then therapy without a real consent is equally an act of
aggression. Certainly, it is an attack on the right to
self-determination of the individual. Many, however, 
might seek to equate aggression with the concept of 
assault, the terminology of which, as has been seen, has
largely been eschewed in cases involving an alleged lack
of consent. But analysis of the reasons for the shift 
from assault to negligence would tend to suggest that the 
rationale was not that an assault is not in fact
committed, but rather can be traced to distaste for the 
use of such value-laden terminology in respect of the
practice of medicine.[82]
It can be concluded therefore that Scots law may 
indeed offer an alternative right of action to that of 
negligence in such cases. As Walker says:
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The Roman law principles are still the main 
basis of delictual liability in modern Scots 
law and have largely superseded indigenous 
principles ... A person is liable for wilful 
aggression on the personality of another 
(in juria), even though it may not cause 
pecuniary loss.'£833
England
The development of the English law of tort is in a 
somewhat different tradition and results in different 
conclusions. A general statement of the development of 
tort law is given by James[84] in these terms:
Historically, torts are divided into two 
great classes: trespasses and actions “on
the case11. A trespass is a "direct and 
forcible" injury. This is the most obvious 
and dramatic of all injuries; it is not, 
therefore, surprising that in point of time, 
trespasses were the earliest torts which the 
law recognized and remedied. Actions "on the 
case" were actions for damage caused 
otherwise than "directly and forcibly". They 
were called actions "on the case" primarily 
... because they were originally granted in 
certain cases where the plaintiff could show 
that, upon the facts of his case, he had 
suffered damage as the result of some act or 
omission of the defendant.[85]
Now, although the infliction of therapy without adequate 
information disclosure could be seen as both direct and 
forcible, the strength and implications of the 
terminology of trespass may provide a strong disincentive 
to courts' accepting that a trespass has been committed 
by inadequate information disclosure. Indeed, the 
English courts have recently indicated that an action in
585
trespass will no longer apply in such cases unless the 
failure to disclose was gross.[86]
It is from the action "on the case" that other 
torts such as negligence have developed, with the 
consequential effect that, whereas in other actions the
mere fact of the trespass was sufficient to found a 
successful action, these other forms of action require 
evidence of harm. Not only, therefore, will the proof 
demanded of the litigant include this harm, and evidence 
that the harm would have been avoided had the information 
been disclosed, but certain types of harm may not be
regarded as legally redressable. As James says: * [i]t
must not ... be imagined that, because proof of damage 
was essential to found an action upon the case, that
therefore proof of any sort of damage would, or will, 
give rise to a claim in tort.*[87]
In his excellent analysis of the law in respect of 
compensation, Atiyah[88] points to a number of
limitations on the right of the individual to claim 
redress. He notes, for example, that:
In theory, the courts have ruled out any 
liability for mental distress which does not 
arise as a result of physical injury, unless 
the mental distress manifests itself in some 
x sort of definite illness. Thus, mere grief, 
anguish, unhappiness, humiliation, outrage 
and so on, however distressing they may be, 
are never compensable at all unless they 
follow on some physical injury.[89]
Therefore, unlike the kinds of harm which may be
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compensable under the actio in juriarum, it would seem 
that insult to the person's capacity for 
self-determination is unlikely to found the basis of a 
successful claim. In fact this is clear from the fact 
that the negligence action is currently, and apparently 
permanently, the preferred action in these cases.
A radical alternative action, therefore, would 
require to arise either by a restatement of trespass, or 
from one of the other forms of action "on the case", but 
it seems unlikely that the latter could be sufficiently 
modified to accommodate situations where the harm 
complained of is insult to integrity rather than some 
physical invasion. In any event, some would claim that 
the development of English law in this area has been a 
specific type of process that is, it has been based on 
the introduction and perpetuation of specific torts.[90] 
Thus, unlike the approach of Scots law which applies 
principles in a flexible manner to new situations, 
English law is said by some to have bound its hands 
within the confines of nominate torts. This position is 
equally hotly denied by other commentators,[91] but 
whatever the truth of the matter, it seems relatively 
unlikely that a new tort will be developed to take 
specific account of this intrusion into the rights of the 
individual.
This is not, however to suggest that the courts 
cannot expand the categories of redressable harm. 
However, it is clear that, where a new interest is to be
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created:
...their expansion must, nevertheless, be 
limited by the practical consideration that 
not every injury of which people may complain 
can be regarded as a legal wrong. A tort 
does not consist simply in the infliction of 
an injury, but in the infliction of a legally 
recognized injury.[92]
However, although the limitations on the kinds of injury 
which can attract compensation may seem at first sight to 
preclude the patient from any alternative to the
negligence based action, there maybe some comfort to be 
derived from the following: 1[f]or the infringement of an
absolute right a person is entitled at Common Law to 
bring an action for damages, although he may not in fact 
have suffered any loss or inconvenience at all from the 
act.'[93] Although it is not entirely clear on what
basis such claims would be tested, it would seem unlikely 
that the tests used would be those applied in the
negligence based action. Rather they seem likely to be 
more in line with the tort of trespass. Thus, for the 
patient, it may be crucial - if alternatives are to be 
found - that the task of convincing the law that the 
right to information disclosure is absolute is 
successfully undertaken, before legal change can be
initiated. Whilst the claim in this discussion has been 
that this right is fundamental, incorporating as it does 
aspects of self-determination, the current attitudes of 
the courts would not lead to optimism that such would be
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their view, particularly if this meant offering novel 
remedies.
This brief review of the possibilities in three 
jurisdictions would seem to suggest that existing legal 
process may, in Scotland and the United States, be 
capable - without radical revision - of encapsulating and 
vindicating the rights of patients in respect of 
information disclosure. The position under English law 
seems more dubious. In any event, athough all the 
possibilities canvassed are theoretically plausible, 
their actual adoption seems somewhat more far-fetched. 
Yet one further possible option, however, remains.
Radicalising Decision-Making
Despite the caution expressed above as to the likelihood 
of legal change resulting from initiatives in process, 
the position of the aggrieved patient need not be 
hopeless. Although current decision making may seem to 
block the potential for a real recognition both of the 
value of the right and the validity of the claim for 
redress, the question remains as to whether or not reform 
is yet possible. In terms of the systems currently 
operating, rather than those alternatives briefly 
discussed above, the assault based action has been shown 
to be insufficiently wide ranging to encompass a right 
whose definition is not dependent on physical intrusion 
but rather on the intangible concepts of
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self-determination, liberty and privacy. For this reason 
it will not be re-considered here.
However both of the other major schemes of 
liability no fault and negligence) merit some 
reconsideration in order to assess the extent to which 
radicalised decision-making would enhance their capacity 
to protect this important right.
It has been said of the no fault system, as 
currently operated in New Zealand, that it neither offers 
protection to the patient who alleges 'medical 
misadventure' nor does it provide an incentive for 
changes in medical practice.[94] As Mahoney notes:
The effect ... of the present interpretation 
of the 'medical misadventure* style of 
•personal injury by accident' is blatantly 
ironic. Except in the unusual case of 
equipment failure or a bizarre and novel 
reaction to treatment, the person who suffers 
a personal injury from medical treatment must 
prove fault in the nature of 'old style* 
medical negligence if he hopes to receive 
compensation. If he cannot meet this 
requirement then he is denied assistance from 
a system that purports to have as its 
philosophical underpinning the abolition of 
the elusive search for fault.[95]
Inded, it is clear from cases such as Re Mundayf96] and 
Re Stopford|'971 that the only risks which will, if they 
occur, generate compensation under the scheme are very 
remote risks indeed. Indeed, in at least one case, the 
judge has been prepared to say ' [i]t seems clear that 
unless the patient asks the doctor specifically about the 
risks the doctor is under no obligation to inform the
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patient . . . ' [98]
In fact, of course, although the exclusion of 
illness from the accident compensation scheme has proved 
to be one of the biggest stumbling blocks to the 
operation of the system in a way which equates directly 
with its philosophy, the attitude of decision-makers has 
served to refine it further. Many of the presuppositions 
and attitudes which informed the pre-existing tort based 
system have simply been carried through to the new 
scheme.[99] However, this is neither unavoidable nor 
inevitable. The crucial factor to be borne in mind in 
respect of this system is that the interpretation 
presently common in 'medical misadvanture' claims is not 
derivative from. nor defined by, the terms of the
legislation itself. Specifically in relation to matters 
of information disclosure as has already been seen, the 
current attitude can, in fact, be said to be in direct 
contrast to the ideological underpinnings of the 
definition of accident outlined by the Woodhouse Report, 
[100] and incorporated into the legislation.
Although not a simple task, some of the essential 
flaws in this radical system, at least in respect of
information disclosure, can be overcome. Acceptance of
the basic right to information, held by every patient in 
vindication of their self-determination, when combined
with the given definition of accident. could be 
sufficient to encourage decision makers to give 
allegations of non-disclosure serious and unequivocal
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consideration. However, one fatal flaw remains, and
this is one which does relate to the very nature of the 
scheme itself.
The type of compensation envisaged by the scheme 
is considerably different from that awarded in tort based 
systems. The accident compensation scheme was designed 
essentially (although there are exceptions) to cushion 
loss rather than to recognise the existence of a wrong
where that wrong had caused no pecuniary loss. 
Compensation, therefore, is assessed on the basis of
needs, and is closely tied to assisting where there is a 
loss of wages. In this respect, like the tort based
system, compensation requires evidence of that loss. 
Mere insult will not suffice unless it results in damage 
which can be described as a 'personal injury by
accident.1[101J Thus, although the scheme may become 
more flexible, damages sought in relation to 
non-disclosure of information, where the only damage is 
the insult to integrity, can only be sought through 
recourse to the civil courts.
Thus, the patient will continue to face the same
obstructions to redress which are faced by his or her
equivalent in other jurisdictions. Moreover, the New 
Zealand patient seems for the moment to be somewhat 
reluctant to proceed this far. Mahoney explains this
reluctance thus:
The very existence of the Accident
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Compensation Act must have a negative effect 
on the public's recognition of the possibility 
of these claims. A public that has been told 
for a decade that the drunk driver and the 
rapist are immune from civil suit can hardly 
be expected to learn by osmosis from a few 
legal journals the possibility of suing a 
doctor where medical treatment does not turn 
out as expected or promised.'[102]
The pattern of decision-making demonstrated in the 
no fault system is, it has been claimed, essentially 
similar to that which prevails in the negligence action. 
Cautious decision-making is equally a feature of this 
latter action. Where balancing is undertaken, courts 
have tended to presume the 'good' of therapy in 
preference to what is described here as the 'good' of 
patient self-determination. Thus, they are reluctant to 
impute fault to a benign and socially valued discipline, 
whose motivation is generally conceded to be good, even 
although, '[s]ince motive, as a rule, finds no place in 
the Law of Torts, a good motive can no more redeem than a 
bad motive can condemn.'[ 103 ] This is no less true of 
the law of delict.
However, this approach need not be immutable. 
Recognition of the importance of the right here described 
can result in its legal protection. The value attributed 
to each of these 'goods' can be weighted to take account 
of the distinction between ,questions concerning 
professional competence and those which relate to 
fundamental rights. However, it has also been suggested 
that the emphasis, inherent in the negligence action, on
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the concept of duty, can provide, and presently does
create, an almost insurmountable obstacle to direct 
concentration on the rights of patients. If the 
negligence action is to be of value in such cases clearly 
this hurdle must be overcome. It is here that the true 
radicalisation of decision-making would be required since 
to date 1 . . . the duty of care concept has largely been 
used for the purpose of resricting liability for cases of 
proved fault, rather than as a means of expanding 
liability ....'[104] But is this inevitable?
There are, in fact, two methods whereby 
modification could be introduced to the concept of duty 
of care and in favour of the protections of patients'
rights. Both require redefinition of the duty, but in 
slightly different ways. First since the duty of the 
doctor, arid his or her justification for intervention, 
derive from the rights of patients, the duty of care
concept could be clearly defined as including the duty to 
disclose risks and benefits of therapy. As was noted 
above,[105] merely to talk of a duty of care says nothing 
about the content of that duty, and a commitment to the
right of a patient to make a self-determining choice
could result in the fleshing out of the duty to take
account of this. In principle, legal or practical, there 
is no obvious barrier to such a move. Thus, the decision
as to whether or not a doctor had been negligent would,
amongst other things, be dependent on the fact of whether 
or not certain information had been disclosed. In
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other words, failure to make disclosure would, in itself, 
be negligent.
A second option would be similar to that which 
Lord Scarman sought to describe in the Sidawayf1061 case 
- that is, the separation of purely professional and more 
generally moral duties, which are recognised and 
reinforced by legal backing. Thus, questions as to the 
adequacy of information disclosure would be matters to be 
judged without direct reference to professional
practice. Rather, assessment would hinge on the extent 
to which disclosure would enhance or protect the
fundamental rights of the patient. Given acceptance by 
the judiciary of the value of the right and the need to 
protect it, such an approach could avoid the traps fallen 
into by current theoretical positions which:
.... submerge analysis of the interest in
autonomy within the related but divergent 
framework of redress for professional 
incompetence .... Protection of patient
autonomy remains derivative rather than 
direct, episodic rather than systematic. As 
a result, significant harms to patients' 
interest in choice go unredressed.'[107]
The effect of either of these options would be to shift 
the decisional balance towards the right of the patient, 
but although they have certain similarities, their 
results in terms of legal process would not be 
identical. The former proposal would equate more closely 
with Shultz's [108] ■ proposed creation of a new protected 
interest, by making a definite statement of patients'
595
rights, breach of which would be actionably negligent. 
The second would essentially minimise the negligence 
concept by permitting the courts to award compensation 
where the behaviour is deemed not be appropriate or good, 
rather than only where it is negligent.
Either of these options, however would have the 
value of ensuring attention to patient autonomy, but 
would they satisfy the third element of negligence, that 
is the occurrence of foreseeable harm? If invasions of 
the right to information disclosure are taken as
culpable, then failure to make this disclosure can
scarcely be said not to result in consequences which are 
foreseeable, that is the invasion of the right. However, 
although foreseeability may present no formidable
obstacles, the legal definition of 'harm' may.
It has been said already that Scots law has long 
recognised the right to receive compensation where no 
pecuniary or physical loss is demonstrated. A  straight
translation of this into the negligence action does not
seem beyond the bounds of possibility, and would
r \
therefore prove to be no barrier to the assessment that
harm has been caused. Recognition of, and compensation 
for, the insult to the individual consequent on failure 
to disclose information is consistent with the tradition 
of Scots law. Equally, although it may be that English 
law has developed in a slightly more restrictive way, 
nonetheless defining the concept of 'harm' to include
invasion of a basic right does not seem out of the
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question.
It can be seen, therefore, that although much 
criticised, negligence analysis - surprisingly, perhaps, 
even more than the no fault system - may have the 
capacity to reflect patients' rights more than it 
currently does. The responsibility for making the 
necessary changes rests firmly with the judiciary, who 
must be convinced that the interest which it is claimed 
has been invaded is significant, and that failure to 
respect it does occasion legally recognised harm. The 
attitudes of courts of law, it is argued, continue to 
play a role in the protection of individual rights 
through the laws of tort or delict, even although the 
strength of their contribution may have been reduced. 
Atiyah may be right to argue that the administration of 
law in this area:
...rests not in the hands of barristers and 
judges (whatever they may think), but in the 
hands of certain employees of insurance 
companies, and the way in which these 
gentlemen behave is often just as important, 
if not more important, than the way people 
behave in law courts.[109J
However, this does not by itself imply that the decisions 
of courts are irrelevant, nor that their ideology will 
not have an impact on others who are involved in reaching 
compensation decisions.
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Conclusions
The preceeding section has considered, albeit briefly and 
somewhat superficially, the possibilities for legal 
change or modification. A more detailed analysis is 
beyond the scope of this discussion, which has rather 
been concerned to establish three fundamental 
hypotheses. First that the language of rights can 
legitimately be used in analysis of the doctor/patient 
relationship: second that the fundamental right to
self-determination incorporates the right of the patient 
to consent, or not, to medical treatment on the basis of 
adequate information disclosure; and third, that legal 
attitudes and process play a highly significant role in 
the vindications of this right.
The last section was designed, moreover to 
demonstrate that this right is no mere unattainable, 
academic aspiration. The fact that mechanisms can be 
found which facilitate its vindication lend weight to 
demands for its routine implementation. Further, it is 
hoped that the fleshing out of the concept itself will be 
taken as guidance for, and not criticism of, the medical 
profession.
Analysis of the complex and important values which 
characterise the patient's involvement with medicine has 
reinforced the view that medicine is not a value free 
discipline. Important issues of personal integrity are 
intimately tied up with the decision whether or not to
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participate in a medical act. Equally, it is a mistake 
to view questions of consent in medicine solely from the 
perspective of legal requirements about capacity to 
consent, or as in some sense generated or defined by
medical criteria. The issue, therefore, has been 
expressed in the language of human rights in order to 
disentangle it from the current anaytical framework, 
which fails to make an adequate distinction between the 
separable issues of patients' rights and professional 
competence. Just as patients' status is enhanced by this 
shift in emphasis, so doctors are not threatened by it. 
The aim of medical practitioners should be, and generally 
is, not just a professionally competent act but also a
morally appropriate one.
To achieve this latter, however, they too require 
an ethical basis from which to assess their activities. 
It has been suggested that one possible source of this is 
reference to what those with decision-making powers have 
to say about given practices. Thus, the approach of the 
law to this problem has considerable significance, not 
just in redressing grievances but in setting consistent 
and unequivocal standards to which doctors may address
themselves. Compliance with these standards renders 
doctors less vulnerable to legal action or patient
dissatisfaction.
It is claimed here, therefore, that a right to 
consent can be identified, encapsulating the right to 
withhold consent. But concentration on the methods by
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which consent is or can be, demonstrated, which is common 
in current discussions of this area, serves to disguise 
the true nature of the question. What is crucial is not 
whether a patient seems to have consented (or n6t) but 
whether or not his or her apparent decision was based on 
an adequate disclosure of information, so that actions 
can truly by described as the product of a real or 
meaningful choice. The right to consent, therefore is 
essentially described by emphasising the right of 
information disclosure, and the right to use that 
information in a manner which is personally 
satisfactory. It can be seen, however, that without 
legal reform, insufficient attention will be paid to the 
need for this disclosure.
What is needed, therefore, is an assertion of the 
values inherent in the doctor/patient relationship and 
redefinition of their respective roles. For the moment, 
questions of autonomy do not predominate, or even feature 
very significantly, in the legal assessment of a medical 
act. However, it has also been suggested that this 
position is not immutable. Change may occur, either 
through modifying the relevant legal process or by 
influencing decision-makers. In a rights-conscious 
society, the sporadic and equivocal protection of 
patient's rights can no longer be tolerated, and a new 
formula for the allocation of responsibility in medicine 
is urgently required. Giving serious weight to the 
proposition discussed here will, it is hoped, provide a
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relevant starting point for the development of a morally 
appropriate allocation of power within medical practice.
In this discussion, the writer has sought to 
establish that there is a value in viewing the 
interaction between patient and doctor in terms of basic 
rights - in particular a right to informtaion disclosure, 
leading to the capacity to protect the capacity of the 
patient for self-determination, has been identified and 
described. However, it is further argued that, even 
accepting the existence of this right, its vindication 
depends substantially on its legal recognition. 
Further, effective recognition is essential, and thus, it 
is suggested, the law must both acknowledge the validity 
of the right, and provide an effective mechanism whereby 
its breach or invasion can be remedied. In this way, a 
proper balancing of the rights and interests concerned in 
the practice of medicine can be established, and the 
legitimacy of the patient's interests in his or her 
health care accepted. A review of the existing legal 
mechanisms would suggest that the potential for change 
exists, given a rights dominated approach to the issue.
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fifty years ago that the tort of negligence was 
born, or synthesised, but it has thrived so 
mightily and grown so lusty that one could be 
forgiven for wondering whether there was room left 
for any other tort at all.1
16. since the essence of the negligence action is the
concept of ‘duty of care'; for further 
discussion, see chapter 4, supra.
17. see chapters 5 and 6, supra.
18. see particularly chapter 6, supra.
19. McKay V .  Essex A.H. A. [1982J 2 W.L.R. 890; for
discussion of the problems in 'wrongful life' 
actions, see e.g. Liu, A.N.C., 'Wrongful Life: 
Some of the Problems' 1987 J . Med. Ethics 69; 
Symmons, C.R., 'Policy Factors in Actions for 
Wrongful Birth' M.L.R. 269 (1987)
20. Ison, T.G., The Forensic Lottery, London, Staples 
Press, 1967.
21. even despite the availability of legal aid; for 
recent discussion, see 'The Independent' 17 March 
1987, under the headline 'How to remove financial 
insult from injury'.
22. for further discussion, see Report of the Royal 
Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation for 
Personal Injury (Pearson Commission) Cmnd 
7054/1978.
23. see chapter 7, supra.
24. now governed by consolidating legislation in the
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25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32 .
33 . 
34.
Accident Compensation Act 1982.
for further discussion of these interpretational 
problems, see chapter 7, supra.; see also 
Mahoney, R., 'Informed Consent and Breach of the 
Medical Contract to Achieve a Particular Result: 
Opportunities for New Zealand's Latent Personal 
Injury Litigators to Peek out of the Accident 
Comoensation Closet' 6. Otago Law Review, no. 1, 
103 (1985); McLean, S.A.M., 'Liability Without
Fault - The New Zealand Experience' [1985] 
J.S.W.L. 125. 
loc.cit. 
at p. 105.
Unreported, High Court, Adminstrative Division, 
Hamilton, 25 July, 1985, 55/85, discussed by
Mahoney, loc.cit.
Re Priestly [1984] N.Z.A.C.R. 787. per Willis, J., 
at p. 789.
e.g. Robertson, G. , 'Informed Consent to Medical
Treatment' 97 L.Q.R. 102 (1981).
Tancredi, L., 'Competency for Informed Consent: 
Conceptual Limits of Empirical Data' 5 
International J. of Law and Psychiatry. 51, (1982) 
at p . 51.
loc.cit., particularly at p. 137.
Shultz, M.M., 'From Informed Consent to Patient 
Choice: A New Protected Interest' 9_5 Yale Law
Journal, 219 (1985).
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35.
36.
37.
38 .
39 .
40.
41.
42. 
43 . 
44. 
45 .
46.
47.
at p. 299
e.g. Thake v. Maurice [1984J 2 All E.R. 513, but
see also [1986J 1 All E.R. 497; Eyre v. Measday
[1986 J 1 All E.R. 488.
for discussion of contractual obligations see 
Walker, D.M., The Law of Delict in Scotland, (2nd 
Ed., revised), Edinburgh, W. Green & Son Ltd., 
1981; Weir, op.cit.
1914 S.C. 277
supra cit.
loc.cit., at p. 281
at p . 282
id.
Shultz, loc.cit., at p. 291.
for discussion, see Pearson Commission, supra cit. 
for analysis of a range of rights, many of which 
are intangible, e.g. the right to freedom of 
speech, see Campbell, et al., (eds) Human Rights: 
From Rhetoric to Reality. Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 
1986.
loc.cit.. at p. 278.
Thus, societies may infringe, on classical 
utilitarian lines, certain liberties if their 
exercise threatens others, in line with J.S. 
Mill's classic statement 'On Liberty' 6 (1873)
'...the sole end for which mankind are 
warranted... in interfering with the liberty of 
action of any of their number, is
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48 .
49 .
50.
51.
52 .
53 .
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
self-protection...the only part of the conduct of 
any one, for which he is amenable to society, is 
that which concerns others.'
c.f. Illich, I., Limits to Medicine. Medical
Nemesis: The_____Expropriation_____of_____Health,
Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1985 edition; 
Kennedy, I., The Unmasking of Medicine. London, 
George Allen & Unwin, 1981; Shultz, loc.cit. 
c.f. Walker, op.cit.; Rogers, W.V.H., Winfield 
and Jolowicz on Tort, (12th. Ed.), London, Sweet & 
Maxwell, 1984. 
supra cit. 
para 1371
for further discussion, see chapter 5, supra. 
even although the Constitution makes no specific 
reference to a privacy right, the use of the 
concept is common in both American courts and 
American academic writing.
c.f Shultz, loc.cit. , at p. 283 : 'Privacy torts
encompass both negligent and intentional conduct 
without being confined to one or the other, and 
this approach would also be appropriate for 
patient choice.' 
loc.cit. 
at p. 283. 
at pp. 283-284. 
at p. 284.
464 F 2d 772 (1972)
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60. 
61. 
62 . 
63 .
64.
65.
66 . 
67.
68 .
69.
70.
loc.cit.. at pp. 284-285. 
loc.cit., at p. 28 6 et seq. 
at p. 279.
loc.cit., at pp. 292-293
see chapter 6, supra; Campbell, et al., op.cit. 
c.f. Walker, op.cit.. at p. 30: '...new kinds of
torts have been, and may again be, recognised, but 
any such general proinciple as of liability for 
fault is open to many qualifications and 
objections. With a totally different history, 
and with modern cases still sometimes determined 
by historical factors, it can never be assumed 
that an English case apparently in point is a safe 
guide in a Scottish court, or that because the two 
systems reach the same or similar conclusions on a 
given set of facts, the underlying principles are 
the same.'
Sidaway v. Board of Governors. Bethlem Royal 
Hospital [1985] 1 All E.R. 643 (H.L.)
Stair. Institutions of the Law of Scotland. (2nd. 
Ed.)) University Presses of Edinburgh and Glasgow, 
1981 (Edition by Walker, D.M.)
for a general exposition of Stair's perspective, 
see Inst.1.1.
for discussion, see McLean, S.A.M.. ‘Ante-Natal 
Injuries' in McLean, S.A.M., (ed). Legal Issues in
Medicine. Aldershot, Gower, 1981.
Walker, op.cit.. at p. 29.
608
71. 
72 . 
73. 
74 .
75.
76.
77. 
78 .
79.
80. 
81. 
82 .
83 .
84 .
85 . 
86.
87.
88.
c.f. Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort, supra cit. 
op.cit., at p. 30. 
c.f. Walker, op.cit.
for discussion, see Walker, op.cit., at p. 20:
* In juria seems originally to have covered any 
wilful aggression of one individual on the person 
of another which did not cause any actual or 
material harm. Later it acquired the meaning of 
an actionable offence against the individual's 
personality, his person, dignity or reputation.' 
McKechnie, H. , 'Delict and Quasi-Delict' in An 
Introduction to Scottish Legal History, Edinburgh, 
The Stair Society, 1958. 
id.
Walker, op.cit., at p. 20.
Walker, op.cit., at p. 40.
Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary, 
for further discussion, see chapter 4, supra. 
see chapter 2, supra. 
see chapter 3, supra.
Walker, op.cit., at p. 31.
James, P.S., Introduction to English Law. (5th 
Ed.), London, Butterworths, 1962. 
op.cit., at p. 2 92.
Chatterton v. Gerson & Anor. [1981] 1 All E.R. 257.
op.cit., at p. 293.
Atiyah, P.S., Accidents, Compensation and the Law, 
(3rd. Ed.), London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1980
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(reprinted 1984)
89.- at p. 82.
90. this has been a long-standing debate; c.f.
Williams, G ., 'The Foundation of Tortious 
Liability' (1939) 7 Camb. L.J. Ill; Winfield,
'The Foundation of Liability in Tort' (1927) 27
Col. L. Rev. 3.
91. Williams, loc.cit., proposes a compromise, at
p.131: 'Why should we not settle the argument by
saying simply that there are some general rules 
creating liability... and some equally general 
rules exempting from liability...Between the two 
is a stretch of disputed territory, with the 
courts as an unbiased boundary commission.'
92. James, op.cit., at p. 2 94.
9 3. Stephen's Commentaries on the L aws of England,
(21st Ed.), Vol II, London, Butterworths, 1950.
94. see chapter 7, supra.
95. loc.cit., at p. 107.
96. [1984] 4 N.Z.A.R. 339.
97. [1984] N.Z.A.C.R. 783.
98. Re Priestly, supra cit. ^
99. see chapter 7, supra.
100. Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry on
Compensation for_Personal Injuries in New Zealand, 
(Government Printer, New Zealand) (1967).
101. for discussion, see chapter 7, supra
102. loc.cit., at p. 137.
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103. Stephen's Commentaries, supra cit., at p. 280. 
104; Atiyah, op.cit., at p. 38.
105. see chapter 4, supra.
106. supra cit.
107. Shultz, loc.cit., at pp. 298-299.
108. loc.cit.
109. Atiyah, op.cit., at p. 7.
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